Merge pull request 'Release 2026.9.27.1' (#67) from release-2026.9.27.1 into main

The audit log (#64): every administrator change, admin sign-in and look
into someone else's data, recorded before it happens, chained per node
and checkable for tampering, exportable with a manifest, kept 2 years.

Locked accounts (#65, #66): an account that keeps receiving mail but
can't sign in and sends nothing on its own, handed to delegates at read,
organize or full, ending at a date when one is set.

Prepared Explain answers relabeled for this release; no setting changed
since 2026.9.27, so all 706 carry over.

Cargo.lock

@@ -3960,10 +3960,12 @@ version = "0.16.22"
 dependencies = [
  "ahash",
  "base64 0.23.1",
+ "flate2",
  "jmap_proto",
  "registry",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
+ "sha2 0.11.0",
  "store",
  "tokio",
  "trc",

crates/common/src/audit.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! inbuxa: the audit log's server side (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-1 to
+//! AU-11). The records, the chain and queries live in
+//! `inbuxa_features::audit`; this is what needs the running server: the
+//! node's id, account names, and the sign-in and access hooks.
+
+use crate::{
+    Server,
+    auth::{AccessToken, AuthRequest, permissions::DefaultPermissions},
+};
+use directory::Credentials;
+use inbuxa_features::audit::{
+    Action, Actor, AuditLog, EntryId, Outcome, Record, Target, Via, diff, log, scope,
+};
+use registry::{
+    jmap::IntoValue,
+    schema::{enums::Permission, prelude::ObjectType},
+    types::EnumImpl,
+};
+use std::{future::Future, pin::Pin, sync::Arc, sync::OnceLock};
+use store::{
+    Store,
+    registry::hook::{RegistryChange, RegistryWriteHook},
+    write::now,
+};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+/// What kind of recorded access a dedupe key is for (AU-1.4, AU-1.6).
+const KIND_ACCOUNT_ACCESS: u8 = 0;
+const KIND_BLOB_ACCESS: u8 = 1;
+const KIND_SIGN_IN: u8 = 2;
+const KIND_SIGN_IN_FAILED: u8 = 3;
+const KIND_DELEGATE_ACCESS: u8 = 4;
+
+/// The permissions that make an account an administrator for AU-1.4: every
+/// `sys*` permission a plain user doesn't get by default, and impersonation.
+fn admin_permissions() -> &'static [Permission] {
+    static ADMIN: OnceLock<Vec<Permission>> = OnceLock::new();
+    ADMIN.get_or_init(|| {
+        let user = DefaultPermissions::default().user;
+        (0..Permission::COUNT)
+            .filter_map(|id| Permission::from_id(id as u16))
+            .filter(|permission| {
+                (permission.as_str().starts_with("sys") && !user.contains(permission))
+                    || matches!(
+                        permission,
+                        Permission::Impersonate | Permission::FetchAnyBlob
+                    )
+            })
+            .collect()
+    })
+}
+
+/// Whether a session holds any administrator permission.
+pub fn is_admin(token: &AccessToken) -> bool {
+    admin_permissions()
+        .iter()
+        .any(|permission| token.has_permission(*permission))
+}
+
+fn ms() -> u64 {
+    std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map_or(0, |d| d.as_millis() as u64)
+}
+
+/// A small, stable number for a sign-in's method and address, so repeated
+/// sign-ins the same way are recorded once an hour (AU-1.4).
+fn sign_in_key(via: Option<&Via>, ip: std::net::IpAddr) -> u32 {
+    use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
+    let mut hasher = ahash::AHasher::default();
+    via.hash(&mut hasher);
+    ip.hash(&mut hasher);
+    hasher.finish() as u32
+}
+
+impl Server {
+    fn audit(&self) -> &AuditLog {
+        &self.inner.data.audit
+    }
+
+    /// This node's chain.
+    pub fn audit_node(&self) -> u64 {
+        self.core.network.node_id
+    }
+
+    /// An account as an actor, named as it is now, which the record keeps
+    /// (AU-4).
+    pub async fn audit_actor(&self, token: &AccessToken) -> Actor {
+        let account_id = token.account_id();
+        Actor::account(
+            account_id,
+            self.audit_account_name(account_id).await,
+            token.tenant_id(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    pub async fn audit_account_name(&self, account_id: u32) -> String {
+        self.account(account_id)
+            .await
+            .map(|account| account.name.to_string())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| format!("account {}", Id::from(account_id)))
+    }
+
+    /// Writes a record to this node's chain. An error means nothing was
+    /// written: a change must then be refused (AU-3).
+    pub async fn audit_append(&self, record: &Record) -> trc::Result<EntryId> {
+        match self
+            .audit()
+            .append(self.store(), self.audit_node(), record)
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(id) => {
+                trc::event!(
+                    Security(trc::SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded),
+                    Id = id.to_string(),
+                    Type = record.action.as_str(),
+                    AccountName = record.actor.name.clone(),
+                    Details = describe_target(&record.target),
+                    Result = record.outcome.as_str(),
+                );
+                Ok(id)
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                trc::event!(
+                    Security(trc::SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed),
+                    Type = record.action.as_str(),
+                    AccountName = record.actor.name.clone(),
+                    Details = describe_target(&record.target),
+                    Reason = err.to_string(),
+                );
+                Err(err)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Writes the outcome of a record written as pending.
+    pub async fn audit_finish(&self, id: EntryId, outcome: Outcome) -> trc::Result<()> {
+        let result = outcome.as_str();
+        match self
+            .audit()
+            .finish(self.store(), self.audit_node(), id, ms(), outcome)
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                trc::event!(
+                    Security(trc::SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded),
+                    Id = id.to_string(),
+                    Result = result,
+                );
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                trc::event!(
+                    Security(trc::SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed),
+                    Id = id.to_string(),
+                    Reason = err.to_string(),
+                );
+                Err(err)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Records something that isn't a change (a sign-in, an access), where
+    /// a failed write is reported but stops nothing.
+    pub async fn audit_note(&self, record: Record) -> bool {
+        self.audit_append(&record).await.is_ok()
+    }
+
+    /// AU-1.4, AU-1.5: an administrator's sign-in, a master user's, or the
+    /// recovery administrator's, at most once an hour per account, method
+    /// and address. Using an OAuth or directory token isn't a sign-in: the
+    /// sign-in was on the server's own page, with a password.
+    pub async fn audit_sign_in(&self, req: &AuthRequest, token: &AccessToken) {
+        let via = token.origin();
+        let (actor, target) = match via {
+            None | Some(Via::OAuth { .. }) | Some(Via::Directory) => return,
+            Some(Via::Master { account_id, name }) => {
+                let target_id = token.account_id();
+                (
+                    Actor {
+                        account_id: *account_id,
+                        name: name.clone(),
+                        tenant_id: None,
+                    },
+                    Target {
+                        kind: "account".into(),
+                        id: Some(Id::from(target_id).to_string()),
+                        name: Some(self.audit_account_name(target_id).await),
+                        account_id: Some(target_id),
+                        tenant_id: token.tenant_id(),
+                    },
+                )
+            }
+            // The recovery admin is an account for the log's purposes, as
+            // its changes are: named, and signing in to itself
+            Some(Via::Recovery) => {
+                let actor = self.audit_actor(token).await;
+                let target = Target {
+                    kind: "account".into(),
+                    id: Some(Id::from(token.account_id()).to_string()),
+                    name: Some(actor.name.clone()),
+                    account_id: Some(token.account_id()),
+                    tenant_id: None,
+                };
+                (actor, target)
+            }
+            Some(_) if is_admin(token) => {
+                let actor = self.audit_actor(token).await;
+                let target = Target {
+                    kind: "account".into(),
+                    id: Some(Id::from(token.account_id()).to_string()),
+                    name: Some(actor.name.clone()),
+                    account_id: Some(token.account_id()),
+                    tenant_id: token.tenant_id(),
+                };
+                (actor, target)
+            }
+            Some(_) => return,
+        };
+        let actor_key = actor.account_id.unwrap_or(u32::MAX);
+        let key = sign_in_key(via, req.remote_ip);
+        if !self
+            .audit()
+            .first_access_this_hour(actor_key, key, KIND_SIGN_IN, now())
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        let recorded = self
+            .audit_note(Record {
+                at: ms(),
+                actor,
+                via: via.cloned(),
+                remote_ip: Some(req.remote_ip),
+                action: Action::SignIn,
+                target,
+                changes: vec![],
+                details: None,
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: Outcome::success(),
+            })
+            .await;
+        if !recorded {
+            self.audit().forget_access(actor_key, key, KIND_SIGN_IN);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// AU-1.4: a failed password sign-in to an administrator's account, at
+    /// most once an hour per account and address. Accounts that don't exist
+    /// or aren't administrators aren't recorded, so guessing doesn't fill
+    /// the log.
+    pub async fn audit_sign_in_failed(&self, req: &AuthRequest) {
+        let Credentials::Basic { username, .. } = &req.credentials else {
+            return;
+        };
+        // `target%master` fails as the master
+        let name = username.rsplit('%').next().unwrap_or(username);
+        let Ok(Some(account_id)) = self.account_id_from_email(name, false).await else {
+            return;
+        };
+        let Ok(token) = self.access_token(account_id).await else {
+            return;
+        };
+        let token = AccessToken::new_maybe_invalid(token);
+        if !is_admin(&token) {
+            return;
+        }
+        let key = sign_in_key(None, req.remote_ip);
+        if !self
+            .audit()
+            .first_access_this_hour(account_id, key, KIND_SIGN_IN_FAILED, now())
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        let actor = self.audit_actor(&token).await;
+        let target = Target {
+            kind: "account".into(),
+            id: Some(Id::from(account_id).to_string()),
+            name: Some(actor.name.clone()),
+            account_id: Some(account_id),
+            tenant_id: token.tenant_id(),
+        };
+        if !self
+            .audit_note(Record {
+                at: ms(),
+                actor,
+                via: None,
+                remote_ip: Some(req.remote_ip),
+                action: Action::SignInFailed,
+                target,
+                changes: vec![],
+                details: None,
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: Outcome::refused("authenticationFailed", None),
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            self.audit()
+                .forget_access(account_id, key, KIND_SIGN_IN_FAILED);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// AU-1.6: access to another account's data through `Impersonate` (or a
+    /// blob through `FetchAnyBlob`), once an hour per session's account and
+    /// target. Access through a share or group membership isn't this: the
+    /// owner granted it.
+    pub async fn audit_foreign_access(&self, token: &AccessToken, target_id: u32, blob: bool) {
+        if target_id == token.account_id() || token.is_member_directly(target_id) {
+            return;
+        }
+        let kind = if blob {
+            KIND_BLOB_ACCESS
+        } else {
+            KIND_ACCOUNT_ACCESS
+        };
+        if !self
+            .audit()
+            .first_access_this_hour(token.account_id(), target_id, kind, now())
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        let actor = self.audit_actor(token).await;
+        let target_tenant = self
+            .account(target_id)
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|account| account.id_tenant);
+        if !self
+            .audit_note(Record {
+                at: ms(),
+                actor,
+                via: token.origin().cloned(),
+                remote_ip: None,
+                action: if blob {
+                    Action::BlobAccess
+                } else {
+                    Action::AccountAccess
+                },
+                target: Target {
+                    kind: "account".into(),
+                    id: Some(Id::from(target_id).to_string()),
+                    name: Some(self.audit_account_name(target_id).await),
+                    account_id: Some(target_id),
+                    tenant_id: target_tenant,
+                },
+                changes: vec![],
+                details: None,
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: Outcome::success(),
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            self.audit()
+                .forget_access(token.account_id(), target_id, kind);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// AU-1.10: from here on, registry writes the server makes on its own
+    /// are recorded. Installed once boot has written its defaults.
+    pub fn install_audit_hook(&self) {
+        self.registry().set_write_hook(Arc::new(SystemWrites {
+            data: self.store().clone(),
+            log: AuditLog::new(),
+            node: self.audit_node(),
+        }));
+    }
+
+    /// AL-9: a delegate reaching a locked account: its access once an hour,
+    /// and every change it makes there, one record per method call.
+    pub async fn audit_delegate(
+        &self,
+        token: &AccessToken,
+        locked_id: u32,
+        access: &str,
+        write: Option<&str>,
+        error: Option<&trc::Error>,
+    ) {
+        let first = self.audit().first_access_this_hour(
+            token.account_id(),
+            locked_id,
+            KIND_DELEGATE_ACCESS,
+            now(),
+        );
+        if !first && write.is_none() {
+            return;
+        }
+        let actor = self.audit_actor(token).await;
+        let target = Target {
+            kind: "account".into(),
+            id: Some(Id::from(locked_id).to_string()),
+            name: Some(self.audit_account_name(locked_id).await),
+            account_id: Some(locked_id),
+            tenant_id: self
+                .account(locked_id)
+                .await
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|account| account.id_tenant),
+        };
+        let mut records = Vec::new();
+        if first {
+            records.push(Record {
+                at: ms(),
+                actor: actor.clone(),
+                via: token.origin().cloned(),
+                remote_ip: None,
+                action: Action::AccountAccess,
+                target: target.clone(),
+                changes: vec![],
+                details: Some(format!("As a delegate ({access})")),
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: Outcome::success(),
+            });
+        }
+        if let Some(method) = write {
+            records.push(Record {
+                at: ms(),
+                actor,
+                via: token.origin().cloned(),
+                remote_ip: None,
+                action: Action::Update,
+                target,
+                changes: vec![],
+                details: Some(format!("{method} as a delegate ({access})")),
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: match error {
+                    None => Outcome::success(),
+                    Some(err) => Outcome::refused(
+                        "error",
+                        err.value_as_str(trc::Key::Details).map(str::to_string),
+                    ),
+                },
+            });
+        }
+        for record in records {
+            if !self.audit_note(record).await && first {
+                self.audit()
+                    .forget_access(token.account_id(), locked_id, KIND_DELEGATE_ACCESS);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// AU-7: removes entries past the retention period.
+    pub async fn audit_purge(&self) -> trc::Result<usize> {
+        let settings = log::settings(self.store()).await?;
+        let cutoff = ms().saturating_sub(settings.keep_for_secs.saturating_mul(1000));
+        log::purge(self.store(), cutoff, |_| false).await
+    }
+}
+
+fn describe_target(target: &Target) -> String {
+    match (&target.name, &target.id) {
+        (Some(name), _) => format!("{} {name}", target.kind),
+        (None, Some(id)) => format!("{} {id}", target.kind),
+        (None, None) => target.kind.clone(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// AU-1.10: records a registry write made outside any request, as the
+/// server's own, under the subsystem its task runs in.
+struct SystemWrites {
+    data: Store,
+    log: AuditLog,
+    node: u64,
+}
+
+/// Objects whose writes aren't the control plane: telemetry and mail data
+/// the registry also stores.
+fn is_quiet_object(object_type: ObjectType) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        object_type,
+        ObjectType::SpamTrainingSample
+            | ObjectType::ArchivedItem
+            | ObjectType::Trace
+            | ObjectType::Metric
+            | ObjectType::Log
+            | ObjectType::ClusterNode
+            | ObjectType::Task
+            | ObjectType::QueuedMessage
+            | ObjectType::ArfExternalReport
+            | ObjectType::DmarcExternalReport
+            | ObjectType::TlsExternalReport
+            | ObjectType::DmarcInternalReport
+            | ObjectType::TlsInternalReport
+    )
+}
+
+impl RegistryWriteHook for SystemWrites {
+    fn written<'a>(
+        &'a self,
+        change: RegistryChange<'a>,
+    ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'a>> {
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            let subsystem = match scope::current() {
+                Some(scope::Scope::Request | scope::Scope::Quiet) => return,
+                Some(scope::Scope::System(subsystem)) => subsystem,
+                None => "server",
+            };
+            if is_quiet_object(change.object_type) {
+                return;
+            }
+            let kind = format!("x:{}", change.object_type.as_str());
+            let json = |object: &registry::schema::prelude::Object| {
+                serde_json::to_value(object.clone().into_value()).unwrap_or_default()
+            };
+            let before = change.before.map(json);
+            let after = change.after.map(json);
+            let described = after
+                .as_ref()
+                .or(before.as_ref())
+                .map(diff::describe)
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+            let action = match (&before, &after) {
+                (None, _) => Action::Create,
+                (Some(_), Some(_)) => Action::Update,
+                (Some(_), None) => Action::Destroy,
+            };
+            let changes = match action {
+                Action::Destroy => vec![],
+                _ => diff::diff(&kind, before.as_ref(), after.as_ref()),
+            };
+            let record = Record {
+                at: std::time::SystemTime::now()
+                    .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+                    .map_or(0, |d| d.as_millis() as u64),
+                actor: Actor::system(subsystem),
+                via: None,
+                remote_ip: None,
+                action,
+                target: Target {
+                    kind,
+                    id: Some(change.id.to_string()),
+                    name: described.name,
+                    account_id: described.account_id,
+                    tenant_id: described.tenant_id,
+                },
+                changes,
+                details: None,
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: Outcome::success(),
+            };
+            match self.log.append(&self.data, self.node, &record).await {
+                Ok(id) => trc::event!(
+                    Security(trc::SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded),
+                    Id = id.to_string(),
+                    Type = record.action.as_str(),
+                    AccountName = record.actor.name.clone(),
+                    Details = describe_target(&record.target),
+                ),
+                Err(err) => trc::event!(
+                    Security(trc::SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed),
+                    Type = record.action.as_str(),
+                    AccountName = record.actor.name.clone(),
+                    Details = describe_target(&record.target),
+                    Reason = err.to_string(),
+                ),
+            }
+        })
+    }
+}

crates/common/src/auth/access_token.rs

@@ -43,6 +43,27 @@ impl Server {
         revision: u64,
         revision_account: u64,
     ) -> trc::Result<AccessTokenInner> {
+        // inbuxa: AL-2, AL-5: whether this account is locked, and which
+        // locked accounts are handed to it. The token is their cache: every
+        // change to a lock invalidates the tokens it touches.
+        let locked = inbuxa_features::lock::get(self.store(), account_id)
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+            .is_some();
+        let now_secs = now();
+        let delegations: Box<[super::Delegation]> =
+            inbuxa_features::lock::delegated_to(self.store(), account_id)
+                .await
+                .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+                .into_iter()
+                .filter(|(_, delegate)| delegate.is_current(now_secs))
+                .map(|(locked_id, delegate)| super::Delegation {
+                    account_id: locked_id,
+                    access: delegate.access,
+                    send_as: delegate.send_as,
+                    until: delegate.until,
+                })
+                .collect();
         match account {
             Account::User(account) => {
                 let tenant_id = account.member_tenant_id.map(|t| t.id() as u32);
@@ -202,6 +223,8 @@ impl Server {
                         .upload_max_concurrent
                         .map(ConcurrencyLimiter::new),
                     obj_size: 0,
+                    locked,
+                    delegations: delegations.clone(),
                     revision,
                     revision_account,
                     credential_version,
@@ -211,7 +234,15 @@ impl Server {
                     access_to: access_to.into_boxed_slice(),
                     scopes: []
                         .into_iter()
-                        .chain(credential_scopes)
+                        .chain(credential_scopes.into_iter().map(|mut scope| {
+                            // inbuxa: AL-2: no credential of a locked
+                            // account authenticates; receiving mail isn't
+                            // signing in, so EmailReceive stays
+                            if locked {
+                                scope.permissions.clear(Permission::Authenticate as usize);
+                            }
+                            scope
+                        }))
                         .collect::<Box<[AccessScope]>>(),
                 }
                 .update_size())
@@ -245,6 +276,8 @@ impl Server {
                         .upload_max_concurrent
                         .map(ConcurrencyLimiter::new),
                     obj_size: 0,
+                    locked,
+                    delegations: delegations.clone(),
                     revision,
                     revision_account,
                     credential_version: 0,
@@ -376,6 +409,7 @@ impl AccessToken {
     pub fn new(inner: Arc<AccessTokenInner>, remote_ip: IpAddr) -> trc::Result<Self> {
         AccessToken {
             scope_idx: 0,
+            origin: None,
             inner,
         }
         .assert_is_valid(remote_ip)
@@ -384,6 +418,7 @@ impl AccessToken {
     pub fn new_maybe_invalid(inner: Arc<AccessTokenInner>) -> Self {
         AccessToken {
             scope_idx: 0,
+            origin: None,
             inner,
         }
     }
@@ -404,7 +439,11 @@ impl AccessToken {
                     .ctx(trc::Key::Id, credential_id)
                     .reason("Credential expired or removed.")
             })
-            .map(|scope_idx| AccessToken { scope_idx, inner })
+            .map(|scope_idx| AccessToken {
+                scope_idx,
+                inner,
+                origin: None,
+            })
             .and_then(|token| token.assert_is_valid(remote_ip))
     }
 
@@ -418,6 +457,7 @@ impl AccessToken {
         } else {
             AccessToken {
                 scope_idx: 0,
+                origin: None,
                 inner,
             }
             .assert_is_valid(remote_ip)
@@ -481,6 +521,15 @@ impl AccessToken {
             || self.has_permission(Permission::Impersonate)
     }
 
+    /// inbuxa: AU-1.6: whether the account is reachable without
+    /// impersonation: its own, a group's it belongs to, or one shared with
+    /// it.
+    pub fn is_member_directly(&self, account_id: u32) -> bool {
+        self.inner.account_id == account_id
+            || self.inner.member_of.contains(&account_id)
+            || self.inner.access_to.iter().any(|a| a.account_id == account_id)
+    }
+
     pub fn is_account_id(&self, account_id: u32) -> bool {
         self.inner.account_id == account_id
     }
@@ -575,10 +624,13 @@ impl AccessToken {
                     revision: old_inner.revision,
                     credential_version: old_inner.credential_version,
                     obj_size: old_inner.obj_size,
+                    locked: old_inner.locked,
+                    delegations: old_inner.delegations.clone(),
                 };
 
                 access_token = AccessToken {
                     scope_idx: access_token.scope_idx,
+                    origin: access_token.origin.clone(),
                     inner: Arc::new(inner),
                 };
             }
@@ -758,9 +810,55 @@ impl AccessToken {
         }
     }
 
+    /// inbuxa: AL-2: the account is locked.
+    pub fn is_locked(&self) -> bool {
+        self.inner.locked
+    }
+
+    /// inbuxa: AL-5: this account's delegation into a locked account, if it
+    /// has one that hasn't ended.
+    pub fn delegation(&self, account_id: u32) -> Option<&super::Delegation> {
+        let now = now();
+        self.inner
+            .delegations
+            .iter()
+            .find(|d| d.account_id == account_id && d.until.is_none_or(|until| until > now))
+    }
+
+    /// inbuxa: AL-5: every current delegation this account holds.
+    pub fn delegations(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &super::Delegation> {
+        let now = now();
+        self.inner
+            .delegations
+            .iter()
+            .filter(move |d| d.until.is_none_or(|until| until > now))
+    }
+
+    /// inbuxa: how this session signed in (AU-5).
+    pub fn origin(&self) -> Option<&inbuxa_features::audit::Via> {
+        self.origin.as_deref()
+    }
+
+    /// inbuxa: records how this session signed in (AU-5).
+    pub fn with_origin(mut self, origin: inbuxa_features::audit::Via) -> Self {
+        self.origin = Some(Arc::new(origin));
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn origin_arc(&self) -> Option<Arc<inbuxa_features::audit::Via>> {
+        self.origin.clone()
+    }
+
+    /// inbuxa: restores how a cached session signed in (AU-5).
+    pub fn with_origin_arc(mut self, origin: Option<Arc<inbuxa_features::audit::Via>>) -> Self {
+        self.origin = origin;
+        self
+    }
+
     pub fn new_admin() -> AccessToken {
         AccessToken {
             scope_idx: 0,
+            origin: None,
             inner: Arc::new(AccessTokenInner::new_admin()),
         }
     }
@@ -775,6 +873,7 @@ impl AccessToken {
         }
         AccessToken {
             scope_idx: 0,
+            origin: None,
             inner: Arc::new(AccessTokenInner {
                 account_id,
                 tenant_id: Default::default(),
@@ -788,6 +887,8 @@ impl AccessToken {
                 revision_account: Default::default(),
                 credential_version: Default::default(),
                 obj_size: Default::default(),
+                locked: false,
+                delegations: Default::default(),
             }),
         }
     }
@@ -798,6 +899,11 @@ impl AccessToken {
 }
 
 impl AccessTokenInner {
+    /// inbuxa: AL-2: the account is locked.
+    pub fn is_locked(&self) -> bool {
+        self.locked
+    }
+
     /// inbuxa: SCIM-27: the account's own effective permission, from its
     /// roles, its own settings and its tenant, before a credential narrows it
     pub fn account_has_permission(&self, permission: Permission) -> bool {
@@ -841,6 +947,8 @@ impl AccessTokenInner {
             revision_account: Default::default(),
             credential_version: Default::default(),
             obj_size: Default::default(),
+            locked: false,
+            delegations: Default::default(),
         }
     }
 

crates/common/src/auth/authentication.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ use registry::schema::{
 use serde::Deserialize;
 use std::{borrow::Cow, net::IpAddr, sync::Arc};
 use store::write::now;
+use inbuxa_features::audit::Via;
 use trc::AddContext;
 
 pub struct UsernameParts {
@@ -43,10 +44,32 @@ impl Server {
     pub async fn authenticate(&self, req: &AuthRequest) -> trc::Result<AccessToken> {
         match Box::pin(self.route_auth_request(req))
             .await
+            // inbuxa: AL-2: a locked account fails as a wrong password does,
+            // so the right password learns nothing; master and recovery
+            // sign-ins as it fail the same way
+            .and_then(|token| {
+                if token.is_locked() {
+                    Err(trc::AuthEvent::Failed
+                        .into_err()
+                        .ctx(trc::Key::AccountId, token.account_id())
+                        .reason("Account is locked"))
+                } else {
+                    Ok(token)
+                }
+            })
             .and_then(|token| token.assert_has_permission(Permission::Authenticate))
         {
-            Ok(token) => Ok(token),
+            Ok(token) => {
+                // inbuxa: AU-1.4, AU-1.5
+                self.audit_sign_in(req, &token).await;
+                Ok(token)
+            }
             Err(err) => {
+                // inbuxa: AU-1.4
+                if matches!(err.as_ref(), trc::EventType::Auth(trc::AuthEvent::Failed)) {
+                    self.audit_sign_in_failed(req).await;
+                }
+
                 // Random delay to mitigate user enumeration attacks
                 #[cfg(not(feature = "test_mode"))]
                 {
@@ -106,6 +129,13 @@ impl Server {
                                 self.access_token(account_id)
                                     .await
                                     .and_then(|token| AccessToken::new(token, req.remote_ip))
+                                    // inbuxa: AU-1.5, AU-5
+                                    .map(|token| {
+                                        token.with_origin(Via::Master {
+                                            account_id: None,
+                                            name: fallback_user.to_string(),
+                                        })
+                                    })
                             } else {
                                 Err(trc::AuthEvent::Failed
                                     .into_err()
@@ -119,7 +149,8 @@ impl Server {
                                 SpanId = req.session_id,
                             );
 
-                            Ok(AccessToken::new_admin())
+                            // inbuxa: AU-1.5, AU-5
+                            Ok(AccessToken::new_admin().with_origin(Via::Recovery))
                         }
                     } else {
                         Err(trc::AuthEvent::Failed
@@ -163,6 +194,12 @@ impl Server {
                             req.session_id,
                         )
                         .await
+                        // inbuxa: AU-5
+                        .map(|token| {
+                            token.with_origin(Via::AppPassword {
+                                id: app_pass.credential_id,
+                            })
+                        })
                     } else {
                         Err(trc::AuthEvent::Failed
                             .into_err()
@@ -262,6 +299,7 @@ impl Server {
 
                 // Validate master user access
                 if username.is_master() {
+                    let master_id = token.account_id(); // inbuxa: AU-5
                     token.assert_has_permissions(&[
                         Permission::Impersonate,
                         Permission::Authenticate,
@@ -282,6 +320,13 @@ impl Server {
                         self.access_token(account_id)
                             .await
                             .map(AccessToken::new_maybe_invalid)
+                            // inbuxa: AU-1.5, AU-5: the master stays known
+                            .map(|impersonated| {
+                                impersonated.with_origin(Via::Master {
+                                    account_id: Some(master_id),
+                                    name: master_address.to_string(),
+                                })
+                            })
                     } else {
                         Err(trc::AuthEvent::Failed
                             .into_err()
@@ -297,7 +342,12 @@ impl Server {
                         SpanId = req.session_id,
                     );
 
-                    Ok(token)
+                    // inbuxa: AU-5 (a directory's token already says so)
+                    Ok(if token.origin().is_none() {
+                        token.with_origin(Via::Password)
+                    } else {
+                        token
+                    })
                 }
             }
             Credentials::Bearer { username, token } => {
@@ -311,7 +361,9 @@ impl Server {
                             req.remote_ip,
                             req.session_id,
                         )
-                        .await;
+                        .await
+                        // inbuxa: AU-5
+                        .map(|token| token.with_origin(Via::ApiKey { id: key.credential_id }));
                 }
 
                 #[cfg(feature = "dev_mode")]
@@ -368,7 +420,8 @@ impl Server {
                                     .ctx(trc::Key::AccountId, token.account_id())
                                     .reason("Authenticated using an email alias but account does not have AuthenticateAlias permission"));
                             }
-                            return Ok(token);
+                            // inbuxa: AU-5
+                            return Ok(token.with_origin(Via::Directory));
                         }
                         Err(err) => {
                             external_error = Some(err);
@@ -384,7 +437,20 @@ impl Server {
                     Ok(token_info) => self
                         .access_token(token_info.account_id)
                         .await
-                        .and_then(|token| AccessToken::new(token, req.remote_ip)),
+                        .and_then(|token| AccessToken::new(token, req.remote_ip))
+                        // inbuxa: AU-5
+                        .map(|token| {
+                            token.with_origin(Via::OAuth {
+                                client: token_info
+                                    .claims
+                                    .as_deref()
+                                    .filter(|claims| !claims.is_empty())
+                                    .unwrap_or("unknown")
+                                    .chars()
+                                    .take(200)
+                                    .collect(),
+                            })
+                        }),
                     Err(err) => {
                         if let Some(external_error) = external_error {
                             Err(external_error)

crates/common/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ pub struct PermissionsGroup {
 pub struct AccessToken {
     scope_idx: usize,
     inner: Arc<AccessTokenInner>,
+    // inbuxa: how this session signed in, for the audit log (AU-5)
+    origin: Option<Arc<inbuxa_features::audit::Via>>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
@@ -148,6 +150,21 @@ pub struct AccessTokenInner {
     pub(crate) revision: u64,
     pub(crate) credential_version: u64,
     pub(crate) obj_size: u64,
+    // inbuxa: AL-2: the account is locked; it may not authenticate
+    pub(crate) locked: bool,
+    // inbuxa: AL-5: locked accounts handed to this one
+    pub(crate) delegations: Box<[Delegation]>,
+}
+
+/// inbuxa: a locked account this one may open, and how (AL-5, AL-6).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Delegation {
+    /// The locked account.
+    pub account_id: u32,
+    pub access: inbuxa_features::lock::Access,
+    pub send_as: bool,
+    /// Seconds since the epoch.
+    pub until: Option<u64>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Hash, Clone)]
@@ -298,6 +315,7 @@ impl BuildAccessToken for Arc<AccessTokenInner> {
     fn build(self) -> AccessToken {
         AccessToken {
             scope_idx: 0,
+            origin: None,
             inner: self,
         }
     }

crates/common/src/auth/permissions.rs

@@ -269,6 +269,21 @@ impl Default for DefaultPermissions {
                     default.superuser.push(permission);
                     default.tenant.push(permission);
                 }
+                // inbuxa: AU-9: a tenant administrator reads and exports
+                // its tenant's audit log; retention stays the server's
+                Permission::SysAuditGet | Permission::SysAuditExport => {
+                    default.superuser.push(permission);
+                    default.tenant.push(permission);
+                }
+                // inbuxa: AL-12: tenant administrators lock and delegate
+                // within their tenant
+                Permission::SysAccountLockGet
+                | Permission::SysAccountLockCreate
+                | Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate
+                | Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy => {
+                    default.superuser.push(permission);
+                    default.tenant.push(permission);
+                }
                 permission => {
                     let name = permission.as_str();
                     if name.starts_with("jmap")

crates/common/src/cache/directory.rs

@@ -31,6 +31,19 @@ impl Server {
     pub async fn synchronize_account(
         &self,
         account: directory::Account,
+    ) -> trc::Result<AccountWithId> {
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.10: what a directory (LDAP, AD, SQL, OIDC) changed
+        // is recorded as its sync, not as the server acting on its own
+        inbuxa_features::audit::scope::system(
+            "directory-sync",
+            self.synchronize_account_unscoped(account),
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+
+    async fn synchronize_account_unscoped(
+        &self,
+        account: directory::Account,
     ) -> trc::Result<AccountWithId> {
         let (local, domain) = self.validate_address(&account.email).await?;
 
@@ -267,6 +280,15 @@ impl Server {
     }
 
     pub async fn synchronize_group(&self, group: directory::Group) -> trc::Result<u32> {
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.10, as for accounts
+        inbuxa_features::audit::scope::system(
+            "directory-sync",
+            self.synchronize_group_unscoped(group),
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+
+    async fn synchronize_group_unscoped(&self, group: directory::Group) -> trc::Result<u32> {
         let (local, domain) = self.validate_address(&group.email).await?;
 
         match self

crates/common/src/config/inner.rs

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ impl Data {
             logos: Default::default(),
             smtp_connectors: TlsConnectors::try_new().failed("Failed to build TLS connectors"),
             build_errors: Default::default(),
+            audit: Default::default(),
             asn_geo_data: Default::default(),
         }
     }
@@ -243,6 +244,7 @@ impl Default for Data {
             logos: Default::default(),
             smtp_connectors: TlsConnectors::try_new().unwrap(),
             build_errors: Default::default(),
+            audit: Default::default(),
             asn_geo_data: Default::default(),
             lookup_stores: Default::default(),
         }

crates/common/src/ipc.rs

@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ pub enum BroadcastEvent {
     CacheInvalidateNegative,
     MtaQueueStatus { is_running: bool },
     QueueRefresh,
+    // inbuxa: AL-3: end an account's open sessions on every node
+    EndSessions(u32),
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]

crates/common/src/lib.rs

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ use utils::{
 
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod cache;
+pub mod audit; // inbuxa: the audit log (audit-hold-lock spec, AU)
 pub mod config;
 pub mod expr;
 pub mod i18n;
@@ -174,6 +175,9 @@ pub struct Data {
     // inbuxa: the objects that failed to build when the running settings
     // were built, at boot or by the last applied reload (see reload_registry)
     pub build_errors: Mutex<AHashSet<registry::types::id::ObjectId>>,
+
+    // inbuxa: the audit log's chain heads and recent-access marks (AU)
+    pub audit: inbuxa_features::audit::AuditLog,
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone)]
@@ -282,6 +286,8 @@ pub struct HttpAuthCache {
     pub revision: u64,
     pub credential_id: Option<u32>,
     pub expires: Instant,
+    // inbuxa: how the cached credentials signed in (AU-5)
+    pub origin: Option<Arc<inbuxa_features::audit::Via>>,
 }
 
 pub struct Ipc {

crates/common/src/manager/boot.rs

@@ -243,6 +243,10 @@ impl BootManager {
                 // inbuxa: a reload isn't refused over objects that failed here
                 inner.build_server().record_build_errors(&bootstrap.errors);
 
+                // inbuxa: AU-1.10: the server's own registry writes are
+                // recorded from here on, after boot's defaults
+                inner.build_server().install_audit_hook();
+
                 BootManager {
                     inner,
                     bootstrap,

crates/common/src/manager/granted_permissions.rs

@@ -29,11 +29,43 @@ use trc::AddContext;
 use types::id::Id;
 
 /// Granted to the default administrator roles: "Explain this"
-/// (ai-explain spec, EX-4: superuser by default).
-const ADMIN_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[Permission::SysAiExplain];
+/// (ai-explain spec, EX-4: superuser by default), and the audit log
+/// (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-9).
+const ADMIN_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
+    Permission::SysAiExplain,
+    Permission::SysAuditGet,
+    Permission::SysAuditExport,
+    Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockGet,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockCreate,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy,
+];
 
-fn granted_key(permission: Permission) -> ValueClass {
+/// Granted to the default tenant administrator roles: reading and exporting
+/// the tenant's audit log (AU-9), and locking and delegating its accounts
+/// (AL-12).
+const TENANT_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
+    Permission::SysAuditGet,
+    Permission::SysAuditExport,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockGet,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockCreate,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy,
+];
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum Audience {
+    Admin,
+    Tenant,
+}
+
+fn granted_key(permission: Permission, audience: Audience) -> ValueClass {
     let mut key = b"Pg".to_vec();
+    // Admin grants keep the key they were first recorded under
+    if audience == Audience::Tenant {
+        key.extend_from_slice(b"tenant:");
+    }
     key.extend_from_slice(permission.as_str().as_bytes());
     ValueClass::Any(AnyClass {
         subspace: SUBSPACE_INBUXA,
@@ -42,11 +74,16 @@ fn granted_key(permission: Permission) -> ValueClass {
 }
 
 pub(crate) async fn grant_new_admin_permissions(bp: &mut Bootstrap) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    grant(bp, Audience::Admin, ADMIN_GRANTS).await?;
+    grant(bp, Audience::Tenant, TENANT_GRANTS).await
+}
+
+async fn grant(bp: &mut Bootstrap, audience: Audience, grants: &[Permission]) -> trc::Result<()> {
     let mut pending = Vec::new();
-    for permission in ADMIN_GRANTS {
+    for permission in grants {
         if bp
             .data_store
-            .get_value::<String>(ValueKey::from(granted_key(*permission)))
+            .get_value::<String>(ValueKey::from(granted_key(*permission, audience)))
             .await
             .caused_by(trc::location!())?
             .is_none()
@@ -58,21 +95,33 @@ pub(crate) async fn grant_new_admin_permissions(bp: &mut Bootstrap) -> trc::Resu
         return Ok(());
     }
     // An administrator's default roles include the plain User role, which
-    // every user also holds; only roles that are administrators' alone get it
+    // every user also holds; only roles that are the audience's alone get it
     let admin_roles: Vec<Id> = bp
         .registry
         .object::<Authentication>(Id::singleton())
         .await?
         .map(|auth| {
-            let shared = [
-                auth.default_user_role_ids.as_slice(),
-                auth.default_group_role_ids.as_slice(),
-                auth.default_tenant_role_ids.as_slice(),
-            ]
-            .concat();
-            auth.default_admin_role_ids
-                .as_slice()
-                .iter()
+            let (own, shared) = match audience {
+                Audience::Admin => (
+                    auth.default_admin_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                    [
+                        auth.default_user_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                        auth.default_group_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                        auth.default_tenant_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                    ]
+                    .concat(),
+                ),
+                Audience::Tenant => (
+                    auth.default_tenant_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                    [
+                        auth.default_user_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                        auth.default_group_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                        auth.default_admin_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                    ]
+                    .concat(),
+                ),
+            };
+            own.iter()
                 .filter(|id| !shared.contains(id))
                 .copied()
                 .collect()
@@ -114,7 +163,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn grant_new_admin_permissions(bp: &mut Bootstrap) -> trc::Resu
     }
     let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
     for permission in pending {
-        batch.set(granted_key(permission), b"granted".to_vec());
+        batch.set(granted_key(permission, audience), b"granted".to_vec());
     }
     bp.data_store
         .write(batch.build_all())

crates/common/src/network/security.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use crate::{
@@ -335,9 +337,10 @@ impl Server {
             .insert(IpWithTtl::new(ip, expires_at.unwrap_or(u64::MAX)));
 
         // Write blocked IP to config
-        let RegistryWriteResult::Success(id) = self
-            .registry()
-            .write(RegistryWrite::insert(
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.10: recorded as the server's automatic ban
+        let RegistryWriteResult::Success(id) = inbuxa_features::audit::scope::system(
+            "auto-ban",
+            self.registry().write(RegistryWrite::insert(
                 &BlockedIp {
                     address: IpAddrOrMask::from_ip(ip),
                     created_at: UTCDateTime::from_timestamp(now as i64),
@@ -345,8 +348,9 @@ impl Server {
                     reason,
                 }
                 .into(),
-            ))
-            .await
+            )),
+        )
+        .await
             .caused_by(trc::location!())?
         else {
             return Ok(());

crates/dav/src/file/mkcol.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use super::proppatch::FilePropPatchRequestHandler;
@@ -131,6 +133,14 @@ impl FileMkColRequestHandler for Server {
         let etag = batch.etag();
         self.commit_batch(batch).await.caused_by(trc::location!())?;
 
+        // inbuxa: AL-7: a folder a delegate makes in a locked account gets
+        // the lock's grants
+        if account_id != access_token.account_id()
+            && let Err(err) = groupware::inbuxa_lock::reconcile_dav(self, account_id).await
+        {
+            trc::error!(err.details("Failed to grant a lock's delegates on a new folder"));
+        }
+
         if let Some(prop_stat) = return_prop_stat {
             Ok(HttpResponse::new(StatusCode::CREATED)
                 .with_xml_body(

crates/dav/src/file/update.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use crate::{
@@ -299,6 +301,14 @@ impl FileUpdateRequestHandler for Server {
             let etag = batch.etag();
             self.commit_batch(batch).await.caused_by(trc::location!())?;
 
+            // inbuxa: AL-7: a top-level file a delegate adds to a locked
+            // account gets the lock's grants
+            if account_id != access_token.account_id()
+                && let Err(err) = groupware::inbuxa_lock::reconcile_dav(self, account_id).await
+            {
+                trc::error!(err.details("Failed to grant a lock's delegates on a new file"));
+            }
+
             Ok(HttpResponse::new(StatusCode::CREATED).with_etag_opt(etag))
         }
     }

crates/email/src/inbuxa_lock.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! inbuxa: a locked account's grants, whole (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-7,
+//! AL-10): its mailboxes here, and its calendars, address books and files
+//! through `groupware::inbuxa_lock`.
+//!
+//! A delegate's access is real ACL grants on the locked account's
+//! containers, the sharing IMAP, DAV and JMAP already honor, so a delegate
+//! sees the account as a shared one everywhere. The lock notes what each
+//! delegate had on a container before, so ending a delegation or the lock
+//! puts it back. Idempotent: run again, it grants on containers made since
+//! and changes nothing else.
+
+use crate::{cache::MessageCacheFetch, mailbox::Mailbox};
+use common::{Server, storage::index::ObjectIndexBuilder};
+use groupware::inbuxa_lock::{apply_dav_grants, invalidate, same_replaced};
+use inbuxa_features::lock::{self, Lock, Replaced};
+use store::{
+    ValueKey,
+    write::{AlignedBytes, Archive, BatchBuilder, now},
+};
+use trc::AddContext;
+use types::{collection::Collection, special_use::SpecialUse};
+
+/// Grants a lock's delegates their rights on every container of the locked
+/// account, and takes away those of delegations that ended. Returns what the
+/// lock now has to remember.
+pub async fn apply_grants(
+    server: &Server,
+    account_id: u32,
+    old: Option<&Lock>,
+    new: Option<&Lock>,
+) -> trc::Result<Vec<Replaced>> {
+    let now = now();
+    let mut replaced = Vec::new();
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+
+    let cache = server
+        .get_cached_messages(account_id)
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    for mailbox in cache.mailboxes.items.iter() {
+        // Mail in Trash and Junk is destroyed in time: an organizing
+        // delegate may look, not move mail in
+        let is_trash = matches!(mailbox.role, SpecialUse::Trash | SpecialUse::Junk);
+        let current = mailbox.acls.to_vec();
+        let Some(acls) = lock::merge_grants(
+            &current,
+            Collection::Mailbox,
+            mailbox.document_id,
+            is_trash,
+            old,
+            new,
+            now,
+            &mut replaced,
+        ) else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        let Some(archive) = server
+            .store()
+            .get_value::<Archive<AlignedBytes>>(ValueKey::archive(
+                account_id,
+                Collection::Mailbox,
+                mailbox.document_id,
+            ))
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+        else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        let current = archive
+            .into_deserialized::<Mailbox>()
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+        let mut changed = current.inner.clone();
+        changed.acls = acls;
+        batch
+            .with_account_id(account_id)
+            .with_collection(Collection::Mailbox)
+            .with_document(mailbox.document_id)
+            .custom(
+                ObjectIndexBuilder::new()
+                    .with_changes(changed)
+                    .with_current(current),
+            )
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    }
+
+    apply_dav_grants(server, account_id, old, new, now, &mut replaced, &mut batch).await?;
+
+    if !batch.is_empty() {
+        server
+            .commit_batch(batch)
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    }
+    Ok(replaced)
+}
+
+/// Re-applies the lock on `account_id`, if any, so containers made since get
+/// its grants: after a delegate creates something there, and daily.
+pub async fn reconcile(server: &Server, account_id: u32) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let data = server.store();
+    let Some(current) = lock::get(data, account_id).await? else {
+        return Ok(());
+    };
+    let replaced = apply_grants(server, account_id, Some(&current), Some(&current)).await?;
+    if !same_replaced(&replaced, &current.replaced) {
+        let updated = Lock {
+            replaced,
+            ..current.clone()
+        };
+        lock::set(data, &updated, Some(&current)).await?;
+    }
+    invalidate(server, account_id, Some(&current), Some(&current)).await
+}
+
+/// Re-applies every lock: the daily sweep, for containers made by the server
+/// itself (a Sieve `fileinto :create`) rather than by a delegate.
+pub async fn reconcile_all(server: &Server) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    for current in lock::all(server.store()).await? {
+        reconcile(server, current.account_id).await?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}

crates/email/src/lib.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 pub mod cache;
 pub mod identity;
+pub mod inbuxa_lock; // inbuxa: account lock grants
 pub mod mailbox;
 pub mod message;
 pub mod push;

crates/email/src/sieve/ingest.rs

@@ -287,6 +287,18 @@ impl SieveScriptIngest for Server {
                         do_discard = true;
                         input = true.into();
                     }
+                    // inbuxa: AL-4: a locked account answers no sender, so a
+                    // rejection is kept instead; sieve has already cleared
+                    // the implicit keep, so it is filed here
+                    Event::Reject { .. } if access_token.is_locked() => {
+                        if let Some(message) = messages.get_mut(0)
+                            && !message.file_into.contains(&INBOX_ID)
+                        {
+                            message.file_into.push(INBOX_ID);
+                        }
+                        do_deliver = true;
+                        input = true.into();
+                    }
                     Event::Reject { reason, .. } => {
                         reject_reason = reason.into();
                         do_discard = true;
@@ -388,6 +400,17 @@ impl SieveScriptIngest for Server {
                         }
                         input = true.into();
                     }
+                    // inbuxa: AL-4: a locked account sends nothing on its
+                    // own: no redirect, vacation reply or notification. An
+                    // unsent redirect leaves the message to be kept.
+                    Event::SendMessage { .. } if access_token.is_locked() => {
+                        trc::event!(
+                            Sieve(SieveEvent::ActionReject),
+                            Details = "Account is locked: nothing is sent",
+                            SpanId = session_id
+                        );
+                        input = true.into();
+                    }
                     Event::SendMessage {
                         recipient,
                         message_id,

crates/features/Cargo.toml

@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1.0"
 xxhash-rust = { version = "0.8.18", features = ["xxh3"] }
 base64 = "0.23"
+sha2 = "0.11"
+flate2 = "1.1"
+tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["sync", "rt"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["macros", "rt"] }

crates/features/src/ai/explain/schema.rs

@@ -9,11 +9,27 @@
 //! it holds a secret anywhere inside it.
 
 use serde_json::Value;
-use std::collections::HashSet;
+use std::{collections::HashSet, io::Read, sync::OnceLock};
 
 /// The registry schema, as the console downloads it.
 pub struct Schema(Value);
 
+/// The schema built into the server, read once. Also used by the audit log,
+/// to know which properties hold secrets (AU-4).
+pub fn embedded() -> Option<&'static Schema> {
+    static SCHEMA: OnceLock<Option<Schema>> = OnceLock::new();
+    static SCHEMA_JSON: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../../../resources/schema/schema.json.gz");
+    SCHEMA
+        .get_or_init(|| {
+            let mut json = Vec::new();
+            flate2::read::GzDecoder::new(SCHEMA_JSON)
+                .read_to_end(&mut json)
+                .ok()?;
+            serde_json::from_slice(&json).ok().map(Schema::new)
+        })
+        .as_ref()
+}
+
 /// What the schema says about one property of one object.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
 pub struct PropertyInfo {

crates/features/src/audit/diff.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! What changed in an object, as audit changes (AU-4). Objects are compared
+//! as their JMAP JSON, one top-level property at a time. A property that is
+//! a secret, or holds one anywhere inside it, is recorded as changed and
+//! never with its value: the registry schema says which those are, and a few
+//! names are treated as secret whatever it says.
+
+use crate::{ai::explain::schema, audit::record::Change};
+use serde_json::{Map, Value};
+use std::str::FromStr;
+use types::id::Id;
+
+/// Properties never recorded with a value, even if the schema lacks them.
+const ALWAYS_SECRET: &[&str] = &[
+    "secret",
+    "password",
+    "credentials",
+    "apiKey",
+    "token",
+    "privateKey",
+    "otpAuth",
+];
+
+/// Whether `property` of `object` (`x:AiModel`, `apiKey`) holds a secret.
+pub fn is_secret(object: &str, property: &str) -> bool {
+    let lower = property.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    ALWAYS_SECRET
+        .iter()
+        .any(|name| lower == name.to_ascii_lowercase())
+        || lower.ends_with("secret")
+        || lower.ends_with("password")
+        || schema::embedded()
+            .and_then(|schema| schema.property(object, property))
+            .is_some_and(|info| info.secret)
+}
+
+/// The changes between two versions of an object; `None` for a side that
+/// doesn't exist (a create or a destroy).
+pub fn diff(object: &str, before: Option<&Value>, after: Option<&Value>) -> Vec<Change> {
+    let empty = Map::new();
+    let before = before.and_then(Value::as_object).unwrap_or(&empty);
+    let after = after.and_then(Value::as_object).unwrap_or(&empty);
+    let mut fields = before.keys().chain(after.keys()).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    fields.sort();
+    fields.dedup();
+
+    let mut changes = Vec::new();
+    for field in fields {
+        if field == "id" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let old = before.get(field).filter(|v| !v.is_null());
+        let new = after.get(field).filter(|v| !v.is_null());
+        if old == new {
+            continue;
+        }
+        changes.push(if is_secret(object, field) {
+            Change::redacted(field.as_str())
+        } else {
+            Change::new(field.as_str(), old.cloned(), new.cloned())
+        });
+    }
+    changes
+}
+
+/// The changes a JMAP patch asks for, with what each place held before when
+/// the old object is known. Patch keys are properties or JSON pointers
+/// (`sections/0/enabled`); the property is the pointer's first part.
+pub fn patch(object: &str, before: Option<&Value>, patch: &Map<String, Value>) -> Vec<Change> {
+    let mut changes = Vec::new();
+    for (pointer, value) in patch {
+        let property = pointer.split('/').next().unwrap_or(pointer);
+        if property == "id" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if is_secret(object, property) {
+            changes.push(Change::redacted(pointer.as_str()));
+            continue;
+        }
+        let old = before
+            .and_then(|before| before.pointer(&format!("/{pointer}")))
+            .filter(|v| !v.is_null())
+            .cloned();
+        let new = Some(value.clone()).filter(|v| !v.is_null());
+        if old == new {
+            continue;
+        }
+        changes.push(Change::new(pointer.as_str(), old, new));
+    }
+    changes
+}
+
+/// What an object is called, and whose it is, for an audit target.
+#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Described {
+    pub name: Option<String>,
+    pub account_id: Option<u32>,
+    pub tenant_id: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+/// Reads a target's name and owners from its JSON.
+pub fn describe(value: &Value) -> Described {
+    let name = [
+        "name",
+        "email",
+        "address",
+        "hostname",
+        "domain",
+        "description",
+    ]
+    .iter()
+    .find_map(|key| value.get(key)?.as_str())
+    .map(|name| name.chars().take(200).collect());
+    let id = |key: &str| {
+        value
+            .get(key)?
+            .as_str()
+            .and_then(|id| Id::from_str(id).ok())
+            .map(|id| id.document_id())
+    };
+    Described {
+        name,
+        account_id: id("accountId"),
+        tenant_id: id("memberTenantId"),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn diffs_by_property() {
+        let before = json!({"id": "a", "name": "x", "enabled": true, "gone": 1});
+        let after = json!({"id": "b", "name": "y", "enabled": true, "added": [1]});
+        let changes = diff("x:Thing", Some(&before), Some(&after));
+        assert_eq!(
+            changes,
+            vec![
+                Change::new("added", None, Some(json!([1]))),
+                Change::new("gone", Some(json!(1)), None),
+                Change::new("name", Some(json!("x")), Some(json!("y"))),
+            ]
+        );
+        // A create lists everything that is set
+        assert_eq!(diff("x:Thing", None, Some(&after)).len(), 3);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secrets_are_never_kept() {
+        let before = json!({"apiKey": "old-key", "userPassword": "a", "name": "m"});
+        let after = json!({"apiKey": "new-key", "userPassword": "b", "name": "m"});
+        let changes = diff("x:AiModel", Some(&before), Some(&after));
+        assert_eq!(
+            changes,
+            vec![Change::redacted("apiKey"), Change::redacted("userPassword")]
+        );
+        let text = serde_json::to_string(&changes).unwrap();
+        assert!(!text.contains("new-key"));
+        assert!(!text.contains("old-key"));
+        // Unchanged secrets aren't mentioned at all
+        assert!(diff("x:AiModel", Some(&before), Some(&before)).is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secrets_the_schema_knows() {
+        // x:AiModel's httpAuth holds a secret inside one of its variants
+        if schema::embedded().is_some() {
+            assert!(is_secret("x:AiModel", "httpAuth"));
+            assert!(!is_secret("x:AiModel", "name"));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn patches_with_their_old_values() {
+        let before = json!({"name": "a", "list": [{"on": false}], "secret": "s"});
+        let patch_value = json!({"name": "b", "list/0/on": true, "secret": "t", "new": 3});
+        let changes = patch("x:Thing", Some(&before), patch_value.as_object().unwrap());
+        assert!(changes.contains(&Change::new("name", Some(json!("a")), Some(json!("b")))));
+        assert!(changes.contains(&Change::new(
+            "list/0/on",
+            Some(json!(false)),
+            Some(json!(true))
+        )));
+        assert!(changes.contains(&Change::redacted("secret")));
+        assert!(changes.contains(&Change::new("new", None, Some(json!(3)))));
+        // Nothing to nothing isn't a change
+        let nulls = json!({"description": null});
+        assert!(patch("x:Thing", None, nulls.as_object().unwrap()).is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn describes_targets() {
+        let d = describe(&json!({
+            "name": "example.com",
+            "memberTenantId": Id::from(5u32).to_string(),
+            "accountId": Id::from(9u32).to_string(),
+        }));
+        assert_eq!(
+            d,
+            Described {
+                name: Some("example.com".into()),
+                account_id: Some(9),
+                tenant_id: Some(5)
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(describe(&json!({"n": 1})), Described::default());
+    }
+}

crates/features/src/audit/log.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,984 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The audit log's storage (AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7), in the fork's own
+//! subspace (`store::SUBSPACE_INBUXA`). Every key starts with `L`, then one
+//! byte for the kind:
+//!
+//! - `e` + node + seq: one entry of that node's chain, as JSON. An entry is
+//!   an event, or the outcome of an event written before its change was
+//!   tried. Each holds the SHA-256 of the entry before it on the same node.
+//! - `t` + time + node + seq: the time index of events, for queries.
+//! - `o` + node + seq: the seq of an event's outcome entry.
+//! - `h` + node: the chain's head: that entry's hash, then its seq as the
+//!   last eight bytes, which each append asserts, so two writers can never
+//!   both add the same seq.
+//! - `f` + node: where the chain starts after purging, and the hash the
+//!   first kept entry names.
+//! - `s`: the settings (`keepFor`).
+//!
+//! Numbers are big-endian, so keys sort in time and chain order. Each node
+//! writes only its own chain, so nodes never contend for a key; nothing about
+//! a chain is kept in memory, so a node restarted or rebuilt carries on
+//! from what is stored.
+
+use crate::audit::record::{Action, Outcome, Record};
+use ahash::AHashMap;
+use serde::{Deserialize as SerdeDeserialize, Serialize as SerdeSerialize};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::{fmt, net::IpAddr, str::FromStr};
+use store::{
+    Deserialize, IterateParams, SUBSPACE_INBUXA, Serialize, Store, ValueKey,
+    write::{AnyClass, BatchBuilder, ValueClass, assert::AssertValue},
+};
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use trc::AddContext;
+
+const FEATURE: u8 = b'L';
+const KIND_ENTRY: u8 = b'e';
+const KIND_TIME: u8 = b't';
+const KIND_OUTCOME: u8 = b'o';
+const KIND_HEAD: u8 = b'h';
+const KIND_FLOOR: u8 = b'f';
+const KIND_SETTINGS: u8 = b's';
+
+/// How long entries are kept unless set otherwise: two years (AU-7).
+pub const DEFAULT_KEEP_FOR_SECS: u64 = 730 * 86_400;
+/// The shortest period an administrator may set (AU-7).
+pub const MIN_KEEP_FOR_SECS: u64 = 90 * 86_400;
+/// Most results one query page returns.
+pub const MAX_QUERY_LIMIT: usize = 500;
+/// Keys cleared per purge batch.
+const PURGE_BATCH: usize = 500;
+
+/// Where one entry sits: its node's chain and its place in it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+pub struct EntryId {
+    pub node: u64,
+    pub seq: u64,
+}
+
+impl EntryId {
+    /// As one number, for JMAP ids: the node in the top 16 bits, the seq in
+    /// the rest. Node ids are 16 bits; a chain reaches 2^48 entries never.
+    pub fn to_u64(&self) -> u64 {
+        (self.node << 48) | (self.seq & ((1 << 48) - 1))
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_u64(id: u64) -> Self {
+        EntryId {
+            node: id >> 48,
+            seq: id & ((1 << 48) - 1),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for EntryId {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "{}-{}", self.node, self.seq)
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromStr for EntryId {
+    type Err = ();
+
+    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+        let (node, seq) = s.split_once('-').ok_or(())?;
+        Ok(EntryId {
+            node: node.parse().map_err(|_| ())?,
+            seq: seq.parse().map_err(|_| ())?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// What is kept for one chain entry. The hash of these exact bytes is what
+/// the next entry names as `prev`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct Stored {
+    seq: u64,
+    prev: String,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    entry: Entry,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "entry", rename_all = "camelCase")]
+enum Entry {
+    Event { record: Record },
+    Outcome { of: u64, at: u64, outcome: Outcome },
+}
+
+impl Entry {
+    fn at(&self) -> u64 {
+        match self {
+            Entry::Event { record } => record.at,
+            Entry::Outcome { at, .. } => *at,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq)]
+struct Head {
+    seq: u64,
+    hash: String,
+}
+
+impl Head {
+    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let mut bytes = self.hash.as_bytes().to_vec();
+        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.seq.to_be_bytes());
+        bytes
+    }
+}
+
+impl Deserialize for Head {
+    fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> trc::Result<Self> {
+        let split = bytes.len().checked_sub(8).ok_or_else(|| {
+            trc::StoreEvent::DataCorruption
+                .into_err()
+                .details("Invalid audit chain head")
+        })?;
+        Ok(Head {
+            seq: u64::from_be_bytes(bytes[split..].try_into().unwrap()),
+            hash: String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes[..split]).into_owned(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+async fn head(data: &Store, node: u64) -> trc::Result<Option<Head>> {
+    data.get_value::<Head>(key(KIND_HEAD, &[node]))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())
+}
+
+/// Attempts at an append that another writer beat to the same seq.
+const APPEND_ATTEMPTS: usize = 5;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+struct Floor {
+    seq: u64,
+    prev: String,
+}
+
+/// The audit log's settings (`inbuxa:AuditSettings`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Settings {
+    pub keep_for_secs: u64,
+}
+
+impl Default for Settings {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Settings {
+            keep_for_secs: DEFAULT_KEEP_FOR_SECS,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A value stored as JSON.
+struct Json<T>(T);
+
+impl<T: SerdeSerialize> Serialize for Json<T> {
+    fn serialize(&self) -> trc::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        serde_json::to_vec(&self.0).map_err(|err| {
+            trc::StoreEvent::UnexpectedError
+                .into_err()
+                .details("Failed to serialize audit entry")
+                .reason(err)
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned + Sync + Send> Deserialize for Json<T> {
+    fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> trc::Result<Self> {
+        serde_json::from_slice(bytes).map(Json).map_err(|err| {
+            trc::StoreEvent::DataCorruption
+                .into_err()
+                .details("Invalid audit entry")
+                .reason(err)
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Raw bytes, for entries whose hash is checked.
+struct Raw(Vec<u8>);
+
+impl Deserialize for Raw {
+    fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> trc::Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Raw(bytes.to_vec()))
+    }
+}
+
+struct U64(u64);
+
+impl Deserialize for U64 {
+    fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> trc::Result<Self> {
+        bytes
+            .try_into()
+            .map(|bytes| U64(u64::from_be_bytes(bytes)))
+            .map_err(|_| {
+                trc::StoreEvent::DataCorruption
+                    .into_err()
+                    .details("Invalid audit outcome pointer")
+            })
+    }
+}
+
+fn class(kind: u8, parts: &[u64]) -> ValueClass {
+    let mut key = Vec::with_capacity(2 + parts.len() * 8);
+    key.push(FEATURE);
+    key.push(kind);
+    for part in parts {
+        key.extend_from_slice(&part.to_be_bytes());
+    }
+    ValueClass::Any(AnyClass {
+        subspace: SUBSPACE_INBUXA,
+        key,
+    })
+}
+
+fn key(kind: u8, parts: &[u64]) -> ValueKey<ValueClass> {
+    ValueKey::from(class(kind, parts))
+}
+
+/// Where an entry is kept, for tests and tools that check tampering is
+/// caught.
+pub fn entry_key(id: EntryId) -> ValueKey<ValueClass> {
+    key(KIND_ENTRY, &[id.node, id.seq])
+}
+
+/// Where a node's chain head is kept, for the same.
+pub fn head_key(node: u64) -> ValueKey<ValueClass> {
+    key(KIND_HEAD, &[node])
+}
+
+/// The numbers after the kind byte, read from the key's tail: the iterator
+/// may or may not hand back the subspace byte.
+fn parse_key(key: &[u8], kind: u8, parts: usize) -> Option<Vec<u64>> {
+    let len = 2 + parts * 8;
+    let tail = key.get(key.len().checked_sub(len)?..)?;
+    (tail[0] == FEATURE && tail[1] == kind).then_some(())?;
+    Some(
+        tail[2..]
+            .chunks_exact(8)
+            .map(|chunk| u64::from_be_bytes(chunk.try_into().unwrap()))
+            .collect(),
+    )
+}
+
+fn hash(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    Sha256::digest(bytes)
+        .iter()
+        .map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Lines up this process's appends, so they rarely race for a head; the
+/// store's assert settles any that still do.
+static APPENDING: Mutex<()> = Mutex::const_new(());
+
+/// What a node keeps in memory: which accesses it has recorded lately
+/// (AU-1.6).
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct AuditLog {
+    recent_access: std::sync::Mutex<AHashMap<(u32, u32, u8), u64>>,
+}
+
+/// A query over events (AU-9), newest first.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct Filter {
+    /// From this time on, in ms.
+    pub after: Option<u64>,
+    /// Before this time, in ms.
+    pub before: Option<u64>,
+    pub actor_id: Option<u32>,
+    pub action: Option<Action>,
+    pub target_kind: Option<String>,
+    pub target_id: Option<String>,
+    pub account_id: Option<u32>,
+    /// Records whose actor or target is in this tenant.
+    pub tenant_id: Option<u32>,
+    pub outcome: Option<String>,
+    pub remote_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
+    /// Words that must all appear in the actor's or target's name, the
+    /// target kind, or the details, ignoring case.
+    pub text: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl Filter {
+    pub fn matches(&self, record: &Record) -> bool {
+        self.after.is_none_or(|after| record.at >= after)
+            && self.before.is_none_or(|before| record.at < before)
+            && self
+                .actor_id
+                .is_none_or(|actor| record.actor.account_id == Some(actor))
+            && self.action.is_none_or(|action| record.action == action)
+            && self
+                .target_kind
+                .as_ref()
+                .is_none_or(|kind| record.target.kind.eq_ignore_ascii_case(kind))
+            && self
+                .target_id
+                .as_ref()
+                .is_none_or(|target| record.target.id.as_ref() == Some(target))
+            && self.account_id.is_none_or(|account| {
+                record.target.account_id == Some(account)
+                    || record.actor.account_id == Some(account)
+                    || (record.target.kind == "x:Account"
+                        && record.target.id.as_deref()
+                            == Some(types::id::Id::from(account).to_string().as_str()))
+            })
+            && self
+                .tenant_id
+                .is_none_or(|tenant| in_tenant(record, tenant))
+            && self
+                .outcome
+                .as_ref()
+                .is_none_or(|outcome| record.outcome.as_str() == outcome)
+            && self.remote_ip.is_none_or(|ip| record.remote_ip == Some(ip))
+            && self.text.as_ref().is_none_or(|text| {
+                let haystack = format!(
+                    "{} {} {} {} {}",
+                    record.actor.name,
+                    record.target.kind,
+                    record.target.name.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+                    record.details.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+                    record.reason.as_deref().unwrap_or_default()
+                )
+                .to_lowercase();
+                text.to_lowercase()
+                    .split_whitespace()
+                    .all(|word| haystack.contains(word))
+            })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether a tenant administrator may see a record: its actor or its
+/// target is in the tenant (AU-9).
+pub fn in_tenant(record: &Record, tenant_id: u32) -> bool {
+    record.actor.tenant_id == Some(tenant_id) || record.target.tenant_id == Some(tenant_id)
+}
+
+/// One node's chain, as `verify` found it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, SerdeSerialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct ChainReport {
+    pub node: u64,
+    pub entries: u64,
+    pub first_seq: u64,
+    pub last_seq: u64,
+    /// The first entry that doesn't follow from the one before it, or the
+    /// head that doesn't match the last entry.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub broken_at: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub reason: Option<String>,
+    /// Events written before their change whose outcome never followed.
+    pub unfinished: u64,
+}
+
+impl AuditLog {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self::default()
+    }
+
+    /// Appends an event to this node's chain. An error means nothing was
+    /// written, and the caller must not go ahead with the change (AU-3).
+    pub async fn append(&self, data: &Store, node: u64, record: &Record) -> trc::Result<EntryId> {
+        self.append_entry(
+            data,
+            node,
+            Entry::Event {
+                record: record.clone(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+
+    /// Appends the outcome of an event written as pending.
+    pub async fn finish(
+        &self,
+        data: &Store,
+        node: u64,
+        of: EntryId,
+        at: u64,
+        outcome: Outcome,
+    ) -> trc::Result<EntryId> {
+        self.append_entry(
+            data,
+            node,
+            Entry::Outcome {
+                of: of.seq,
+                at,
+                outcome,
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+
+    async fn append_entry(&self, data: &Store, node: u64, entry: Entry) -> trc::Result<EntryId> {
+        let _appending = APPENDING.lock().await;
+        let at = entry.at();
+        let event_of = match &entry {
+            Entry::Outcome { of, .. } => Some(*of),
+            Entry::Event { .. } => None,
+        };
+        let mut stored = Stored {
+            seq: 0,
+            prev: String::new(),
+            entry,
+        };
+        let mut attempt = 0;
+        loop {
+            attempt += 1;
+            let current = head(data, node).await?;
+            let (seq, prev) = current
+                .as_ref()
+                .map_or((1, String::new()), |head| (head.seq + 1, head.hash.clone()));
+            stored.seq = seq;
+            stored.prev = prev;
+            let bytes = Json(&stored).serialize()?;
+            let new_head = Head {
+                seq,
+                hash: hash(&bytes),
+            };
+
+            let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+            batch.assert_value(
+                class(KIND_HEAD, &[node]),
+                current.map_or(AssertValue::None, |head| AssertValue::U64(head.seq)),
+            );
+            batch.set(class(KIND_ENTRY, &[node, seq]), bytes);
+            match event_of {
+                None => {
+                    batch.set(class(KIND_TIME, &[at, node, seq]), vec![]);
+                }
+                Some(of) => {
+                    batch.set(class(KIND_OUTCOME, &[node, of]), seq.to_be_bytes().to_vec());
+                }
+            }
+            batch.set(class(KIND_HEAD, &[node]), new_head.to_bytes());
+            match data.write(batch.build_all()).await {
+                Ok(_) => return Ok(EntryId { node, seq }),
+                Err(err)
+                    if attempt < APPEND_ATTEMPTS
+                        && matches!(
+                            err.as_ref(),
+                            trc::EventType::Store(trc::StoreEvent::AssertValueFailed)
+                        ) =>
+                {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                Err(err) => return Err(err.caused_by(trc::location!())),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Whether an access of `target` by `actor` (kind 0: account, 1: blob)
+    /// is the first this hour on this node, and so should be recorded
+    /// (AU-1.6). Marks it recorded.
+    pub fn first_access_this_hour(&self, actor: u32, target: u32, kind: u8, now_secs: u64) -> bool {
+        let hour = now_secs / 3600;
+        let mut recent = self.recent_access.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
+        if recent.len() > 10_000 {
+            recent.retain(|_, seen| *seen == hour);
+        }
+        recent.insert((actor, target, kind), hour) != Some(hour)
+    }
+
+    /// Forgets which accesses were recorded, so the next is recorded again
+    /// (after a write failed).
+    pub fn forget_access(&self, actor: u32, target: u32, kind: u8) {
+        self.recent_access
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
+            .remove(&(actor, target, kind));
+    }
+}
+
+/// One event with its outcome, when that was written separately.
+pub async fn get(data: &Store, id: EntryId) -> trc::Result<Option<Record>> {
+    let Some(Json(stored)) = data
+        .get_value::<Json<Stored>>(key(KIND_ENTRY, &[id.node, id.seq]))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+    else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let Entry::Event { mut record } = stored.entry else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    if record.outcome == Outcome::Pending
+        && let Some(U64(outcome_seq)) = data
+            .get_value::<U64>(key(KIND_OUTCOME, &[id.node, id.seq]))
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+        && let Some(Json(Stored {
+            entry: Entry::Outcome { outcome, .. },
+            ..
+        })) = data
+            .get_value::<Json<Stored>>(key(KIND_ENTRY, &[id.node, outcome_seq]))
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+    {
+        record.outcome = outcome;
+    }
+    Ok(Some(record))
+}
+
+/// One event with its outcome, and the hash of its entry and the hash that
+/// entry follows: what an export carries so a recipient can match it
+/// against a later verification (AU-11).
+pub async fn get_with_hash(
+    data: &Store,
+    id: EntryId,
+) -> trc::Result<Option<(Record, String, String)>> {
+    let Some(Raw(bytes)) = data
+        .get_value::<Raw>(key(KIND_ENTRY, &[id.node, id.seq]))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+    else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let Json(stored) = Json::<Stored>::deserialize(&bytes)?;
+    if !matches!(stored.entry, Entry::Event { .. }) {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let entry_hash = hash(&bytes);
+    Ok(get(data, id)
+        .await?
+        .map(|record| (record, entry_hash, stored.prev)))
+}
+
+/// Every event matching `filter`, newest first, up to `max`: for exports.
+pub async fn query_all(data: &Store, filter: &Filter, max: usize) -> trc::Result<Vec<EntryId>> {
+    query_inner(data, filter, 0, max, false)
+        .await
+        .map(|(ids, _)| ids)
+}
+
+/// Events matching `filter`, newest first: the ids from `position`, at most
+/// `limit` of them, and how many match in all when `count_all` is set.
+pub async fn query(
+    data: &Store,
+    filter: &Filter,
+    position: usize,
+    limit: usize,
+    count_all: bool,
+) -> trc::Result<(Vec<EntryId>, usize)> {
+    query_inner(
+        data,
+        filter,
+        position,
+        limit.min(MAX_QUERY_LIMIT),
+        count_all,
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+async fn query_inner(
+    data: &Store,
+    filter: &Filter,
+    position: usize,
+    limit: usize,
+    count_all: bool,
+) -> trc::Result<(Vec<EntryId>, usize)> {
+    let from = filter.after.unwrap_or(0);
+    let to = filter
+        .before
+        .map_or(u64::MAX, |before| before.saturating_sub(1));
+    if from > to {
+        return Ok((Vec::new(), 0));
+    }
+
+    // Walk the time index newest first, collecting candidates
+    let mut candidates = Vec::new();
+    data.iterate(
+        IterateParams::new(
+            key(KIND_TIME, &[from, 0, 0]),
+            key(KIND_TIME, &[to, u64::MAX, u64::MAX]),
+        )
+        .descending()
+        .no_values(),
+        |key, _| {
+            if let Some(parts) = parse_key(key, KIND_TIME, 3) {
+                candidates.push(EntryId {
+                    node: parts[1],
+                    seq: parts[2],
+                });
+            }
+            Ok(true)
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+    .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+
+    let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(limit);
+    let mut matched = 0;
+    for id in candidates {
+        if !count_all && ids.len() >= limit {
+            break;
+        }
+        let Some(record) = get(data, id).await? else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        if filter.matches(&record) {
+            if matched >= position && ids.len() < limit {
+                ids.push(id);
+            }
+            matched += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    Ok((ids, matched))
+}
+
+pub async fn settings(data: &Store) -> trc::Result<Settings> {
+    Ok(data
+        .get_value::<Json<Settings>>(key(KIND_SETTINGS, &[]))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+        .map(|Json(settings)| settings)
+        .unwrap_or_default())
+}
+
+pub async fn set_settings(data: &Store, settings: &Settings) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    batch.set(class(KIND_SETTINGS, &[]), Json(settings).serialize()?);
+    data.write(batch.build_all())
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())
+        .map(|_| ())
+}
+
+/// The nodes that have a chain.
+async fn nodes(data: &Store) -> trc::Result<Vec<u64>> {
+    let mut nodes = Vec::new();
+    data.iterate(
+        IterateParams::new(key(KIND_HEAD, &[0]), key(KIND_HEAD, &[u64::MAX])).no_values(),
+        |key, _| {
+            if let Some(parts) = parse_key(key, KIND_HEAD, 1) {
+                nodes.push(parts[0]);
+            }
+            Ok(true)
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+    .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    Ok(nodes)
+}
+
+async fn floor(data: &Store, node: u64) -> trc::Result<Floor> {
+    Ok(data
+        .get_value::<Json<Floor>>(key(KIND_FLOOR, &[node]))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+        .map(|Json(floor)| floor)
+        .unwrap_or(Floor {
+            seq: 1,
+            prev: String::new(),
+        }))
+}
+
+/// Removes, from the start of every node's chain, the entries older than
+/// `cutoff` (ms), stopping at the first one that is newer or that `keep`
+/// holds on to (AU-7, LH-6). The chain stays verifiable: its new start and
+/// the hash that start names are recorded. Returns how many were removed.
+pub async fn purge(
+    data: &Store,
+    cutoff: u64,
+    keep: impl Fn(&Record) -> bool + Sync + Send,
+) -> trc::Result<usize> {
+    let mut removed = 0;
+    for node in nodes(data).await? {
+        let start = floor(data, node).await?;
+        let mut doomed: Vec<(u64, Stored)> = Vec::new();
+        let mut new_floor = None;
+        data.iterate(
+            IterateParams::new(
+                key(KIND_ENTRY, &[node, start.seq]),
+                key(KIND_ENTRY, &[node, u64::MAX]),
+            )
+            .ascending(),
+            |key, value| {
+                let Some(parts) = parse_key(key, KIND_ENTRY, 2) else {
+                    return Ok(true);
+                };
+                let Json(stored) = Json::<Stored>::deserialize(value)?;
+                let held = matches!(&stored.entry, Entry::Event { record } if keep(record));
+                if stored.entry.at() >= cutoff || held || doomed.len() >= 100_000 {
+                    new_floor = Some(Floor {
+                        seq: parts[1],
+                        prev: stored.prev,
+                    });
+                    return Ok(false);
+                }
+                doomed.push((parts[1], stored));
+                Ok(true)
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+
+        if doomed.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        // With nothing newer, the chain continues from its head
+        let new_floor = match new_floor {
+            Some(floor) => floor,
+            None => {
+                let head = head(data, node).await?.unwrap_or_default();
+                Floor {
+                    seq: head.seq + 1,
+                    prev: head.hash,
+                }
+            }
+        };
+
+        // The floor moves first: a purge cut short leaves entries before it,
+        // which the next run clears, never a chain that looks broken
+        let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+        batch.set(class(KIND_FLOOR, &[node]), Json(&new_floor).serialize()?);
+        data.write(batch.build_all())
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+
+        for chunk in doomed.chunks(PURGE_BATCH / 3) {
+            let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+            for (seq, stored) in chunk {
+                batch.clear(class(KIND_ENTRY, &[node, *seq]));
+                match &stored.entry {
+                    Entry::Event { record } => {
+                        batch
+                            .clear(class(KIND_TIME, &[record.at, node, *seq]))
+                            .clear(class(KIND_OUTCOME, &[node, *seq]));
+                    }
+                    Entry::Outcome { .. } => {}
+                }
+            }
+            data.write(batch.build_all())
+                .await
+                .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+            removed += chunk.len();
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(removed)
+}
+
+/// Rechecks every node's chain (AU-6): each entry must name the hash of the
+/// one before it, seqs must run without gaps from the chain's start, and the
+/// head must match the last entry.
+pub async fn verify(data: &Store) -> trc::Result<Vec<ChainReport>> {
+    let mut reports = Vec::new();
+    for node in nodes(data).await? {
+        let start = floor(data, node).await?;
+        let head = head(data, node).await?.unwrap_or_default();
+        let mut report = ChainReport {
+            node,
+            entries: 0,
+            first_seq: start.seq,
+            last_seq: start.seq.saturating_sub(1),
+            broken_at: None,
+            reason: None,
+            unfinished: 0,
+        };
+        let mut expected_seq = start.seq;
+        let mut expected_prev = start.prev.clone();
+        let mut pending: ahash::AHashSet<u64> = Default::default();
+
+        data.iterate(
+            IterateParams::new(
+                key(KIND_ENTRY, &[node, start.seq]),
+                key(KIND_ENTRY, &[node, u64::MAX]),
+            )
+            .ascending(),
+            |key, value| {
+                let Some(parts) = parse_key(key, KIND_ENTRY, 2) else {
+                    return Ok(true);
+                };
+                let seq = parts[1];
+                let broken = |report: &mut ChainReport, reason: String| {
+                    report.broken_at = Some(EntryId { node, seq }.to_string());
+                    report.reason = Some(reason);
+                };
+                let Raw(bytes) = Raw::deserialize(value)?;
+                let Ok(Json(stored)) = Json::<Stored>::deserialize(&bytes) else {
+                    broken(&mut report, "The entry can't be read.".into());
+                    return Ok(false);
+                };
+                if seq != expected_seq || stored.seq != seq {
+                    broken(
+                        &mut report,
+                        format!("Entry {expected_seq} is missing; the next one found is {seq}."),
+                    );
+                    return Ok(false);
+                }
+                if stored.prev != expected_prev {
+                    broken(
+                        &mut report,
+                        "The entry doesn't follow from the one before it: one of them was changed."
+                            .into(),
+                    );
+                    return Ok(false);
+                }
+                match &stored.entry {
+                    Entry::Event { record } if record.outcome == Outcome::Pending => {
+                        pending.insert(seq);
+                    }
+                    Entry::Outcome { of, .. } => {
+                        pending.remove(of);
+                    }
+                    Entry::Event { .. } => {}
+                }
+                expected_prev = hash(&bytes);
+                expected_seq = seq + 1;
+                report.entries += 1;
+                report.last_seq = seq;
+                Ok(true)
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+
+        if report.broken_at.is_none() {
+            if head.seq != report.last_seq || (report.entries > 0 && head.hash != expected_prev) {
+                report.broken_at = Some(
+                    EntryId {
+                        node,
+                        seq: report.last_seq,
+                    }
+                    .to_string(),
+                );
+                report.reason = Some(
+                    "The chain's recorded end doesn't match its last entry: entries were \
+                     removed or changed at the end."
+                        .into(),
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        report.unfinished = pending.len() as u64;
+        reports.push(report);
+    }
+    Ok(reports)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn keys_read_back() {
+        let ValueClass::Any(any) = class(KIND_TIME, &[5, 3, 9]) else {
+            panic!()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(parse_key(&any.key, KIND_TIME, 3), Some(vec![5, 3, 9]));
+        let mut with_subspace = vec![SUBSPACE_INBUXA];
+        with_subspace.extend_from_slice(&any.key);
+        assert_eq!(parse_key(&with_subspace, KIND_TIME, 3), Some(vec![5, 3, 9]));
+        assert_eq!(parse_key(&any.key, KIND_ENTRY, 3), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ids_read_back() {
+        let id = EntryId { node: 2, seq: 1042 };
+        assert_eq!(id.to_string(), "2-1042");
+        assert_eq!("2-1042".parse::<EntryId>(), Ok(id));
+        assert!("2".parse::<EntryId>().is_err());
+        assert!("a-1".parse::<EntryId>().is_err());
+        assert_eq!(EntryId::from_u64(id.to_u64()), id);
+        let big = EntryId {
+            node: 65535,
+            seq: (1 << 48) - 1,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(EntryId::from_u64(big.to_u64()), big);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filters() {
+        use crate::audit::record::{Actor, Target};
+        let record = Record {
+            at: 1000,
+            actor: Actor::account(7, "[email protected]", Some(4)),
+            via: None,
+            remote_ip: None,
+            action: Action::Update,
+            target: Target {
+                kind: "x:Domain".into(),
+                id: Some("d".into()),
+                name: Some("example.org".into()),
+                tenant_id: Some(9),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+            changes: vec![],
+            details: None,
+            reason: None,
+            outcome: Outcome::success(),
+        };
+        let yes = |filter: Filter| assert!(filter.matches(&record), "{filter:?}");
+        let no = |filter: Filter| assert!(!filter.matches(&record), "{filter:?}");
+        yes(Filter::default());
+        yes(Filter {
+            after: Some(1000),
+            before: Some(1001),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        no(Filter {
+            before: Some(1000),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        yes(Filter {
+            tenant_id: Some(4),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        yes(Filter {
+            tenant_id: Some(9),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        no(Filter {
+            tenant_id: Some(5),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        yes(Filter {
+            text: Some("admin EXAMPLE.ORG".into()),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        no(Filter {
+            text: Some("admin other".into()),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        yes(Filter {
+            outcome: Some("success".into()),
+            action: Some(Action::Update),
+            target_kind: Some("x:domain".into()),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        no(Filter {
+            actor_id: Some(8),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn heads_read_back() {
+        let head = Head {
+            seq: 77,
+            hash: hash(b"x"),
+        };
+        let bytes = head.to_bytes();
+        assert!(AssertValue::U64(77).matches(&bytes));
+        assert!(!AssertValue::U64(76).matches(&bytes));
+        assert_eq!(Head::deserialize(&bytes).unwrap(), head);
+        assert!(Head::deserialize(b"short").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hashes_are_sha256_hex() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            hash(b""),
+            "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/features/src/audit/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The audit log (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-1 to AU-11): a permanent record
+//! of what administrators and the server itself did to the control plane,
+//! kept in the fork's own subspace as one hash chain per node.
+//!
+//! - `record`: what one entry says.
+//! - `log`: appending to the chain, reading, querying, purging, verifying.
+//! - `scope`: who is acting, carried with the task, so a registry write the
+//!   server makes on its own is told apart from one a request made.
+//! - `diff`: what changed in a registry object, with secrets redacted.
+
+pub mod diff;
+pub mod log;
+pub mod record;
+pub mod scope;
+
+pub use log::{AuditLog, EntryId};
+pub use record::{Action, Actor, Change, Outcome, Record, Target, Via};

crates/features/src/audit/record.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! What an audit entry holds (AU-4). Stored as JSON, so entries written by
+//! one version of the fork read back in the next.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::net::IpAddr;
+
+/// Longest value kept for one side of a change; longer ones are cut, with
+/// their original length noted.
+pub const MAX_VALUE_LEN: usize = 2048;
+
+/// One thing that happened.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Record {
+    /// Milliseconds since the epoch.
+    pub at: u64,
+    pub actor: Actor,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub via: Option<Via>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub remote_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
+    pub action: Action,
+    pub target: Target,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub changes: Vec<Change>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub details: Option<String>,
+    /// Why, as the actor gave it: required for holds, locks and exports,
+    /// optional for everything else.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub reason: Option<String>,
+    pub outcome: Outcome,
+}
+
+/// Who acted: an account, named as it was then, or the server itself.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Actor {
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub account_id: Option<u32>,
+    /// The account's name, or `system:<subsystem>`.
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub tenant_id: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+impl Actor {
+    pub fn account(account_id: u32, name: impl Into<String>, tenant_id: Option<u32>) -> Self {
+        Actor {
+            account_id: Some(account_id),
+            name: name.into(),
+            tenant_id,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn system(subsystem: &str) -> Self {
+        Actor {
+            account_id: None,
+            name: format!("system:{subsystem}"),
+            tenant_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_system(&self) -> bool {
+        self.account_id.is_none()
+    }
+}
+
+/// How the actor signed in (AU-5).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub enum Via {
+    Password,
+    AppPassword {
+        id: u32,
+    },
+    ApiKey {
+        id: u32,
+    },
+    #[serde(rename = "oauth")]
+    OAuth {
+        client: String,
+    },
+    /// A token from an external directory (OIDC).
+    Directory,
+    /// Signed in as someone else with a master user's password.
+    #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+    Master {
+        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+        account_id: Option<u32>,
+        name: String,
+    },
+    /// The recovery administrator from the server's own configuration.
+    Recovery,
+}
+
+/// What kind of thing happened.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub enum Action {
+    Create,
+    Update,
+    Destroy,
+    SignIn,
+    SignInFailed,
+    /// JMAP access to another account through `Impersonate`.
+    AccountAccess,
+    /// A blob of another account read through `FetchAnyBlob`.
+    BlobAccess,
+    Export,
+    Verify,
+}
+
+impl Action {
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Action::Create => "create",
+            Action::Update => "update",
+            Action::Destroy => "destroy",
+            Action::SignIn => "signIn",
+            Action::SignInFailed => "signInFailed",
+            Action::AccountAccess => "accountAccess",
+            Action::BlobAccess => "blobAccess",
+            Action::Export => "export",
+            Action::Verify => "verify",
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn parse(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        Some(match value {
+            "create" => Action::Create,
+            "update" => Action::Update,
+            "destroy" => Action::Destroy,
+            "signIn" => Action::SignIn,
+            "signInFailed" => Action::SignInFailed,
+            "accountAccess" => Action::AccountAccess,
+            "blobAccess" => Action::BlobAccess,
+            "export" => Action::Export,
+            "verify" => Action::Verify,
+            _ => return None,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// What it happened to.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Target {
+    /// An object type (`x:Domain`, `inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy`), or `account`
+    /// for sign-ins and access.
+    pub kind: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub id: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub name: Option<String>,
+    /// The account the object belongs to, when it belongs to one.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub account_id: Option<u32>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub tenant_id: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+/// One property's change. A secret is never stored: `redacted` says it
+/// changed, and both sides are left out (AU-4).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Change {
+    pub field: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub before: Option<Value>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub after: Option<Value>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
+    pub redacted: bool,
+}
+
+impl Change {
+    pub fn new(field: impl Into<String>, before: Option<Value>, after: Option<Value>) -> Self {
+        Change {
+            field: field.into(),
+            before: before.map(shorten),
+            after: after.map(shorten),
+            redacted: false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn redacted(field: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Change {
+            field: field.into(),
+            before: None,
+            after: None,
+            redacted: true,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// How it ended.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(
+    tag = "status",
+    rename_all = "camelCase",
+    rename_all_fields = "camelCase"
+)]
+pub enum Outcome {
+    Success {
+        /// The id a create was given.
+        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+        created_id: Option<String>,
+    },
+    Refused {
+        /// The JMAP error type (`forbidden`, `invalidProperties`, …).
+        error: String,
+        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+        description: Option<String>,
+    },
+    /// Written before the change was tried; its outcome follows in a later
+    /// entry, or never if the server stopped in between (AU-3).
+    Pending,
+}
+
+impl Outcome {
+    pub fn success() -> Self {
+        Outcome::Success { created_id: None }
+    }
+
+    pub fn refused(error: impl Into<String>, description: Option<String>) -> Self {
+        Outcome::Refused {
+            error: error.into(),
+            description: description.map(|d| shorten_str(d, 500)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Outcome::Success { .. } => "success",
+            Outcome::Refused { .. } => "refused",
+            Outcome::Pending => "pending",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Cuts a long value, keeping it valid JSON.
+pub fn shorten(value: Value) -> Value {
+    match value {
+        Value::String(s) if s.len() > MAX_VALUE_LEN => Value::String(shorten_str(s, MAX_VALUE_LEN)),
+        Value::String(_) | Value::Null | Value::Bool(_) | Value::Number(_) => value,
+        other => {
+            let text = other.to_string();
+            if text.len() > MAX_VALUE_LEN {
+                Value::String(shorten_str(text, MAX_VALUE_LEN))
+            } else {
+                other
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn shorten_str(s: String, max: usize) -> String {
+    if s.len() <= max {
+        return s;
+    }
+    let mut end = max;
+    while !s.is_char_boundary(end) {
+        end -= 1;
+    }
+    format!("{}… ({} bytes in all)", &s[..end], s.len())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reads_back_as_written() {
+        let record = Record {
+            at: 1_800_000_000_000,
+            actor: Actor::account(3, "[email protected]", None),
+            via: Some(Via::OAuth {
+                client: "inbuxa-admin".into(),
+            }),
+            remote_ip: Some("192.0.2.1".parse().unwrap()),
+            action: Action::Update,
+            target: Target {
+                kind: "x:Domain".into(),
+                id: Some("b".into()),
+                name: Some("example.com".into()),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+            changes: vec![
+                Change::new("isEnabled", Some(true.into()), Some(false.into())),
+                Change::redacted("secret"),
+            ],
+            details: None,
+            reason: Some("Ticket 42".into()),
+            outcome: Outcome::Pending,
+        };
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&record).unwrap();
+        assert!(json.contains("\"kind\":\"oauth\""));
+        let created = serde_json::to_string(&Outcome::Success {
+            created_id: Some("c".into()),
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(created, r#"{"status":"success","createdId":"c"}"#);
+        assert!(json.contains("\"redacted\":true"));
+        assert!(!json.contains("\"details\""));
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Record>(&json).unwrap(), record);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn long_values_are_cut() {
+        let long = "é".repeat(MAX_VALUE_LEN);
+        let Value::String(cut) = shorten(Value::String(long.clone())) else {
+            panic!()
+        };
+        assert!(cut.len() < long.len());
+        assert!(cut.ends_with(&format!("({} bytes in all)", long.len())));
+        let array = Value::Array((0..2000).map(Value::from).collect());
+        assert!(shorten(array).is_string());
+        assert_eq!(shorten(Value::from(5)), Value::from(5));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn actions_round_trip() {
+        for action in [
+            Action::Create,
+            Action::Update,
+            Action::Destroy,
+            Action::SignIn,
+            Action::SignInFailed,
+            Action::AccountAccess,
+            Action::BlobAccess,
+            Action::Export,
+            Action::Verify,
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(Action::parse(action.as_str()), Some(action));
+            assert_eq!(
+                serde_json::to_value(action).unwrap(),
+                Value::String(action.as_str().into())
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/features/src/audit/scope.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! Who a registry write is for, carried with the task that makes it.
+//!
+//! A JMAP request records its own changes, with the actor and what was
+//! asked (AU-1.1), so the registry's write hook stays quiet inside one. A
+//! write outside any request is the server acting on its own (AU-1.10) and
+//! is recorded by the hook, under the subsystem named here or as
+//! `system:server` when none is.
+
+use std::future::Future;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Scope {
+    /// A request that records its own changes.
+    Request,
+    /// The server acting on its own, in the named subsystem.
+    System(&'static str),
+    /// Writes counted, not recorded one by one: a bulk update records one
+    /// summary itself (spam rules from an update, for one).
+    Quiet,
+}
+
+tokio::task_local! {
+    static SCOPE: Scope;
+}
+
+/// Runs `f` as a request that records its own changes.
+pub async fn request<F: Future>(f: F) -> F::Output {
+    SCOPE.scope(Scope::Request, f).await
+}
+
+/// Runs `f` as the server's own `subsystem`.
+pub async fn system<F: Future>(subsystem: &'static str, f: F) -> F::Output {
+    SCOPE.scope(Scope::System(subsystem), f).await
+}
+
+/// Runs `f` without recording its registry writes one by one.
+pub async fn quiet<F: Future>(f: F) -> F::Output {
+    SCOPE.scope(Scope::Quiet, f).await
+}
+
+/// The scope the current task runs in, if any.
+pub fn current() -> Option<Scope> {
+    SCOPE.try_with(|scope| *scope).ok()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn nested_scopes() {
+        assert_eq!(current(), None);
+        system("acme", async {
+            assert_eq!(current(), Some(Scope::System("acme")));
+            request(async {
+                assert_eq!(current(), Some(Scope::Request));
+            })
+            .await;
+            assert_eq!(current(), Some(Scope::System("acme")));
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(current(), None);
+    }
+}

crates/features/src/lib.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@
 //! `common::Server`.
 
 pub mod ai;
+pub mod audit;
 pub mod branding;
+pub mod lock;
 pub mod masked_email;
 pub mod security;
 pub mod tenancy;

crates/features/src/lock/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! Account lock with delegation (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-1 to AL-12).
+//!
+//! A locked account keeps receiving mail but can't sign in, by any means,
+//! and sends nothing on its own. Delegates open it as a separate account,
+//! through real ACL grants on its containers (the sharing every protocol
+//! already honors), at a level the administrator chose.
+//!
+//! Kept in the fork's subspace (`store::SUBSPACE_INBUXA`). Every key starts
+//! with `K`, then one byte for the kind:
+//!
+//! - `l` + account: the lock, as JSON.
+//! - `d` + delegate + account: an index, so a delegate's access token can
+//!   find the accounts delegated to it with one scan.
+//!
+//! Numbers are big-endian. Nothing is cached in memory: the access token is
+//! the cache, built from these keys and invalidated on every change.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize as SerdeDeserialize, Serialize as SerdeSerialize};
+use store::{
+    Deserialize, IterateParams, SUBSPACE_INBUXA, Serialize, Store, ValueKey,
+    write::{AnyClass, BatchBuilder, ValueClass},
+};
+use trc::AddContext;
+
+/// Rung when a lock is written, so this node's expiry timer re-reads the
+/// `until` dates (AL-5): a delegation ends at its time, not at a sweep.
+pub static UNTIL_CHANGED: tokio::sync::Notify = tokio::sync::Notify::const_new();
+
+/// The soonest `until` still ahead of `now`, across every lock.
+pub fn next_until(locks: &[Lock], now: u64) -> Option<u64> {
+    locks
+        .iter()
+        .flat_map(|lock| &lock.delegates)
+        .filter_map(|delegate| delegate.until)
+        .filter(|until| *until > now)
+        .min()
+}
+
+/// Locks with a delegation that ended in `(after, now]`.
+pub fn ended_between(locks: &[Lock], after: u64, now: u64) -> impl Iterator<Item = u32> + '_ {
+    locks
+        .iter()
+        .filter(move |lock| {
+            lock.delegates
+                .iter()
+                .any(|d| d.until.is_some_and(|until| until > after && until <= now))
+        })
+        .map(|lock| lock.account_id)
+}
+use types::{
+    acl::{Acl, AclGrant},
+    collection::Collection,
+};
+use utils::map::bitmap::Bitmap;
+
+const FEATURE: u8 = b'K';
+const KIND_LOCK: u8 = b'l';
+const KIND_DELEGATE: u8 = b'd';
+
+/// Most delegates one lock may have (AL-5).
+pub const MAX_DELEGATES: usize = 10;
+
+/// What a delegate may do in the locked account (AL-6).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub enum Access {
+    /// See and download everything; change nothing, not even `$seen`.
+    Read,
+    /// Read, set keywords, move mail and create and rename folders; never
+    /// destroy.
+    Organize,
+    /// Everything the owner could do. Deletions are still kept under a hold.
+    Full,
+}
+
+impl Access {
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Access::Read => "read",
+            Access::Organize => "organize",
+            Access::Full => "full",
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn parse(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match value {
+            "read" => Some(Access::Read),
+            "organize" => Some(Access::Organize),
+            "full" => Some(Access::Full),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Whether a delegate at this level may destroy anything.
+    pub fn may_destroy(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, Access::Full)
+    }
+
+    /// The rights granted on one container. `is_trash` marks a mailbox with
+    /// the Trash or Junk role: an organizing delegate may read it, but not
+    /// move mail into it, since mail there is destroyed in time.
+    pub fn grants(&self, collection: Collection, is_trash: bool) -> Bitmap<Acl> {
+        let read = [Acl::Read, Acl::ReadItems];
+        let rights: &[Acl] = match (self, collection) {
+            (Access::Read, _) => &read,
+            (Access::Organize, Collection::Mailbox) if is_trash => &read,
+            (Access::Organize, Collection::Mailbox) => &[
+                Acl::Read,
+                Acl::ReadItems,
+                Acl::Modify,
+                Acl::AddItems,
+                Acl::ModifyItems,
+                Acl::RemoveItems,
+                Acl::CreateChild,
+            ],
+            // Calendars, address books and files have no "move": organizing
+            // there is adding and changing, never removing
+            (Access::Organize, _) => &[
+                Acl::Read,
+                Acl::ReadItems,
+                Acl::AddItems,
+                Acl::ModifyItems,
+                Acl::CreateChild,
+            ],
+            (Access::Full, _) => &[
+                Acl::Read,
+                Acl::Modify,
+                Acl::Delete,
+                Acl::ReadItems,
+                Acl::AddItems,
+                Acl::ModifyItems,
+                Acl::RemoveItems,
+                Acl::CreateChild,
+                Acl::Submit,
+                Acl::ModifyItemsOwn,
+                Acl::ModifyPrivateProperties,
+                Acl::ModifyRSVP,
+                Acl::SchedulingReadFreeBusy,
+                Acl::SchedulingInvite,
+                Acl::SchedulingReply,
+            ],
+        };
+        Bitmap::from_iter(rights.iter().copied())
+    }
+}
+
+/// One person the locked account is handed to (AL-5).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Delegate {
+    pub account_id: u32,
+    pub access: Access,
+    /// May send from the locked account's identities (AL-8). Needs
+    /// `organize` or `full`: a message is made in its Drafts first.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub send_as: bool,
+    /// Seconds since the epoch; the delegation ends then on its own.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub until: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+impl Delegate {
+    pub fn is_current(&self, now: u64) -> bool {
+        self.until.is_none_or(|until| until > now)
+    }
+}
+
+/// A delegate's rights a lock replaced on one container, put back when the
+/// lock or that delegation ends (AL-10). A container with no entry had no
+/// grant for that delegate before.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Replaced {
+    pub collection: u8,
+    pub document_id: u32,
+    pub delegate: u32,
+    /// The rights as a bitmap's raw value.
+    pub rights: u64,
+}
+
+/// An account's lock (AL-1).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, SerdeSerialize, SerdeDeserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Lock {
+    pub account_id: u32,
+    pub reason: String,
+    /// Seconds since the epoch.
+    pub locked_at: u64,
+    pub locked_by: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub locked_by_id: Option<u32>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub delegates: Vec<Delegate>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub replaced: Vec<Replaced>,
+}
+
+impl Lock {
+    pub fn delegate(&self, account_id: u32) -> Option<&Delegate> {
+        self.delegates.iter().find(|d| d.account_id == account_id)
+    }
+
+    /// The grants a new container of this account gets: one per current
+    /// delegate (AL-7, containers made later).
+    pub fn grants_for_new(
+        &self,
+        collection: Collection,
+        is_trash: bool,
+        now: u64,
+    ) -> Vec<(u32, Bitmap<Acl>)> {
+        self.delegates
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|d| d.is_current(now))
+            .map(|d| (d.account_id, d.access.grants(collection, is_trash)))
+            .collect()
+    }
+}
+
+/// One container's ACL as a lock change leaves it (AL-7, AL-10).
+///
+/// Delegates in `new` get their level's rights. The first time a delegate
+/// is given a container, whatever it had there before is noted in
+/// `replaced`; entries `old` already noted are carried over. Delegates only
+/// in `old` get back what they had before, or nothing. Returns the new ACL
+/// when it differs from `current`.
+pub fn merge_grants(
+    current: &[AclGrant],
+    collection: Collection,
+    document_id: u32,
+    is_trash: bool,
+    old: Option<&Lock>,
+    new: Option<&Lock>,
+    now: u64,
+    replaced: &mut Vec<Replaced>,
+) -> Option<Vec<AclGrant>> {
+    let mut acls = current.to_vec();
+    let collection_id = collection as u8;
+    let noted = |lock: &Lock, delegate: u32| {
+        lock.replaced
+            .iter()
+            .find(|r| {
+                r.collection == collection_id && r.document_id == document_id && r.delegate == delegate
+            })
+            .cloned()
+    };
+    let is_current = |lock: Option<&Lock>, delegate: u32| {
+        lock.and_then(|lock| lock.delegate(delegate))
+            .is_some_and(|d| d.is_current(now))
+    };
+    let set = |acls: &mut Vec<AclGrant>, account_id: u32, grants: Bitmap<Acl>| {
+        acls.retain(|a| a.account_id != account_id);
+        if !grants.is_empty() {
+            acls.push(AclGrant { account_id, grants });
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Delegations that ended get back what they had
+    if let Some(old) = old {
+        for delegate in &old.delegates {
+            if is_current(new, delegate.account_id) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let note = noted(old, delegate.account_id);
+            let before = note
+                .as_ref()
+                .map(|r| Bitmap::from(r.rights))
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+            set(&mut acls, delegate.account_id, before);
+            // Still listed but past its `until`: keep the note, so running
+            // this again puts back the same share instead of removing it
+            if let Some(note) = note
+                && new.is_some_and(|new| new.delegate(delegate.account_id).is_some())
+            {
+                replaced.push(note);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Current delegations get their level
+    if let Some(new) = new {
+        for delegate in new.delegates.iter().filter(|d| d.is_current(now)) {
+            let had = old.and_then(|old| {
+                is_current(Some(old), delegate.account_id)
+                    .then(|| noted(old, delegate.account_id))
+                    .flatten()
+            });
+            match had {
+                Some(entry) => replaced.push(entry),
+                None if !is_current(old, delegate.account_id) => {
+                    if let Some(existing) = current.iter().find(|a| a.account_id == delegate.account_id) {
+                        replaced.push(Replaced {
+                            collection: collection_id,
+                            document_id,
+                            delegate: delegate.account_id,
+                            rights: existing.grants.into(),
+                        });
+                    }
+                }
+                None => {}
+            }
+            set(
+                &mut acls,
+                delegate.account_id,
+                delegate.access.grants(collection, is_trash),
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    let sorted = |acls: &[AclGrant]| {
+        let mut v = acls.iter().map(|a| (a.account_id, u64::from(a.grants))).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        v.sort();
+        v
+    };
+    (sorted(&acls) != sorted(current)).then_some(acls)
+}
+
+struct Json<T>(T);
+
+impl<T: SerdeSerialize> Serialize for Json<T> {
+    fn serialize(&self) -> trc::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        serde_json::to_vec(&self.0).map_err(|err| {
+            trc::StoreEvent::UnexpectedError
+                .into_err()
+                .details("Failed to serialize account lock")
+                .reason(err)
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned + Sync + Send> Deserialize for Json<T> {
+    fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> trc::Result<Self> {
+        serde_json::from_slice(bytes).map(Json).map_err(|err| {
+            trc::StoreEvent::DataCorruption
+                .into_err()
+                .details("Invalid account lock")
+                .reason(err)
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+fn class(kind: u8, parts: &[u32]) -> ValueClass {
+    let mut key = Vec::with_capacity(2 + parts.len() * 4);
+    key.push(FEATURE);
+    key.push(kind);
+    for part in parts {
+        key.extend_from_slice(&part.to_be_bytes());
+    }
+    ValueClass::Any(AnyClass {
+        subspace: SUBSPACE_INBUXA,
+        key,
+    })
+}
+
+fn key(kind: u8, parts: &[u32]) -> ValueKey<ValueClass> {
+    ValueKey::from(class(kind, parts))
+}
+
+/// The numbers after the kind byte, from the key's tail (the iterator may or
+/// may not hand back the subspace byte).
+fn parse_key(key: &[u8], kind: u8, parts: usize) -> Option<Vec<u32>> {
+    let len = 2 + parts * 4;
+    let tail = key.get(key.len().checked_sub(len)?..)?;
+    (tail[0] == FEATURE && tail[1] == kind).then_some(())?;
+    Some(
+        tail[2..]
+            .chunks_exact(4)
+            .map(|chunk| u32::from_be_bytes(chunk.try_into().unwrap()))
+            .collect(),
+    )
+}
+
+/// An account's lock, if it is locked.
+pub async fn get(data: &Store, account_id: u32) -> trc::Result<Option<Lock>> {
+    Ok(data
+        .get_value::<Json<Lock>>(key(KIND_LOCK, &[account_id]))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+        .map(|Json(lock)| lock))
+}
+
+/// Every lock, for the console's list.
+pub async fn all(data: &Store) -> trc::Result<Vec<Lock>> {
+    let mut locks = Vec::new();
+    data.iterate(
+        IterateParams::new(key(KIND_LOCK, &[0]), key(KIND_LOCK, &[u32::MAX])),
+        |_, value| {
+            if let Ok(Json(lock)) = Json::<Lock>::deserialize(value) {
+                locks.push(lock);
+            }
+            Ok(true)
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+    .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    Ok(locks)
+}
+
+/// The accounts delegated to `delegate`, with its delegation in each.
+pub async fn delegated_to(data: &Store, delegate: u32) -> trc::Result<Vec<(u32, Delegate)>> {
+    let mut locked = Vec::new();
+    data.iterate(
+        IterateParams::new(
+            key(KIND_DELEGATE, &[delegate, 0]),
+            key(KIND_DELEGATE, &[delegate, u32::MAX]),
+        )
+        .no_values(),
+        |key, _| {
+            if let Some(parts) = parse_key(key, KIND_DELEGATE, 2) {
+                locked.push(parts[1]);
+            }
+            Ok(true)
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+    .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+
+    let mut delegations = Vec::with_capacity(locked.len());
+    for account_id in locked {
+        if let Some(lock) = get(data, account_id).await?
+            && let Some(delegation) = lock.delegate(delegate)
+        {
+            delegations.push((account_id, delegation.clone()));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(delegations)
+}
+
+/// Writes a lock, keeping the delegate index in step with `previous`.
+pub async fn set(data: &Store, lock: &Lock, previous: Option<&Lock>) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    if let Some(previous) = previous {
+        for delegate in &previous.delegates {
+            if lock.delegate(delegate.account_id).is_none() {
+                batch.clear(class(KIND_DELEGATE, &[delegate.account_id, lock.account_id]));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    for delegate in &lock.delegates {
+        batch.set(
+            class(KIND_DELEGATE, &[delegate.account_id, lock.account_id]),
+            vec![],
+        );
+    }
+    batch.set(class(KIND_LOCK, &[lock.account_id]), Json(lock).serialize()?);
+    data.write(batch.build_all())
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    UNTIL_CHANGED.notify_one();
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Removes a lock and its delegate index.
+pub async fn remove(data: &Store, lock: &Lock) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    for delegate in &lock.delegates {
+        batch.clear(class(KIND_DELEGATE, &[delegate.account_id, lock.account_id]));
+    }
+    batch.clear(class(KIND_LOCK, &[lock.account_id]));
+    data.write(batch.build_all())
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())
+        .map(|_| ())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn keys_read_back() {
+        let ValueClass::Any(any) = class(KIND_DELEGATE, &[7, 9]) else {
+            panic!()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(parse_key(&any.key, KIND_DELEGATE, 2), Some(vec![7, 9]));
+        let mut with_subspace = vec![SUBSPACE_INBUXA];
+        with_subspace.extend_from_slice(&any.key);
+        assert_eq!(parse_key(&with_subspace, KIND_DELEGATE, 2), Some(vec![7, 9]));
+        assert_eq!(parse_key(&any.key, KIND_LOCK, 2), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn levels_grant_what_they_say() {
+        let read = Access::Read.grants(Collection::Mailbox, false);
+        assert!(read.contains(Acl::ReadItems));
+        assert!(!read.contains(Acl::ModifyItems), "read can't set $seen");
+        assert!(!read.contains(Acl::RemoveItems));
+
+        let organize = Access::Organize.grants(Collection::Mailbox, false);
+        assert!(organize.contains(Acl::RemoveItems), "moving needs it");
+        assert!(!organize.contains(Acl::Delete));
+        assert!(!organize.contains(Acl::Submit));
+        let trash = Access::Organize.grants(Collection::Mailbox, true);
+        assert!(!trash.contains(Acl::AddItems), "nothing moved into Trash");
+        let calendar = Access::Organize.grants(Collection::Calendar, false);
+        assert!(!calendar.contains(Acl::RemoveItems));
+
+        let full = Access::Full.grants(Collection::Mailbox, false);
+        assert!(full.contains(Acl::Delete) && full.contains(Acl::RemoveItems));
+        assert!(!full.contains(Acl::Share), "a delegate can't pass it on");
+        assert!(Access::Full.may_destroy() && !Access::Organize.may_destroy());
+    }
+
+    fn lock_with(delegates: Vec<Delegate>, replaced: Vec<Replaced>) -> Lock {
+        Lock {
+            account_id: 1,
+            reason: "r".into(),
+            locked_at: 0,
+            locked_by: "admin".into(),
+            locked_by_id: None,
+            delegates,
+            replaced,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn delegate(account_id: u32, access: Access) -> Delegate {
+        Delegate {
+            account_id,
+            access,
+            send_as: false,
+            until: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn grants_are_added_and_restored() {
+        let read = Access::Read.grants(Collection::Mailbox, false);
+        let full = Access::Full.grants(Collection::Mailbox, false);
+        // Delegate 2 already had a share here; delegate 3 had nothing
+        let earlier: Bitmap<Acl> = Bitmap::from_iter([Acl::Read]);
+        let current = vec![AclGrant {
+            account_id: 2,
+            grants: earlier,
+        }];
+        let lock = lock_with(
+            vec![delegate(2, Access::Full), delegate(3, Access::Read)],
+            vec![],
+        );
+        let mut replaced = Vec::new();
+        let acls = merge_grants(&current, Collection::Mailbox, 5, false, None, Some(&lock), 0, &mut replaced)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(acls.contains(&AclGrant { account_id: 2, grants: full }));
+        assert!(acls.contains(&AclGrant { account_id: 3, grants: read }));
+        assert_eq!(replaced.len(), 1, "only 2 had rights to put back");
+        assert_eq!(replaced[0].rights, u64::from(earlier));
+
+        // Running it again changes nothing and keeps the note
+        let locked = Lock { replaced: replaced.clone(), ..lock.clone() };
+        let mut again = Vec::new();
+        assert!(merge_grants(&acls, Collection::Mailbox, 5, false, Some(&locked), Some(&locked), 0, &mut again).is_none());
+        assert_eq!(again, replaced);
+
+        // Unlocking puts 2's share back and removes 3
+        let mut none = Vec::new();
+        let back = merge_grants(&acls, Collection::Mailbox, 5, false, Some(&locked), None, 0, &mut none).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(back, vec![AclGrant { account_id: 2, grants: earlier }]);
+
+        // Ending one delegation keeps the other
+        let fewer = lock_with(vec![delegate(3, Access::Read)], vec![]);
+        let mut kept = Vec::new();
+        let after = merge_grants(&acls, Collection::Mailbox, 5, false, Some(&locked), Some(&fewer), 0, &mut kept).unwrap();
+        assert!(after.contains(&AclGrant { account_id: 2, grants: earlier }));
+        assert!(after.contains(&AclGrant { account_id: 3, grants: read }));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_expired_delegation_gives_back_its_share_every_time() {
+        let earlier: Bitmap<Acl> = Bitmap::from_iter([Acl::Read]);
+        let note = Replaced {
+            collection: Collection::Mailbox as u8,
+            document_id: 5,
+            delegate: 2,
+            rights: u64::from(earlier),
+        };
+        let mut ending = delegate(2, Access::Full);
+        ending.until = Some(200);
+        let lock = lock_with(vec![ending], vec![note.clone()]);
+        let during = vec![AclGrant {
+            account_id: 2,
+            grants: Access::Full.grants(Collection::Mailbox, false),
+        }];
+
+        // At its `until`, the share it had before comes back, and the note stays
+        let mut replaced = Vec::new();
+        let after = merge_grants(&during, Collection::Mailbox, 5, false, Some(&lock), Some(&lock), 300, &mut replaced)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(after, vec![AclGrant { account_id: 2, grants: earlier }]);
+        assert_eq!(replaced, vec![note.clone()]);
+
+        // The next sweep changes nothing, rather than removing that share
+        let swept = Lock { replaced: replaced.clone(), ..lock };
+        let mut again = Vec::new();
+        assert!(
+            merge_grants(&after, Collection::Mailbox, 5, false, Some(&swept), Some(&swept), 400, &mut again).is_none()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(again, vec![note]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_timer_finds_the_next_end() {
+        let ends_at = |account_id, until| {
+            let mut d = delegate(account_id, Access::Read);
+            d.until = until;
+            d
+        };
+        let a = Lock { account_id: 10, ..lock_with(vec![ends_at(2, Some(500)), ends_at(3, None)], vec![]) };
+        let b = Lock { account_id: 11, ..lock_with(vec![ends_at(4, Some(300))], vec![]) };
+        let locks = vec![a, b];
+        assert_eq!(next_until(&locks, 100), Some(300));
+        assert_eq!(next_until(&locks, 300), Some(500));
+        assert_eq!(next_until(&locks, 500), None);
+        assert_eq!(ended_between(&locks, 100, 300).collect::<Vec<_>>(), vec![11]);
+        assert_eq!(ended_between(&locks, 300, 600).collect::<Vec<_>>(), vec![10]);
+        assert!(ended_between(&locks, 600, 900).next().is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn expired_delegations_grant_nothing() {
+        let lock = Lock {
+            account_id: 1,
+            reason: "Left the company".into(),
+            locked_at: 100,
+            locked_by: "admin".into(),
+            locked_by_id: None,
+            delegates: vec![
+                Delegate {
+                    account_id: 2,
+                    access: Access::Read,
+                    send_as: false,
+                    until: Some(200),
+                },
+                Delegate {
+                    account_id: 3,
+                    access: Access::Full,
+                    send_as: true,
+                    until: None,
+                },
+            ],
+            replaced: vec![],
+        };
+        let grants = lock.grants_for_new(Collection::Mailbox, false, 300);
+        assert_eq!(grants.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(grants[0].0, 3);
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&lock).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Lock>(&json).unwrap(), lock);
+        assert!(json.contains("\"access\":\"full\""));
+    }
+}

crates/groupware/src/inbuxa_lock.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! inbuxa: a locked account's grants on its calendars, address books, file
+//! folders and top-level files (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-7, AL-10). The
+//! mailbox half, and the whole, are in `email::inbuxa_lock`; this half is
+//! here so DAV, which sees only these, can grant on what it creates.
+
+use crate::{cache::GroupwareCache, calendar::Calendar, contact::AddressBook, file::FileNode};
+use common::{
+    DavResourceMetadata, Server,
+    auth::AccountTenantIds,
+    cache::invalidate::CacheInvalidationBuilder,
+    ipc::CacheInvalidation,
+};
+use inbuxa_features::lock::{self, Lock, Replaced};
+use store::{
+    ValueKey,
+    write::{AlignedBytes, Archive, BatchBuilder, now},
+};
+use trc::AddContext;
+use types::collection::{Collection, SyncCollection};
+
+/// The collections this half covers.
+pub const DAV_COLLECTIONS: [Collection; 3] = [
+    Collection::Calendar,
+    Collection::AddressBook,
+    Collection::FileNode,
+];
+
+/// Who a lock's grant changes are recorded as having been made by: the
+/// locked account itself, as the server acting for it.
+pub async fn changed_by(server: &Server, account_id: u32) -> AccountTenantIds {
+    AccountTenantIds {
+        account_id,
+        tenant_id: server.account(account_id).await.ok().and_then(|a| a.id_tenant),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Grants on calendars, address books, file folders and top-level files,
+/// into `batch`, with what they replaced into `replaced`.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub async fn apply_dav_grants(
+    server: &Server,
+    account_id: u32,
+    old: Option<&Lock>,
+    new: Option<&Lock>,
+    now: u64,
+    replaced: &mut Vec<Replaced>,
+    batch: &mut BatchBuilder,
+) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let changed_by = changed_by(server, account_id).await;
+    for (sync, collection) in [
+        (SyncCollection::Calendar, Collection::Calendar),
+        (SyncCollection::AddressBook, Collection::AddressBook),
+        (SyncCollection::FileNode, Collection::FileNode),
+    ] {
+        let resources = server
+            .fetch_dav_resources(account_id, account_id, sync)
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+        for resource in &resources.resources {
+            // A folder covers what's in it; a file outside any folder
+            // needs its own grant
+            let top_level_file = matches!(
+                &resource.data,
+                DavResourceMetadata::File {
+                    parent_id: None,
+                    ..
+                }
+            );
+            if !resource.is_container() && !top_level_file {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let Some(current) = resource.acls() else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let Some(acls) = lock::merge_grants(
+                current,
+                collection,
+                resource.document_id,
+                false,
+                old,
+                new,
+                now,
+                replaced,
+            ) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let Some(archive) = server
+                .store()
+                .get_value::<Archive<AlignedBytes>>(ValueKey::archive(
+                    account_id,
+                    collection,
+                    resource.document_id,
+                ))
+                .await
+                .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+            else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            match collection {
+                Collection::Calendar => {
+                    let current = archive
+                        .to_unarchived::<Calendar>()
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                    let mut changed = current
+                        .deserialize::<Calendar>()
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                    changed.acls = acls;
+                    changed
+                        .update(changed_by, current, account_id, resource.document_id, batch)
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                }
+                Collection::AddressBook => {
+                    let current = archive
+                        .to_unarchived::<AddressBook>()
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                    let mut changed = current
+                        .deserialize::<AddressBook>()
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                    changed.acls = acls;
+                    changed
+                        .update(changed_by, current, account_id, resource.document_id, batch)
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                }
+                _ => {
+                    let current = archive
+                        .to_unarchived::<FileNode>()
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                    let mut changed = current
+                        .deserialize::<FileNode>()
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                    changed.acls = acls;
+                    changed
+                        .update(
+                            changed_by,
+                            current,
+                            account_id,
+                            resource.document_id,
+                            false,
+                            batch,
+                        )
+                        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Every token a lock change touches is rebuilt on its next use, on every
+/// node: the locked account's and each delegate's, before and after.
+pub async fn invalidate(
+    server: &Server,
+    account_id: u32,
+    old: Option<&Lock>,
+    new: Option<&Lock>,
+) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let mut builder = CacheInvalidationBuilder::default();
+    builder.invalidate(CacheInvalidation::AccessToken(account_id));
+    for delegate in old.into_iter().chain(new).flat_map(|l| &l.delegates) {
+        builder.invalidate(CacheInvalidation::AccessToken(delegate.account_id));
+    }
+    server.invalidate_caches(builder).await
+}
+
+/// Whether two lists of replaced rights say the same, in any order.
+pub fn same_replaced(a: &[Replaced], b: &[Replaced]) -> bool {
+    let key = |r: &Replaced| (r.collection, r.document_id, r.delegate, r.rights);
+    let mut a = a.iter().map(key).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    let mut b = b.iter().map(key).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    a.sort();
+    b.sort();
+    a == b
+}
+
+/// Grants the lock on `account_id`, if any, on calendars, address books and
+/// files made since. For DAV, after a delegate creates one there.
+pub async fn reconcile_dav(server: &Server, account_id: u32) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let data = server.store();
+    let Some(current) = lock::get(data, account_id).await? else {
+        return Ok(());
+    };
+    // Mailbox entries aren't this half's to change
+    let mut replaced = current
+        .replaced
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| !DAV_COLLECTIONS.iter().any(|c| *c as u8 == r.collection))
+        .cloned()
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    apply_dav_grants(
+        server,
+        account_id,
+        Some(&current),
+        Some(&current),
+        now(),
+        &mut replaced,
+        &mut batch,
+    )
+    .await?;
+    if batch.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    server
+        .commit_batch(batch)
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+    if !same_replaced(&replaced, &current.replaced) {
+        let updated = Lock {
+            replaced,
+            ..current.clone()
+        };
+        lock::set(data, &updated, Some(&current)).await?;
+    }
+    invalidate(server, account_id, Some(&current), Some(&current)).await
+}

crates/groupware/src/lib.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ pub mod calendar;
 pub mod contact;
 pub mod file;
 pub mod inbuxa; // inbuxa: undelete notes
+pub mod inbuxa_lock; // inbuxa: account lock grants
 pub mod scheduling;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]

crates/http/src/auth/authenticate.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use common::auth::AccessToken;
@@ -36,7 +38,9 @@ impl Authenticator for Server {
                         self.access_token(http_cache.account_id).await?,
                         http_cache.credential_id,
                         session.remote_ip,
-                    )?;
+                    )?
+                    // inbuxa: AU-5
+                    .with_origin_arc(http_cache.origin.clone());
 
                     if access_token.revision() == http_cache.revision {
                         // Enforce authenticated rate limit
@@ -99,6 +103,7 @@ impl Authenticator for Server {
                     credential_id: access_token.credential_id(),
                     expires: Instant::now()
                         + Duration::from_secs(self.core.oauth.oauth_expiry_token),
+                    origin: access_token.origin_arc(),
                 },
             );
 

crates/http/src/auth/oauth/registration.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use super::ErrorType;
@@ -164,9 +166,10 @@ impl ClientRegistrationHandler for Server {
         .await
         .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
 
-        let result = self
-            .registry()
-            .write(RegistryWrite::insert(
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.10: a client registering itself
+        let result = inbuxa_features::audit::scope::system(
+            "oauth-registration",
+            self.registry().write(RegistryWrite::insert(
                 &OAuthClient {
                     client_id: client_id.clone(),
                     description: request.client_name.clone(),
@@ -179,9 +182,10 @@ impl ClientRegistrationHandler for Server {
                     ..Default::default()
                 }
                 .into(),
-            ))
-            .await
-            .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
+            )),
+        )
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?;
 
         if !matches!(result, RegistryWriteResult::Success(_)) {
             return Err(trc::StoreEvent::UnexpectedError

crates/http/src/auth/oauth/token.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use super::{
@@ -237,10 +239,20 @@ impl TokenHandler for Server {
                     .validate_access_token(GrantType::RefreshToken.into(), refresh_token)
                     .await
                 {
+                    // inbuxa: AL-2: a locked account gets no new tokens
+                    Ok(token_info)
+                        if self
+                            .access_token(token_info.account_id)
+                            .await
+                            .is_ok_and(|token| token.is_locked()) =>
+                    {
+                        TokenResponse::error(ErrorType::InvalidGrant)
+                    }
                     Ok(token_info) => self
                         .issue_token(
                             token_info.account_id,
-                            "",
+                            // inbuxa: AU-5: the client travels in the refresh token
+                            token_info.claims.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
                             issuer,
                             None,
                             None,
@@ -327,7 +339,8 @@ impl TokenHandler for Server {
                     account_id,
                     account_name,
                     self.core.oauth.oauth_expiry_token,
-                    None,
+                    // inbuxa: AU-5: the token names the client it was issued to
+                    Some(client_id),
                     credential_version.into(),
                 )
                 .await?,
@@ -339,7 +352,8 @@ impl TokenHandler for Server {
                     account_id,
                     account_name,
                     self.core.oauth.oauth_expiry_refresh_token,
-                    None,
+                    // inbuxa: AU-5: so a refreshed access token still names it
+                    Some(client_id),
                     credential_version.into(),
                 )
                 .await?

crates/imap/src/core/mod.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use ahash::AHashMap;
@@ -198,6 +200,13 @@ impl<T: SessionStream> SessionData<T> {
             .access_token(self.account_id)
             .await
             .and_then(|inner| {
+                // inbuxa: AL-3: a session opened before its account was
+                // locked is refused from its next command
+                if inner.is_locked() {
+                    return Err(trc::AuthEvent::Failed
+                        .into_err()
+                        .details("Account is locked"));
+                }
                 AccessToken::renew(inner, self.access_token.credential_id(), self.remote_addr)
             })
             .caused_by(trc::location!())

crates/imap/src/op/create.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use crate::{
@@ -141,6 +143,14 @@ impl<T: SessionStream> SessionData<T> {
             .await
             .imap_ctx(&arguments.tag, trc::location!())?;
 
+        // inbuxa: AL-7: a folder a delegate makes in a locked account gets
+        // the lock's grants, so the delegate can see it
+        if params.account_id != self.account_id
+            && let Err(err) = email::inbuxa_lock::reconcile(&self.server, params.account_id).await
+        {
+            trc::error!(err.details("Failed to grant a lock's delegates on a new folder"));
+        }
+
         trc::event!(
             Imap(trc::ImapEvent::CreateMailbox),
             SpanId = self.session_id,

crates/imap/src/op/expunge.rs

@@ -45,14 +45,22 @@ impl<T: SessionStream> Session<T> {
         let (data, mailbox) = self.state.select_data();
 
         // Validate ACL
-        if !data
-            .check_mailbox_acl(
-                mailbox.id.account_id,
-                mailbox.id.mailbox_id,
-                Acl::RemoveItems,
-            )
+        // inbuxa: AL-6: a delegate below full may move mail, never delete it
+        let may_destroy = data
+            .refresh_access_token()
             .await
             .imap_ctx(&request.tag, trc::location!())?
+            .delegation(mailbox.id.account_id)
+            .is_none_or(|delegation| delegation.access.may_destroy());
+        if !may_destroy
+            || !data
+                .check_mailbox_acl(
+                    mailbox.id.account_id,
+                    mailbox.id.mailbox_id,
+                    Acl::RemoveItems,
+                )
+                .await
+                .imap_ctx(&request.tag, trc::location!())?
         {
             return Err(trc::ImapEvent::Error
                 .into_err()
@@ -143,6 +151,16 @@ impl<T: SessionStream> SessionData<T> {
     ) -> trc::Result<Option<u32>> {
         // Obtain message ids
         let account_id = mailbox.id.account_id;
+        // inbuxa: AL-6: nothing is deleted for a delegate below full (CLOSE
+        // expunges quietly, so it deletes nothing, quietly)
+        if self
+            .refresh_access_token()
+            .await?
+            .delegation(account_id)
+            .is_some_and(|delegation| !delegation.access.may_destroy())
+        {
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
         let mut deleted_ids = RoaringBitmap::from_iter(
             self.server
                 .get_cached_messages(account_id)

crates/jmap-proto/src/object/inbuxa_account_lock.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! `inbuxa:AccountLock/get` and `/set` under `urn:inbuxa:jmap`: an account
+//! locked, and the people it is handed to (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-1 to
+//! AL-12). A lock's id is the locked account's id. Creating one locks the
+//! account, updating changes its delegates, destroying unlocks it. The set
+//! call's `reason` argument says why, for the audit log (AU-12); creating
+//! takes it as a property.
+
+use crate::{
+    object::{AnyId, JmapObject, JmapObjectId},
+    request::deserialize::DeserializeArguments,
+};
+use jmap_tools::{Element, Key, Property};
+use std::{borrow::Cow, str::FromStr};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AccountLock;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+pub enum AccountLockProperty {
+    Id,
+    /// The locked account (on create; afterwards the same as `id`).
+    AccountId,
+    Name,
+    Reason,
+    LockedAt,
+    LockedBy,
+    Delegates,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+pub enum AccountLockValue {
+    Id(Id),
+}
+
+impl Property for AccountLockProperty {
+    fn try_parse(parent: Option<&Key<'_, Self>>, value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        // Keys inside a delegate stay plain keys
+        match parent {
+            None => AccountLockProperty::parse(value),
+            Some(_) => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn to_cow(&self) -> Cow<'static, str> {
+        match self {
+            AccountLockProperty::Id => "id",
+            AccountLockProperty::AccountId => "accountId",
+            AccountLockProperty::Name => "name",
+            AccountLockProperty::Reason => "reason",
+            AccountLockProperty::LockedAt => "lockedAt",
+            AccountLockProperty::LockedBy => "lockedBy",
+            AccountLockProperty::Delegates => "delegates",
+        }
+        .into()
+    }
+}
+
+impl AccountLockProperty {
+    fn parse(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        hashify::tiny_map!(value.as_bytes(),
+            b"id" => AccountLockProperty::Id,
+            b"accountId" => AccountLockProperty::AccountId,
+            b"name" => AccountLockProperty::Name,
+            b"reason" => AccountLockProperty::Reason,
+            b"lockedAt" => AccountLockProperty::LockedAt,
+            b"lockedBy" => AccountLockProperty::LockedBy,
+            b"delegates" => AccountLockProperty::Delegates,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromStr for AccountLockProperty {
+    type Err = ();
+
+    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+        AccountLockProperty::parse(s).ok_or(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Element for AccountLockValue {
+    type Property = AccountLockProperty;
+
+    fn try_parse<P>(key: &Key<'_, Self::Property>, value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match key {
+            Key::Property(AccountLockProperty::Id | AccountLockProperty::AccountId) => {
+                Id::from_str(value).ok().map(AccountLockValue::Id)
+            }
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn to_cow(&self) -> Cow<'static, str> {
+        match self {
+            AccountLockValue::Id(id) => id.to_string().into(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// The set call's own arguments: why (AU-12).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AccountLockSetArguments {
+    pub reason: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl<'de> DeserializeArguments<'de> for AccountLockSetArguments {
+    fn deserialize_argument<A>(&mut self, key: &str, map: &mut A) -> Result<(), A::Error>
+    where
+        A: serde::de::MapAccess<'de>,
+    {
+        if key == "reason" {
+            self.reason = map.next_value()?;
+        } else {
+            let _ = map.next_value::<serde::de::IgnoredAny>()?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl JmapObject for AccountLock {
+    type Property = AccountLockProperty;
+
+    type Element = AccountLockValue;
+
+    type Id = Id;
+
+    type Filter = ();
+
+    type Comparator = ();
+
+    type GetArguments = ();
+
+    type SetArguments<'de> = AccountLockSetArguments;
+
+    type QueryArguments = ();
+
+    type CopyArguments = ();
+
+    type ParseArguments = ();
+
+    const ID_PROPERTY: Self::Property = AccountLockProperty::Id;
+}
+
+impl From<Id> for AccountLockValue {
+    fn from(id: Id) -> Self {
+        AccountLockValue::Id(id)
+    }
+}
+
+impl JmapObjectId for AccountLockValue {
+    fn as_id(&self) -> Option<Id> {
+        match self {
+            AccountLockValue::Id(id) => Some(*id),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn as_any_id(&self) -> Option<AnyId> {
+        match self {
+            AccountLockValue::Id(id) => Some(AnyId::Id(*id)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn as_id_ref(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn try_set_id(&mut self, new_id: AnyId) -> bool {
+        if let AnyId::Id(id) = new_id {
+            *self = AccountLockValue::Id(id);
+            true
+        } else {
+            false
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl JmapObjectId for AccountLockProperty {
+    fn as_id(&self) -> Option<Id> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn as_any_id(&self) -> Option<AnyId> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn as_id_ref(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn try_set_id(&mut self, _: AnyId) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+}

crates/jmap-proto/src/object/inbuxa_audit.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The audit log's JMAP objects under `urn:inbuxa:jmap`
+//! (`inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md`, AU-9 to AU-11):
+//!
+//! - `inbuxa:AuditEvent/get` and `/query`: the records, read-only.
+//! - `inbuxa:AuditSettings/get` and `/set`: how long records are kept.
+//! - `inbuxa:AuditExport/set`: create one to get a file of the records a
+//!   filter matches.
+//! - `inbuxa:AuditVerification/set`: create one to recheck every chain.
+//!
+//! They share one set of properties. Nested values (an event's actor, its
+//! target and changes, an export's filter) are plain JSON objects.
+
+use crate::{
+    object::{AnyId, JmapObject, JmapObjectId},
+    request::deserialize::DeserializeArguments,
+};
+use jmap_tools::{Element, Key, Property};
+use std::{borrow::Cow, str::FromStr};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AuditEvent;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AuditSettings;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AuditExport;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AuditVerification;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+pub enum AuditProperty {
+    Id,
+    // AuditEvent
+    At,
+    Node,
+    Actor,
+    Via,
+    RemoteIp,
+    Action,
+    Target,
+    Changes,
+    Details,
+    Reason,
+    Outcome,
+    // AuditSettings
+    KeepForDays,
+    // AuditExport
+    Format,
+    Filter,
+    BlobId,
+    Count,
+    Size,
+    Sha256,
+    // AuditVerification
+    Verified,
+    Chains,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+pub enum AuditValue {
+    Id(Id),
+}
+
+impl Property for AuditProperty {
+    fn try_parse(parent: Option<&Key<'_, Self>>, value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        // Only the objects' own properties: keys inside a filter, an actor
+        // or a target stay plain keys
+        match parent {
+            None => AuditProperty::parse(value),
+            Some(_) => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn to_cow(&self) -> Cow<'static, str> {
+        match self {
+            AuditProperty::Id => "id",
+            AuditProperty::At => "at",
+            AuditProperty::Node => "node",
+            AuditProperty::Actor => "actor",
+            AuditProperty::Via => "via",
+            AuditProperty::RemoteIp => "remoteIp",
+            AuditProperty::Action => "action",
+            AuditProperty::Target => "target",
+            AuditProperty::Changes => "changes",
+            AuditProperty::Details => "details",
+            AuditProperty::Reason => "reason",
+            AuditProperty::Outcome => "outcome",
+            AuditProperty::KeepForDays => "keepForDays",
+            AuditProperty::Format => "format",
+            AuditProperty::Filter => "filter",
+            AuditProperty::BlobId => "blobId",
+            AuditProperty::Count => "count",
+            AuditProperty::Size => "size",
+            AuditProperty::Sha256 => "sha256",
+            AuditProperty::Verified => "verified",
+            AuditProperty::Chains => "chains",
+        }
+        .into()
+    }
+}
+
+impl AuditProperty {
+    fn parse(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        hashify::tiny_map!(value.as_bytes(),
+            b"id" => AuditProperty::Id,
+            b"at" => AuditProperty::At,
+            b"node" => AuditProperty::Node,
+            b"actor" => AuditProperty::Actor,
+            b"via" => AuditProperty::Via,
+            b"remoteIp" => AuditProperty::RemoteIp,
+            b"action" => AuditProperty::Action,
+            b"target" => AuditProperty::Target,
+            b"changes" => AuditProperty::Changes,
+            b"details" => AuditProperty::Details,
+            b"reason" => AuditProperty::Reason,
+            b"outcome" => AuditProperty::Outcome,
+            b"keepForDays" => AuditProperty::KeepForDays,
+            b"format" => AuditProperty::Format,
+            b"filter" => AuditProperty::Filter,
+            b"blobId" => AuditProperty::BlobId,
+            b"count" => AuditProperty::Count,
+            b"size" => AuditProperty::Size,
+            b"sha256" => AuditProperty::Sha256,
+            b"verified" => AuditProperty::Verified,
+            b"chains" => AuditProperty::Chains,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromStr for AuditProperty {
+    type Err = ();
+
+    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+        AuditProperty::parse(s).ok_or(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Element for AuditValue {
+    type Property = AuditProperty;
+
+    fn try_parse<P>(key: &Key<'_, Self::Property>, value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match key {
+            Key::Property(AuditProperty::Id) => Id::from_str(value).ok().map(AuditValue::Id),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn to_cow(&self) -> Cow<'static, str> {
+        match self {
+            AuditValue::Id(id) => id.to_string().into(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// One condition of an `inbuxa:AuditEvent/query` filter. Several in one
+/// filter object must all hold.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AuditFilter {
+    /// From this time on (UTC date).
+    After(String),
+    /// Before this time (UTC date).
+    Before(String),
+    ActorId(Id),
+    Action(String),
+    TargetKind(String),
+    TargetId(String),
+    AccountId(Id),
+    TenantId(Id),
+    Outcome(String),
+    RemoteIp(String),
+    Text(String),
+    _T(String),
+}
+
+impl Default for AuditFilter {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        AuditFilter::_T(String::new())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'de> DeserializeArguments<'de> for AuditFilter {
+    fn deserialize_argument<A>(&mut self, key: &str, map: &mut A) -> Result<(), A::Error>
+    where
+        A: serde::de::MapAccess<'de>,
+    {
+        hashify::fnc_map!(key.as_bytes(),
+            b"after" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::After(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"before" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::Before(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"actorId" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::ActorId(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"action" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::Action(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"targetKind" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::TargetKind(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"targetId" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::TargetId(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"accountId" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::AccountId(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"tenantId" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::TenantId(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"outcome" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::Outcome(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"remoteIp" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::RemoteIp(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            b"text" => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::Text(map.next_value()?);
+            },
+            _ => {
+                *self = AuditFilter::_T(key.to_string());
+                let _ = map.next_value::<serde::de::IgnoredAny>()?;
+            }
+        );
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Events sort newest first, by `at`; nothing else.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AuditComparator {
+    At,
+    _T(String),
+}
+
+impl Default for AuditComparator {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        AuditComparator::_T(String::new())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'de> DeserializeArguments<'de> for AuditComparator {
+    fn deserialize_argument<A>(&mut self, key: &str, map: &mut A) -> Result<(), A::Error>
+    where
+        A: serde::de::MapAccess<'de>,
+    {
+        if key == "property" {
+            let value = map.next_value::<Cow<str>>()?;
+            *self = if value == "at" {
+                AuditComparator::At
+            } else {
+                AuditComparator::_T(value.into_owned())
+            };
+        } else {
+            let _ = map.next_value::<serde::de::IgnoredAny>()?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+macro_rules! audit_object {
+    ($object:ty, $filter:ty, $comparator:ty) => {
+        impl JmapObject for $object {
+            type Property = AuditProperty;
+
+            type Element = AuditValue;
+
+            type Id = Id;
+
+            type Filter = $filter;
+
+            type Comparator = $comparator;
+
+            type GetArguments = ();
+
+            type SetArguments<'de> = ();
+
+            type QueryArguments = ();
+
+            type CopyArguments = ();
+
+            type ParseArguments = ();
+
+            const ID_PROPERTY: Self::Property = AuditProperty::Id;
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+audit_object!(AuditEvent, AuditFilter, AuditComparator);
+audit_object!(AuditSettings, (), ());
+audit_object!(AuditExport, (), ());
+audit_object!(AuditVerification, (), ());
+
+impl From<Id> for AuditValue {
+    fn from(id: Id) -> Self {
+        AuditValue::Id(id)
+    }
+}
+
+impl JmapObjectId for AuditValue {
+    fn as_id(&self) -> Option<Id> {
+        match self {
+            AuditValue::Id(id) => Some(*id),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn as_any_id(&self) -> Option<AnyId> {
+        match self {
+            AuditValue::Id(id) => Some(AnyId::Id(*id)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn as_id_ref(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn try_set_id(&mut self, new_id: AnyId) -> bool {
+        if let AnyId::Id(id) = new_id {
+            *self = AuditValue::Id(id);
+            true
+        } else {
+            false
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl JmapObjectId for AuditProperty {
+    fn as_id(&self) -> Option<Id> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn as_any_id(&self) -> Option<AnyId> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn as_id_ref(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn try_set_id(&mut self, _: AnyId) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+}

crates/jmap-proto/src/object/mod.rs

@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ pub mod contact;
 pub mod email;
 pub mod email_submission;
 pub mod fastmail_masked_email; // inbuxa: masked email
+pub mod inbuxa_account_lock; // inbuxa: account lock with delegation
 pub mod inbuxa_ai_limits; // inbuxa: AI spam classification
+pub mod inbuxa_audit; // inbuxa: the audit log
 pub mod inbuxa_explanation; // inbuxa: "Explain this" with the local model
 pub mod inbuxa_protocol_policy; // inbuxa: legacy protocols off
 pub mod inbuxa_tenant_protocol_policy; // inbuxa: legacy protocols off, per tenant

crates/jmap-proto/src/references/eval.rs

@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ impl Response<'_> {
                         GetResponseMethod::AiLimits(response) => {
                             response.eval_jptr(path, &mut results)
                         }
+                        GetResponseMethod::AuditEvent(response) => {
+                            response.eval_jptr(path, &mut results)
+                        }
+                        GetResponseMethod::AuditSettings(response) => {
+                            response.eval_jptr(path, &mut results)
+                        }
+                        GetResponseMethod::AccountLock(response) => {
+                            response.eval_jptr(path, &mut results)
+                        }
                         GetResponseMethod::ProtocolPolicy(response) => {
                             response.eval_jptr(path, &mut results)
                         }

crates/jmap-proto/src/references/resolve.rs

@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ impl Response<'_> {
                 GetRequestMethod::MaskedEmail(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
                 GetRequestMethod::DeletedAccount(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
                 GetRequestMethod::AiLimits(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
+                GetRequestMethod::AuditEvent(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
+                GetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
+                GetRequestMethod::AccountLock(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
                 GetRequestMethod::ProtocolPolicy(request) => request.resolve_references(self)?,
                 GetRequestMethod::TenantProtocolPolicy(request) => {
                     request.resolve_references(self)?
@@ -96,6 +99,18 @@ impl Response<'_> {
                 SetRequestMethod::Explanation(request) => {
                     request.resolve_references(self, 1, false)?
                 }
+                SetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(request) => {
+                    request.resolve_references(self, 1, false)?
+                }
+                SetRequestMethod::AuditExport(request) => {
+                    request.resolve_references(self, 1, false)?
+                }
+                SetRequestMethod::AuditVerification(request) => {
+                    request.resolve_references(self, 1, false)?
+                }
+                SetRequestMethod::AccountLock(request) => {
+                    request.resolve_references(self, 1, false)?
+                }
                 SetRequestMethod::ProtocolPolicy(request) => {
                     request.resolve_references(self, 1, false)?
                 }

crates/jmap-proto/src/request/capability.rs

@@ -133,9 +133,31 @@ pub enum Capabilities {
     FileNode(FileNodeCapabilities),
     WebPush(WebPushCapabilities),
     Inbuxa(InbuxaAccountCapabilities),
+    // inbuxa: AL-7
+    InbuxaDelegated(InbuxaDelegatedCapabilities),
     Empty(EmptyCapabilities),
 }
 
+/// inbuxa: `urn:inbuxa:jmap` on a locked account delegated to the signed-in
+/// principal (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-7), so a client can tell it from an
+/// ordinary share without guessing from `isReadOnly`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
+pub struct InbuxaDelegatedCapabilities {
+    pub delegation: DelegationInfo,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
+pub struct DelegationInfo {
+    /// Always true: only locked accounts are delegated.
+    pub locked: bool,
+    /// `read`, `organize` or `full`.
+    pub access: &'static str,
+    #[serde(rename(serialize = "sendAs"))]
+    pub send_as: bool,
+    /// When the delegation ends, if it does (UTC).
+    pub until: Option<String>,
+}
+
 /// inbuxa: `urn:inbuxa:jmap` on the signed-in principal's own account.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
 pub struct InbuxaAccountCapabilities {

crates/jmap-proto/src/request/method.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ pub enum MethodObject {
     AiLimits,
     // inbuxa: "Explain this" with the local model
     Explanation,
+    // inbuxa: the audit log
+    AuditEvent,
+    AuditSettings,
+    AuditExport,
+    AuditVerification,
+    // inbuxa: account lock with delegation
+    AccountLock,
     ProtocolPolicy,
     TenantProtocolPolicy,
 }
@@ -80,6 +87,11 @@ impl MethodObject {
             MethodObject::DeletedAccount => Capability::Inbuxa,
             MethodObject::AiLimits => Capability::Inbuxa,
             MethodObject::Explanation => Capability::Inbuxa,
+            MethodObject::AuditEvent
+            | MethodObject::AuditSettings
+            | MethodObject::AuditExport
+            | MethodObject::AuditVerification
+            | MethodObject::AccountLock => Capability::Inbuxa,
             MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy => Capability::Inbuxa,
             MethodObject::TenantProtocolPolicy => Capability::Inbuxa,
         }
@@ -260,6 +272,16 @@ impl MethodName {
             (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AiLimits) => "inbuxa:AiLimits/get",
             (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AiLimits) => "inbuxa:AiLimits/set",
             (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::Explanation) => "inbuxa:Explanation/set",
+            (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AuditEvent) => "inbuxa:AuditEvent/get",
+            (MethodFunction::Query, MethodObject::AuditEvent) => "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query",
+            (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AuditSettings) => "inbuxa:AuditSettings/get",
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AuditSettings) => "inbuxa:AuditSettings/set",
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AuditExport) => "inbuxa:AuditExport/set",
+            (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AccountLock) => "inbuxa:AccountLock/get",
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AccountLock) => "inbuxa:AccountLock/set",
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AuditVerification) => {
+                "inbuxa:AuditVerification/set"
+            }
             (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy) => "inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy/get",
             (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy) => "inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy/set",
             (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::TenantProtocolPolicy) => {
@@ -394,6 +416,14 @@ impl MethodName {
             "inbuxa:AiLimits/get" => (MethodObject::AiLimits, MethodFunction::Get),
             "inbuxa:AiLimits/set" => (MethodObject::AiLimits, MethodFunction::Set),
             "inbuxa:Explanation/set" => (MethodObject::Explanation, MethodFunction::Set),
+            "inbuxa:AuditEvent/get" => (MethodObject::AuditEvent, MethodFunction::Get),
+            "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query" => (MethodObject::AuditEvent, MethodFunction::Query),
+            "inbuxa:AuditSettings/get" => (MethodObject::AuditSettings, MethodFunction::Get),
+            "inbuxa:AuditSettings/set" => (MethodObject::AuditSettings, MethodFunction::Set),
+            "inbuxa:AuditExport/set" => (MethodObject::AuditExport, MethodFunction::Set),
+            "inbuxa:AccountLock/get" => (MethodObject::AccountLock, MethodFunction::Get),
+            "inbuxa:AccountLock/set" => (MethodObject::AccountLock, MethodFunction::Set),
+            "inbuxa:AuditVerification/set" => (MethodObject::AuditVerification, MethodFunction::Set),
             "inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy/get" => (MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy, MethodFunction::Get),
             "inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy/set" => (MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy, MethodFunction::Set),
             "inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy/get" => (MethodObject::TenantProtocolPolicy, MethodFunction::Get),
@@ -452,6 +482,11 @@ impl Display for MethodObject {
             MethodObject::DeletedAccount => "inbuxa:DeletedAccount",
             MethodObject::AiLimits => "inbuxa:AiLimits",
             MethodObject::Explanation => "inbuxa:Explanation",
+            MethodObject::AuditEvent => "inbuxa:AuditEvent",
+            MethodObject::AuditSettings => "inbuxa:AuditSettings",
+            MethodObject::AuditExport => "inbuxa:AuditExport",
+            MethodObject::AuditVerification => "inbuxa:AuditVerification",
+            MethodObject::AccountLock => "inbuxa:AccountLock",
             MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy => "inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy",
             MethodObject::TenantProtocolPolicy => "inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy",
             MethodObject::Registry(obj) => {

crates/jmap-proto/src/request/mod.rs

@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ pub enum GetRequestMethod {
     MaskedEmail(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::fastmail_masked_email::FastmailMaskedEmail>>),
     DeletedAccount(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_deleted_account::DeletedAccount>>),
     AiLimits(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_ai_limits::AiLimits>>),
+    AuditEvent(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditEvent>>),
+    AuditSettings(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>>),
+    AccountLock(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>>),
     ProtocolPolicy(Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_protocol_policy::ProtocolPolicy>>),
     TenantProtocolPolicy(
         Box<GetRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_tenant_protocol_policy::TenantProtocolPolicy>>,
@@ -144,6 +147,10 @@ pub enum SetRequestMethod<'x> {
     DeletedAccount(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_deleted_account::DeletedAccount>>),
     AiLimits(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_ai_limits::AiLimits>>),
     Explanation(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_explanation::Explanation>>),
+    AuditSettings(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>>),
+    AuditExport(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditExport>>),
+    AuditVerification(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditVerification>>),
+    AccountLock(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>>),
     ProtocolPolicy(Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_protocol_policy::ProtocolPolicy>>),
     TenantProtocolPolicy(
         Box<SetRequest<'x, crate::object::inbuxa_tenant_protocol_policy::TenantProtocolPolicy>>,
@@ -175,6 +182,7 @@ pub enum QueryRequestMethod {
     CalendarEventNotification(Box<QueryRequest<CalendarEventNotification>>),
     ShareNotification(Box<QueryRequest<ShareNotification>>),
     Registry(Box<QueryRequest<Registry>>),
+    AuditEvent(Box<QueryRequest<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditEvent>>),
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]

crates/jmap-proto/src/request/parser.rs

@@ -551,6 +551,64 @@ impl<'de> Visitor<'de> for CallVisitor {
                     return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
                 }
             },
+            // inbuxa: account lock with delegation
+            (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AccountLock) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Get(GetRequestMethod::AccountLock(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AccountLock) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Set(SetRequestMethod::AccountLock(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            // inbuxa: the audit log
+            (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AuditEvent) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Get(GetRequestMethod::AuditEvent(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            (MethodFunction::Query, MethodObject::AuditEvent) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Query(QueryRequestMethod::AuditEvent(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            (MethodFunction::Get, MethodObject::AuditSettings) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Get(GetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AuditSettings) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Set(SetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AuditExport) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Set(SetRequestMethod::AuditExport(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
+            (MethodFunction::Set, MethodObject::AuditVerification) => match seq.next_element() {
+                Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Set(SetRequestMethod::AuditVerification(value)),
+                Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(1, &self));
+                }
+            },
             (MethodFunction::Query, MethodObject::Registry(_)) => match seq.next_element() {
                 Ok(Some(value)) => RequestMethod::Query(QueryRequestMethod::Registry(value)),
                 Err(err) => RequestMethod::invalid(err),

crates/jmap-proto/src/response/mod.rs

@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ pub enum GetResponseMethod {
     MaskedEmail(GetResponse<crate::object::fastmail_masked_email::FastmailMaskedEmail>),
     DeletedAccount(GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_deleted_account::DeletedAccount>),
     AiLimits(GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_ai_limits::AiLimits>),
+    AuditEvent(GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditEvent>),
+    AuditSettings(GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>),
+    AccountLock(GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>),
     ProtocolPolicy(GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_protocol_policy::ProtocolPolicy>),
     TenantProtocolPolicy(
         GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_tenant_protocol_policy::TenantProtocolPolicy>,
@@ -131,6 +134,10 @@ pub enum SetResponseMethod {
     MaskedEmail(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::fastmail_masked_email::FastmailMaskedEmail>>),
     DeletedAccount(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_deleted_account::DeletedAccount>>),
     AiLimits(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_ai_limits::AiLimits>>),
+    AuditSettings(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>>),
+    AuditExport(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditExport>>),
+    AuditVerification(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditVerification>>),
+    AccountLock(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>>),
     Explanation(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_explanation::Explanation>>),
     ProtocolPolicy(Box<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_protocol_policy::ProtocolPolicy>>),
     TenantProtocolPolicy(
@@ -714,3 +721,47 @@ impl From<SetResponse<CalendarEventNotification>> for ResponseMethod<'_> {
         )))
     }
 }
+
+// inbuxa: the audit log
+impl<'x> From<GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditEvent>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditEvent>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Get(GetResponseMethod::AuditEvent(value))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'x> From<GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Get(GetResponseMethod::AuditSettings(value))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'x> From<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditSettings>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Set(SetResponseMethod::AuditSettings(Box::new(value)))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'x> From<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditExport>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditExport>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Set(SetResponseMethod::AuditExport(Box::new(value)))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'x> From<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditVerification>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_audit::AuditVerification>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Set(SetResponseMethod::AuditVerification(Box::new(value)))
+    }
+}
+
+// inbuxa: account lock with delegation
+impl<'x> From<GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: GetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Get(GetResponseMethod::AccountLock(value))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'x> From<SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>> for ResponseMethod<'x> {
+    fn from(value: SetResponse<crate::object::inbuxa_account_lock::AccountLock>) -> Self {
+        ResponseMethod::Set(SetResponseMethod::AccountLock(Box::new(value)))
+    }
+}

crates/jmap/src/api/auth.rs

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ use types::{collection::Collection, id::Id};
 
 pub trait JmapAuthorization {
     fn assert_is_member(&self, account_id: Id) -> trc::Result<&Self>;
+    /// inbuxa: AL-8: the account's own, or a delegate allowed to send as it.
+    fn assert_can_send(&self, account_id: Id) -> trc::Result<&Self>;
     fn assert_has_jmap_permission(
         &self,
         request: &RequestMethod,
@@ -31,6 +33,17 @@ pub trait JmapAuthorization {
 }
 
 impl JmapAuthorization for AccessToken {
+    fn assert_can_send(&self, account_id: Id) -> trc::Result<&Self> {
+        if self
+            .delegation(account_id.document_id())
+            .is_some_and(|delegation| delegation.send_as)
+        {
+            Ok(self)
+        } else {
+            self.assert_is_member(account_id)
+        }
+    }
+
     fn assert_is_member(&self, account_id: Id) -> trc::Result<&Self> {
         if self.is_member(account_id.document_id()) {
             Ok(self)
@@ -77,6 +90,12 @@ impl JmapAuthorization for AccessToken {
                 GetRequestMethod::DeletedAccount(_) => Permission::SysAccountGet,
                 // inbuxa: AI call limits, with the classifier's permissions
                 GetRequestMethod::AiLimits(_) => Permission::SysSpamLlmGet,
+                // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-9)
+                GetRequestMethod::AuditEvent(_) | GetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(_) => {
+                    Permission::SysAuditGet
+                }
+                // inbuxa: account lock (AL-12)
+                GetRequestMethod::AccountLock(_) => Permission::SysAccountLockGet,
                 // inbuxa: legacy protocols off. It takes listeners away and
                 // puts them back, so it takes the listener's permissions
                 GetRequestMethod::ProtocolPolicy(_) => Permission::SysNetworkListenerGet,
@@ -180,6 +199,36 @@ impl JmapAuthorization for AccessToken {
                         Permission::SysSpamLlmUpdate,
                         Permission::SysSpamLlmUpdate,
                     ),
+                    // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-7, AU-9, AU-11)
+                    SetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(s) => validate_set(
+                        s,
+                        self,
+                        Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate,
+                        Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate,
+                        Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate,
+                    ),
+                    SetRequestMethod::AuditExport(s) => validate_set(
+                        s,
+                        self,
+                        Permission::SysAuditExport,
+                        Permission::SysAuditExport,
+                        Permission::SysAuditExport,
+                    ),
+                    // inbuxa: account lock (AL-12)
+                    SetRequestMethod::AccountLock(s) => validate_set(
+                        s,
+                        self,
+                        Permission::SysAccountLockCreate,
+                        Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate,
+                        Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy,
+                    ),
+                    SetRequestMethod::AuditVerification(s) => validate_set(
+                        s,
+                        self,
+                        Permission::SysAuditGet,
+                        Permission::SysAuditGet,
+                        Permission::SysAuditGet,
+                    ),
                     // inbuxa: "Explain this" (EX-4)
                     SetRequestMethod::Explanation(s) => validate_set(
                         s,
@@ -315,6 +364,11 @@ impl JmapAuthorization for AccessToken {
                 | MethodObject::DeletedAccount
                 | MethodObject::AiLimits
                 | MethodObject::Explanation
+                | MethodObject::AuditEvent
+                | MethodObject::AuditSettings
+                | MethodObject::AuditExport
+                | MethodObject::AuditVerification
+                | MethodObject::AccountLock
                 | MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy
                 | MethodObject::TenantProtocolPolicy => Permission::JmapEmailChanges,
                 // inbuxa: x:MaskedEmail/changes reads what /get reads
@@ -371,6 +425,8 @@ impl JmapAuthorization for AccessToken {
                     Permission::JmapCalendarEventNotificationQuery
                 }
                 QueryRequestMethod::ShareNotification(_) => Permission::JmapShareNotificationQuery,
+                // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-9)
+                QueryRequestMethod::AuditEvent(_) => Permission::SysAuditGet,
                 QueryRequestMethod::Registry(_) => {
                     let MethodObject::Registry(object_type) = object else {
                         unreachable!()

crates/jmap/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -188,10 +188,13 @@ impl ToRequestError for trc::Error {
                 trc::SecurityEvent::Unauthorized | trc::SecurityEvent::IpUnauthorized => {
                     RequestError::forbidden()
                 }
-                // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8 is an event, never an error
+                // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8 is an event, never an error;
+                // a failed audit write refuses the change (AU-3)
                 trc::SecurityEvent::IpBlockExpired
                 | trc::SecurityEvent::IpAllowExpired
-                | trc::SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged => {
+                | trc::SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged
+                | trc::SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded
+                | trc::SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed => {
                     RequestError::internal_server_error()
                 }
             },

crates/jmap/src/api/request.rs

@@ -143,15 +143,27 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                             | RequestMethod::Changes(_)
                             | RequestMethod::QueryChanges(_)
                     );
-                if matches!(
+                let is_write = matches!(
                     call.method,
                     RequestMethod::Set(_)
                         | RequestMethod::Copy(_)
                         | RequestMethod::ImportEmail(_)
                         | RequestMethod::UploadBlob(_)
-                ) {
+                );
+                if is_write {
                     has_written = true;
                 }
+                // inbuxa: AL-7: what a delegate makes in a locked account
+                // may need the lock's grants
+                let makes_containers = is_write
+                    && matches!(
+                        call.name.obj,
+                        MethodObject::Mailbox
+                            | MethodObject::Calendar
+                            | MethodObject::AddressBook
+                            | MethodObject::FileNode
+                    );
+                let call_name = call.name.as_str().into_owned();
                 let presented = match &call.method {
                     RequestMethod::Changes(changes) => match &changes.since_state {
                         jmap_proto::types::state::State::Exact(change_id) => {
@@ -161,13 +173,16 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                     },
                     _ => None,
                 };
-                let method_call = self.handle_method_call(
-                    call.method,
-                    call.name,
-                    access_token,
-                    &mut next_call,
-                    session,
-                );
+                // inbuxa: AU-1.6: which accounts it reached by impersonation
+                let method_call = crate::inbuxa::audit::collect_access(Box::pin(
+                    self.handle_method_call(
+                        call.method,
+                        call.name,
+                        access_token,
+                        &mut next_call,
+                        session,
+                    ),
+                ));
                 let result = if eligible {
                     store::backend::scaleout::replica::replica_read(
                         access_token.all_ids().map(|account_id| {
@@ -184,6 +199,31 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                 } else {
                     method_call.await
                 };
+                let (result, reached) = result;
+                for account_id in reached {
+                    // inbuxa: AL-9: a delegate's access, and what it
+                    // changes, are recorded; anyone else here impersonated
+                    if let Some(delegation) = access_token.delegation(account_id) {
+                        let access = delegation.access.as_str();
+                        self.audit_delegate(
+                            access_token,
+                            account_id,
+                            access,
+                            is_write.then_some(call_name.as_str()),
+                            result.as_ref().err(),
+                        )
+                        .await;
+                        if makes_containers
+                            && result.is_ok()
+                            && let Err(err) =
+                                email::inbuxa_lock::reconcile(self, account_id).await
+                        {
+                            trc::error!(err.details("Failed to grant a lock's delegates on new folders"));
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        self.audit_foreign_access(access_token, account_id, false).await;
+                    }
+                }
                 match result
                 {
                     Ok(mut method_response) => {
@@ -221,6 +261,18 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                                     SetResponseMethod::AiLimits(set_response) => {
                                         set_response.update_created_ids(&mut response);
                                     }
+                                    SetResponseMethod::AuditSettings(set_response) => {
+                                        set_response.update_created_ids(&mut response);
+                                    }
+                                    SetResponseMethod::AuditExport(set_response) => {
+                                        set_response.update_created_ids(&mut response);
+                                    }
+                                    SetResponseMethod::AuditVerification(set_response) => {
+                                        set_response.update_created_ids(&mut response);
+                                    }
+                                    SetResponseMethod::AccountLock(set_response) => {
+                                        set_response.update_created_ids(&mut response);
+                                    }
                                     SetResponseMethod::Explanation(set_response) => {
                                         set_response.update_created_ids(&mut response);
                                     }
@@ -338,13 +390,15 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                 }
                 GetRequestMethod::Identity(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    access_token.assert_is_member(req.account_id)?;
+                    // inbuxa: AL-8: a delegate may send as a locked account
+                    access_token.assert_can_send(req.account_id)?;
 
                     self.identity_get(*req).await?.into()
                 }
                 GetRequestMethod::EmailSubmission(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    access_token.assert_is_member(req.account_id)?;
+                    // inbuxa: AL-8: a delegate may send as a locked account
+                    access_token.assert_can_send(req.account_id)?;
 
                     self.email_submission_get(*req).await?.into()
                 }
@@ -385,6 +439,26 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                         .await?
                         .into()
                 }
+                // inbuxa: account lock with delegation (AL-1)
+                GetRequestMethod::AccountLock(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::account_lock::get(self, access_token, *req)
+                        .await?
+                        .into()
+                }
+                // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-9)
+                GetRequestMethod::AuditEvent(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit_log::event_get(self, access_token, *req)
+                        .await?
+                        .into()
+                }
+                GetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit_log::settings_get(self, *req)
+                        .await?
+                        .into()
+                }
                 // inbuxa: inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy/get (legacy protocols off)
                 GetRequestMethod::ProtocolPolicy(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
@@ -497,7 +571,8 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                 }
                 QueryRequestMethod::EmailSubmission(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    access_token.assert_is_member(req.account_id)?;
+                    // inbuxa: AL-8: a delegate may send as a locked account
+                    access_token.assert_can_send(req.account_id)?;
 
                     self.email_submission_query(*req).await?.into()
                 }
@@ -560,6 +635,13 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
 
                     self.share_notification_query(*req).await?.into()
                 }
+                // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-9)
+                QueryRequestMethod::AuditEvent(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit_log::event_query(self, access_token, *req)
+                        .await?
+                        .into()
+                }
                 QueryRequestMethod::Registry(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
                     assert_registry_account(self, method_name.obj, access_token, req.account_id)
@@ -595,7 +677,8 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                 }
                 SetRequestMethod::EmailSubmission(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    access_token.assert_is_member(req.account_id)?;
+                    // inbuxa: AL-8: a delegate may send as a locked account
+                    access_token.assert_can_send(req.account_id)?;
 
                     self.email_submission_set(*req, &session.instance, next_call)
                         .await?
@@ -622,21 +705,107 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                 // inbuxa: Fastmail's MaskedEmail/set
                 SetRequestMethod::MaskedEmail(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    crate::inbuxa::fastmail::set(self, access_token, *req)
-                        .await?
-                        .into()
+                    // inbuxa: AU-1.2, AU-3
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::fastmail::set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
                 }
                 // inbuxa: inbuxa:DeletedAccount/set (UD-17)
                 SetRequestMethod::DeletedAccount(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    crate::inbuxa::deleted_account::set(self, access_token, *req)
-                        .await?
-                        .into()
+                    // inbuxa: AU-1.2, AU-3
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::deleted_account::set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
                 }
                 // inbuxa: inbuxa:AiLimits/set
                 SetRequestMethod::AiLimits(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    crate::inbuxa::ai_limits::set(self, access_token, *req)
+                    // inbuxa: AU-1.2, AU-3
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::ai_limits::set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
+                }
+                // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-7, AU-11, AU-6)
+                SetRequestMethod::AuditSettings(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::audit_log::settings_set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
+                }
+                // inbuxa: account lock with delegation, recorded with its
+                // reason (AL-1, AU-12)
+                SetRequestMethod::AccountLock(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    let reason = req.arguments.reason.clone().or_else(|| {
+                        req.create.as_ref().and_then(|create| {
+                            create.values().find_map(|value| {
+                                serde_json::to_value(value)
+                                    .ok()?
+                                    .get("reason")?
+                                    .as_str()
+                                    .map(str::to_string)
+                            })
+                        })
+                    });
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        reason,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::account_lock::set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
+                }
+                SetRequestMethod::AuditExport(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit_log::export_set(self, access_token, session, *req)
+                        .await?
+                        .into()
+                }
+                SetRequestMethod::AuditVerification(mut req) => {
+                    resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit_log::verification_set(self, access_token, session, *req)
                         .await?
                         .into()
                 }
@@ -650,16 +819,36 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                 // inbuxa: inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy/set (legacy protocols off)
                 SetRequestMethod::ProtocolPolicy(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    crate::inbuxa::protocol_policy::set(self, access_token, *req)
-                        .await?
-                        .into()
+                    // inbuxa: AU-1.2, AU-3
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::protocol_policy::set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
                 }
                 // inbuxa: inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy/set (legacy protocols off, per tenant)
                 SetRequestMethod::TenantProtocolPolicy(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
-                    crate::inbuxa::tenant_protocol_policy::set(self, access_token, *req)
-                        .await?
-                        .into()
+                    // inbuxa: AU-1.2, AU-3
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
+                        access_token,
+                        session,
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(crate::inbuxa::tenant_protocol_policy::set(self, access_token, req)),
+                    )
+                    .await?
+                    .into()
                 }
                 SetRequestMethod::AddressBook(mut req) => {
                     resolve_account_id(&mut req.account_id, method_name.obj, access_token)?;
@@ -724,12 +913,18 @@ impl RequestHandler for Server {
                     assert_registry_account(self, method_name.obj, access_token, req.account_id)
                         .await?;
 
-                    Box::pin(self.registry_set(
-                        method_name.obj.unwrap_registry(),
-                        *req,
+                    // inbuxa: AU-1.1, AU-3: recorded before and after
+                    let object_type = method_name.obj.unwrap_registry();
+                    crate::inbuxa::audit::recorded(
+                        self,
                         access_token,
                         session,
-                    ))
+                        &method_name.obj.to_string(),
+                        Some(object_type),
+                        None,
+                        *req,
+                        |req| Box::pin(self.registry_set(object_type, req, access_token, session)),
+                    )
                     .await?
                     .into()
                 }
@@ -906,6 +1101,8 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_account_id(
     access_token: &AccessToken,
 ) -> trc::Result<()> {
     if account_id.id() < INVALID_ACCOUNT_ID {
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.6
+        crate::inbuxa::audit::note_access(account_id.document_id(), access_token);
         Ok(())
     } else if matches!(
         obj,

crates/jmap/src/api/session.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 use common::{Server, auth::AccessToken};
 use jmap_proto::request::capability::{
-    Account, Capabilities, Capability, EmptyCapabilities, InbuxaAccountCapabilities, Session,
+    Account, Capabilities, Capability, EmptyCapabilities, InbuxaAccountCapabilities, InbuxaDelegatedCapabilities, DelegationInfo, Session,
 };
 use registry::schema::enums::Permission;
 use std::future::Future;
@@ -116,11 +116,16 @@ impl SessionHandler for Server {
                 continue;
             };
 
+            // inbuxa: AL-6, AL-7: a delegated locked account says so, and is
+            // read-only at the read level
+            let delegation = access_token.delegation(account_id).cloned();
             let account_id = Id::from(account_id);
             let mut account = Account {
                 name: account.name().to_string(),
                 is_personal: false,
-                is_read_only: false,
+                is_read_only: delegation
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .is_some_and(|d| d.access == inbuxa_features::lock::Access::Read),
                 account_capabilities: VecMap::with_capacity(account_capabilities.len()),
             };
             for capability in access_token.account_capabilities() {
@@ -132,6 +137,22 @@ impl SessionHandler for Server {
                         .unwrap_or_else(|| Capabilities::Empty(EmptyCapabilities::default())),
                 );
             }
+            if let Some(delegation) = delegation {
+                account.account_capabilities.append(
+                    Capability::Inbuxa,
+                    Capabilities::InbuxaDelegated(InbuxaDelegatedCapabilities {
+                        delegation: DelegationInfo {
+                            locked: true,
+                            access: delegation.access.as_str(),
+                            send_as: delegation.send_as,
+                            until: delegation.until.map(|until| {
+                                jmap_proto::types::date::UTCDate::from_timestamp(until as i64)
+                                    .to_string()
+                            }),
+                        },
+                    }),
+                );
+            }
             session.accounts.append(account_id, account);
         }
 

crates/jmap/src/blob/download.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <hello@stalw.art>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use common::{Server, auth::AccessToken};
@@ -115,6 +117,9 @@ impl BlobDownload for Server {
                             document_id,
                         } => {
                             if access_token.is_member(*account_id) {
+                                // inbuxa: AU-1.6: another account's blob
+                                self.audit_foreign_access(access_token, *account_id, true)
+                                    .await;
                                 true
                             } else {
                                 match Collection::from(*collection) {

crates/jmap/src/changes/get.rs

@@ -419,6 +419,11 @@ impl IntermediateChangesResponse {
             | MethodObject::DeletedAccount
             | MethodObject::AiLimits
             | MethodObject::Explanation
+            | MethodObject::AuditEvent
+            | MethodObject::AuditSettings
+            | MethodObject::AuditExport
+            | MethodObject::AuditVerification
+            | MethodObject::AccountLock
             | MethodObject::ProtocolPolicy
             | MethodObject::TenantProtocolPolicy
             | MethodObject::Registry(_) => unreachable!(),

crates/jmap/src/email/set.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <hello@stalw.art>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use crate::{
@@ -1141,7 +1143,20 @@ impl EmailSet for Server {
         }
 
         // Process deletions
-        if !will_destroy.is_empty() {
+        // inbuxa: AL-6: a delegate below full may move mail, never delete it
+        if !will_destroy.is_empty()
+            && access_token
+                .delegation(account_id)
+                .is_some_and(|delegation| !delegation.access.may_destroy())
+        {
+            for destroy_id in will_destroy {
+                response.not_destroyed.append(
+                    destroy_id,
+                    SetError::forbidden()
+                        .with_description("A delegate at this level can move mail but not delete it."),
+                );
+            }
+        } else if !will_destroy.is_empty() {
             let email_ids = cache.email_document_ids();
             let can_destroy_message_ids = if access_token.is_shared(account_id) {
                 cache.shared_messages(access_token, Acl::RemoveItems).into()

crates/jmap/src/inbuxa/account_lock.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! `inbuxa:AccountLock` (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-1 to AL-12): locking an
+//! account, handing it to delegates, and unlocking it. The grants
+//! themselves are `email::inbuxa_lock`'s.
+
+use common::{
+    Server,
+    auth::AccessToken,
+    ipc::{BroadcastEvent, PushEvent},
+};
+use email::inbuxa_lock::apply_grants;
+use groupware::inbuxa_lock::invalidate;
+use inbuxa_features::lock::{self, Access, Delegate, Lock, MAX_DELEGATES};
+use jmap_proto::{
+    error::set::SetError,
+    method::{
+        get::{GetRequest, GetResponse},
+        set::{SetRequest, SetResponse},
+    },
+    object::inbuxa_account_lock::{
+        AccountLock, AccountLockProperty as P, AccountLockSetArguments, AccountLockValue,
+    },
+    request::IntoValid,
+    types::date::UTCDate,
+};
+use jmap_tools::{Key, Map, Value};
+use std::{borrow::Cow, str::FromStr};
+use store::write::now;
+use types::id::Id;
+
+type LValue = Value<'static, P, AccountLockValue>;
+
+const ALL: &[P] = &[
+    P::Id,
+    P::AccountId,
+    P::Name,
+    P::Reason,
+    P::LockedAt,
+    P::LockedBy,
+    P::Delegates,
+];
+
+/// Whether the caller may lock, change or unlock `account_id` (AL-12): an
+/// administrator for an account in reach, never its own, never a group.
+async fn assert_reach(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    account_id: u32,
+) -> Result<(), SetError<P>> {
+    if access_token.is_account_id(account_id) {
+        return Err(SetError::forbidden().with_description("You can't lock your own account."));
+    }
+    let Ok(account) = server.account(account_id).await else {
+        return Err(SetError::not_found());
+    };
+    if !account.is_user_account() {
+        return Err(SetError::invalid_properties()
+            .with_property(P::AccountId)
+            .with_description("Only a person's account can be locked."));
+    }
+    match access_token.tenant_id() {
+        // A tenant administrator reaches its own tenant's accounts only
+        Some(tenant_id) if account.id_tenant != Some(tenant_id) => Err(SetError::not_found()),
+        _ => Ok(()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reads and checks the delegates asked for (AL-5, AL-6, AL-8).
+async fn parse_delegates(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    locked_id: u32,
+    value: LValue,
+) -> Result<Vec<Delegate>, SetError<P>> {
+    let invalid = |why: String| {
+        SetError::invalid_properties()
+            .with_property(P::Delegates)
+            .with_description(why)
+    };
+    let json: serde_json::Value = value.into();
+    let Some(items) = json.as_array() else {
+        return Err(invalid("delegates must be a list.".into()));
+    };
+    if items.len() > MAX_DELEGATES {
+        return Err(invalid(format!("At most {MAX_DELEGATES} delegates.")));
+    }
+    let locked_tenant = server.account(locked_id).await.ok().and_then(|a| a.id_tenant);
+    let mut delegates: Vec<Delegate> = Vec::with_capacity(items.len());
+    for item in items {
+        let account_id = item["accountId"]
+            .as_str()
+            .and_then(|id| Id::from_str(id).ok())
+            .map(|id| id.document_id())
+            .ok_or_else(|| invalid("Each delegate needs an accountId.".into()))?;
+        let access = item["access"]
+            .as_str()
+            .and_then(Access::parse)
+            .ok_or_else(|| invalid("access must be read, organize or full.".into()))?;
+        let send_as = item["sendAs"].as_bool().unwrap_or(false);
+        let until = match item.get("until").filter(|v| !v.is_null()) {
+            None => None,
+            Some(value) => Some(
+                value
+                    .as_str()
+                    .and_then(|d| UTCDate::from_str(d).ok())
+                    .map(|d| d.timestamp().max(0) as u64)
+                    .ok_or_else(|| invalid("until must be a UTC date.".into()))?,
+            ),
+        };
+        if account_id == locked_id {
+            return Err(invalid("An account can't be its own delegate.".into()));
+        }
+        if access_token.is_account_id(account_id) && access_token.tenant_id().is_some() {
+            return Err(invalid(
+                "Only a server administrator may make themselves a delegate.".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+        if send_as && access == Access::Read {
+            return Err(invalid(
+                "Sending as the account needs organize or full access: the message is made in its Drafts first."
+                    .into(),
+            ));
+        }
+        let Ok(delegate) = server.account(account_id).await else {
+            return Err(invalid(format!("No account {}.", Id::from(account_id))));
+        };
+        if !delegate.is_user_account() {
+            return Err(invalid("A delegate must be a person, not a group.".into()));
+        }
+        // Delegates stay in the locked account's tenant, unless a server
+        // administrator says otherwise (AL-5)
+        if access_token.tenant_id().is_some() && delegate.id_tenant != locked_tenant {
+            return Err(invalid("A delegate must be in the same organization.".into()));
+        }
+        if delegates.iter().any(|d| d.account_id == account_id) {
+            return Err(invalid("A delegate is listed twice.".into()));
+        }
+        delegates.push(Delegate {
+            account_id,
+            access,
+            send_as,
+            until,
+        });
+    }
+    Ok(delegates)
+}
+
+/// Ends the account's open sessions, here and on every node (AL-3).
+async fn end_sessions(server: &Server, account_id: u32) {
+    let _ = server
+        .inner
+        .ipc
+        .push_tx
+        .send(PushEvent::Revoke { account_id })
+        .await;
+    server
+        .cluster_broadcast(BroadcastEvent::EndSessions(account_id))
+        .await;
+}
+
+fn date(seconds: u64) -> LValue {
+    Value::Str(UTCDate::from_timestamp(seconds as i64).to_string().into())
+}
+
+async fn to_value(server: &Server, lock: &Lock, properties: &[P]) -> LValue {
+    let mut out = Map::with_capacity(properties.len());
+    for property in properties {
+        let value = match property {
+            P::Id | P::AccountId => Value::Element(AccountLockValue::Id(Id::from(lock.account_id))),
+            P::Name => Value::Str(server.audit_account_name(lock.account_id).await.into()),
+            P::Reason => Value::Str(lock.reason.clone().into()),
+            P::LockedAt => date(lock.locked_at),
+            P::LockedBy => Value::Str(lock.locked_by.clone().into()),
+            P::Delegates => {
+                let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(lock.delegates.len());
+                for delegate in &lock.delegates {
+                    let mut item = Map::with_capacity(5);
+                    item.insert_unchecked(
+                        Key::Borrowed("accountId"),
+                        Value::Str(Id::from(delegate.account_id).to_string().into()),
+                    );
+                    item.insert_unchecked(
+                        Key::Borrowed("name"),
+                        Value::Str(server.audit_account_name(delegate.account_id).await.into()),
+                    );
+                    item.insert_unchecked(
+                        Key::Borrowed("access"),
+                        Value::Str(Cow::Borrowed(delegate.access.as_str())),
+                    );
+                    item.insert_unchecked(Key::Borrowed("sendAs"), Value::Bool(delegate.send_as));
+                    item.insert_unchecked(
+                        Key::Borrowed("until"),
+                        delegate.until.map_or(Value::Null, date),
+                    );
+                    items.push(Value::Object(item));
+                }
+                Value::Array(items)
+            }
+        };
+        out.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(property.clone()), value);
+    }
+    Value::Object(out)
+}
+
+/// Whether a lock is in the caller's reach: every lock at server level, the
+/// tenant's own inside one.
+async fn in_reach(server: &Server, access_token: &AccessToken, account_id: u32) -> bool {
+    match access_token.tenant_id() {
+        None => true,
+        Some(tenant_id) => server
+            .account(account_id)
+            .await
+            .is_ok_and(|a| a.id_tenant == Some(tenant_id)),
+    }
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AccountLock/get`: the locks in reach.
+pub async fn get(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    mut request: GetRequest<AccountLock>,
+) -> trc::Result<GetResponse<AccountLock>> {
+    let properties = request.unwrap_properties(ALL);
+    let (ids, not_found) = request.unwrap_ids(server.core.jmap.get_max_objects)?;
+    let mut response = GetResponse {
+        account_id: request.account_id.into(),
+        state: None,
+        list: Vec::new(),
+        not_found,
+    };
+    let data = server.store();
+    match ids {
+        None => {
+            for current in lock::all(data).await? {
+                if in_reach(server, access_token, current.account_id).await {
+                    response.list.push(to_value(server, &current, &properties).await);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Some(ids) => {
+            for id in ids {
+                match lock::get(data, id.document_id()).await? {
+                    Some(current) if in_reach(server, access_token, current.account_id).await => {
+                        response.list.push(to_value(server, &current, &properties).await);
+                    }
+                    _ => response.push_not_found(id),
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(response)
+}
+
+fn reason_of(reason: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
+    reason
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|r| !r.is_empty())
+        .map(|r| r.chars().take(500).collect())
+}
+
+fn reason_required() -> SetError<P> {
+    SetError::invalid_properties()
+        .with_property(P::Reason)
+        .with_description("Say why: a reason is required and is kept in the audit log.")
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AccountLock/set`: create locks, update changes delegates or the
+/// reason, destroy unlocks. The request layer records each.
+pub async fn set(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    mut request: SetRequest<'_, AccountLock>,
+) -> trc::Result<SetResponse<AccountLock>> {
+    let mut response = SetResponse::from_request(&request, server.core.jmap.set_max_objects)?;
+    let arguments: AccountLockSetArguments = std::mem::take(&mut request.arguments);
+    let data = server.store();
+    let actor = server.audit_actor(access_token).await;
+
+    for (client_id, value) in request.unwrap_create() {
+        let mut account_id = None;
+        let mut reason = None;
+        let mut delegates_value = None;
+        let mut invalid = None;
+        for (key, value) in value.into_expanded_object() {
+            match (&key, value) {
+                (Key::Property(P::AccountId), Value::Element(AccountLockValue::Id(id))) => {
+                    account_id = Some(id.document_id())
+                }
+                (Key::Property(P::Reason), Value::Str(r)) => reason = reason_of(Some(&r)),
+                (Key::Property(P::Delegates), value) => delegates_value = Some(value.into_owned()),
+                _ => {
+                    invalid = Some(SetError::invalid_properties().with_property(key.into_owned()));
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(error) = invalid {
+            response.not_created.append(client_id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let Some(account_id) = account_id else {
+            response.not_created.append(
+                client_id,
+                SetError::invalid_properties().with_property(P::AccountId),
+            );
+            continue;
+        };
+        let Some(reason) = reason.or_else(|| reason_of(arguments.reason.as_deref())) else {
+            response.not_created.append(client_id, reason_required());
+            continue;
+        };
+        if let Err(error) = assert_reach(server, access_token, account_id).await {
+            response.not_created.append(client_id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if lock::get(data, account_id).await?.is_some() {
+            response.not_created.append(
+                client_id,
+                SetError::already_exists().with_description("That account is already locked."),
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
+        let delegates = match delegates_value {
+            Some(value) => match parse_delegates(server, access_token, account_id, value).await {
+                Ok(delegates) => delegates,
+                Err(error) => {
+                    response.not_created.append(client_id, error);
+                    continue;
+                }
+            },
+            None => Vec::new(),
+        };
+        let mut created = Lock {
+            account_id,
+            reason,
+            locked_at: now(),
+            locked_by: actor.name.clone(),
+            locked_by_id: actor.account_id,
+            delegates,
+            replaced: Vec::new(),
+        };
+        // The lock is written first: from here the account can't sign in,
+        // whatever happens to the grants
+        lock::set(data, &created, None).await?;
+        created.replaced = apply_grants(server, account_id, None, Some(&created)).await?;
+        lock::set(data, &created, Some(&created)).await?;
+        invalidate(server, account_id, None, Some(&created)).await?;
+        end_sessions(server, account_id).await;
+
+        let mut out = Map::with_capacity(1);
+        out.insert_unchecked(
+            Key::Property(P::Id),
+            Value::Element(AccountLockValue::Id(Id::from(account_id))),
+        );
+        response.created.insert(client_id, Value::Object(out));
+    }
+
+    for (id, value) in request.unwrap_update().into_valid() {
+        let account_id = id.document_id();
+        if let Err(error) = assert_reach(server, access_token, account_id).await {
+            response.not_updated.append(id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let Some(current) = lock::get(data, account_id).await? else {
+            response.not_updated.append(id, SetError::not_found());
+            continue;
+        };
+        if reason_of(arguments.reason.as_deref()).is_none() {
+            response.not_updated.append(id, reason_required());
+            continue;
+        }
+        let mut updated = current.clone();
+        let mut invalid = None;
+        for (key, value) in value.into_expanded_object() {
+            match (&key, value) {
+                (Key::Property(P::Delegates), value) => {
+                    match parse_delegates(server, access_token, account_id, value.into_owned()).await {
+                        Ok(delegates) => updated.delegates = delegates,
+                        Err(error) => {
+                            invalid = Some(error);
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                (Key::Property(P::Reason), Value::Str(r)) => match reason_of(Some(&r)) {
+                    Some(r) => updated.reason = r,
+                    None => {
+                        invalid = Some(reason_required());
+                        break;
+                    }
+                },
+                _ => {
+                    invalid = Some(SetError::invalid_properties().with_property(key.into_owned()));
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(error) = invalid {
+            response.not_updated.append(id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        updated.replaced = apply_grants(server, account_id, Some(&current), Some(&updated)).await?;
+        lock::set(data, &updated, Some(&current)).await?;
+        invalidate(server, account_id, Some(&current), Some(&updated)).await?;
+        response.updated.append(id, None);
+    }
+
+    for id in request.unwrap_destroy().into_valid() {
+        let account_id = id.document_id();
+        if let Err(error) = assert_reach(server, access_token, account_id).await {
+            response.not_destroyed.append(id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let Some(current) = lock::get(data, account_id).await? else {
+            response.not_destroyed.append(id, SetError::not_found());
+            continue;
+        };
+        if reason_of(arguments.reason.as_deref()).is_none() {
+            response.not_destroyed.append(id, reason_required());
+            continue;
+        }
+        // Grants go first: an unlocked account never keeps its delegates
+        apply_grants(server, account_id, Some(&current), None).await?;
+        lock::remove(data, &current).await?;
+        // Delegates lose the account on their next request: their tokens
+        // are rebuilt without it, on every node
+        invalidate(server, account_id, Some(&current), None).await?;
+        response.destroyed.push(id);
+    }
+
+    Ok(response)
+}

crates/jmap/src/inbuxa/audit.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The audit log's request layer (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-1.1 to AU-1.3,
+//! AU-3). Before a set method changes anything, one pending record per
+//! requested create, update and destroy is written, with what was asked
+//! and, for registry objects, what each changed place held before. If that
+//! write fails, nothing is changed. After the method, each record's outcome
+//! follows. The method runs in a request scope, so the registry's write hook
+//! doesn't record the same writes again.
+
+use common::{Server, auth::AccessToken};
+use http_proto::HttpSessionData;
+use inbuxa_features::audit::{Action, EntryId, Outcome, Record, Target, diff, scope};
+use jmap_proto::{
+    error::set::SetError,
+    method::set::{SetRequest, SetResponse},
+    object::JmapObject,
+    request::{MaybeInvalid, reference::MaybeResultReference},
+};
+use registry::schema::enums::Permission;
+use registry::{
+    schema::prelude::{OBJ_FILTER_ACCOUNT, OBJ_SINGLETON, ObjectType},
+    types::id::ObjectId,
+};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::{cell::RefCell, future::Future};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+tokio::task_local! {
+    /// Accounts a method call reached through impersonation (AU-1.6).
+    static REACHED: RefCell<Vec<u32>>;
+}
+
+/// Runs one method call, collecting the accounts it reached through
+/// `Impersonate` rather than as the caller's own, a group's or a share.
+pub async fn collect_access<F: Future>(f: F) -> (F::Output, Vec<u32>) {
+    REACHED
+        .scope(RefCell::new(Vec::new()), async {
+            let output = f.await;
+            let reached = REACHED.with(|reached| std::mem::take(&mut *reached.borrow_mut()));
+            (output, reached)
+        })
+        .await
+}
+
+/// Notes an account a method call is about to reach (AU-1.6): through
+/// impersonation, or as a locked account's delegate (AL-9).
+pub fn note_access(account_id: u32, access_token: &AccessToken) {
+    if access_token.delegation(account_id).is_some()
+        || (!access_token.is_member_directly(account_id)
+            && access_token.has_permission(Permission::Impersonate))
+    {
+        let _ = REACHED.try_with(|reached| {
+            let mut reached = reached.borrow_mut();
+            if !reached.contains(&account_id) {
+                reached.push(account_id);
+            }
+        });
+    }
+}
+
+enum Item {
+    Create(String),
+    Update(MaybeInvalid<Id>),
+    Destroy(MaybeInvalid<Id>),
+}
+
+/// The pending records written for one set method.
+pub struct Pending {
+    items: Vec<(Item, EntryId)>,
+}
+
+fn ms() -> u64 {
+    std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map_or(0, |d| d.as_millis() as u64)
+}
+
+/// Whether a set on this object isn't recorded: content a user manages for
+/// themselves, which isn't the control plane.
+pub fn is_exempt(object: &str, account_id: Id, access_token: &AccessToken) -> bool {
+    let own = account_id.document_id() == access_token.account_id();
+    match object {
+        // Spam training is mail handling, and can come with every message
+        "x:SpamTrainingSample" => true,
+        // A user's own masks and archive are their own business; an
+        // administrator reaching someone else's is recorded
+        "x:MaskedEmail" | "MaskedEmail" | "x:ArchivedItem" => own,
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+/// `before`, boxed in a frame of its own (see `recorded`).
+fn before_boxed<'a, T: JmapObject>(
+    server: &'a Server,
+    access_token: &'a AccessToken,
+    session: &'a HttpSessionData,
+    object: &'a str,
+    registry: Option<ObjectType>,
+    reason: Option<String>,
+    request: &'a SetRequest<'_, T>,
+) -> std::pin::Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = trc::Result<Pending>> + Send + 'a>> {
+    Box::pin(before(
+        server,
+        access_token,
+        session,
+        object,
+        registry,
+        reason,
+        request,
+    ))
+}
+
+/// Runs a set method with its requested changes recorded first and its
+/// outcomes after (AU-3). `method` returns its future already boxed, so
+/// this frame and the scope around it hold a pointer, not the method's
+/// state.
+pub async fn recorded<'x, T, F, Fut>(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    session: &HttpSessionData,
+    object: &str,
+    registry: Option<ObjectType>,
+    reason: Option<String>,
+    request: SetRequest<'x, T>,
+    method: F,
+) -> trc::Result<SetResponse<T>>
+where
+    T: JmapObject,
+    F: FnOnce(SetRequest<'x, T>) -> std::pin::Pin<Box<Fut>>,
+    Fut: Future<Output = trc::Result<SetResponse<T>>> + ?Sized,
+{
+    if is_exempt(object, request.account_id, access_token) {
+        return method(request).await;
+    }
+    // Every inner future is boxed where it's made, never held in this
+    // frame: a debug build's stack can't take a copy of registry_set's
+    // state on top of the request's own
+    let pending =
+        before_boxed(server, access_token, session, object, registry, reason, &request).await?;
+    let result = scope::request(method(request)).await;
+    after(server, pending, &result).await;
+    result
+}
+
+async fn before<T: JmapObject>(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    session: &HttpSessionData,
+    object: &str,
+    registry: Option<ObjectType>,
+    reason: Option<String>,
+    request: &SetRequest<'_, T>,
+) -> trc::Result<Pending> {
+    let actor = server.audit_actor(access_token).await;
+    let via = access_token.origin().cloned();
+    // The request's account is the target's only for objects that belong
+    // to an account; a domain created by an administrator isn't theirs
+    let account_id = registry
+        .is_none_or(|object_type| object_type.flags() & OBJ_FILTER_ACCOUNT != 0)
+        .then(|| request.account_id.document_id());
+    let mut records = Vec::new();
+
+    for (client_id, value) in request.create.iter().flat_map(|c| c.iter()) {
+        let after = serde_json::to_value(value).unwrap_or_default();
+        let described = diff::describe(&after);
+        let changes = after
+            .as_object()
+            .map(|patch| diff::patch(object, None, patch))
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        records.push((
+            Item::Create(client_id.clone()),
+            Action::Create,
+            Target {
+                kind: object.to_string(),
+                id: None,
+                name: described.name,
+                account_id: described.account_id.or(account_id),
+                tenant_id: described.tenant_id.or(access_token.tenant_id()),
+            },
+            changes,
+        ));
+    }
+
+    for (id, value) in request.update.iter().flat_map(|u| u.iter()) {
+        let before = match registry {
+            Some(_) => stored(server, registry, id).await,
+            None => fork_current(server, object, id).await,
+        };
+        let patch = serde_json::to_value(value).unwrap_or_default();
+        let described = before.as_ref().map(diff::describe).unwrap_or_default();
+        let changes = patch
+            .as_object()
+            .map(|patch| diff::patch(object, before.as_ref(), patch))
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        records.push((
+            Item::Update(id.clone()),
+            Action::Update,
+            Target {
+                kind: object.to_string(),
+                id: Some(id_text(id)),
+                name: described.name,
+                account_id: described.account_id.or(account_id),
+                tenant_id: described.tenant_id.or(access_token.tenant_id()),
+            },
+            changes,
+        ));
+    }
+
+    if let Some(MaybeResultReference::Value(destroy)) = &request.destroy {
+        for id in destroy {
+            let before = stored(server, registry, id).await;
+            let described = before.as_ref().map(diff::describe).unwrap_or_default();
+            records.push((
+                Item::Destroy(id.clone()),
+                Action::Destroy,
+                Target {
+                    kind: object.to_string(),
+                    id: Some(id_text(id)),
+                    name: described.name,
+                    account_id: described.account_id.or(account_id),
+                    tenant_id: described.tenant_id.or(access_token.tenant_id()),
+                },
+                vec![],
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut pending = Pending {
+        items: Vec::with_capacity(records.len()),
+    };
+    for (item, action, target, changes) in records {
+        let record = Record {
+            at: ms(),
+            actor: actor.clone(),
+            via: via.clone(),
+            remote_ip: Some(session.remote_ip),
+            action,
+            target,
+            changes,
+            details: None,
+            reason: reason.clone(),
+            outcome: Outcome::Pending,
+        };
+        match server.audit_append(&record).await {
+            Ok(entry) => pending.items.push((item, entry)),
+            Err(err) => {
+                // Nothing is changed: the records already written say so
+                for (_, entry) in pending.items {
+                    let _ = server
+                        .audit_finish(
+                            entry,
+                            Outcome::refused(
+                                "serverFail",
+                                Some("The audit log couldn't be written.".into()),
+                            ),
+                        )
+                        .await;
+                }
+                return Err(
+                    err.details("The audit log couldn't be written, so nothing was changed.")
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(pending)
+}
+
+async fn after<T: JmapObject>(
+    server: &Server,
+    pending: Pending,
+    result: &trc::Result<SetResponse<T>>,
+) {
+    for (item, entry) in pending.items {
+        let outcome = match result {
+            Err(err) => Outcome::refused(
+                "serverFail",
+                err.value_as_str(trc::Key::Details).map(str::to_string),
+            ),
+            Ok(response) => outcome(response, &item),
+        };
+        // The change is done: a failure here is reported, and the record
+        // stays pending, which verify counts (AU-6)
+        let _ = server.audit_finish(entry, outcome).await;
+    }
+}
+
+fn outcome<T: JmapObject>(response: &SetResponse<T>, item: &Item) -> Outcome {
+    let refused = |err: &SetError<T::Property>| {
+        Outcome::refused(
+            err.error_type().as_str(),
+            err.description().map(str::to_string),
+        )
+    };
+    match item {
+        Item::Create(client_id) => {
+            if let Some(created) = response.created.get(client_id) {
+                Outcome::Success {
+                    created_id: serde_json::to_value(created)
+                        .ok()
+                        .and_then(|v| v.get("id").and_then(Value::as_str).map(str::to_string)),
+                }
+            } else if let Some(err) = response.not_created.get(client_id) {
+                refused(err)
+            } else {
+                Outcome::refused("notProcessed", None)
+            }
+        }
+        Item::Update(id) => {
+            if let MaybeInvalid::Value(id) = id
+                && response.updated.contains_key(id)
+            {
+                Outcome::success()
+            } else if let Some(err) = response.not_updated.get(id) {
+                refused(err)
+            } else {
+                Outcome::refused("notProcessed", None)
+            }
+        }
+        Item::Destroy(id) => {
+            if let MaybeInvalid::Value(id) = id
+                && response.destroyed.contains(id)
+            {
+                Outcome::success()
+            } else if let Some(err) = response.not_destroyed.get(id) {
+                refused(err)
+            } else {
+                Outcome::refused("notProcessed", None)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn id_text(id: &MaybeInvalid<Id>) -> String {
+    match id {
+        MaybeInvalid::Value(id) => id.to_string(),
+        MaybeInvalid::Invalid(text) => text.chars().take(100).collect(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// The fork's own settings as they are now, as JSON, so their changes are
+/// recorded with what they replaced. Their stored names are the JMAP
+/// property names.
+async fn fork_current(server: &Server, object: &str, id: &MaybeInvalid<Id>) -> Option<Value> {
+    use inbuxa_features::{ai::limits, audit::log, security};
+    let data = server.store();
+    match object {
+        "inbuxa:AuditSettings" => log::settings(data)
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .map(|settings| serde_json::json!({"keepForDays": settings.keep_for_secs / 86_400})),
+        "inbuxa:AiLimits" => limits::get(data)
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|limits| serde_json::to_value(limits).ok()),
+        "inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy" => security::protocol_policy::get(data)
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|policy| serde_json::to_value(policy).ok()),
+        "inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy" => match id {
+            MaybeInvalid::Value(id) => {
+                security::tenant_protocol_policy::get(data, id.document_id())
+                    .await
+                    .ok()
+                    .and_then(|policy| serde_json::to_value(policy).ok())
+            }
+            MaybeInvalid::Invalid(_) => None,
+        },
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// A registry object as it is now, as JSON: what an update or destroy
+/// starts from. A singleton never saved holds its defaults.
+async fn stored(
+    server: &Server,
+    registry: Option<ObjectType>,
+    id: &MaybeInvalid<Id>,
+) -> Option<Value> {
+    let (Some(object_type), MaybeInvalid::Value(id)) = (registry, id) else {
+        return None;
+    };
+    let object = match server
+        .registry()
+        .get(ObjectId::new(object_type, *id))
+        .await
+        .ok()?
+    {
+        Some(object) => object,
+        None if id.is_singleton() && object_type.flags() & OBJ_SINGLETON != 0 => {
+            registry::schema::prelude::Object::from(object_type)
+        }
+        None => return None,
+    };
+    serde_json::to_value(registry::jmap::IntoValue::into_value(object)).ok()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn user_content_is_exempt() {
+        let token = AccessToken::from_permissions(5, []);
+        let own = Id::from(5u32);
+        let other = Id::from(6u32);
+        assert!(is_exempt("x:SpamTrainingSample", other, &token));
+        assert!(is_exempt("x:MaskedEmail", own, &token));
+        assert!(!is_exempt("x:MaskedEmail", other, &token));
+        assert!(is_exempt("x:ArchivedItem", own, &token));
+        assert!(!is_exempt("x:ArchivedItem", other, &token));
+        assert!(!is_exempt("x:Domain", own, &token));
+        assert!(!is_exempt("x:AppPassword", own, &token));
+    }
+}

crates/jmap/src/inbuxa/audit_log.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,864 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The audit log over JMAP (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9 to
+//! AU-11): reading records, the retention setting, exports and
+//! verification. Tenant administrators see only records whose actor or
+//! target is in their tenant; retention and verification are the server's.
+
+use common::{Server, auth::AccessToken};
+use http_proto::HttpSessionData;
+use inbuxa_features::audit::{
+    Action, EntryId, Outcome, Record, Target,
+    log::{self, ChainReport, Filter, MIN_KEEP_FOR_SECS, Settings},
+};
+use jmap_proto::{
+    error::set::SetError,
+    method::{
+        get::{GetRequest, GetResponse},
+        query::{Filter as QueryFilter, QueryRequest, QueryResponse},
+        set::{SetRequest, SetResponse},
+    },
+    object::inbuxa_audit::{
+        AuditEvent, AuditExport, AuditFilter, AuditProperty as P, AuditSettings, AuditValue,
+        AuditVerification,
+    },
+    request::IntoValid,
+    types::{date::UTCDate, state::State},
+};
+use jmap_tools::{Key, Map, Value};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::{borrow::Cow, str::FromStr};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+type AValue = Value<'static, P, AuditValue>;
+
+/// Most records one export holds.
+const MAX_EXPORT: usize = 100_000;
+
+const EVENT_PROPERTIES: &[P] = &[
+    P::Id,
+    P::At,
+    P::Node,
+    P::Actor,
+    P::Via,
+    P::RemoteIp,
+    P::Action,
+    P::Target,
+    P::Changes,
+    P::Details,
+    P::Reason,
+    P::Outcome,
+];
+
+fn ms() -> u64 {
+    std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map_or(0, |d| d.as_millis() as u64)
+}
+
+/// A record's time, to the millisecond, in RFC 3339.
+fn iso(at_ms: u64) -> String {
+    let date = UTCDate::from_timestamp((at_ms / 1000) as i64).to_string();
+    // `2026-09-27T10:00:00Z` becomes `2026-09-27T10:00:00.123Z`
+    match date.strip_suffix('Z') {
+        Some(date) => format!("{date}.{:03}Z", at_ms % 1000),
+        None => date,
+    }
+}
+
+fn json_to_value(json: serde_json::Value) -> AValue {
+    match json {
+        serde_json::Value::Null => Value::Null,
+        serde_json::Value::Bool(b) => Value::Bool(b),
+        serde_json::Value::Number(n) => {
+            if let Some(n) = n.as_u64() {
+                Value::Number(n.into())
+            } else if let Some(n) = n.as_i64() {
+                Value::Number(n.into())
+            } else {
+                Value::Number(n.as_f64().unwrap_or_default().into())
+            }
+        }
+        serde_json::Value::String(s) => Value::Str(Cow::Owned(s)),
+        serde_json::Value::Array(items) => {
+            Value::Array(items.into_iter().map(json_to_value).collect())
+        }
+        serde_json::Value::Object(map) => {
+            let mut out = Map::with_capacity(map.len());
+            for (key, value) in map {
+                out.insert_unchecked(Key::Owned(key), json_to_value(value));
+            }
+            Value::Object(out)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn to_json<T: serde::Serialize>(value: &T) -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::to_value(value).unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+/// Account and tenant ids as JMAP ids, not the numbers they're stored as.
+fn with_jmap_ids(mut value: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Value {
+    if let Some(map) = value.as_object_mut() {
+        for key in ["accountId", "tenantId"] {
+            if let Some(id) = map.get(key).and_then(serde_json::Value::as_u64) {
+                map.insert(key.into(), Id::from(id as u32).to_string().into());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    value
+}
+
+/// One record as a JMAP object.
+fn event_value(id: EntryId, record: &Record, properties: &[P]) -> AValue {
+    let mut out = Map::with_capacity(properties.len());
+    for property in properties {
+        let value = match property {
+            P::Id => Value::Element(AuditValue::Id(Id::new(id.to_u64()))),
+            P::At => Value::Str(iso(record.at).into()),
+            P::Node => Value::Number(id.node.into()),
+            P::Actor => json_to_value(with_jmap_ids(to_json(&record.actor))),
+            P::Via => record.via.as_ref().map_or(Value::Null, |via| {
+                json_to_value(with_jmap_ids(to_json(via)))
+            }),
+            P::RemoteIp => record
+                .remote_ip
+                .map_or(Value::Null, |ip| Value::Str(ip.to_string().into())),
+            P::Action => Value::Str(record.action.as_str().into()),
+            P::Target => json_to_value(with_jmap_ids(to_json(&record.target))),
+            P::Changes => json_to_value(to_json(&record.changes)),
+            P::Details => record
+                .details
+                .as_ref()
+                .map_or(Value::Null, |d| Value::Str(d.clone().into())),
+            P::Reason => record
+                .reason
+                .as_ref()
+                .map_or(Value::Null, |r| Value::Str(r.clone().into())),
+            P::Outcome => json_to_value(to_json(&record.outcome)),
+            _ => continue,
+        };
+        out.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(property.clone()), value);
+    }
+    Value::Object(out)
+}
+
+/// The tenant a caller's view is limited to (AU-9).
+fn view_tenant(access_token: &AccessToken) -> Option<u32> {
+    access_token.tenant_id()
+}
+
+fn server_level(access_token: &AccessToken) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    if access_token.tenant_id().is_some() {
+        Err(trc::JmapEvent::Forbidden
+            .into_err()
+            .details("This is for server administrators."))
+    } else {
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AuditEvent/get`.
+pub async fn event_get(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    mut request: GetRequest<AuditEvent>,
+) -> trc::Result<GetResponse<AuditEvent>> {
+    let properties = request.unwrap_properties(EVENT_PROPERTIES);
+    let (ids, not_found) = request.unwrap_ids(server.core.jmap.get_max_objects)?;
+    let mut response = GetResponse {
+        account_id: request.account_id.into(),
+        state: None,
+        list: Vec::new(),
+        not_found,
+    };
+    let Some(ids) = ids else {
+        return Err(trc::JmapEvent::RequestTooLarge
+            .into_err()
+            .details("Name the records to get; use inbuxa:AuditEvent/query to find them."));
+    };
+    let tenant = view_tenant(access_token);
+    for id in ids {
+        let entry = EntryId::from_u64(id.id());
+        match log::get(server.store(), entry).await? {
+            Some(record) if tenant.is_none_or(|tenant| log::in_tenant(&record, tenant)) => {
+                response.list.push(event_value(entry, &record, &properties));
+            }
+            _ => response.push_not_found(id),
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(response)
+}
+
+fn date_ms(value: &str) -> Result<u64, String> {
+    UTCDate::from_str(value)
+        .map(|date| date.timestamp().max(0) as u64 * 1000)
+        .map_err(|_| format!("{value} isn't a UTC date."))
+}
+
+/// The conditions of a query filter, all of which must hold. `Or` and
+/// `Not` aren't supported.
+fn build_filter(conditions: Vec<QueryFilter<AuditFilter>>) -> trc::Result<Filter> {
+    let unsupported = |why: String| trc::JmapEvent::UnsupportedFilter.into_err().details(why);
+    let mut filter = Filter::default();
+    for condition in conditions {
+        match condition {
+            QueryFilter::Property(condition) => match condition {
+                AuditFilter::After(date) => {
+                    filter.after = Some(date_ms(&date).map_err(unsupported)?)
+                }
+                AuditFilter::Before(date) => {
+                    filter.before = Some(date_ms(&date).map_err(unsupported)?)
+                }
+                AuditFilter::ActorId(id) => filter.actor_id = Some(id.document_id()),
+                AuditFilter::Action(action) => {
+                    filter.action =
+                        Some(Action::parse(&action).ok_or_else(|| {
+                            unsupported(format!("{action} isn't an audit action."))
+                        })?)
+                }
+                AuditFilter::TargetKind(kind) => filter.target_kind = Some(kind),
+                AuditFilter::TargetId(id) => filter.target_id = Some(id),
+                AuditFilter::AccountId(id) => filter.account_id = Some(id.document_id()),
+                AuditFilter::TenantId(id) => filter.tenant_id = Some(id.document_id()),
+                AuditFilter::Outcome(outcome) => filter.outcome = Some(outcome),
+                AuditFilter::RemoteIp(ip) => {
+                    filter.remote_ip = Some(
+                        ip.parse()
+                            .map_err(|_| unsupported(format!("{ip} isn't an IP address.")))?,
+                    )
+                }
+                AuditFilter::Text(text) => filter.text = Some(text),
+                AuditFilter::_T(other) => {
+                    return Err(unsupported(format!("Unknown filter property {other}.")));
+                }
+            },
+            QueryFilter::And | QueryFilter::Close => {}
+            QueryFilter::Or | QueryFilter::Not => {
+                return Err(unsupported(
+                    "Audit queries take conditions that must all hold; OR and NOT aren't supported."
+                        .into(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(filter)
+}
+
+/// Applies the caller's reach: a tenant administrator sees its tenant only.
+fn scoped(mut filter: Filter, access_token: &AccessToken) -> Option<Filter> {
+    if let Some(tenant) = view_tenant(access_token) {
+        match filter.tenant_id {
+            Some(asked) if asked != tenant => return None,
+            _ => filter.tenant_id = Some(tenant),
+        }
+    }
+    Some(filter)
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AuditEvent/query`: newest first.
+pub async fn event_query(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    request: QueryRequest<AuditEvent>,
+) -> trc::Result<QueryResponse> {
+    let filter = build_filter(request.filter)?;
+    let position = request.position.unwrap_or(0);
+    if position < 0 || request.anchor.is_some() {
+        return Err(trc::JmapEvent::UnsupportedFilter
+            .into_err()
+            .details("Audit queries page by a position from the start."));
+    }
+    let limit = request
+        .limit
+        .unwrap_or(log::MAX_QUERY_LIMIT)
+        .min(log::MAX_QUERY_LIMIT);
+    let count_all = request.calculate_total.unwrap_or(false);
+    let (ids, total) = match scoped(filter, access_token) {
+        Some(filter) => {
+            log::query(server.store(), &filter, position as usize, limit, count_all).await?
+        }
+        None => (Vec::new(), 0),
+    };
+    Ok(QueryResponse {
+        account_id: request.account_id,
+        query_state: State::Initial,
+        can_calculate_changes: false,
+        position,
+        ids: ids.into_iter().map(|id| Id::new(id.to_u64())).collect(),
+        total: count_all.then_some(total),
+        limit: Some(limit),
+    })
+}
+
+fn settings_value(settings: &Settings, properties: &[P]) -> Value<'static, P, AuditValue> {
+    let mut out = Map::with_capacity(2);
+    for property in properties {
+        let value = match property {
+            P::Id => Value::Element(AuditValue::Id(Id::singleton())),
+            P::KeepForDays => Value::Number((settings.keep_for_secs / 86_400).into()),
+            _ => continue,
+        };
+        out.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(property.clone()), value);
+    }
+    Value::Object(out)
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AuditSettings/get`: a singleton.
+pub async fn settings_get(
+    server: &Server,
+    mut request: GetRequest<AuditSettings>,
+) -> trc::Result<GetResponse<AuditSettings>> {
+    let properties = request.unwrap_properties(&[P::Id, P::KeepForDays]);
+    let (ids, not_found) = request.unwrap_ids(1)?;
+    let mut response = GetResponse {
+        account_id: request.account_id.into(),
+        state: None,
+        list: Vec::new(),
+        not_found,
+    };
+    let settings = log::settings(server.store()).await?;
+    match ids {
+        None => response.list.push(settings_value(&settings, &properties)),
+        Some(ids) => {
+            for id in ids {
+                if id.is_singleton() {
+                    response.list.push(settings_value(&settings, &properties));
+                } else {
+                    response.push_not_found(id);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(response)
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AuditSettings/set`: update `keepForDays` on the singleton
+/// (AU-7). The request layer records the change.
+pub async fn settings_set(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    mut request: SetRequest<'_, AuditSettings>,
+) -> trc::Result<SetResponse<AuditSettings>> {
+    server_level(access_token)?;
+    let mut response = SetResponse::from_request(&request, server.core.jmap.set_max_objects)?;
+    for (client_id, _) in request.unwrap_create() {
+        response
+            .not_created
+            .append(client_id, SetError::singleton());
+    }
+    for id in request.unwrap_destroy().into_valid() {
+        response.not_destroyed.append(id, SetError::singleton());
+    }
+    for (id, value) in request.unwrap_update().into_valid() {
+        if !id.is_singleton() {
+            response.not_updated.append(id, SetError::not_found());
+            continue;
+        }
+        let mut settings = log::settings(server.store()).await?;
+        let mut error = None;
+        for (key, value) in value.into_expanded_object() {
+            match (&key, value) {
+                (Key::Property(P::KeepForDays), Value::Number(days)) => {
+                    let secs = days.cast_to_u64().saturating_mul(86_400);
+                    if secs < MIN_KEEP_FOR_SECS {
+                        error = Some(
+                            SetError::invalid_properties()
+                                .with_property(P::KeepForDays)
+                                .with_description(format!(
+                                    "Records are kept for at least {} days.",
+                                    MIN_KEEP_FOR_SECS / 86_400
+                                )),
+                        );
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    settings.keep_for_secs = secs;
+                }
+                (Key::Property(P::KeepForDays), Value::Null) => {
+                    settings = Settings::default();
+                }
+                (Key::Property(P::Id), _) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    error = Some(SetError::invalid_properties().with_property(key.into_owned()));
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        match error {
+            Some(error) => response.not_updated.append(id, error),
+            None => {
+                log::set_settings(server.store(), &settings).await?;
+                response.updated.append(id, None);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(response)
+}
+
+/// Reads an export's `filter` object, the same conditions a query takes.
+fn export_filter(value: Option<AValue>) -> Result<Filter, String> {
+    let Some(value) = value else {
+        return Ok(Filter::default());
+    };
+    let json: serde_json::Value = value.into();
+    let Some(map) = json.as_object() else {
+        return Err("The filter must be an object.".into());
+    };
+    let mut filter = Filter::default();
+    for (key, value) in map {
+        let text = || {
+            value
+                .as_str()
+                .map(str::to_string)
+                .ok_or_else(|| format!("{key} must be a string."))
+        };
+        let id = || {
+            Id::from_str(&text()?)
+                .map(|id| id.document_id())
+                .map_err(|_| format!("{key} must be an id."))
+        };
+        match key.as_str() {
+            "after" => filter.after = Some(date_ms(&text()?)?),
+            "before" => filter.before = Some(date_ms(&text()?)?),
+            "actorId" => filter.actor_id = Some(id()?),
+            "action" => {
+                filter.action =
+                    Some(Action::parse(&text()?).ok_or_else(|| "Unknown action.".to_string())?)
+            }
+            "targetKind" => filter.target_kind = Some(text()?),
+            "targetId" => filter.target_id = Some(text()?),
+            "accountId" => filter.account_id = Some(id()?),
+            "tenantId" => filter.tenant_id = Some(id()?),
+            "outcome" => filter.outcome = Some(text()?),
+            "remoteIp" => {
+                filter.remote_ip = Some(
+                    text()?
+                        .parse()
+                        .map_err(|_| "remoteIp must be an address.")?,
+                )
+            }
+            "text" => filter.text = Some(text()?),
+            other => return Err(format!("Unknown filter property {other}.")),
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(filter)
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+enum Format {
+    Csv,
+    JsonLines,
+}
+
+fn csv_field(value: &str) -> String {
+    if value.contains([',', '"', '\n', '\r']) {
+        format!("\"{}\"", value.replace('"', "\"\""))
+    } else {
+        value.to_string()
+    }
+}
+
+/// The export file's text: one line per record, then a manifest line
+/// (AU-11). Each line carries the entry's hash and the hash it follows.
+fn render(
+    format: Format,
+    entries: &[(EntryId, Record, String, String)],
+    filter_json: &serde_json::Value,
+) -> (Vec<u8>, String) {
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    if format == Format::Csv {
+        out.push_str(
+            "id,at,node,actor,actorId,actorTenantId,via,remoteIp,action,targetKind,targetId,\
+             targetName,targetAccountId,targetTenantId,outcome,error,changes,details,reason,\
+             hash,prev\r\n",
+        );
+    }
+    for (id, record, hash, prev) in entries {
+        match format {
+            Format::Csv => {
+                let (outcome, error) = match &record.outcome {
+                    Outcome::Refused { error, .. } => ("refused", error.as_str()),
+                    other => (other.as_str(), ""),
+                };
+                let opt = |v: Option<u32>| v.map(|v| Id::from(v).to_string()).unwrap_or_default();
+                let fields = [
+                    Id::new(id.to_u64()).to_string(),
+                    iso(record.at),
+                    id.node.to_string(),
+                    record.actor.name.clone(),
+                    opt(record.actor.account_id),
+                    opt(record.actor.tenant_id),
+                    record
+                        .via
+                        .as_ref()
+                        .map(|via| to_json(via).to_string())
+                        .unwrap_or_default(),
+                    record
+                        .remote_ip
+                        .map(|ip| ip.to_string())
+                        .unwrap_or_default(),
+                    record.action.as_str().to_string(),
+                    record.target.kind.clone(),
+                    record.target.id.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+                    record.target.name.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+                    opt(record.target.account_id),
+                    opt(record.target.tenant_id),
+                    outcome.to_string(),
+                    error.to_string(),
+                    if record.changes.is_empty() {
+                        String::new()
+                    } else {
+                        to_json(&record.changes).to_string()
+                    },
+                    record.details.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+                    record.reason.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+                    hash.clone(),
+                    prev.clone(),
+                ];
+                out.push_str(
+                    &fields
+                        .iter()
+                        .map(|field| csv_field(field))
+                        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                        .join(","),
+                );
+                out.push_str("\r\n");
+            }
+            Format::JsonLines => {
+                let mut line = to_json(record);
+                if let Some(map) = line.as_object_mut() {
+                    for key in ["actor", "target", "via"] {
+                        if let Some(value) = map.remove(key) {
+                            map.insert(key.into(), with_jmap_ids(value));
+                        }
+                    }
+                    map.insert("id".into(), Id::new(id.to_u64()).to_string().into());
+                    map.insert("node".into(), id.node.into());
+                    map.insert("at".into(), iso(record.at).into());
+                    map.insert("hash".into(), hash.clone().into());
+                    map.insert("prev".into(), prev.clone().into());
+                }
+                out.push_str(&line.to_string());
+                out.push('\n');
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    let body_hash = hex(&Sha256::digest(out.as_bytes()));
+    let manifest = serde_json::json!({
+        "manifest": {
+            "exportedAt": iso(ms()),
+            "filter": filter_json,
+            "count": entries.len(),
+            "first": entries.last().map(|(id, ..)| Id::new(id.to_u64()).to_string()),
+            "last": entries.first().map(|(id, ..)| Id::new(id.to_u64()).to_string()),
+            "recordsSha256": body_hash,
+        }
+    });
+    match format {
+        Format::Csv => {
+            out.push_str("# ");
+            out.push_str(&manifest.to_string());
+            out.push_str("\r\n");
+        }
+        Format::JsonLines => {
+            out.push_str(&manifest.to_string());
+            out.push('\n');
+        }
+    }
+    let file_hash = hex(&Sha256::digest(out.as_bytes()));
+    (out.into_bytes(), file_hash)
+}
+
+fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AuditExport/set`: create `{format, filter}`; the created object
+/// names the file's blob, its size, the number of records and its SHA-256
+/// (AU-11). The export is recorded before the file is built, and refused
+/// if it can't be (AU-1.9, AU-3).
+pub async fn export_set(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    session: &HttpSessionData,
+    mut request: SetRequest<'_, AuditExport>,
+) -> trc::Result<SetResponse<AuditExport>> {
+    let mut response = SetResponse::from_request(&request, server.core.jmap.set_max_objects)?;
+    for (id, _) in request.unwrap_update().into_valid() {
+        response.not_updated.append(
+            id,
+            SetError::forbidden().with_description("Exports can't be changed."),
+        );
+    }
+    for id in request.unwrap_destroy().into_valid() {
+        response.not_destroyed.append(
+            id,
+            SetError::forbidden().with_description("Exports aren't kept to destroy."),
+        );
+    }
+
+    for (client_id, value) in request.unwrap_create() {
+        let mut format = Format::Csv;
+        let mut filter_value = None;
+        let mut reason = None;
+        let mut invalid = None;
+        for (key, value) in value.into_expanded_object() {
+            match (&key, value) {
+                (Key::Property(P::Format), Value::Str(f)) if f == "csv" => format = Format::Csv,
+                (Key::Property(P::Format), Value::Str(f)) if f == "jsonl" => {
+                    format = Format::JsonLines
+                }
+                (Key::Property(P::Filter), value) => filter_value = Some(value.into_owned()),
+                (Key::Property(P::Reason), Value::Str(r)) => {
+                    reason = Some(r.chars().take(500).collect::<String>())
+                }
+                (Key::Property(P::Reason), Value::Null) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    invalid = Some(SetError::invalid_properties().with_property(key.into_owned()));
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(error) = invalid {
+            response.not_created.append(client_id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let filter_json: serde_json::Value = filter_value
+            .clone()
+            .map(Into::into)
+            .unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Object(Default::default()));
+        let filter = match export_filter(filter_value) {
+            Ok(filter) => filter,
+            Err(why) => {
+                response.not_created.append(
+                    client_id,
+                    SetError::invalid_properties()
+                        .with_property(P::Filter)
+                        .with_description(why),
+                );
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Recorded first: no export leaves without its record
+        let record = Record {
+            at: ms(),
+            actor: server.audit_actor(access_token).await,
+            via: access_token.origin().cloned(),
+            remote_ip: Some(session.remote_ip),
+            action: Action::Export,
+            target: Target {
+                kind: "inbuxa:AuditEvent".into(),
+                tenant_id: access_token.tenant_id(),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+            changes: vec![],
+            details: Some(format!(
+                "{} export, filter {filter_json}",
+                if format == Format::Csv {
+                    "CSV"
+                } else {
+                    "JSON Lines"
+                }
+            )),
+            reason,
+            outcome: Outcome::Pending,
+        };
+        let entry = server.audit_append(&record).await.map_err(|err| {
+            err.details("The audit log couldn't be written, so nothing was exported.")
+        })?;
+
+        let result = build_export(server, access_token, format, filter, &filter_json).await;
+        let outcome = match &result {
+            Ok(_) => Outcome::success(),
+            Err(_) => Outcome::refused("serverFail", None),
+        };
+        let _ = server.audit_finish(entry, outcome).await;
+        let (blob_id, size, count, sha256) = result?;
+
+        let mut created = Map::with_capacity(5);
+        created.insert_unchecked(
+            Key::Property(P::Id),
+            Value::Element(AuditValue::Id(Id::new(entry.to_u64()))),
+        );
+        created.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(P::BlobId), Value::Str(blob_id.into()));
+        created.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(P::Size), Value::Number((size as u64).into()));
+        created.insert_unchecked(
+            Key::Property(P::Count),
+            Value::Number((count as u64).into()),
+        );
+        created.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(P::Sha256), Value::Str(sha256.into()));
+        response.created.insert(client_id, Value::Object(created));
+    }
+    Ok(response)
+}
+
+async fn build_export(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    format: Format,
+    filter: Filter,
+    filter_json: &serde_json::Value,
+) -> trc::Result<(String, usize, usize, String)> {
+    let mut entries = Vec::new();
+    if let Some(filter) = scoped(filter, access_token) {
+        for id in log::query_all(server.store(), &filter, MAX_EXPORT).await? {
+            if let Some((record, hash, prev)) = log::get_with_hash(server.store(), id).await? {
+                entries.push((id, record, hash, prev));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    let (bytes, sha256) = render(format, &entries, filter_json);
+    let blob = server
+        .put_jmap_blob(access_token.account_id(), &bytes)
+        .await?;
+    Ok((blob.to_string(), bytes.len(), entries.len(), sha256))
+}
+
+/// `inbuxa:AuditVerification/set`: create `{}` to recheck every node's
+/// chain (AU-6). Server administrators only.
+pub async fn verification_set(
+    server: &Server,
+    access_token: &AccessToken,
+    session: &HttpSessionData,
+    mut request: SetRequest<'_, AuditVerification>,
+) -> trc::Result<SetResponse<AuditVerification>> {
+    server_level(access_token)?;
+    let mut response = SetResponse::from_request(&request, server.core.jmap.set_max_objects)?;
+    for (id, _) in request.unwrap_update().into_valid() {
+        response.not_updated.append(id, SetError::forbidden());
+    }
+    for id in request.unwrap_destroy().into_valid() {
+        response.not_destroyed.append(id, SetError::forbidden());
+    }
+    for (client_id, _) in request.unwrap_create() {
+        let chains = log::verify(server.store()).await?;
+        let verified = chains.iter().all(|chain| chain.broken_at.is_none());
+        let record = Record {
+            at: ms(),
+            actor: server.audit_actor(access_token).await,
+            via: access_token.origin().cloned(),
+            remote_ip: Some(session.remote_ip),
+            action: Action::Verify,
+            target: Target {
+                kind: "inbuxa:AuditEvent".into(),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+            changes: vec![],
+            details: Some(summary(&chains)),
+            reason: None,
+            outcome: if verified {
+                Outcome::success()
+            } else {
+                Outcome::refused("chainBroken", None)
+            },
+        };
+        let entry = server.audit_append(&record).await.ok();
+
+        let mut created = Map::with_capacity(3);
+        created.insert_unchecked(
+            Key::Property(P::Id),
+            Value::Element(AuditValue::Id(Id::new(
+                entry.map_or(0, |entry| entry.to_u64()),
+            ))),
+        );
+        created.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(P::Verified), Value::Bool(verified));
+        created.insert_unchecked(Key::Property(P::Chains), json_to_value(to_json(&chains)));
+        response.created.insert(client_id, Value::Object(created));
+    }
+    Ok(response)
+}
+
+fn summary(chains: &[ChainReport]) -> String {
+    chains
+        .iter()
+        .map(|chain| match (&chain.broken_at, &chain.reason) {
+            (Some(at), Some(reason)) => format!("node {}: broken at {at}: {reason}", chain.node),
+            _ => format!(
+                "node {}: {} entries verified ({} to {})",
+                chain.node, chain.entries, chain.first_seq, chain.last_seq
+            ),
+        })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        .join("; ")
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use inbuxa_features::audit::{Actor, Change};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn times_keep_milliseconds() {
+        assert_eq!(iso(1_790_000_000_123), "2026-09-21T14:13:20.123Z");
+        assert_eq!(iso(1_790_000_000_000), "2026-09-21T14:13:20.000Z");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn csv_quotes_what_needs_it() {
+        assert_eq!(csv_field("plain"), "plain");
+        assert_eq!(csv_field("a,b"), "\"a,b\"");
+        assert_eq!(csv_field("say \"hi\""), "\"say \"\"hi\"\"\"");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn exports_end_with_a_manifest() {
+        let record = Record {
+            at: 1_790_000_000_000,
+            actor: Actor::account(3, "[email protected]", None),
+            via: None,
+            remote_ip: None,
+            action: Action::Update,
+            target: Target {
+                kind: "x:Domain".into(),
+                name: Some("example.com".into()),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+            changes: vec![Change::new(
+                "isEnabled",
+                Some(true.into()),
+                Some(false.into()),
+            )],
+            details: None,
+            reason: None,
+            outcome: Outcome::success(),
+        };
+        let entries = vec![(EntryId { node: 1, seq: 9 }, record, "h".into(), "p".into())];
+        let filter = serde_json::json!({});
+        for format in [Format::Csv, Format::JsonLines] {
+            let (bytes, sha) = render(format, &entries, &filter);
+            let text = String::from_utf8(bytes.clone()).unwrap();
+            let last = text.trim_end().lines().last().unwrap();
+            assert!(last.contains("\"manifest\""), "{last}");
+            assert!(last.contains("\"count\":1"));
+            assert_eq!(sha, hex(&Sha256::digest(&bytes)));
+            assert!(text.contains("example.com"));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filters_parse() {
+        let filter = build_filter(vec![
+            QueryFilter::Property(AuditFilter::Action("signIn".into())),
+            QueryFilter::Property(AuditFilter::After("2026-09-01T00:00:00Z".into())),
+        ])
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(filter.action, Some(Action::SignIn));
+        assert!(filter.after.is_some());
+        assert!(build_filter(vec![QueryFilter::Or]).is_err());
+        assert!(
+            build_filter(vec![QueryFilter::Property(AuditFilter::Action("x".into()))]).is_err()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tenant_view_is_forced() {
+        let token = AccessToken::from_permissions(5, []);
+        let filter = scoped(Filter::default(), &token).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(filter.tenant_id, None);
+    }
+}

crates/jmap/src/inbuxa/explanation.rs

@@ -89,15 +89,7 @@ const NOT_SETTINGS: &[ObjectType] = &[
 
 /// The registry schema the console downloads, read once.
 fn schema() -> Option<&'static Schema> {
-    static SCHEMA: OnceLock<Option<Schema>> = OnceLock::new();
-    static SCHEMA_JSON: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../../resources/schema/schema.json.gz");
-    SCHEMA
-        .get_or_init(|| {
-            let mut json = Vec::new();
-            GzDecoder::new(SCHEMA_JSON).read_to_end(&mut json).ok()?;
-            serde_json::from_slice(&json).ok().map(Schema::new)
-        })
-        .as_ref()
+    inbuxa_features::ai::explain::schema::embedded()
 }
 
 fn server_fail(why: &'static str) -> SetError<P> {

crates/jmap/src/inbuxa/mod.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
 //! `crates/features`; this module only speaks JMAP for them.
 
 pub mod access;
+pub mod account_lock;
+pub mod audit;
+pub mod audit_log;
 pub mod ai_limits;
 pub mod explanation;
 pub mod protocol_policy;

crates/registry/src/schema/enums.rs

@@ -1730,6 +1730,15 @@ pub enum Permission {
     ScimAccess = 660,
     // inbuxa: "Explain this" (ai-explain spec)
     SysAiExplain = 661,
+    // inbuxa: the audit log (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-9)
+    SysAuditGet = 662,
+    SysAuditExport = 663,
+    SysAuditSettingsUpdate = 664,
+    // inbuxa: account lock with delegation (audit-hold-lock spec, AL-12)
+    SysAccountLockGet = 665,
+    SysAccountLockCreate = 666,
+    SysAccountLockUpdate = 667,
+    SysAccountLockDestroy = 668,
     SysAccountGet = 219,
     SysAccountCreate = 220,
     SysAccountUpdate = 221,

crates/registry/src/schema/enums_impl.rs

@@ -7073,6 +7073,13 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
             b"liveDeliveryTest" => Permission::LiveDeliveryTest,
             b"scimAccess" => Permission::ScimAccess,
             b"sysAiExplain" => Permission::SysAiExplain,
+            b"sysAuditGet" => Permission::SysAuditGet,
+            b"sysAuditExport" => Permission::SysAuditExport,
+            b"sysAuditSettingsUpdate" => Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate,
+            b"sysAccountLockGet" => Permission::SysAccountLockGet,
+            b"sysAccountLockCreate" => Permission::SysAccountLockCreate,
+            b"sysAccountLockUpdate" => Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate,
+            b"sysAccountLockDestroy" => Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy,
             b"sysAccountGet" => Permission::SysAccountGet,
             b"sysAccountCreate" => Permission::SysAccountCreate,
             b"sysAccountUpdate" => Permission::SysAccountUpdate,
@@ -7751,6 +7758,13 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
             Permission::LiveDeliveryTest => "liveDeliveryTest",
             Permission::ScimAccess => "scimAccess",
             Permission::SysAiExplain => "sysAiExplain",
+            Permission::SysAuditGet => "sysAuditGet",
+            Permission::SysAuditExport => "sysAuditExport",
+            Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate => "sysAuditSettingsUpdate",
+            Permission::SysAccountLockGet => "sysAccountLockGet",
+            Permission::SysAccountLockCreate => "sysAccountLockCreate",
+            Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate => "sysAccountLockUpdate",
+            Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy => "sysAccountLockDestroy",
             Permission::SysAccountGet => "sysAccountGet",
             Permission::SysAccountCreate => "sysAccountCreate",
             Permission::SysAccountUpdate => "sysAccountUpdate",
@@ -8422,6 +8436,13 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
             218 => Some(Permission::LiveDeliveryTest),
             660 => Some(Permission::ScimAccess),
             661 => Some(Permission::SysAiExplain),
+            662 => Some(Permission::SysAuditGet),
+            663 => Some(Permission::SysAuditExport),
+            664 => Some(Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate),
+            665 => Some(Permission::SysAccountLockGet),
+            666 => Some(Permission::SysAccountLockCreate),
+            667 => Some(Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate),
+            668 => Some(Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy),
             219 => Some(Permission::SysAccountGet),
             220 => Some(Permission::SysAccountCreate),
             221 => Some(Permission::SysAccountUpdate),
@@ -8866,7 +8887,7 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
         }
     }
 
-    const COUNT: usize = 662;
+    const COUNT: usize = 669;
 }
 
 impl serde::Serialize for Permission {

crates/services/src/broadcast/mod.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <hello@stalw.art>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use common::ipc::{
@@ -139,6 +141,11 @@ impl BroadcastBatch<Vec<BroadcastEvent>> {
                 BroadcastEvent::QueueRefresh => {
                     serialized.push(12u8);
                 }
+                // inbuxa: AL-3
+                BroadcastEvent::EndSessions(account_id) => {
+                    serialized.push(13u8);
+                    let _ = serialized.write_leb128(*account_id);
+                }
             }
         }
         serialized
@@ -272,6 +279,11 @@ where
                 10 => Ok(Some(BroadcastEvent::MtaQueueStatus { is_running: true })),
                 11 => Ok(Some(BroadcastEvent::MtaQueueStatus { is_running: false })),
                 12 => Ok(Some(BroadcastEvent::QueueRefresh)),
+                // inbuxa: AL-3
+                13 => {
+                    let account_id = self.messages.next_leb128().ok_or(())?;
+                    Ok(Some(BroadcastEvent::EndSessions(account_id)))
+                }
                 _ => Err(()),
             }
         } else {

crates/services/src/broadcast/subscriber.rs

@@ -180,6 +180,15 @@ pub fn spawn_broadcast_subscriber(inner: Arc<Inner>, mut shutdown_rx: watch::Rec
                                                             .send(QueueEvent::Paused(!is_running))
                                                             .await;
                                                 }
+                                                // inbuxa: AL-3: sessions an account has
+                                                // open here end too
+                                                BroadcastEvent::EndSessions(account_id) => {
+                                                    let _ = inner
+                                                        .ipc
+                                                        .push_tx
+                                                        .send(PushEvent::Revoke { account_id })
+                                                        .await;
+                                                }
                                                 BroadcastEvent::QueueRefresh => {
                                                     if inner.shared_core.load().network.roles.outbound_mta {
                                                         let _ = inner
@@ -266,6 +275,9 @@ fn log_event(event: &BroadcastEvent) -> trc::Value {
         BroadcastEvent::PushServerUpdate(account_id) => {
             trc::Value::Array(vec!["PushServerUpdate".into(), (*account_id).into()])
         }
+        BroadcastEvent::EndSessions(account_id) => {
+            trc::Value::Array(vec!["EndSessions".into(), (*account_id).into()])
+        }
         BroadcastEvent::RegistryChange(change) => match change {
             RegistryChange::Insert(id) => trc::Value::Array(vec![
                 "RegistryInsert".into(),

crates/services/src/inbuxa_lock_expiry.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! Ends a locked account's delegations at their `until` (AL-5), rather than
+//! at the next daily sweep. Each node sleeps until the soonest `until`, wakes
+//! early when a lock is written here, and checks at least hourly for locks
+//! written on other nodes. One node re-applies each lock; the others find it
+//! claimed.
+
+use common::{BuildServer, Inner, KV_LOCK_TASK, Server};
+use inbuxa_features::lock;
+use std::{sync::Arc, time::Duration};
+use store::write::now;
+
+/// The longest the timer sleeps, so an `until` set on another node is seen.
+const CEILING: u64 = 3600;
+
+pub fn spawn_lock_expiry(inner: Arc<Inner>) {
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        // Since boot: anything that ended while the server was down
+        let mut checked = 0;
+        loop {
+            let server = inner.build_server();
+            let now = now();
+            let wait = match lock::all(server.store()).await {
+                Ok(locks) => {
+                    for account_id in lock::ended_between(&locks, checked, now).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                    {
+                        end_delegations(&server, account_id).await;
+                    }
+                    checked = now;
+                    lock::next_until(&locks, now)
+                        .map_or(CEILING, |until| (until - now).min(CEILING))
+                }
+                Err(err) => {
+                    trc::error!(err.details("Failed to read account locks for their end dates"));
+                    60
+                }
+            };
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(wait.max(1))) => {}
+                _ = lock::UNTIL_CHANGED.notified() => {}
+            }
+        }
+    });
+}
+
+async fn end_delegations(server: &Server, account_id: u32) {
+    let key = [b"lock-until:".as_slice(), &account_id.to_be_bytes()].concat();
+    match server
+        .in_memory_store()
+        .try_lock(KV_LOCK_TASK, &key, 60)
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(true) => {
+            if let Err(err) = email::inbuxa_lock::reconcile(server, account_id).await {
+                trc::error!(
+                    err.account_id(account_id)
+                        .details("Failed to end a delegation at its date")
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(false) => {}
+        Err(err) => {
+            trc::error!(err.details("Failed to claim a delegation's end"));
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/services/src/lib.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use crate::task_manager::{manager::spawn_task_manager, scheduler::spawn_task_scheduler};
 
 pub mod broadcast;
+// inbuxa: AL-5, delegations end at their date
+pub mod inbuxa_lock_expiry;
 pub mod state_manager;
 pub mod task_manager;
 
@@ -65,6 +67,9 @@ impl SpawnServices for IpcReceivers {
             // Spawn task manager
             spawn_task_manager(inner.clone());
 
+            // inbuxa: AL-5, end delegations at their `until`
+            inbuxa_lock_expiry::spawn_lock_expiry(inner.clone());
+
             // Spawn task scheduler
             spawn_task_scheduler(inner);
         }

crates/services/src/task_manager/maintenance.rs

@@ -263,6 +263,18 @@ async fn store_maintenance(
                 }
             }
 
+            // inbuxa: AL-7: locks' grants reach folders the server made on
+            // its own (a Sieve fileinto :create)
+            if let Err(err) = email::inbuxa_lock::reconcile_all(server).await {
+                trc::error!(err.details("Failed to re-apply account locks"));
+            }
+
+            // inbuxa: AU-7: audit records past their retention go; a
+            // failure leaves them for the next run
+            if let Err(err) = server.audit_purge().await {
+                trc::error!(err.details("Failed to purge audit records"));
+            }
+
             trc::event!(
                 Store(StoreEvent::DataStorePurged),
                 Elapsed = started.elapsed()

crates/services/src/task_manager/manager.rs

@@ -514,6 +514,16 @@ async fn run_task(
     server: &Server,
     task: &Task,
     server_instance: Arc<ServerInstance>,
+) -> TaskResult {
+    // inbuxa: AU-1.10: registry writes a task makes are the server's own
+    inbuxa_features::audit::scope::system(task.name(), run_task_unscoped(server, task, server_instance))
+        .await
+}
+
+async fn run_task_unscoped(
+    server: &Server,
+    task: &Task,
+    server_instance: Arc<ServerInstance>,
 ) -> TaskResult {
     match task {
         Task::CalendarAlarmEmail(task) => {

crates/services/src/task_manager/spam_classifier.rs

@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ async fn spam_filter_maintenance(
             }
         }
         TaskSpamFilterMaintenanceType::UpdateRules => {
-            return update_spam_rules(server).await;
+            // inbuxa: AU-1.10: one summary record, not one per rule
+            return inbuxa_features::audit::scope::quiet(update_spam_rules(server)).await;
         }
     }
 
@@ -276,6 +277,37 @@ async fn update_spam_rules(server: &Server) -> trc::Result<TaskResult> {
             .await;
     }
 
+    // inbuxa: AU-1.10: what the update added, as one audit record
+    let added = stats
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(_, result)| result.success > 0)
+        .map(|(object_type, result)| format!("{} {}", result.success, object_type.as_str()))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    if !added.is_empty() {
+        let mut added = added;
+        added.sort();
+        server
+            .audit_note(inbuxa_features::audit::Record {
+                at: std::time::SystemTime::now()
+                    .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+                    .map_or(0, |d| d.as_millis() as u64),
+                actor: inbuxa_features::audit::Actor::system("SpamFilterMaintenance"),
+                via: None,
+                remote_ip: None,
+                action: inbuxa_features::audit::Action::Update,
+                target: inbuxa_features::audit::Target {
+                    kind: "x:SpamRule".into(),
+                    name: Some("Spam filter rules".into()),
+                    ..Default::default()
+                },
+                changes: vec![],
+                details: Some(format!("Rules update added {}", added.join(", "))),
+                reason: None,
+                outcome: inbuxa_features::audit::Outcome::success(),
+            })
+            .await;
+    }
+
     trc::event!(
         Spam(SpamEvent::RulesUpdated),
         Details = stats

crates/store/src/build/registry.rs

@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ impl RegistryStore {
                 env_hostname: hostname,
                 env_public_url: None,
                 id_generator: utils::snowflake::SnowflakeIdGenerator::new(),
+                write_hook: Default::default(),
             },
             true,
         )

crates/store/src/lib.rs

@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ pub struct RegistryStoreInner {
     pub(crate) env_hostname: String,
     pub(crate) env_public_url: Option<String>,
     pub(crate) id_generator: SnowflakeIdGenerator,
+    // inbuxa: AU-1.10, shared by every clone of this registry
+    pub(crate) write_hook: registry::hook::RegistryHookSlot,
 }
 
 #[cfg(feature = "sqlite")]

crates/store/src/registry/hook.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! inbuxa: told of every registry write that succeeded, with the object as
+//! it was and as it is, so the audit log records what the server changed on
+//! its own (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-1.10). The store knows nothing of the
+//! audit log; the server installs the hook once it has one.
+
+use registry::schema::prelude::{Object, ObjectType};
+use std::{future::Future, pin::Pin, sync::Arc};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+/// One registry write that succeeded.
+pub struct RegistryChange<'a> {
+    pub object_type: ObjectType,
+    pub id: Id,
+    /// Absent for an insert.
+    pub before: Option<&'a Object>,
+    /// Absent for a delete.
+    pub after: Option<&'a Object>,
+}
+
+pub trait RegistryWriteHook: Send + Sync {
+    fn written<'a>(
+        &'a self,
+        change: RegistryChange<'a>,
+    ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'a>>;
+}
+
+pub type RegistryHookSlot = Arc<std::sync::OnceLock<Arc<dyn RegistryWriteHook>>>;

crates/store/src/registry/local.rs

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ impl RegistryStoreInner {
                     })
                 }),
             env_hostname,
+            write_hook: Default::default(),
         }
     }
 

crates/store/src/registry/mod.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <hello@stalw.art>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 pub mod bootstrap;
@@ -10,6 +12,10 @@ pub mod local;
 pub mod query;
 pub mod write;
 
+// inbuxa: the audit log's view of registry writes (audit-hold-lock spec,
+// AU-1.10)
+pub mod hook;
+
 use crate::{
     Deserialize, SerializeInfallible, U16_LEN, U32_LEN, U64_LEN,
     write::key::{DeserializeBigEndian, KeySerializer},

crates/store/src/registry/write.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <hello@stalw.art>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use crate::{
@@ -73,7 +75,42 @@ pub enum RegistryWrite<'x> {
 }
 
 impl RegistryStore {
+    /// inbuxa: installs the audit log's hook (AU-1.10). Only the first one
+    /// installed is kept.
+    pub fn set_write_hook(&self, hook: std::sync::Arc<dyn super::hook::RegistryWriteHook>) {
+        let _ = self.0.write_hook.set(hook);
+    }
+
     pub async fn write(&self, write: RegistryWrite<'_>) -> trc::Result<RegistryWriteResult> {
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.10: the hook hears of every write that succeeded
+        let Some(hook) = self.0.write_hook.get() else {
+            return self.write_unhooked(write).await;
+        };
+        let (object_type, id, before, after) = match &write {
+            RegistryWrite::Insert { object, id } => (object.object_type(), *id, None, Some(*object)),
+            RegistryWrite::Update {
+                object,
+                id,
+                old_object,
+            } => (object.object_type(), Some(*id), Some(*old_object), Some(*object)),
+            RegistryWrite::Delete {
+                object_id, object, ..
+            } => (object_id.object(), Some(object_id.id()), *object, None),
+        };
+        let result = self.write_unhooked(write).await?;
+        if let RegistryWriteResult::Success(written) = &result {
+            hook.written(super::hook::RegistryChange {
+                object_type,
+                id: id.unwrap_or(*written),
+                before,
+                after,
+            })
+            .await;
+        }
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    async fn write_unhooked(&self, write: RegistryWrite<'_>) -> trc::Result<RegistryWriteResult> {
         let mut set_index = IndexBuilder::default();
         let mut clear_index = IndexBuilder::default();
 

crates/trc/src/event/enums.rs

@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
 // inbuxa: 637 to 641 are the fork's SCIM events (SCIM-54); 642 is
 // auth.legacy-protocol-refused (legacy-protocols LP-6); 643 is
 // security.legacy-protocols-changed (LP-8); 644 to 646 are the cluster
-// coordinator's connection events
-pub const TOTAL_EVENT_COUNT: usize = 647;
+// coordinator's connection events; 647 and 648 are the audit log's
+// (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-3, AU-8)
+pub const TOTAL_EVENT_COUNT: usize = 649;
 pub const TOTAL_METRIC_COUNT: usize = 369;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
@@ -663,6 +664,9 @@ pub enum SecurityEvent {
     Unauthorized = 552,
     // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8
     LegacyProtocolsChanged = 643,
+    // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+    AuditRecorded = 647,
+    AuditWriteFailed = 648,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]

crates/trc/src/event/enums_impl.rs

@@ -452,6 +452,9 @@ impl EventType {
             b"security.unauthorized" => EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::Unauthorized),
             // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8
             b"security.legacy-protocols-changed" => EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged),
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            b"security.audit-recorded" => EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded),
+            b"security.audit-write-failed" => EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed),
             b"server.startup" => EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup),
             b"server.shutdown" => EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown),
             b"server.startup-error" => EventType::Server(ServerEvent::StartupError),
@@ -1229,6 +1232,9 @@ impl EventType {
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged) => {
                 "security.legacy-protocols-changed"
             }
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded) => "security.audit-recorded",
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed) => "security.audit-write-failed",
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup) => "server.startup",
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown) => "server.shutdown",
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::StartupError) => "server.startup-error",
@@ -1907,6 +1913,9 @@ impl EventType {
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::Unauthorized) => 552,
             // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged) => 643,
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded) => 647,
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed) => 648,
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup) => 393,
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown) => 392,
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::StartupError) => 394,
@@ -2601,6 +2610,9 @@ impl EventType {
             552 => Some(EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::Unauthorized)),
             // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8
             643 => Some(EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged)),
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            647 => Some(EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded)),
+            648 => Some(EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed)),
             393 => Some(EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup)),
             392 => Some(EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown)),
             394 => Some(EventType::Server(ServerEvent::StartupError)),
@@ -3022,6 +3034,9 @@ impl EventType {
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::Unauthorized) => Level::Info,
             // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged) => Level::Info,
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded) => Level::Info,
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed) => Level::Error,
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup) => Level::Info,
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown) => Level::Info,
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Licensing) => Level::Info,
@@ -3757,6 +3772,9 @@ impl EventType {
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged) => {
                 "Legacy mail protocols switch changed"
             }
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded) => "Audit record written",
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed) => "Audit record not written",
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup) => "Starting inbuxa Server",
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown) => "Shutting down inbuxa Server",
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::StartupError) => "Server startup error",
@@ -4154,6 +4172,13 @@ impl EventType {
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged) => {
                 "Legacy mail protocols switch changed"
             }
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded) => {
+                "An administrator's action or a sign-in was written to the audit log"
+            }
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed) => {
+                "The audit log couldn't be written, so the change was refused"
+            }
             EventType::Smtp(SmtpEvent::ConnectionStart) => "SMTP error",
             EventType::Smtp(SmtpEvent::ConnectionEnd) => "SMTP error",
             EventType::Smtp(SmtpEvent::Error) => "SMTP error",
@@ -4721,6 +4746,9 @@ impl EventType {
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::Unauthorized),
             // inbuxa: legacy-protocols LP-8
             EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::LegacyProtocolsChanged),
+            // inbuxa: the audit log (AU-3, AU-8)
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditRecorded),
+            EventType::Security(SecurityEvent::AuditWriteFailed),
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Startup),
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::Shutdown),
             EventType::Server(ServerEvent::StartupError),

crates/types/src/branding.rs

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ fn legacy_setting(name: &str, is_set: impl Fn(&str) -> bool) -> Option<String> {
 #[macro_export]
 macro_rules! brand_version {
     () => {
-        "2026.9.27"
+        "2026.9.27.1"
     };
 }
 

resources/schema/schema.json.sha256

@@ -1 +1 @@
-krR-kLAFyDZPDN7u7qgMjHqDWn_BepUPrzpaSfZZEOM
+SXIEex8gcOKNb6F6RKdEJLxzY-dKbdu8-DF23YN0Epc

tests/src/system/account_lock.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! Account lock with delegation acceptance tests, from
+//! `inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md` (AL-1 to AL-12; tests 10 to 15
+//! of its list). Each check names the requirement or test number.
+
+use crate::{
+    jmap::mail::submission::{
+        MockMessage, assert_message_delivery, expect_nothing, spawn_mock_smtp_server,
+    },
+    utils::{
+        account::Account,
+        dns::DnsCache,
+        server::{TestServer, TestServerBuilder},
+        smtp::SmtpConnection,
+    },
+};
+use registry::{
+    schema::{
+        enums::MtaProtocol,
+        structs::{
+            Expression, ExpressionMatch, Imap, MtaOutboundStrategy, MtaRoute, MtaRouteRelay,
+            MtaStageAuth,
+        },
+    },
+    types::list::List,
+};
+use serde_json::{Value, json};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+const USING: &[&str] = &[
+    "urn:ietf:params:jmap:core",
+    "urn:ietf:params:jmap:mail",
+    "urn:ietf:params:jmap:submission",
+    "urn:inbuxa:jmap",
+];
+
+const OWNER_SECRET: &str = "owner-secret-4471";
+const DELEGATE_SECRET: &str = "delegate-secret-9902";
+
+impl Account {
+    async fn call(&self, method: &str, arguments: Value) -> (String, Value) {
+        let response = self.jmap_request(USING, json!([[method, arguments, "0"]])).await;
+        let call = response
+            .0
+            .pointer("/methodResponses/0")
+            .cloned()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{method}: {}", response.0));
+        (call[0].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string(), call[1].clone())
+    }
+
+    async fn lock_set(&self, arguments: Value) -> Value {
+        let mut arguments = arguments;
+        arguments["accountId"] = self.id_string().into();
+        let (name, response) = self.call("inbuxa:AccountLock/set", arguments).await;
+        assert_eq!(name, "inbuxa:AccountLock/set", "{response}");
+        response
+    }
+
+    async fn session_status(&self) -> u16 {
+        self.http_get_raw(&format!("{}/jmap/session", self.base_url()), None)
+            .await
+            .status
+    }
+}
+
+fn message(from: &str, subject: &str) -> String {
+    format!("From: {from}\r\nTo: [email protected]\r\nSubject: {subject}\r\n\r\nHello.\r\n")
+}
+
+pub async fn test(test: &mut TestServer) {
+    println!("Running account lock tests...");
+    let admin = test.account("[email protected]");
+    let owner = admin
+        .create_user_account("[email protected]", OWNER_SECRET, "Owner", &[], vec![])
+        .await;
+    let delegate = admin
+        .create_user_account("[email protected]", DELEGATE_SECRET, "Delegate", &[], vec![])
+        .await;
+    let owner_id = owner.id_string().to_string();
+
+    // Mail leaving the server goes to the mock
+    let (mut smtp_rx, _smtp_settings) = spawn_mock_smtp_server();
+    test.server.ipv4_add(
+        "localhost",
+        vec!["127.0.0.1".parse().unwrap()],
+        Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(60),
+    );
+
+    // The owner set a vacation reply before leaving
+    owner
+        .jmap_client()
+        .await
+        .vacation_response_enable("Away", "I'm away.".into(), None::<String>)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    // Control: before the lock, the vacation reply goes out, so its absence
+    // later means the lock stopped it
+    let mut lmtp = SmtpConnection::connect().await;
+    lmtp.ingest(
+        "[email protected]",
+        &["[email protected]"],
+        &message("[email protected]", "Before the lock"),
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert_message_delivery(
+        &mut smtp_rx,
+        MockMessage::new("<[email protected]>", ["<[email protected]>"], "@Away"),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    let right_password = owner.session_status().await;
+    assert_eq!(right_password, 200, "the owner can sign in before the lock");
+    let wrong = Account::new("[email protected]", "wrong-password", &[], "", owner.id());
+    let wrong_password = wrong.session_status().await;
+
+    // AU-12: no lock without a reason
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"create": {"l": {"accountId": owner_id,
+            "delegates": [{"accountId": delegate.id_string(), "access": "read"}]}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        response["notCreated"]["l"]["type"], "invalidProperties",
+        "AU-12: {response}"
+    );
+
+    // AL-12: nobody locks themselves
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"create": {"l": {"accountId": admin.id_string(), "reason": "test"}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(response["notCreated"]["l"]["type"], "forbidden", "AL-12: {response}");
+
+    // AL-8: send-as needs more than read
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"create": {"l": {"accountId": owner_id, "reason": "Left",
+            "delegates": [{"accountId": delegate.id_string(), "access": "read", "sendAs": true}]}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        response["notCreated"]["l"]["type"], "invalidProperties",
+        "AL-8: {response}"
+    );
+
+    // Lock, with a read-only delegate (AL-1)
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"create": {"l": {"accountId": owner_id,
+            "reason": "Left the company; mail to be reviewed",
+            "delegates": [{"accountId": delegate.id_string(), "access": "read"}]}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(response["created"]["l"]["id"], owner_id.as_str(), "AL-1: {response}");
+
+    // AL-2: the right password fails as a wrong one does
+    let right_password = owner.session_status().await;
+    assert_ne!(right_password, 200, "AL-2: a locked account signed in");
+    assert_eq!(
+        right_password, wrong_password,
+        "AL-2: the right password is told apart from a wrong one"
+    );
+
+    // Test 11, AL-4: mail keeps arriving, and nothing is sent: no vacation
+    lmtp.ingest(
+        "[email protected]",
+        &["[email protected]"],
+        &message("[email protected]", "Quarterly report"),
+    )
+    .await;
+    expect_nothing(&mut smtp_rx).await;
+
+    // AL-7: the delegate sees the account, read-only, marked as delegated
+    let session = delegate.jmap_session_object().await.0;
+    let entry = &session["accounts"][owner_id.as_str()];
+    assert_eq!(entry["isPersonal"], false, "AL-7: {session}");
+    assert_eq!(entry["isReadOnly"], true, "AL-6: {entry}");
+    let delegation = &entry["accountCapabilities"]["urn:inbuxa:jmap"]["delegation"];
+    assert_eq!(delegation["locked"], true, "AL-7: {entry}");
+    assert_eq!(delegation["access"], "read", "AL-7");
+    assert_eq!(delegation["sendAs"], false, "AL-7");
+
+    // The delegate reads the mail that arrived
+    let (_, found) = delegate
+        .call(
+            "Email/query",
+            json!({"accountId": owner_id, "filter": {"text": "Quarterly"}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let email_id = found["ids"][0]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("AL-4: the mail didn't arrive: {found}"))
+        .to_string();
+
+    // Test 12, AL-6: read means nothing changes, not even $seen
+    let (_, response) = delegate
+        .call(
+            "Email/set",
+            json!({"accountId": owner_id, "update": {email_id.as_str(): {"keywords/$seen": true}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        response["notUpdated"][email_id.as_str()].is_object(),
+        "test 12: a read delegate changed a keyword: {response}"
+    );
+
+    // AU-12: changing delegates needs a reason
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"update": {owner_id.as_str(): {"delegates": [
+            {"accountId": delegate.id_string(), "access": "organize"}]}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        response["notUpdated"][owner_id.as_str()]["type"], "invalidProperties",
+        "AU-12: {response}"
+    );
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"reason": "Manager files the mail",
+            "update": {owner_id.as_str(): {"delegates": [
+            {"accountId": delegate.id_string(), "access": "organize"}]}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        response["updated"].get(owner_id.as_str()).is_some(),
+        "AL-5: {response}"
+    );
+
+    // Test 12, AL-6, AL-7: organize makes folders it can see, moves mail,
+    // never deletes it
+    let (_, mailboxes) = delegate
+        .call("Mailbox/get", json!({"accountId": owner_id, "ids": null}))
+        .await;
+    let inbox = mailboxes["list"]
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .find(|m| m["role"] == "inbox")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("AL-7: no inbox seen: {mailboxes}"))["id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string();
+    let (_, created) = delegate
+        .call(
+            "Mailbox/set",
+            json!({"accountId": owner_id, "create": {"f": {"name": "Reviewed", "parentId": inbox}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let folder = created["created"]["f"]["id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("AL-6: organize couldn't make a folder: {created}"))
+        .to_string();
+    let (_, mailboxes) = delegate
+        .call("Mailbox/get", json!({"accountId": owner_id, "ids": [folder]}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        mailboxes["list"].as_array().map(Vec::len),
+        Some(1),
+        "AL-7: the delegate can't see the folder it made: {mailboxes}"
+    );
+    let (_, moved) = delegate
+        .call(
+            "Email/set",
+            json!({"accountId": owner_id, "update": {email_id.as_str(): {
+                "mailboxIds": {folder.as_str(): true}}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        moved["updated"].get(email_id.as_str()).is_some(),
+        "test 12: organize couldn't move mail: {moved}"
+    );
+    let (_, destroyed) = delegate
+        .call(
+            "Email/set",
+            json!({"accountId": owner_id, "destroy": [email_id]}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        destroyed["notDestroyed"][email_id.as_str()]["type"], "forbidden",
+        "test 12: organize deleted mail: {destroyed}"
+    );
+
+    // AL-8: no sending without send-as
+    let (name, _) = delegate
+        .call("Identity/get", json!({"accountId": owner_id, "ids": null}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "error", "AL-8: identities of a locked account without send-as");
+
+    // Test 11, AL-4: a Sieve reject is kept instead, and nobody is answered
+    admin
+        .jmap_client()
+        .await
+        .set_default_account_id(owner_id.clone())
+        .sieve_script_create(
+            "rejector",
+            "require \"reject\";\r\nreject \"Not here.\";\r\n",
+            true,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    lmtp.ingest(
+        "[email protected]",
+        &["[email protected]"],
+        &message("[email protected]", "Invoice 77"),
+    )
+    .await;
+    expect_nothing(&mut smtp_rx).await;
+    let (_, kept) = delegate
+        .call(
+            "Email/query",
+            json!({"accountId": owner_id, "filter": {"text": "Invoice"}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        kept["ids"].as_array().map(Vec::len),
+        Some(1),
+        "AL-4: the rejected message wasn't kept: {kept}"
+    );
+
+    // AL-5: a delegation ends at its `until`, not at the next daily sweep
+    let soon = store::write::now() + 3;
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"reason": "Handover ends shortly",
+            "update": {owner_id.as_str(): {"delegates": [
+            {"accountId": delegate.id_string(), "access": "organize",
+             "until": chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(soon as i64, 0).unwrap().to_rfc3339_opts(chrono::SecondsFormat::Secs, true)}]}}}))
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        response["updated"].get(owner_id.as_str()).is_some(),
+        "AL-5: {response}"
+    );
+    let (_, before) = delegate
+        .call("Mailbox/get", json!({"accountId": owner_id, "ids": null}))
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        before["list"].as_array().is_some_and(|l| !l.is_empty()),
+        "AL-5: the delegate lost the account before its end: {before}"
+    );
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(6)).await;
+    let session = delegate.jmap_session_object().await.0;
+    assert!(
+        session["accounts"].get(owner_id.as_str()).is_none(),
+        "AL-5: the delegation outlived its end in the session: {session}"
+    );
+    let (_, after) = delegate
+        .call("Mailbox/get", json!({"accountId": owner_id, "ids": null}))
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        after["list"].as_array().is_none_or(|l| l.is_empty()),
+        "AL-5: the delegate still reaches the folders after its end: {after}"
+    );
+
+    // AL-10: unlocking needs a reason, then restores everything
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"destroy": [owner_id]}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        response["notDestroyed"][owner_id.as_str()]["type"], "invalidProperties",
+        "AU-12: {response}"
+    );
+    let response = admin
+        .lock_set(json!({"reason": "Review done", "destroy": [owner_id]}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(response["destroyed"][0], owner_id.as_str(), "AL-10: {response}");
+    assert_eq!(owner.session_status().await, 200, "AL-10: the owner can sign in");
+    let session = delegate.jmap_session_object().await.0;
+    assert!(
+        session["accounts"].get(owner_id.as_str()).is_none(),
+        "test 15: the delegate kept the account: {session}"
+    );
+
+    // AL-9, AU-12: every step is recorded, with its reason
+    let (_, query) = admin
+        .call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query",
+            json!({"accountId": admin.id_string(), "filter": {"targetKind": "inbuxa:AccountLock"}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let (_, records) = admin
+        .call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditEvent/get",
+            json!({"accountId": admin.id_string(), "ids": query["ids"]}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let reasons = records["list"]
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| r["outcome"]["status"] == "success")
+        .filter_map(|r| r["reason"].as_str())
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    for reason in [
+        "Left the company; mail to be reviewed",
+        "Manager files the mail",
+        "Review done",
+    ] {
+        assert!(reasons.contains(&reason), "AU-12: {reason} missing from {reasons:?}");
+    }
+    let (_, query) = admin
+        .call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query",
+            json!({"accountId": admin.id_string(),
+                "filter": {"actorId": delegate.id_string(), "accountId": owner_id}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        query["ids"].as_array().is_some_and(|ids| ids.len() >= 2),
+        "AL-9: the delegate's access and changes weren't recorded: {query}"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Runs these tests alone: `cargo test -p tests account_lock_tests -- --ignored`.
+#[ignore]
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+pub async fn account_lock_tests() {
+    let mut test = TestServerBuilder::new("account_lock_tests")
+        .await
+        .with_default_listeners()
+        .await
+        .build()
+        .await;
+    let admin = test.create_admin_account("[email protected]").await;
+    admin
+        .registry_create_object(Imap {
+            allow_plain_text_auth: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_create_object(MtaStageAuth {
+            require: Expression {
+                else_: "false".to_string(),
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_create_object(MtaOutboundStrategy {
+            route: Expression {
+                match_: List::from_iter([
+                    ExpressionMatch {
+                        if_: "rcpt_domain == 'example.com'".into(),
+                        then: "'local'".into(),
+                    },
+                    ExpressionMatch {
+                        if_: "rcpt_domain == 'remote.org'".into(),
+                        then: "'mock-smtp'".into(),
+                    },
+                ]),
+                else_: "'mx'".to_string(),
+            },
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_create_object(MtaRoute::Relay(MtaRouteRelay {
+            address: "127.0.0.1".into(),
+            port: 9999,
+            allow_invalid_certs: true,
+            implicit_tls: false,
+            name: "mock-smtp".into(),
+            protocol: MtaProtocol::Smtp,
+            ..Default::default()
+        }))
+        .await;
+    admin.reload_settings().await;
+    test.insert_account(admin);
+    self::test(&mut test).await;
+    if test.is_reset() {
+        test.temp_dir.delete();
+    }
+}

tests/src/system/audit.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! Audit log acceptance tests, from `inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md`
+//! (AU-1 to AU-11, and tests 1 to 5 of its list). Each check names the
+//! requirement or test number.
+
+use crate::utils::{
+    account::Account,
+    server::{TestServer, TestServerBuilder},
+};
+use inbuxa_features::audit::{EntryId, log};
+use registry::{
+    schema::{
+        prelude::{ObjectType, Property},
+        structs::{
+            BlockedIp, CertificateManagement, DkimManagement, DnsManagement, Domain, Tenant,
+            UserRoles,
+        },
+    },
+    types::ipmask::IpAddrOrMask,
+};
+use serde_json::{Value, json};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::str::FromStr;
+use store::{Deserialize, registry::write::RegistryWrite, write::BatchBuilder};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+const USING: &[&str] = &["urn:ietf:params:jmap:core", "urn:inbuxa:jmap"];
+
+struct Bytes(Vec<u8>);
+
+impl Deserialize for Bytes {
+    fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> trc::Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Bytes(bytes.to_vec()))
+    }
+}
+
+impl Account {
+    /// Records matching `filter`, newest first.
+    async fn audit(&self, filter: Value) -> Vec<Value> {
+        let response = self
+            .jmap_request(
+                USING,
+                json!([
+                    ["inbuxa:AuditEvent/query", {
+                        "accountId": self.id_string(), "filter": filter, "limit": 100
+                    }, "q"],
+                    ["inbuxa:AuditEvent/get", {
+                        "accountId": self.id_string(),
+                        "#ids": {"resultOf": "q", "name": "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query", "path": "/ids"}
+                    }, "g"]
+                ]),
+            )
+            .await;
+        response
+            .0
+            .pointer("/methodResponses/1/1/list")
+            .and_then(Value::as_array)
+            .cloned()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("audit query failed: {}", response.0))
+    }
+
+    /// One method's response: its name and arguments.
+    async fn audit_call(&self, method: &str, arguments: Value) -> (String, Value) {
+        let response = self
+            .jmap_request(USING, json!([[method, arguments, "0"]]))
+            .await;
+        let call = response
+            .0
+            .pointer("/methodResponses/0")
+            .cloned()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{method}: {}", response.0));
+        (
+            call[0].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string(),
+            call[1].clone(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    async fn audit_verify(&self) -> Value {
+        let (_, response) = self
+            .audit_call(
+                "inbuxa:AuditVerification/set",
+                json!({"accountId": self.id_string(), "create": {"v": {}}}),
+            )
+            .await;
+        response["created"]["v"].clone()
+    }
+
+    async fn create_audit_domain(&self, name: &str, tenant: Option<Id>) -> Id {
+        self.registry_create_object(Domain {
+            name: name.to_string(),
+            is_enabled: true,
+            member_tenant_id: tenant,
+            certificate_management: CertificateManagement::Manual,
+            dns_management: DnsManagement::Manual,
+            dkim_management: DkimManagement::Manual,
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+}
+
+fn changed(record: &Value, field: &str) -> Option<(Value, Value)> {
+    record["changes"]
+        .as_array()?
+        .iter()
+        .find(|change| change["field"] == field)
+        .map(|change| (change["before"].clone(), change["after"].clone()))
+}
+
+pub async fn test(test: &mut TestServer) {
+    println!("Running audit log tests...");
+    let admin = test.account("[email protected]");
+    let admin_id = admin.id_string().to_string();
+
+    // AU-1.4, AU-5: the administrator's sign-in, by password
+    admin.jmap_session_object().await;
+    let signins = admin
+        .audit(json!({"action": "signIn", "actorId": admin_id}))
+        .await;
+    assert!(!signins.is_empty(), "AU-1.4: no sign-in recorded");
+    assert_eq!(
+        signins[0]["via"]["kind"], "password",
+        "AU-5: {}",
+        signins[0]
+    );
+    assert!(signins[0]["remoteIp"].is_string(), "AU-4");
+
+    // Test 1: a change, with its field's before and after
+    let domain = admin.create_audit_domain("audit.example.org", None).await;
+    let created = admin
+        .audit(json!({"action": "create", "targetKind": "x:Domain"}))
+        .await;
+    let record = created
+        .iter()
+        .find(|r| r["outcome"]["createdId"] == domain.to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("test 1: no create record in {created:?}"));
+    assert_eq!(record["outcome"]["status"], "success", "test 1");
+    assert_eq!(record["target"]["name"], "audit.example.org", "test 1");
+    assert_eq!(record["actor"]["name"], "[email protected]", "test 1");
+
+    admin
+        .registry_update_object(
+            ObjectType::Domain,
+            domain,
+            json!({Property::IsEnabled: false}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let updated = admin
+        .audit(json!({"action": "update", "targetId": domain.to_string()}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(updated.len(), 1, "test 1: {updated:?}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        changed(&updated[0], "isEnabled"),
+        Some((json!(true), json!(false))),
+        "test 1: {}",
+        updated[0]
+    );
+    assert_eq!(updated[0]["target"]["name"], "audit.example.org", "test 1");
+    let update_id = updated[0]["id"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
+
+    // Test 1: a secret is recorded as changed, never with its value
+    let secret = "a-very-secret-password-0192";
+    let user = admin
+        .create_user_account("[email protected]", secret, "Audit user", &[], vec![])
+        .await;
+    let accounts = admin
+        .audit(json!({"action": "create", "targetKind": "x:Account"}))
+        .await;
+    assert!(!accounts.is_empty(), "test 1: account create");
+    for record in &accounts {
+        assert!(
+            !record.to_string().contains(secret),
+            "test 1: secret kept: {record}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // AU-1.10: a registry write outside any request is the server's own
+    let blocked = IpAddrOrMask::from_ip("192.0.2.99".parse().unwrap());
+    test.server
+        .registry()
+        .write(RegistryWrite::insert(
+            &BlockedIp {
+                address: blocked,
+                ..Default::default()
+            }
+            .into(),
+        ))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let system = admin.audit(json!({"targetKind": "x:BlockedIp"})).await;
+    assert_eq!(system.len(), 1, "AU-1.10: {system:?}");
+    assert_eq!(system[0]["actor"]["name"], "system:server", "AU-1.10");
+    assert!(system[0]["actor"]["accountId"].is_null(), "AU-1.10");
+
+    // Test 3, AU-1.6: impersonated access, once an hour
+    for _ in 0..2 {
+        let response = admin
+            .jmap_request(
+                &["urn:ietf:params:jmap:core", "urn:ietf:params:jmap:mail"],
+                json!([["Mailbox/get", {"accountId": user.id_string(), "ids": null}, "0"]]),
+            )
+            .await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.0.pointer("/methodResponses/0/0"),
+            Some(&json!("Mailbox/get")),
+            "test 3: {}",
+            response.0
+        );
+    }
+    let access = admin
+        .audit(json!({"action": "accountAccess", "accountId": user.id_string()}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(access.len(), 1, "test 3: {access:?}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        access[0]["target"]["name"], "[email protected]",
+        "test 3"
+    );
+
+    // AU-9: a plain user can't read the audit log
+    let plain = Account::new(
+        "[email protected]",
+        "a-very-secret-password-0192",
+        &[],
+        "",
+        user.id(),
+    );
+    let (name, response) = plain
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query",
+            json!({"accountId": user.id_string(), "filter": {}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "error", "AU-9: a user read the audit log: {response}");
+    assert_eq!(response["type"], "forbidden", "AU-9");
+
+    // AU-1.4: a failed password sign-in to an administrator's account
+    let wrong = Account::new(
+        "[email protected]",
+        "not-the-password",
+        &[],
+        "Admin",
+        admin.id(),
+    );
+    let failed = wrong.jmap_session_object().await;
+    assert!(
+        failed.0.pointer("/accounts").is_none(),
+        "wrong password worked"
+    );
+    let failures = admin
+        .audit(json!({"action": "signInFailed", "actorId": admin_id}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(failures.len(), 1, "AU-1.4: {failures:?}");
+    assert_eq!(failures[0]["outcome"]["status"], "refused", "AU-1.4");
+    // A user that isn't an administrator isn't recorded
+    let wrong_user = Account::new(
+        "[email protected]",
+        "not-the-password",
+        &[],
+        "",
+        user.id(),
+    );
+    wrong_user.jmap_session_object().await;
+    assert!(
+        admin
+            .audit(json!({"action": "signInFailed", "actorId": user.id_string()}))
+            .await
+            .is_empty(),
+        "AU-1.4: a plain user's failure recorded"
+    );
+
+    // Test 5, AU-9: a tenant administrator sees its tenant only
+    let tenant = admin
+        .registry_create_object(Tenant {
+            name: "Audit tenant".to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    let tenant_domain = admin
+        .create_audit_domain("tenant-audit.example.org", Some(tenant))
+        .await;
+    let t_admin = admin
+        .create_user_account(
+            "[email protected]",
+            "tenant-admin-secret-3391",
+            "Tenant admin",
+            &[],
+            vec![],
+        )
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_update_object(
+            ObjectType::Account,
+            t_admin.id(),
+            json!({Property::Roles: UserRoles::Admin}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let seen = t_admin.audit(json!({})).await;
+    assert!(!seen.is_empty(), "test 5: nothing seen");
+    let tenant_str = tenant.to_string();
+    for record in &seen {
+        assert!(
+            record["actor"]["tenantId"] == tenant_str.as_str()
+                || record["target"]["tenantId"] == tenant_str.as_str(),
+            "test 5: outside the tenant: {record}"
+        );
+    }
+    // The server administrator's change to the tenant's domain is included
+    assert!(
+        seen.iter()
+            .any(|r| r["outcome"]["createdId"] == tenant_domain.to_string()),
+        "test 5: the server admin's create is missing"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        t_admin
+            .audit(json!({"targetId": domain.to_string()}))
+            .await
+            .is_empty(),
+        "test 5: another domain's records seen"
+    );
+    let (name, _) = t_admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditSettings/set",
+            json!({"accountId": t_admin.id_string(),
+                "update": {"singleton": {"keepForDays": 400}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "error", "AU-9: a tenant admin changed retention");
+    let (name, _) = t_admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditVerification/set",
+            json!({"accountId": t_admin.id_string(), "create": {"v": {}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "error", "AU-9: a tenant admin verified");
+
+    // AU-7: retention
+    let (_, response) = admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditSettings/set",
+            json!({"accountId": admin_id, "update": {"singleton": {"keepForDays": 30}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        response["notUpdated"]["singleton"]["type"], "invalidProperties",
+        "AU-7: {response}"
+    );
+    let (_, response) = admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditSettings/set",
+            json!({"accountId": admin_id, "update": {"singleton": {"keepForDays": 365}}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        response["updated"]["singleton"].is_null(),
+        "AU-7: {response}"
+    );
+    let (_, response) = admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditSettings/get",
+            json!({"accountId": admin_id, "ids": null}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(response["list"][0]["keepForDays"], 365, "AU-7");
+    let settings_changes = admin
+        .audit(json!({"targetKind": "inbuxa:AuditSettings"}))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        changed(&settings_changes[0], "keepForDays"),
+        Some((json!(730), json!(365))),
+        "AU-7: the retention change is recorded with what it replaced"
+    );
+
+    // AU-11: an export, recorded, with its hash
+    let (_, response) = admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "inbuxa:AuditExport/set",
+            json!({"accountId": admin_id, "create": {"x": {
+                "format": "jsonl",
+                "filter": {"targetId": domain.to_string()},
+                "reason": "Test export"
+            }}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let export = response["created"]["x"].clone();
+    assert!(export["blobId"].is_string(), "AU-11: {response}");
+    assert!(export["count"].as_u64().unwrap() >= 2, "AU-11: {export}");
+    let file = admin
+        .http_get_raw(
+            &format!(
+                "{}/jmap/download/{}/{}/audit.jsonl",
+                admin.base_url(),
+                admin_id,
+                export["blobId"].as_str().unwrap()
+            ),
+            None,
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(file.status, 200, "AU-11: download");
+    let sha: String = Sha256::digest(&file.body)
+        .iter()
+        .map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
+        .collect();
+    assert_eq!(export["sha256"], sha.as_str(), "AU-11: file hash");
+    let text = String::from_utf8(file.body).unwrap();
+    let manifest: Value = serde_json::from_str(text.trim_end().lines().last().unwrap()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(manifest["manifest"]["count"], export["count"], "AU-11");
+    assert!(text.contains("\"hash\""), "AU-11: lines carry hashes");
+    let exports = admin.audit(json!({"action": "export"})).await;
+    assert_eq!(exports.len(), 1, "AU-1.9: {exports:?}");
+    assert_eq!(exports[0]["reason"], "Test export", "AU-1.9");
+    assert_eq!(exports[0]["outcome"]["status"], "success", "AU-1.9");
+
+    // Test 4, AU-6: verification passes, then catches an edited entry
+    let report = admin.audit_verify().await;
+    assert_eq!(report["verified"], true, "test 4: {report}");
+
+    let store = test.server.store();
+    let tampered = EntryId::from_u64(Id::from_str(&update_id).unwrap().id());
+    let key = log::entry_key(tampered);
+    let original = store
+        .get_value::<Bytes>(key.clone())
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap()
+        .0;
+    let edited = String::from_utf8(original.clone()).unwrap().replacen(
+        "\"after\":false",
+        "\"after\":true",
+        1,
+    );
+    assert_ne!(
+        edited.as_bytes(),
+        original.as_slice(),
+        "test 4: nothing to edit"
+    );
+    let write = |bytes: Vec<u8>| {
+        let key = key.clone();
+        async move {
+            let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+            batch.set(key.class, bytes);
+            store.write(batch.build_all()).await.unwrap();
+        }
+    };
+    write(edited.into_bytes()).await;
+    let report = admin.audit_verify().await;
+    assert_eq!(report["verified"], false, "test 4: {report}");
+    let broken = report["chains"]
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .find_map(|chain| chain["brokenAt"].as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("test 4: no break named: {report}"))
+        .to_string();
+    assert_eq!(
+        broken,
+        EntryId {
+            node: tampered.node,
+            seq: tampered.seq + 1
+        }
+        .to_string(),
+        "test 4: the break is found at the entry after the edited one"
+    );
+    write(original).await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        admin.audit_verify().await["verified"],
+        true,
+        "test 4: restored"
+    );
+
+    // Test 2, AU-3: no change without its record
+    let head = log::head_key(tampered.node);
+    let head_bytes = store
+        .get_value::<Bytes>(head.clone())
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap()
+        .0;
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    batch.set(head.class.clone(), b"bad".to_vec());
+    store.write(batch.build_all()).await.unwrap();
+    let (name, response) = admin
+        .audit_call(
+            "x:Domain/set",
+            json!({"accountId": admin_id, "create": {"d": {
+                "name": "refused.example.org",
+                "isEnabled": true,
+                "certificateManagement": {"@type": "Manual"},
+                "dnsManagement": {"@type": "Manual"},
+                "dkimManagement": {"@type": "Manual"}
+            }}}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "error", "test 2: the change went ahead: {response}");
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    batch.set(head.class, head_bytes);
+    store.write(batch.build_all()).await.unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        admin
+            .registry_query_ids(
+                ObjectType::Domain,
+                [(Property::Name, "refused.example.org")],
+                Vec::<&str>::new(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .is_empty(),
+        "test 2: the domain exists"
+    );
+
+    // AU-7: purging leaves a chain that verifies and carries on
+    let removed = log::purge(store, u64::MAX, |_| false).await.unwrap();
+    assert!(removed > 0, "AU-7: nothing purged");
+    assert_eq!(
+        admin.audit_verify().await["verified"],
+        true,
+        "AU-7: after purge"
+    );
+    admin
+        .registry_update_object(
+            ObjectType::Domain,
+            domain,
+            json!({Property::IsEnabled: true}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        admin
+            .audit(json!({"targetId": domain.to_string()}))
+            .await
+            .len(),
+        1,
+        "AU-7: only the change after the purge"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        admin.audit_verify().await["verified"],
+        true,
+        "AU-7: continued"
+    );
+
+    // Clean up what later suites could trip over
+    admin.registry_destroy_all(ObjectType::BlockedIp).await;
+}
+
+/// Runs these tests alone: `cargo test -p tests audit_log_tests -- --ignored`.
+#[ignore]
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+pub async fn audit_log_tests() {
+    let mut test = TestServerBuilder::new("audit_log_tests")
+        .await
+        .with_default_listeners()
+        .await
+        .build()
+        .await;
+    let admin = test.create_admin_account("[email protected]").await;
+    test.insert_account(admin);
+    self::test(&mut test).await;
+    if test.is_reset() {
+        test.temp_dir.delete();
+    }
+}

tests/src/system/authorization.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <hello@stalw.art>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
+ *
+ * Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
  */
 
 use crate::utils::{jmap::JmapUtils, server::TestServer};
@@ -183,13 +185,14 @@ pub async fn test(test: &mut TestServer) {
             permission
         );
 
+        // inbuxa: the fork's own permissions (sysAuditGet) guard fork
+        // methods, not registry objects; the audit suite checks those
         if let Some(name) = permission
             .as_str()
             .strip_prefix("sys")
             .and_then(|perm| perm.strip_suffix("Get"))
+            && let Some(object_type) = ObjectType::parse(name)
         {
-            let object_type = ObjectType::parse(name).unwrap();
-
             assert_eq!(
                 user.registry_get_many(object_type, Vec::<&str>::new())
                     .await

tests/src/system/mod.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ pub mod authentication;
 pub mod ai;
 pub mod ai_calibration;
 pub mod ai_explain;
+pub mod account_lock; // inbuxa: account lock with delegation
+pub mod audit; // inbuxa: the audit log
 pub mod authorization;
 pub mod auto_reload; // inbuxa: registry writes apply at once
 pub mod branding;

tests/src/utils/server.rs

@@ -398,6 +398,9 @@ impl TestServerBuilder {
             .parse_tcp_acceptors(&mut self.bootstrap, inner.clone())
             .await;
 
+        // inbuxa: AU-1.10, as boot does
+        inner.build_server().install_audit_hook();
+
         // inbuxa: a compat run opens a copy of a real server's store, which
         // carries that server's listeners: 25, 443, 993 and the rest. Nothing
         // here runs as root, so every one of them fails to bind and the run