Design note for #484 (client access through the relay). Spec only, nothing built, not approved.
Revised 11-21 after the t/340 discussion to cover two modes, chosen per port. Pass-through (the default, built first) never ends client TLS, so the relay sees no password, token or content. Terminating ends TLS at the relay and sends the server only requests it has parsed and rebuilt, so a parser exploit lands on the relay instead of the server. To keep that box worth trusting: no password sign-in through it, sessions bound to the relay's generation, its certificate key made on the relay, nothing kept on disk, a worker per connection, and a quarantine that the console or an outside monitor (Cairn OBS first) can trigger, followed by a clean rebuild.
Thirteen open questions at the end of the file, each with a recommended answer.
Design note for #484 (client access through the relay). Spec only, nothing built, not approved.
Revised 11-21 after the t/340 discussion to cover two modes, chosen per port. Pass-through (the default, built first) never ends client TLS, so the relay sees no password, token or content. Terminating ends TLS at the relay and sends the server only requests it has parsed and rebuilt, so a parser exploit lands on the relay instead of the server. To keep that box worth trusting: no password sign-in through it, sessions bound to the relay's generation, its certificate key made on the relay, nothing kept on disk, a worker per connection, and a quarantine that the console or an outside monitor (Cairn OBS first) can trigger, followed by a clean rebuild.
Thirteen open questions at the end of the file, each with a recommended answer.
Pass-through only: the relay reads the TLS name to route and filter and
never ends a client's TLS, so it never sees a password, token or message.
Covers ports, the stream pool, targets chosen by the downstream, PROXY v2
for the client's address, CAA accounturi against a relay-issued
certificate, DNS, limits and blocked addresses, footprint, tests, and seven
open questions with recommended answers. Not approved, not scheduled.
Adds a terminating mode alongside pass-through, chosen per port: requests
are parsed and rebuilt at the relay so a parser exploit lands there, with
no password sign-in, sessions bound to a relay generation, the certificate
key made on the relay, nothing kept, a worker per connection, and a
quarantine that outside monitors can trigger. Open questions redone.
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Design note for #484 (client access through the relay). Spec only, nothing built, not approved.
Revised 11-21 after the t/340 discussion to cover two modes, chosen per port. Pass-through (the default, built first) never ends client TLS, so the relay sees no password, token or content. Terminating ends TLS at the relay and sends the server only requests it has parsed and rebuilt, so a parser exploit lands on the relay instead of the server. To keep that box worth trusting: no password sign-in through it, sessions bound to the relay's generation, its certificate key made on the relay, nothing kept on disk, a worker per connection, and a quarantine that the console or an outside monitor (Cairn OBS first) can trigger, followed by a clean rebuild.
Thirteen open questions at the end of the file, each with a recommended answer.
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