Version 2026.11.17 #416

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jcoffey-dev merged 1 commits from release/version-2026.11.17 into release/2026 2026-11-17 17:15:41 +00:00
2 changed files with 53 additions and 1 deletions

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@@ -11,6 +11,58 @@ https://github.com/inbuxa/inbuxa-server/security/advisories.
Every version PR adds that version's entry here. CI refuses a version this
file has no entry for (`tools/release/changelog-check.py`).
## [2026.11.17] - 2026-11-17
2 security fixes from a private review of the server (1 medium, 1 low), four
hardening changes, and two DNS fixes from 27.1. All versions up to and
including 2026.11.11, and 27.1-rc.1 to 27.1-rc.26, are affected. The same
fixes are in 27.1-rc.27 for the 27.1 series.
### Security
Medium
- HTTP: behind a reverse proxy, a client could choose its own address. With
forwarding headers trusted, the server read RFC 7239 `Forwarded` before
`X-Forwarded-For`, so a proxy that writes only `X-Forwarded-For` passed a
client's own `Forwarded` header through. It now reads one header,
`X-Forwarded-For` unless `INBUXA_HTTP_FORWARDED_HEADER=forwarded`, and a
loopback address in it counts as this host only when every hop after it
is loopback too. (GHSA-hxp3-8c95-4q5v, #414)
Low
- Multi-tenant: a tenant administrator could download any blob by its hash.
Inside a tenant, `fetchAnyBlob` now reaches only blobs the tenant holds:
linked by one of its accounts, or in a queued message the tenant sees.
Tenant queue downloads keep working. (GHSA-x596-5p95-2rm3, #414)
Hardening
- TLS: rustls-webpki 0.103.17, webpki-roots 1.0.12 and webpki-root-certs
1.0.12 stop trusting the distrusted emSign intermediates
(RUSTSEC-2026-0381, RUSTSEC-2026-0382, RUSTSEC-2026-0383).
- Tenants: no tenant policy grants writing system Sieve scripts, which can
run programs as the server's user.
- OAuth: with `requireClientRegistration` off (it's on by default), a client
nobody registered must use PKCE (S256) and may only redirect to a loopback
address or a private-use scheme (RFC 8252).
- Downloads: a requested type that isn't a valid header value falls back to
`application/octet-stream`, and a response with a bad header value is a
500 instead of a dropped connection.
These came from a private security review; thanks to its author.
### Fixed
- Deliverability: Check now skips the DNS caches, so a check right after a
DNS change shows the new state. (#388, from #387)
- Automatic DNS: adding a record type to `publishRecords` on a domain already
set to Automatic now publishes it. (#390, from #389)
### Upgrading
- If your reverse proxy sends only RFC 7239 `Forwarded`, set
`INBUXA_HTTP_FORWARDED_HEADER=forwarded`; otherwise client addresses read
as the proxy's. nginx, Caddy and Traefik send `X-Forwarded-For` and need
nothing.
- With `requireClientRegistration` off, a web application signing in by
OAuth has to be registered now.
## [2026.11.11] - 2026-11-11
1 security fix from our own review of the server (high), covering two gaps in
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@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ fn legacy_setting(name: &str, is_set: impl Fn(&str) -> bool) -> Option<String> {
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! brand_version {
() => {
"2026.11.11"
"2026.11.17"
};
}