A sign-in through the server's page kept its state and PKCE verifier in a
Map in the process that started it. With two replicas behind a balancer,
the callback reached the other one about half the time, and the person
saw "This sign-in didn't start in this browser". Sealed cookie sessions
(K-W1) let a signed-in session move between replicas; the sign-in itself
still couldn't.
The pending sign-in now travels in the state cookie the browser already
carried: <state>.<sealed record>, AES-256-GCM under a key derived from
APP_SECRET with its own label, opened under APP_SECRET_PREVIOUS too. The
callback checks the state inside the sealed record against the URL's.
Each sign-in is still good for one attempt: the callback deletes the
cookie, and the server takes each code once and only with that sign-in's
verifier. The 10,000-sign-in cap goes with the Map: nothing is held here
any more. The cookie is about 420 bytes and lives 10 minutes on
/api/auth only.