Sessions that work across replicas: SESSION_BACKEND=cookie #109
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+22
-2
@@ -44,14 +44,34 @@ SESSION_REMEMBER_TTL=2592000
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# instance does -- see IMMUTABLE below.
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SESSION_FILE=./data/sessions.json
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# Where sessions live. "memory" (default) is the above: this process, mirrored
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# to SESSION_FILE. "cookie" seals each session into its own cookie instead, so
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# any replica can serve it and a restart signs nobody out -- what running more
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# than one webmail replica (Kubernetes, say) needs. It requires APP_SECRET set
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# to the same value on every replica, and OAuth sign-in (OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET).
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# The cost: the Security page can't list or sign out your other sessions;
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# changing the password still signs out everywhere. Signing out revokes the
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# session's tokens at the mail server, so a copy of the cookie stops working;
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# that needs a server with token revocation (inbuxa-server 27.1 or later).
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# Against an older one, a copied cookie works until its tokens expire, and a
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# warning is logged at each sign-out. Use PUSH_MODE=relay with
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# several replicas: subscribe mode fans out only to tabs on the replica the
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# mail server calls back.
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# SESSION_BACKEND=memory
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# When rotating APP_SECRET in cookie mode: the old value(s), comma-separated.
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# Cookies sealed with them still open and are re-sealed with the new secret
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# on their next request. Drop them once SESSION_REMEMBER_TTL has passed.
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# APP_SECRET_PREVIOUS=
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# Assert that this instance is running as an immutable container: read-only
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# root filesystem, no durable state of its own. It is checked rather than
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# taken on trust -- the server refuses to start if SESSION_FILE is set, or if
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# the filesystem it is installed on turns out to be writable. Off by default.
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# Running one looks like:
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# docker run --read-only --tmpfs /tmp -e IMMUTABLE=1 -e SESSION_FILE= ...
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# The cost today is that a restart signs everyone out, since there is nowhere
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# left to keep the sessions. Removing that cost is what the OAuth work is for.
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# In memory mode a restart signs everyone out, since there is nowhere left to
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# keep the sessions; SESSION_BACKEND=cookie removes that cost.
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# IMMUTABLE=1
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# Upstream timeouts / limits
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+19
-3
@@ -17,9 +17,17 @@ import type { UpstreamSession } from "./upstream.js";
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export const MAX_ACCOUNTS = 5;
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/** A session cookie's shape: `id.secret`, both base64url. Anything else is dropped. */
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const COOKIE_SHAPE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,128}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,256}$/;
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/**
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* A session cookie's shape: `id.secret`, both base64url, or a cookie-mode
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* session `s1.<kid>.<sealed>` (sessions.ts). Anything else is dropped.
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*/
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const COOKIE_SHAPE = /^(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,128}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,256}|s1\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,1500})$/;
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const SEP = "~";
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/**
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* Browsers drop a cookie over about 4 KB. Cookie-mode sessions are several
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* hundred bytes each, so the list stops before it would pass this.
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*/
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const MAX_OTHERS_BYTES = 3800;
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export function parseOthers(value: string | undefined): string[] {
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if (!value) return [];
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@@ -35,7 +43,15 @@ export function parseOthers(value: string | undefined): string[] {
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}
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export function serializeOthers(cookies: string[]): string {
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return cookies.filter((c) => COOKIE_SHAPE.test(c)).slice(0, MAX_ACCOUNTS - 1).join(SEP);
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const out: string[] = [];
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let bytes = 0;
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for (const c of cookies.filter((c) => COOKIE_SHAPE.test(c)).slice(0, MAX_ACCOUNTS - 1)) {
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const add = c.length + (out.length ? SEP.length : 0);
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if (bytes + add > MAX_OTHERS_BYTES) break;
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out.push(c);
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bytes += add;
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}
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return out.join(SEP);
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}
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/**
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+67
-21
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import { config } from "./config.js";
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import { sourceDocument } from "./source.js";
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import { fetchPermissions } from "./permissionSchema.js";
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import { administrationAllowed, gateAdministration, grantsAdministration } from "./adminGate.js";
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import { SessionStore, accountKey, type SessionBackend, type LiveSession } from "./sessions.js";
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import { CookieSessionStore, SessionStore, accountKey, type SessionBackend, type LiveSession } from "./sessions.js";
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import { RateLimiter } from "./ratelimit.js";
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import { rateLimitKey, resolveClientIp } from "./clientip.js";
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import { safeEqual } from "./crypto.js";
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import {
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revokeAppPassword,
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} from "./account.js";
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import { imageProxyHandler } from "./imageproxy.js";
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import { SignInError, finish as finishSignIn, needsRefresh, oauthEnabled, passwordConfirms, refreshTokens, singleServer, start as startSignIn, type TokenSet } from "./oauth.js";
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import { SignInError, finish as finishSignIn, needsRefresh, oauthEnabled, passwordConfirms, refreshTokens, revokeTokens, singleServer, start as startSignIn, type TokenSet } from "./oauth.js";
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import { icsProxyHandler } from "./icsproxy.js";
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import { staticHandler } from "./static.js";
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import { mailNode, webmailNode } from "./nodes.js";
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@@ -51,7 +51,10 @@ import { ADD_REFUSED, MAX_ACCOUNTS, mayAddAccounts, parseOthers, serializeOthers
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type Env = { Variables: { session: LiveSession } };
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export const sessions: SessionBackend = new SessionStore(config.sessionFile);
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export const sessions: SessionBackend =
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config.sessionBackend === "cookie"
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? new CookieSessionStore(config.appSecret, config.appSecretPrevious)
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: new SessionStore(config.sessionFile);
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const loginLimiter = new RateLimiter(config.loginRateLimit, 15 * 60_000);
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/*
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* The backstop that is never refunded.
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@@ -236,11 +239,16 @@ const limitSmallBody = bodyLimit({ maxSize: MAX_SMALL_BODY, onError: (c) => c.js
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const smallBodies: MiddlewareHandler = (c, next) => (LARGE_BODY_ROUTE.test(c.req.path) ? next() : limitSmallBody(c, next));
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const requireSession: MiddlewareHandler<Env> = async (c, next) => {
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const cookie = getCookie(c, config.cookieName);
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let cookie = getCookie(c, config.cookieName);
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let session = sessions.resolve(cookie);
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if (session?.tokens && needsRefresh(session.tokens)) {
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try {
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session = await refreshSession(cookie!, session);
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const refreshed = await refreshSession(cookie!, session);
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session = refreshed?.session ?? null;
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if (refreshed && refreshed.cookie !== cookie) {
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cookie = refreshed.cookie;
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setSessionCookie(c, cookie, refreshed.session.remember);
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}
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} catch (err) {
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// Couldn't ask the server. The token may still have a few minutes; if
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// not, the call itself will say so.
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@@ -254,6 +262,9 @@ const requireSession: MiddlewareHandler<Env> = async (c, next) => {
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if (!session) {
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return c.json({ error: "unauthenticated" }, 401);
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}
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// inbuxa K-W1: the cookie backend slides expiry by re-issuing the cookie.
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const reissued = sessions.touch(cookie);
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if (reissued) setSessionCookie(c, reissued, session.remember);
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c.set("session", session);
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await next();
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};
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@@ -262,14 +273,14 @@ const requireSession: MiddlewareHandler<Env> = async (c, next) => {
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* One refresh per session at a time: a page opening does several requests at
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* once, and each would otherwise renew the same token.
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*/
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const refreshing = new Map<string, Promise<LiveSession | null>>();
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const refreshing = new Map<string, Promise<{ session: LiveSession; cookie: string } | null>>();
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/**
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* Renew an OAuth session's access token and keep the new one. Null when the
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* server refused the refresh token (a password change revokes it), which
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* ends the session.
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*/
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function refreshSession(cookie: string, session: LiveSession): Promise<LiveSession | null> {
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function refreshSession(cookie: string, session: LiveSession): Promise<{ session: LiveSession; cookie: string } | null> {
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let inFlight = refreshing.get(session.id);
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if (!inFlight) {
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inFlight = (async () => {
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@@ -279,8 +290,9 @@ function refreshSession(cookie: string, session: LiveSession): Promise<LiveSessi
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forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
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return null;
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}
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sessions.updateTokens(cookie, renewed);
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return sessions.resolve(cookie);
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const next = sessions.updateTokens(cookie, renewed);
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const live = next ? sessions.resolve(next) : null;
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return next && live ? { session: live, cookie: next } : null;
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})().finally(() => refreshing.delete(session.id));
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refreshing.set(session.id, inFlight);
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}
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@@ -355,6 +367,17 @@ function setOthersCookie(c: Context, cookies: string[]) {
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});
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}
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/**
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* inbuxa K-W1: put re-issued cookies of accounts not in front back into the
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* list. Only the cookie backend re-issues; the memory backend's cookies never
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* change, so this is then a no-op.
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*/
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function replaceOthers(c: Context, replaced: Map<string, string>) {
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if (!replaced.size) return;
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const current = parseOthers(getCookie(c, OTHERS_COOKIE));
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setOthersCookie(c, current.map((cookie) => replaced.get(cookie) ?? cookie));
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}
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/** The other accounts still signed in, in their order; ended ones are left out. */
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function liveOthers(c: Context): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession }[] {
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const out: { cookie: string; session: LiveSession }[] = [];
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@@ -768,13 +791,24 @@ export function createApp(basePath = config.basePath): Hono<Env> {
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}
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});
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// inbuxa K-W2: a signed-out session's tokens are revoked at the server, so
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// a copy of its cookie stops working (with cookie sessions there is nothing
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// here to delete)
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const endSession = async (session: LiveSession) => {
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sessions.destroy(session.id);
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forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
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if (session.tokens) {
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const revoked = await revokeTokens(upstreamFor(session.username), session.tokens);
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if (!revoked && !sessions.enumerable) {
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console.warn("[ihasmail] signed out, but the mail server didn't revoke the session's tokens; a copy of the cookie works until they expire");
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}
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}
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};
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api.post("/auth/logout", async (c) => {
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const cookie = getCookie(c, config.cookieName);
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const session = sessions.resolve(cookie);
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if (session) {
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sessions.destroy(session.id);
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forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
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}
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if (session) await endSession(session);
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// inbuxa MA-B: only this account ends; the next one comes to the front
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const [next, ...rest] = liveOthers(c);
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if (next) {
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@@ -790,11 +824,7 @@ export function createApp(basePath = config.basePath): Hono<Env> {
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/* inbuxa MA-B: every account signed in here ends. */
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api.post("/auth/logout-all", async (c) => {
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const front = sessions.resolve(getCookie(c, config.cookieName));
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for (const session of [front, ...liveOthers(c).map((o) => o.session)]) {
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if (!session) continue;
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sessions.destroy(session.id);
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forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
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}
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await Promise.all([front, ...liveOthers(c).map((o) => o.session)].filter((s): s is LiveSession => Boolean(s)).map(endSession));
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deleteCookie(c, config.cookieName, { path: cookiePath });
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deleteCookie(c, OTHERS_COOKIE, { path: cookiePath });
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return c.json({ ok: true });
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@@ -832,13 +862,18 @@ export function createApp(basePath = config.basePath): Hono<Env> {
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* several tabs may ask at once.
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*/
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api.get("/auth/accounts/unread", requireSession, async (c) => {
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const replaced = new Map<string, string>();
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const answers = await Promise.all(
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liveOthers(c).map(async ({ cookie, session }) => {
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const cached = unreadCache.get(session.id);
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if (cached && Date.now() - cached.at < UNREAD_CACHE_MS) return { id: session.id, unread: cached.unread };
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try {
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let live: LiveSession | null = session;
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if (live.tokens && needsRefresh(live.tokens)) live = await refreshSession(cookie, live);
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if (live.tokens && needsRefresh(live.tokens)) {
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const refreshed = await refreshSession(cookie, live);
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live = refreshed?.session ?? null;
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if (refreshed && refreshed.cookie !== cookie) replaced.set(cookie, refreshed.cookie);
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}
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if (!live) return { id: session.id, unread: null };
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const unread = await inboxUnread(live);
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unreadCache.set(session.id, { unread, at: Date.now() });
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@@ -848,6 +883,7 @@ export function createApp(basePath = config.basePath): Hono<Env> {
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}
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}),
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);
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replaceOthers(c, replaced);
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return c.json({ accounts: answers });
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});
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@@ -867,7 +903,11 @@ export function createApp(basePath = config.basePath): Hono<Env> {
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}
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const using = Array.isArray(body.using) ? body.using.filter((u): u is string => typeof u === "string") : [];
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let session: LiveSession | null = other.session;
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if (session.tokens && needsRefresh(session.tokens)) session = await refreshSession(other.cookie, session);
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if (session.tokens && needsRefresh(session.tokens)) {
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const refreshed = await refreshSession(other.cookie, session);
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session = refreshed?.session ?? null;
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if (refreshed && refreshed.cookie !== other.cookie) replaceOthers(c, new Map([[other.cookie, refreshed.cookie]]));
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}
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if (!session) return c.json({ error: "unauthenticated" }, 401);
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try {
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const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization, upstreamFor(session.username));
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@@ -903,11 +943,17 @@ export function createApp(basePath = config.basePath): Hono<Env> {
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api.get("/auth/sessions", requireSession, (c) => {
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const session = c.get("session");
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return c.json({ current: session.id, sessions: sessions.listForUser(session.account) });
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if (!sessions.enumerable) {
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// inbuxa K-W1: the cookie backend only knows the session presenting itself.
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const { authorization: _a, tokens: _t, account: _c, ...summary } = session;
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return c.json({ current: session.id, enumerable: false, sessions: [{ ...summary, userAgent: c.req.header("user-agent")?.slice(0, 200) ?? "" }] });
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}
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return c.json({ current: session.id, enumerable: true, sessions: sessions.listForUser(session.account) });
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});
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api.post("/auth/sessions/revoke-others", requireSession, (c) => {
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const session = c.get("session");
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if (!sessions.enumerable) return c.json({ error: "not_supported" }, 409);
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const n = sessions.destroyAllForUser(session.account, session.id);
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return c.json({ revoked: n });
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});
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@@ -47,6 +47,24 @@ function int(name: string, fallback: number): number {
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const isProd = process.env.NODE_ENV === "production";
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let appSecret = process.env.APP_SECRET ?? "";
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/*
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* inbuxa K-W1: where sessions live. "memory" (the default) keeps them in this
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* process, mirrored to SESSION_FILE when set. "cookie" seals the whole session
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* into the cookie, so any replica can serve it and nothing is kept here --
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* what running more than one webmail replica needs. Cookie mode signs in with
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* OAuth only and can't list or end other sessions (see sessions.ts).
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*/
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const sessionBackend = (process.env.SESSION_BACKEND ?? "memory").trim().toLowerCase();
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if (sessionBackend !== "memory" && sessionBackend !== "cookie") {
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throw new Error(`SESSION_BACKEND must be "memory" or "cookie", not "${sessionBackend}"`);
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}
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if (sessionBackend === "cookie" && (!appSecret || appSecret === "change-me")) {
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// An ephemeral secret would differ on every replica, so each would refuse
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// the others' cookies. Unlike memory mode there is no safe fallback.
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throw new Error("SESSION_BACKEND=cookie needs APP_SECRET set, and the same on every replica");
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}
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/** Secrets that sealed cookies before APP_SECRET was rotated; they still open, never seal. */
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const appSecretPrevious = (process.env.APP_SECRET_PREVIOUS ?? "").split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
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if (!appSecret || appSecret === "change-me") {
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if (isProd) {
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throw new Error("APP_SECRET must be set to a strong random value in production");
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@@ -271,6 +289,12 @@ const stalwartServers = readStalwartServers();
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* registered exactly.
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*/
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const oauthClientSecret = process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET ?? "";
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if (sessionBackend === "cookie" && !oauthClientSecret) {
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// A sealed password in a cookie can't be revoked: changing it would leave
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// the old cookie working wherever it was copied. OAuth tokens are revoked
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// by the server when the password changes.
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throw new Error("SESSION_BACKEND=cookie signs in with OAuth only: set OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET");
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}
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const publicUrl = process.env.PUBLIC_URL ? httpUrl(process.env.PUBLIC_URL, "PUBLIC_URL") : "";
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if (oauthClientSecret && !publicUrl) {
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throw new Error("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET is set but PUBLIC_URL is not: the sign-in redirect needs ihasmail's public address");
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@@ -352,6 +376,8 @@ export const config = {
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oauthClientId: env("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "ihasmail-inbuxa"),
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publicUrl,
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appSecret,
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appSecretPrevious,
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sessionBackend: sessionBackend as "memory" | "cookie",
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trustProxy: bool("TRUST_PROXY", true),
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/**
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* Peers whose X-Forwarded-* headers are believed. Empty falls back to
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Binary file not shown.
@@ -28,13 +28,18 @@ const base = () => `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}`;
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* C-23). Off by default, since the mock also serves password sign-in.
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*/
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export let basicRefused = false;
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/** Whether the metadata offers RFC 7009 revocation, as inbuxa-server 27.1 does. */
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export let revocationOffered = true;
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/** For tests: how long new access tokens last, and a way to end every token. */
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export const oauthMock = {
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setAccessTokenTtl(seconds: number) { accessTokenTtl = seconds; },
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expireAccessTokens() { for (const t of accessTokens.values()) t.expiresAt = 0; },
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refuseBasic(on: boolean) { basicRefused = on; },
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reset() { codes.clear(); accessTokens.clear(); refreshTokens.clear(); accessTokenTtl = 3600; basicRefused = false; },
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offerRevocation(on: boolean) { revocationOffered = on; },
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/** Tokens revoked so far, by RFC 7009. */
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revoked: [] as string[],
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reset() { codes.clear(); accessTokens.clear(); refreshTokens.clear(); accessTokenTtl = 3600; basicRefused = false; revocationOffered = true; oauthMock.revoked.length = 0; },
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};
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/** A bearer token the mock issued, still valid under the current password. */
|
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@@ -84,6 +89,7 @@ export async function handleOAuth(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, url
|
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issuer: base(),
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authorization_endpoint: `${base()}/login`,
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token_endpoint: `${base()}/auth/token`,
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...(revocationOffered ? { revocation_endpoint: `${base()}/auth/revoke` } : {}),
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grant_types_supported: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
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response_types_supported: ["code"],
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scopes_supported: ["openid", "offline_access"],
|
||||
@@ -137,6 +143,19 @@ export async function handleOAuth(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, url
|
||||
json(res, 200, { type: "authenticated", client_code: code, iss: base() });
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (url.pathname === "/auth/revoke" && req.method === "POST" && revocationOffered) {
|
||||
// RFC 7009: this client's secret, then the token goes, whatever it was
|
||||
const form = await readForm(req);
|
||||
if (form.get("client_id") !== OAUTH_CLIENT_ID || form.get("client_secret") !== OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET) {
|
||||
json(res, 401, { error: "invalid_client" });
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const token = form.get("token") ?? "";
|
||||
if (accessTokens.delete(token) || refreshTokens.delete(token)) oauthMock.revoked.push(token);
|
||||
res.writeHead(200);
|
||||
res.end();
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (url.pathname === "/auth/token" && req.method === "POST") {
|
||||
const form = await readForm(req);
|
||||
if (form.get("client_id") !== OAUTH_CLIENT_ID || form.get("client_secret") !== OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET) {
|
||||
|
||||
+43
-3
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@
|
||||
* Access tokens last an hour; `refreshTokens()` renews them before they run
|
||||
* out. A password change on the server revokes both tokens, which ends every
|
||||
* session holding them -- the safe result, and the one the web app is told
|
||||
* about.
|
||||
* about. Signing out revokes them too (`revokeTokens()`), where the server
|
||||
* offers RFC 7009 revocation, so a copy of the session cookie dies with it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Nothing here is taken from another client's implementation; the shapes are
|
||||
* RFC 6749, RFC 7636 and RFC 8414.
|
||||
* RFC 6749, RFC 7636, RFC 7009 and RFC 8414.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
|
||||
import { config } from "./config.js";
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ export interface TokenSet {
|
||||
interface Metadata {
|
||||
authorizationEndpoint: string;
|
||||
tokenEndpoint: string;
|
||||
/** RFC 7009; null on a server without it (inbuxa-server before 27.1). */
|
||||
revocationEndpoint: string | null;
|
||||
scopes: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ async function metadataFor(base: string): Promise<Metadata> {
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.upstreamTimeout),
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (!res.ok) throw new UpstreamError(`OAuth metadata request failed (${res.status})`, 502);
|
||||
const doc = (await res.json()) as { authorization_endpoint?: string; token_endpoint?: string; scopes_supported?: string[] };
|
||||
const doc = (await res.json()) as { authorization_endpoint?: string; token_endpoint?: string; revocation_endpoint?: string; scopes_supported?: string[] };
|
||||
if (!doc.authorization_endpoint || !doc.token_endpoint) {
|
||||
throw new UpstreamError("The mail server's OAuth metadata has no authorization or token endpoint", 502);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ async function metadataFor(base: string): Promise<Metadata> {
|
||||
authorizationEndpoint: new URL(doc.authorization_endpoint, base).toString(),
|
||||
// Where this process goes, so the configured route, like every other call.
|
||||
tokenEndpoint: absoluteUpstream(doc.token_endpoint, base),
|
||||
revocationEndpoint: doc.revocation_endpoint ? absoluteUpstream(doc.revocation_endpoint, base) : null,
|
||||
scopes: doc.scopes_supported ?? [],
|
||||
};
|
||||
metadataCache.set(base, { metadata, fetchedAt: Date.now() });
|
||||
@@ -237,6 +241,42 @@ async function tokenRequest(endpoint: string, fields: Record<string, string>): P
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* K-W2: revoke a signed-out session's tokens at the server, refresh token
|
||||
* first so no new access token can be minted while the access token goes.
|
||||
* With cookie sessions there is nothing here to delete, so this is what
|
||||
* makes a copy of the cookie stop working.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns whether both were revoked: false on a server without RFC 7009, or
|
||||
* one that couldn't be reached. Signing out never waits on more than that,
|
||||
* and never fails because of it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function revokeTokens(base: string, tokens: TokenSet): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
let endpoint: string | null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
endpoint = (await metadataFor(base)).revocationEndpoint;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!endpoint) return false;
|
||||
const revoke = async (token: string, hint: string) => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = await fetch(endpoint!, {
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", accept: "application/json" },
|
||||
body: new URLSearchParams({ token, token_type_hint: hint, client_id: config.oauthClientId, client_secret: config.oauthClientSecret }),
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.upstreamTimeout),
|
||||
});
|
||||
return res.ok;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
const refreshed = tokens.refresh ? await revoke(tokens.refresh, "refresh_token") : true;
|
||||
const accessed = await revoke(tokens.access, "access_token");
|
||||
return refreshed && accessed;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function needsRefresh(tokens: TokenSet, now = Date.now()): boolean {
|
||||
return tokens.expiresAt - now < REFRESH_MARGIN_MS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
||||
import { test } from "node:test";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import { CookieSessionStore, SessionStore } from "./sessions.js";
|
||||
import { parseOthers, serializeOthers } from "./accounts.js";
|
||||
|
||||
// Realistic sizes: server tokens are sealed structs of about 100 characters.
|
||||
const tokens = { access: "a".repeat(110), refresh: "r".repeat(110), expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600_000 };
|
||||
const params = { username: "[email protected]", account: "https://mail.example.com [email protected]", tokens, remember: true, userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0 ".repeat(20), ip: "192.0.2.1" };
|
||||
|
||||
test("cookie sessions resolve on any replica holding the same secret", () => {
|
||||
const a = new CookieSessionStore("shared-secret");
|
||||
const b = new CookieSessionStore("shared-secret");
|
||||
const { cookie, session } = a.create(params);
|
||||
const live = b.resolve(cookie);
|
||||
assert.ok(live);
|
||||
assert.equal(live!.id, session.id);
|
||||
assert.equal(live!.authorization, `Bearer ${tokens.access}`);
|
||||
assert.equal(live!.account, params.account);
|
||||
assert.equal(new CookieSessionStore("another-secret").resolve(cookie), null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("cookie sessions refuse tampered, foreign and expired cookies", () => {
|
||||
const store = new CookieSessionStore("s");
|
||||
const { cookie } = store.create(params);
|
||||
const [v, kid, sealed] = cookie.split(".");
|
||||
assert.equal(store.resolve(`${v}.${kid}.${sealed!.slice(0, -2)}AA`), null);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.resolve(`s2.${kid}.${sealed}`), null);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.resolve(`${cookie}.x`), null);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.resolve(undefined), null);
|
||||
const expired = new CookieSessionStore("s");
|
||||
const old = expired.create({ ...params, remember: false });
|
||||
const real = Date.now;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
Date.now = () => real() + 13 * 3600_000;
|
||||
assert.equal(expired.resolve(old.cookie), null);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
Date.now = real;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a cookie session stays small enough for five accounts", () => {
|
||||
const { cookie } = new CookieSessionStore("s").create(params);
|
||||
// The user agent and IP aren't carried: nothing lists them in this mode.
|
||||
assert.ok(cookie.length < 900, `cookie is ${cookie.length} bytes`);
|
||||
const others = Array.from({ length: 4 }, () => new CookieSessionStore("s").create(params).cookie);
|
||||
const value = serializeOthers(others);
|
||||
assert.ok(value.length < 3800);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(parseOthers(value), others);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("renewed tokens and sliding expiry re-issue the cookie", () => {
|
||||
const store = new CookieSessionStore("s");
|
||||
const { cookie } = store.create(params);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.touch(cookie), null, "fresh cookie stays");
|
||||
const renewed = { ...tokens, access: "b".repeat(110) };
|
||||
const next = store.updateTokens(cookie, renewed);
|
||||
assert.ok(next && next !== cookie);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.resolve(next!)!.authorization, `Bearer ${renewed.access}`);
|
||||
const real = Date.now;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
Date.now = () => real() + 120_000;
|
||||
const slid = store.touch(next!);
|
||||
assert.ok(slid);
|
||||
assert.ok(store.resolve(slid!)!.expiresAt > store.resolve(next!)!.expiresAt);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
Date.now = real;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rotating APP_SECRET: old cookies open and are re-sealed under the new key", () => {
|
||||
const before = new CookieSessionStore("old");
|
||||
const { cookie } = before.create(params);
|
||||
const after = new CookieSessionStore("new", ["old"]);
|
||||
assert.ok(after.resolve(cookie));
|
||||
const resealed = after.touch(cookie);
|
||||
assert.ok(resealed && resealed.split(".")[1] !== cookie.split(".")[1]);
|
||||
assert.ok(new CookieSessionStore("new").resolve(resealed!));
|
||||
assert.equal(new CookieSessionStore("new").resolve(cookie), null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("cookie sessions hold OAuth tokens only and can't enumerate", () => {
|
||||
const store = new CookieSessionStore("s");
|
||||
assert.throws(() => store.create({ username: "u", password: "p", remember: false, userAgent: "", ip: "" }));
|
||||
assert.equal(store.enumerable, false);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.reseal("x", "p"), false);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(store.listForUser("u"), []);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.destroyAllForUser("u"), 0);
|
||||
assert.equal(new SessionStore("").enumerable, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the memory store keeps its cookie across a token renewal", () => {
|
||||
const store = new SessionStore("");
|
||||
const { cookie } = store.create(params);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.updateTokens(cookie, { ...tokens, access: "c" }), cookie);
|
||||
assert.equal(store.touch(cookie), null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
+167
-5
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile, rename } from "node:fs/promises";
|
||||
import { dirname } from "node:path";
|
||||
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
|
||||
import { config } from "./config.js";
|
||||
import { deriveKey, open, randomToken, safeEqual, seal, sha256 } from "./crypto.js";
|
||||
import { cookieKey, deriveKey, open, randomToken, safeEqual, seal, sha256 } from "./crypto.js";
|
||||
import type { TokenSet } from "./oauth.js";
|
||||
|
||||
export interface StoredSession {
|
||||
@@ -107,13 +107,28 @@ export interface CreateSessionParams {
|
||||
* Stalwart's own token registry, which can already answer both questions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface SessionBackend {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether `listForUser` and `destroyAllForUser` can reach sessions other
|
||||
* than the one presenting itself. False for the cookie backend.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
readonly enumerable: boolean;
|
||||
init(): Promise<void>;
|
||||
close(): Promise<void>;
|
||||
create(params: CreateSessionParams): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession };
|
||||
resolve(cookie: string | undefined): LiveSession | null;
|
||||
reseal(cookie: string | undefined, password: string): boolean;
|
||||
/** Store renewed OAuth tokens in place of the ones the session holds. */
|
||||
updateTokens(cookie: string | undefined, tokens: TokenSet): boolean;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Store renewed OAuth tokens in place of the ones the session holds. Returns
|
||||
* the cookie to use from now on (the same one, for a backend that keeps the
|
||||
* record itself), or null when the cookie doesn't resolve.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
updateTokens(cookie: string | undefined, tokens: TokenSet): string | null;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A new cookie to send, when the backend wants this one re-issued (the
|
||||
* cookie backend's sliding expiry, or a cookie sealed under a retired key).
|
||||
* Null when the cookie stays as it is.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
touch(cookie: string | undefined): string | null;
|
||||
destroy(id: string): void;
|
||||
/** `account` is an `accountKey`, as carried on `LiveSession.account`. */
|
||||
destroyAllForUser(account: string, exceptId?: string): number;
|
||||
@@ -132,6 +147,7 @@ function sealable(username: string, params: { password?: string; tokens?: TokenS
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class SessionStore implements SessionBackend {
|
||||
readonly enumerable = true;
|
||||
private sessions = new Map<string, StoredSession>();
|
||||
private dirty = false;
|
||||
private saveTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
|
||||
@@ -274,8 +290,13 @@ export class SessionStore implements SessionBackend {
|
||||
return this.rewrite(cookie, (username) => ({ u: username, p: password }));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
updateTokens(cookie: string | undefined, tokens: TokenSet): boolean {
|
||||
return this.rewrite(cookie, (username) => ({ u: username, t: tokens }));
|
||||
updateTokens(cookie: string | undefined, tokens: TokenSet): string | null {
|
||||
return this.rewrite(cookie, (username) => ({ u: username, t: tokens })) ? cookie! : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Expiry slides in `resolve`, and the cookie itself never changes. */
|
||||
touch(_cookie: string | undefined): string | null {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private rewrite(cookie: string | undefined, next: (username: string) => Sealed): boolean {
|
||||
@@ -338,3 +359,144 @@ export class SessionStore implements SessionBackend {
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* inbuxa K-W1: sessions carried whole in the cookie, so that any replica can
|
||||
* serve a session it never issued and the webmail keeps no state of its own.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The cookie is `s1.<kid>.<sealed>`: the record below sealed with AES-256-GCM
|
||||
* under a key derived from APP_SECRET (`cookieKey`), `kid` naming that key.
|
||||
* APP_SECRET_PREVIOUS keys still open cookies, and a cookie opened with one is
|
||||
* re-sealed under the current key on its next request (`touch`).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* What it can't do, by construction: list a user's other sessions or end
|
||||
* them, so `enumerable` is false and the UI hides both. Ending this session is
|
||||
* deleting the cookie; the server revokes the tokens behind every session when
|
||||
* the password changes. Password sessions aren't offered at all (config.ts
|
||||
* refuses cookie mode without OAuth): a sealed password couldn't be revoked.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const COOKIE_V1 = "s1";
|
||||
|
||||
/** The sealed record. Short keys: it travels on every request. */
|
||||
interface CookieRecord {
|
||||
i: string; // session id
|
||||
u: string; // username
|
||||
a: string; // accountKey
|
||||
t: TokenSet;
|
||||
c: number; // createdAt
|
||||
l: number; // lastSeenAt
|
||||
e: number; // expiresAt
|
||||
r: boolean; // remember
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class CookieSessionStore implements SessionBackend {
|
||||
readonly enumerable = false;
|
||||
private readonly keys: { kid: string; key: Buffer }[];
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(appSecret: string, previous: string[] = []) {
|
||||
this.keys = [appSecret, ...previous].map(cookieKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async init(): Promise<void> {}
|
||||
async close(): Promise<void> {}
|
||||
|
||||
create(params: CreateSessionParams): { cookie: string; session: LiveSession } {
|
||||
if (!params.tokens) throw new Error("cookie sessions hold OAuth tokens only");
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
const record: CookieRecord = {
|
||||
i: randomToken(18),
|
||||
u: params.username,
|
||||
a: params.account ?? params.username.trim().toLowerCase(),
|
||||
t: params.tokens,
|
||||
c: now,
|
||||
l: now,
|
||||
e: now + this.ttl(params.remember),
|
||||
r: params.remember,
|
||||
};
|
||||
return { cookie: this.seal(record), session: this.toLive(record) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resolve(cookie: string | undefined): LiveSession | null {
|
||||
const opened = this.open(cookie);
|
||||
return opened ? this.toLive(opened.record) : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
touch(cookie: string | undefined): string | null {
|
||||
const opened = this.open(cookie);
|
||||
if (!opened) return null;
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
const stale = now - opened.record.l > 60_000;
|
||||
if (!stale && opened.current) return null;
|
||||
if (stale) {
|
||||
opened.record.l = now;
|
||||
opened.record.e = now + this.ttl(opened.record.r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return this.seal(opened.record);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Cookie sessions hold no password to re-seal. */
|
||||
reseal(_cookie: string | undefined, _password: string): boolean {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
updateTokens(cookie: string | undefined, tokens: TokenSet): string | null {
|
||||
const opened = this.open(cookie);
|
||||
if (!opened) return null;
|
||||
opened.record.t = tokens;
|
||||
return this.seal(opened.record);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Nothing is kept here: the caller deletes the cookie. */
|
||||
destroy(_id: string): void {}
|
||||
|
||||
destroyAllForUser(_account: string, _exceptId?: string): number {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
listForUser(_account: string): SessionSummary[] {
|
||||
return [];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private ttl(remember: boolean): number {
|
||||
return (remember ? config.sessionRememberTtl : config.sessionTtl) * 1000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private seal(record: CookieRecord): string {
|
||||
const { kid, key } = this.keys[0]!;
|
||||
return `${COOKIE_V1}${COOKIE_SEP}${kid}${COOKIE_SEP}${seal(JSON.stringify(record), key)}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private open(cookie: string | undefined): { record: CookieRecord; current: boolean } | null {
|
||||
if (!cookie) return null;
|
||||
const [version, kid, sealed, extra] = cookie.split(COOKIE_SEP);
|
||||
if (version !== COOKIE_V1 || !kid || !sealed || extra !== undefined) return null;
|
||||
const at = this.keys.findIndex((k) => k.kid === kid);
|
||||
if (at < 0) return null;
|
||||
const json = open(sealed, this.keys[at]!.key);
|
||||
if (!json) return null;
|
||||
let record: CookieRecord;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
record = JSON.parse(json) as CookieRecord;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (typeof record.e !== "number" || record.e <= Date.now() || !record.t?.access) return null;
|
||||
return { record, current: at === 0 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private toLive(r: CookieRecord): LiveSession {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
id: r.i,
|
||||
username: r.u,
|
||||
account: r.a,
|
||||
authorization: `Bearer ${r.t.access}`,
|
||||
tokens: r.t,
|
||||
remember: r.r,
|
||||
createdAt: r.c,
|
||||
lastSeenAt: r.l,
|
||||
expiresAt: r.e,
|
||||
userAgent: "",
|
||||
ip: "",
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
import { test, after, beforeEach } from "node:test";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* inbuxa K-W2: signing out revokes the session's tokens at the server. With
|
||||
* cookie sessions there is nothing on this side to delete, so the revocation
|
||||
* is what makes a copy of the cookie stop working.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const PORT = 18821;
|
||||
process.env.MOCK_PORT = String(PORT);
|
||||
process.env.MOCK_USER = "[email protected]";
|
||||
process.env.MOCK_PASS = "demo-password";
|
||||
process.env.MAIL_SERVER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}`;
|
||||
process.env.APP_SECRET = "test-secret-for-signout-revoke";
|
||||
process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET = "mock-oauth-secret";
|
||||
process.env.PUBLIC_URL = "https://webmail.example.test";
|
||||
process.env.SESSION_BACKEND = "cookie";
|
||||
|
||||
const mock = await import("./mock/index.js");
|
||||
const { oauthMock } = await import("./mock/oauth.js");
|
||||
const { createApp, sessions } = await import("./app.js");
|
||||
const { resetOAuthState } = await import("./oauth.js");
|
||||
|
||||
const app = createApp();
|
||||
|
||||
async function call(path: string, cookie?: string, init: RequestInit = {}) {
|
||||
return app.request(path, {
|
||||
...init,
|
||||
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "x-requested-with": "ihasmail", ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}) },
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function cookieFrom(res: Response, name: string): string | undefined {
|
||||
for (const header of res.headers.getSetCookie()) {
|
||||
const pair = header.split(";")[0]!;
|
||||
if (pair.startsWith(`${name}=`)) return pair.slice(name.length + 1) || undefined;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return undefined;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Sign in on the mock's page; returns the session cookie as a Cookie header. */
|
||||
async function signIn(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const start = await call("/api/auth/oauth/start?username=demo%40example.com&remember=1");
|
||||
assert.equal(start.status, 302);
|
||||
const state = cookieFrom(start, "ihm_session_signin");
|
||||
const approved = await fetch(new URL(start.headers.get("location")!), { redirect: "manual" });
|
||||
const back = new URL(approved.headers.get("location")!);
|
||||
const res = await call(`/api/auth/callback${back.search}`, state ? `ihm_session_signin=${state}` : undefined);
|
||||
assert.equal(res.status, 302);
|
||||
const session = cookieFrom(res, "ihm_session");
|
||||
assert.ok(session, "a session cookie was set");
|
||||
assert.ok(session!.startsWith("s1."), "a sealed cookie session");
|
||||
return `ihm_session=${session}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
oauthMock.reset();
|
||||
resetOAuthState();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
after(() => {
|
||||
(mock as { server?: { close(): void } }).server?.close();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("after sign-out, a copy of the old cookie gets 401", async () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(sessions.enumerable, false, "cookie sessions");
|
||||
const copy = await signIn();
|
||||
assert.equal((await call("/api/auth/session", copy)).status, 200);
|
||||
|
||||
const out = await call("/api/auth/logout", copy, { method: "POST" });
|
||||
assert.equal(out.status, 200);
|
||||
assert.equal(oauthMock.revoked.length, 2, "the refresh and the access token were revoked");
|
||||
|
||||
assert.equal((await call("/api/auth/session", copy)).status, 401, "the copied cookie is dead");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("signing out of every account revokes each one's tokens", async () => {
|
||||
const copy = await signIn();
|
||||
const out = await call("/api/auth/logout-all", copy, { method: "POST" });
|
||||
assert.equal(out.status, 200);
|
||||
assert.equal(oauthMock.revoked.length, 2);
|
||||
assert.equal((await call("/api/auth/session", copy)).status, 401);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a server without revocation still signs out", async () => {
|
||||
oauthMock.offerRevocation(false);
|
||||
const copy = await signIn();
|
||||
const out = await call("/api/auth/logout", copy, { method: "POST" });
|
||||
assert.equal(out.status, 200, "sign-out doesn't fail");
|
||||
assert.equal(oauthMock.revoked.length, 0);
|
||||
// What revocation is for: without it, the copy works until its tokens expire
|
||||
assert.equal((await call("/api/auth/session", copy)).status, 200);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1096,6 +1096,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "Sie sind als {user} angemeldet. Ihr Passwort wird nie im Browser gespeichert; der Server hält es pro Sitzung verschlüsselt vor, um mit dem Mailserver zu kommunizieren.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "App-Passwörter werden von Ihrer Mail-Administration verwaltet.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Wenn Sie Ihr Passwort ändern, werden Ihre anderen Webmail-Sitzungen abgemeldet. App-Passwörter funktionieren weiterhin.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Diese Webmail kann Ihre anderen Sitzungen nicht auflisten. Wenn Sie Ihr Passwort ändern, werden Sie überall abgemeldet.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "F\u00fcr dieses Konto ist die Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung aktiviert. {app} kann Sie noch nicht per Code anmelden; die Anmeldung auf einem anderen Ger\u00e4t ben\u00f6tigt daher ein App-Passwort \u2014 oder Sie deaktivieren die Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung hier.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Ein eigenes Passwort für ein E-Mail-Programm oder Gerät, das Sie einzeln widerrufen können. App-Passwörter umgehen Zwei-Faktor-Codes und funktionieren daher auch in Programmen, die keinen abfragen können.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Übertragen Sie es jetzt nach {name} — es wird nicht erneut angezeigt.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1158,6 +1158,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "Ha iniciado sesión como {user}. Su contraseña nunca se guarda en el navegador; el servidor la conserva cifrada por sesión para comunicarse con el servidor de correo.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "Las contraseñas de aplicación las gestiona su administrador de correo.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Cambiar la contraseña cierra sus demás sesiones de webmail. Las contraseñas de aplicación siguen funcionando.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Este webmail no puede mostrar tus otras sesiones. Si cambias la contraseña, se cerrará tu sesión en todas partes.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "Esta cuenta tiene activada la autenticaci\u00f3n en dos pasos. {app} todav\u00eda no puede iniciar su sesi\u00f3n con un c\u00f3digo, as\u00ed que iniciar sesi\u00f3n en otro dispositivo requiere una contrase\u00f1a de aplicaci\u00f3n; o puede desactivar aqu\u00ed la autenticaci\u00f3n en dos pasos.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Una contraseña aparte para una aplicación de correo o un dispositivo, que puede revocar por separado. Las contraseñas de aplicación se saltan los códigos de dos pasos, así que siguen funcionando en aplicaciones que no pueden pedir uno.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Cópiela ahora en {name}: no se volverá a mostrar.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1163,6 +1163,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "Vous êtes connecté en tant que {user}. Votre mot de passe n’est jamais stocké dans le navigateur ; le serveur le conserve chiffré, par session, pour communiquer avec le serveur de messagerie.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "Les mots de passe d'application sont gérés par votre administrateur de messagerie.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Changer votre mot de passe déconnecte vos autres sessions webmail. Les mots de passe d'application continuent de fonctionner.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Ce webmail ne peut pas afficher vos autres sessions. Changer votre mot de passe vous déconnecte partout.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "L'authentification \u00e0 deux facteurs est activ\u00e9e sur ce compte. {app} ne sait pas encore vous connecter avec un code : la connexion sur un autre appareil n\u00e9cessite donc un mot de passe d'application \u2014 ou vous pouvez d\u00e9sactiver l'authentification \u00e0 deux facteurs ici.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Un mot de passe distinct pour une application ou un appareil, révocable indépendamment. Les mots de passe d'application contournent les codes à deux facteurs et fonctionnent donc dans les applications qui ne peuvent pas en demander.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Copiez-le dans {name} maintenant — il ne sera plus affiché.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1111,6 +1111,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "{user} としてサインインしています。パスワードがブラウザーに保存されることはありません。メールサーバーとの通信用に、サーバーがセッションごとに暗号化して保持します。",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "アプリパスワードはメール管理者が管理しています。",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "パスワードを変更すると、他のウェブメールのセッションはサインアウトされます。アプリパスワードはそのまま使えます。",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "このWebメールでは他のセッションを一覧表示できません。パスワードを変更すると、すべての場所からサインアウトされます。",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "\u3053\u306e\u30a2\u30ab\u30a6\u30f3\u30c8\u3067\u306f 2 \u6bb5\u968e\u8a8d\u8a3c\u304c\u6709\u52b9\u3067\u3059\u3002{app} \u306f\u307e\u3060\u78ba\u8a8d\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9\u3067\u306e\u30b5\u30a4\u30f3\u30a4\u30f3\u306b\u5bfe\u5fdc\u3057\u3066\u3044\u306a\u3044\u305f\u3081\u3001\u4ed6\u306e\u30c7\u30d0\u30a4\u30b9\u304b\u3089\u30b5\u30a4\u30f3\u30a4\u30f3\u3059\u308b\u306b\u306f\u30a2\u30d7\u30ea\u30d1\u30b9\u30ef\u30fc\u30c9\u304c\u5fc5\u8981\u3067\u3059\u3002\u3053\u3053\u3067 2 \u6bb5\u968e\u8a8d\u8a3c\u3092\u30aa\u30d5\u306b\u3059\u308b\u3053\u3068\u3082\u3067\u304d\u307e\u3059\u3002",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "メールアプリやデバイスごとに用意する別のパスワードで、単独で無効化できます。アプリパスワードは 2 段階認証の確認コードを省くため、コードを入力できないアプリでも使えます。",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "いま {name} にコピーしてください。二度と表示されません。",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1158,6 +1158,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "U bent ingelogd als {user}. Uw wachtwoord wordt nooit in de browser opgeslagen; de server bewaart het versleuteld per sessie om met de mailserver te communiceren.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "App-wachtwoorden worden beheerd door uw mailbeheerder.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Als u uw wachtwoord wijzigt, worden uw andere webmailsessies afgemeld. App-wachtwoorden blijven werken.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Deze webmail kan je andere sessies niet tonen. Als je je wachtwoord wijzigt, word je overal afgemeld.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "Voor dit account staat tweefactorauthenticatie aan. {app} kan u nog niet met een code inloggen, dus inloggen op een ander apparaat vereist een app-wachtwoord \u2014 of u schakelt tweefactorauthenticatie hier uit.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Een apart wachtwoord voor een e-mail app of apparaat, dat u afzonderlijk kunt intrekken. App-wachtwoorden omzeilen tweestapsverificatie, zodat ze blijven werken in apps die hier niet om kunnen vragen.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Neem het nu over in {name} — het wordt niet opnieuw getoond.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1161,6 +1161,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "Você entrou como {user}. Sua senha nunca é guardada no navegador; o servidor a mantém criptografada por sessão para se comunicar com o servidor de e-mail.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "As senhas de aplicativo são gerenciadas pelo seu administrador de e-mail.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Mudar sua senha encerra suas outras sessões de webmail. As senhas de aplicativo continuam funcionando.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Este webmail não consegue listar suas outras sessões. Alterar a senha encerra sua sessão em todos os lugares.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "Esta conta est\u00e1 com a autentica\u00e7\u00e3o em duas etapas ativada. O {app} ainda n\u00e3o consegue conectar voc\u00ea com um c\u00f3digo, ent\u00e3o entrar em outro dispositivo exige uma senha de aplicativo \u2014 ou voc\u00ea pode desativar a autentica\u00e7\u00e3o em duas etapas aqui.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Uma senha separada para um aplicativo de e-mail ou dispositivo, que você pode revogar sozinha. As senhas de aplicativo dispensam os códigos de duas etapas, então continuam funcionando em aplicativos que não conseguem pedir um.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Copie-a para {name} agora — ela não será mostrada de novo.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1160,6 +1160,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "Вы вошли как {user}. Пароль никогда не хранится в браузере; сервер хранит его в зашифрованном виде для каждого сеанса, чтобы обращаться к почтовому серверу.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "Паролями приложений управляет ваш почтовый администратор.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Смена пароля завершает остальные сеансы веб-почты. Пароли приложений продолжают работать.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Эта веб-почта не может показать ваши другие сеансы. При смене пароля вы выйдете из системы везде.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "\u0414\u043b\u044f \u044d\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0443\u0447\u0451\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0438 \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445\u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f. {app} \u043f\u043e\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0435 \u0443\u043c\u0435\u0435\u0442 \u0432\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0443, \u043f\u043e\u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u043c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435 \u043d\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d \u043f\u0430\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u2014 \u043b\u0438\u0431\u043e \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445\u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0443\u044e \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e \u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0437\u0434\u0435\u0441\u044c.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Отдельный пароль для почтовой программы или устройства, который можно отозвать по отдельности. Пароли приложений обходят двухфакторные коды и поэтому работают там, где запросить код невозможно.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Скопируйте его в {name} сейчас — больше он не показывается.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"Change this event?": "Bu etkinlik değiştirilsin mi?",
|
||||
"Change your own password in {settings}.": "Kendi şifrenizi {settings} bölümünden değiştirin.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Şifrenizi değiştirmek diğer webmail oturumlarınızı kapatır. Varsa uygulama şifreleriniz çalışmaya devam eder.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Bu web postası diğer oturumlarınızı listeleyemez. Parolanızı değiştirmek her yerde oturumunuzu kapatır.",
|
||||
"Check for new shares": "Yeni paylaşımları kontrol et",
|
||||
"Checking what is still in this tenant…": "Bu kiracıda hâlâ nelerin bulunduğu kontrol ediliyor…",
|
||||
"Choose a calendar": "Bir takvim seçin",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "Ви ввійшли як {user}. Пароль ніколи не зберігається в браузері; сервер зберігає його зашифрованим для кожного сеансу, щоб звертатися до поштового сервера.",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "Паролями програм керує ваш поштовий адміністратор.",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "Зміна пароля завершує інші сеанси вебпошти. Паролі програм продовжують працювати.",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "Ця веб-пошта не може показати ваші інші сеанси. Зміна пароля завершить ваші сеанси всюди.",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0446\u044c\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0443 \u0443\u0432\u0456\u043c\u043a\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043e \u0434\u0432\u043e\u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0443 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0456\u044e. {app} \u043f\u043e\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0435 \u0432\u043c\u0456\u0454 \u0432\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c, \u0442\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0443 \u043d\u0430 \u0456\u043d\u0448\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0457 \u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0431\u0435\u043d \u043f\u0430\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u2014 \u0430\u0431\u043e \u0434\u0432\u043e\u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0443 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0456\u044e \u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u043c\u043a\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0438 \u0442\u0443\u0442.",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "Окремий пароль для поштової програми чи пристрою, який можна відкликати окремо. Паролі програм обходять двофакторні коди й тому працюють там, де запитати код неможливо.",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "Скопіюйте його до {name} зараз — більше він не показується.",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1110,6 +1110,7 @@ export const catalog: Catalog = {
|
||||
"You're signed in as {user}. Your password is never stored in the browser; the server keeps it encrypted per-session for talking to the mail server.": "您已以 {user} 身份登录。您的密码从不保存在浏览器中;服务器会按会话加密保存它,用于与邮件服务器通信。",
|
||||
"App passwords are managed by your mail administrator.": "应用专用密码由您的邮件管理员管理。",
|
||||
"Changing your password signs out your other webmail sessions. Any app passwords keep working.": "更改密码会让您的其他网页邮箱会话退出登录。已有的应用专用密码仍可继续使用。",
|
||||
"This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.": "此网页邮箱无法列出您的其他会话。更改密码会让您在所有地方退出登录。",
|
||||
"This account has two-factor authentication on. {app} can't sign you in with a code yet, so signing in on another device needs an app password \u2014 or you can turn two-factor authentication off here.": "\u6b64\u8d26\u6237\u5df2\u5f00\u542f\u4e24\u6b65\u9a8c\u8bc1\u3002{app} \u76ee\u524d\u8fd8\u4e0d\u80fd\u901a\u8fc7\u9a8c\u8bc1\u7801\u767b\u5f55\uff0c\u56e0\u6b64\u5728\u5176\u4ed6\u8bbe\u5907\u4e0a\u767b\u5f55\u9700\u8981\u4f7f\u7528\u5e94\u7528\u4e13\u7528\u5bc6\u7801\u2014\u2014\u60a8\u4e5f\u53ef\u4ee5\u5728\u8fd9\u91cc\u5173\u95ed\u4e24\u6b65\u9a8c\u8bc1\u3002",
|
||||
"A separate password for a mail app or device, which you can revoke on its own. App passwords skip two-factor codes, so they keep working in apps that can't ask for one.": "为某个邮件应用或设备单独设置的密码,可以单独吊销。应用专用密码会跳过两步验证码,因此在无法输入验证码的应用中仍然可用。",
|
||||
"Copy it into {name} now — it isn't shown again.": "请立即把它复制到 {name}——它不会再次显示。",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +43,9 @@ export function SecuritySettings() {
|
||||
const logout = useSession((s) => s.logout);
|
||||
const appName = useAppName();
|
||||
|
||||
const load = () => apiFetch<{ current: string; sessions: SessionRow[] }>("/api/auth/sessions").then((r) => { setRows(r.sessions); setCurrent(r.current); }).catch(() => setRows([]));
|
||||
/* inbuxa K-W1: false when sessions live in their cookies and can't be listed or ended from here. */
|
||||
const [enumerable, setEnumerable] = useState(true);
|
||||
const load = () => apiFetch<{ current: string; enumerable?: boolean; sessions: SessionRow[] }>("/api/auth/sessions").then((r) => { setRows(r.sessions); setCurrent(r.current); setEnumerable(r.enumerable !== false); }).catch(() => setRows([]));
|
||||
|
||||
const loadSecurity = useCallback(async () => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
@@ -120,8 +122,9 @@ export function SecuritySettings() {
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
{!enumerable && <p className="hint">{t("This webmail can't list your other sessions. Changing your password signs you out everywhere.")}</p>}
|
||||
<div className="row mt-16">
|
||||
<button className="btn" onClick={async () => { if (await confirmDialog({ title: t("Sign out other sessions?"), confirmLabel: t("Sign out others") })) { const r = await apiFetch<{ revoked: number }>("/api/auth/sessions/revoke-others", { method: "POST" }); toast.success(plural(r.revoked, { one: "Signed out {n} other session", other: "Signed out {n} other sessions" })); void load(); } }}>{t("Sign out all other sessions")}</button>
|
||||
{enumerable && <button className="btn" onClick={async () => { if (await confirmDialog({ title: t("Sign out other sessions?"), confirmLabel: t("Sign out others") })) { const r = await apiFetch<{ revoked: number }>("/api/auth/sessions/revoke-others", { method: "POST" }); toast.success(plural(r.revoked, { one: "Signed out {n} other session", other: "Signed out {n} other sessions" })); void load(); } }}>{t("Sign out all other sessions")}</button>}
|
||||
<button className="btn btn-ghost" onClick={() => void logout()}>{t("Sign out here")}</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user