Client gateway: JMAP/webmail access over the relay's outbound link #484

Open
opened 2026-11-19 16:51:42 +00:00 by jcoffey-dev · 1 comment
Owner

Idea from a reader on LinkedIn: carry client access over the relay's outbound link the same way inbuxa-relay carries MTA traffic, so a server at home or in an office can be reached from outside with no open ports and no VPN.

The catch is where TLS ends. To filter IMAP/JMAP at the edge the gateway has to terminate TLS, and then a compromised gateway sees every password and every message read through it, which the MTA relay never has to. Passing TLS straight through avoids that, but then it's a plain tunnel, and generic tunnels already do that. Pre-auth commands would also still reach the server's parsers unless the gateway parses and re-emits each command, which goes against the relay's small-footprint rule.

The version that might hold up: JMAP and webmail only (HTTP), over the existing pinned mTLS link, with passkey or token sign-in so the gateway never handles a reusable password. IMAP/POP3/submission with plain passwords is where the security case gets weak.

This is a design question for now, not a commitment. Discussion on the forum: https://community.coffeylabs.org/t/client-access-through-the-relay-jmap-and-webmail-with-no-open-ports/340

Idea from a reader on LinkedIn: carry client access over the relay's outbound link the same way inbuxa-relay carries MTA traffic, so a server at home or in an office can be reached from outside with no open ports and no VPN. The catch is where TLS ends. To filter IMAP/JMAP at the edge the gateway has to terminate TLS, and then a compromised gateway sees every password and every message read through it, which the MTA relay never has to. Passing TLS straight through avoids that, but then it's a plain tunnel, and generic tunnels already do that. Pre-auth commands would also still reach the server's parsers unless the gateway parses and re-emits each command, which goes against the relay's small-footprint rule. The version that might hold up: JMAP and webmail only (HTTP), over the existing pinned mTLS link, with passkey or token sign-in so the gateway never handles a reusable password. IMAP/POP3/submission with plain passwords is where the security case gets weak. This is a design question for now, not a commitment. Discussion on the forum: https://community.coffeylabs.org/t/client-access-through-the-relay-jmap-and-webmail-with-no-open-ports/340
jcoffey-dev added this to the 27.7 milestone 2026-11-19 16:51:42 +00:00
jcoffey-dev added the
priority
p3
enhancement
labels 2026-11-19 16:51:42 +00:00
jcoffey-dev self-assigned this 2026-11-19 16:54:23 +00:00
Author
Owner

Design note in #489 (docs/spec/features/client-gateway.md). It recommends passing client TLS through the relay rather than ending it there: a terminating relay would hold every session token and message even with passkey sign-in, while pass-through keeps it blind for every protocol, IMAP included. Seven open questions at the end, each with a recommended answer.

Design note in #489 (`docs/spec/features/client-gateway.md`). It recommends passing client TLS through the relay rather than ending it there: a terminating relay would hold every session token and message even with passkey sign-in, while pass-through keeps it blind for every protocol, IMAP included. Seven open questions at the end, each with a recommended answer.
Sign in to join this conversation.
1 Participants
Notifications
Due Date
No due date set.
Dependencies

No dependencies set.

Reference: inbuxa/inbuxa-server#484