tests/src/directory/issuer.rs, new in v0.16.23, tests routing a bearer token
to a directory by its issuer. That routing is Enterprise-only upstream (the
body of get_directory_for_issuer), and the fork doesn't build it: a token
naming no address gets the server default (DIR-2). The test also calls a
helper from upstream's Enterprise-only OIDC test, so it can't compile here.
mta.rs imported types::id::Id for code inside an Enterprise snippet; the
stripped tree leaves it unused, upstream's as well as ours.
These upstream files were changed after the fork marked the files it had
modified, and never got the notice: six by the listener and schema-cache
work on 2026-09-20, two by the name check. Found by diffing against the
upstream snapshot branch, as before.
Five conflicts, resolved:
- crates/common/src/auth/authentication.rs: upstream's get_directory_for_token
and JwtClaims replace extract_jwt_domain; the per-domain directory code
(DIR-1, DIR-5 to DIR-7) is kept, and the token lookup routes through it.
The release's one new Enterprise snippet was the body of
get_directory_for_issuer, which stays returning None: a token naming no
address gets the server default, as DIR-2 specifies and as v0.16.22 did.
- crates/common/src/manager/application.rs: upstream's rewrite of the tests,
with the temp directory names renamed again, and the 5(a) notice the
name-purge change should have added.
- crates/common/src/network/mta.rs: both sides' imports.
- crates/main/Cargo.toml: the AGPL-only license kept, version 0.16.23.
- Cargo.lock: upstream's, with the fork's crates added by Cargo.
tools/fork/name-check.py reads every string literal in crates/ (comments
and test directories skipped) and fails on any that carries the upstream
name without an entry in name-allowlist.txt. An upstream merge can bring
such strings in without a conflict, so it runs on every push and PR.
The first run found three the earlier sweeps missed, fixed here: the SMTP
HELP reply pointed at upstream's website (now brand_url!), the event
collector thread was named after upstream, and the FreeBSD default data
path still said /var/db/stalwart/ where Linux already had /var/lib/inbuxa/.
Two operator-visible defaults are allowlisted as open, pending a decision:
the log file prefix and the SQL stores' default database and user.
Reads metadata only: upstream's releases list from GitHub's API and the
head of the upstream branch from Gitea's. Nothing of upstream's is
fetched, so its history can't land here. Daily at 06:17 UTC.
The first-party application descriptions and the telemetry service name and
instrumentation scope are shown to operators, and the unpacked-application
temp directory carried the name too.
Left alone deliberately: the OAuth key-derivation contexts (renaming them
would invalidate every sealed token and client id), the migration defaults
that read an upstream installation, links to upstream's upgrade guide, the
wire-protocol identifiers, and upstream's own license and templates.
brand_version_full! is user-visible -- --version, the startup banner, the
console, telemetry and the JMAP session's implementation field -- and the
name belongs only in copyright notices and the lineage line.
publish.yml replaces .github/workflows/publish.yml: on a v* tag it checks the
tag equals v<brand_version!> and is on main, builds the linux/amd64+arm64
image in one buildx run (the Dockerfile already cross-compiles, so only its
final stage goes through QEMU), pushes :<version> and :latest to the
registry, links the package, and creates the tag's release if it has none.
weekly-release.yml ports .github/workflows/release.yml: bump brand_version!
through the contents API, then create the release and so the tag, which
starts publish.yml. It only dry-runs until RELEASE_LIVE=1 and a
RELEASE_TOKEN secret exist.
GitHub took the organization's repos and GHCR offline on 2026-09-20. Repo,
release, raw-file and clone links now go to Gitea at git.coffeylabs.org,
container images to registry.coffeylabs.org, and GitLab-style /-/blob paths
to Gitea's /src/branch form. Go module paths are identifiers and stay as
they are; links to GitHub issues and pull requests are left as history.
The build now mounts the named volume inbuxa-server-cargo at /cache and keeps
CARGO_HOME and CARGO_TARGET_DIR there, so a push reuses the compiled
dependency tree (RocksDB included) instead of rebuilding it from scratch.
Both runners allow that one volume; each host keeps its own copy.
With the cache in place the job moves to runs-on: light, so it can run on
host2 as well. Cargo's parallelism now follows the job's CPU cap rather than
the host's core count, and the target dir is dropped past 25 GB.
Deleting a tenant now also removes its stored inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy,
in the same place the registry's other per-type clean-ups run. Without it
the row outlived the tenant, and a tenant that later came to have the same
id would have started with legacy protocols off.
The e2e deletes a tenant whose switch a server administrator had turned
off, and would check that a new tenant with the same id starts with them
on. On this build the registry hands out a fresh id instead ("d" after
"c"), so the reuse -- and with it the removal -- isn't observable over
JMAP; the test says so rather than passing silently. The risk it guards
was therefore smaller than feared, and the change is mostly about not
leaving an orphaned row behind. All 72 checks pass.
The Hardening link merged to main changed the packaged schema, which this
branch also changes. The file is gzipped, so the two can't be merged line
by line: this takes main's schema and adds security.legacy-protocols-changed
to it again, with the hash recomputed.
The impact panel's data. Every successful sign-in over IMAP, POP3,
ManageSieve or SMTP AUTH records, per account and per protocol, one
timestamp -- nothing else: no address, no IP, no client. It is written at
most once an hour per account and protocol, so a mail app polling every
minute costs a read per sign-in and a write an hour. A record that can't be
written is logged and the sign-in goes ahead.
Both switches serve it as a read-only property, recentLegacyUse, as
wouldClose serves the confirmation: a list of {accountId, name, protocol,
lastUsedAt} for sign-ins in the last 30 days, most recent first.
inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy lists every account; inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy
lists only its tenant's own (MT-1). Accounts since deleted are left out. It
is computed only when the property is asked for.
The recording sits where the tenant check already runs once the account is
known, which becomes admit_legacy_session: refuse if the account's tenant
has legacy protocols off, otherwise record. A refused sign-in is never
recorded.
The spec leaves the interface to the implementation; a property on each
switch keeps the panel's data behind the same permission as the switch
itself, with no new object.
Unit tests hold the 30-day window to acceptance test 11 (three days ago
listed, forty not), the hourly throttle and the keys. The e2e proves on a
running server that the admin's IMAP and submission sign-ins are listed
with their time, that a second sign-in within the hour isn't written again,
and that a tenant's list holds its own user and nobody outside the tenant.
All 70 checks pass.
The urn:inbuxa:jmap capability on the signed-in principal's own account
gains legacyProtocols: "enabled" or "disabled", the stricter of the
server's switch and the account's tenant's (legacy-protocols spec,
Interfaces). It is what the webmail needs to tell someone why their phone's
mail app won't connect (LP-19), and it closes acceptance test 13.
contract.md's C-1 gains the line. It is an optional field added, which
C-3 says doesn't bump the contract version.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py reads it back from the session on a running
server: enabled for the tenant's user while both switches are on, disabled
once its tenant turns legacy protocols off while an account outside the
tenant still reads enabled, disabled for everyone while the server switch
is off, and enabled again at the end. All 67 checks pass.
The tenant switch. A tenant's administrator turns legacy mail protocols
off for its own tenant, and from then on sign-in over IMAP, POP3,
ManageSieve and SMTP AUTH is refused for every address on the tenant's
domains, while every other domain on the server carries on. No port
closes, since other tenants share them (LP-13): it is one stored fact per
tenant, read at sign-in and when client configuration is answered.
inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy/get and /set, one per tenant, id the tenant's:
- Inside a tenant, a principal reaches only its own tenant's switch
(MT-1): /get with no ids answers with it, another tenant's is notFound
and can't be changed. At server level /get with no ids lists every
tenant's.
- Turning it off is always allowed. Turning it back on is refused with
forbidden, naming inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy, while the server has legacy
protocols off (LP-9).
- A change raises security.legacy-protocols-changed with policy = tenant,
the tenant's id, the new value and who made it (LP-14).
- It takes sysDomainGet and sysDomainUpdate, not the two new permissions
the spec names. The switch governs sign-in on the tenant's domains, so
whoever manages those domains may turn it -- and the default Tenant
Administrator role already holds both, where new permissions would reach
no role already stored on a server (MT-12's note), leaving today's
tenant administrators without the switch until someone edited their
role by hand. The same trade inbuxa:AiLimits and inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy
made. /query is not built yet; /get with no ids covers listing.
Sign-in (LP-10 to LP-12). Before the credentials are looked at, the name
given is resolved to its domain and the domain to its tenant, so a real
account and a made-up address on the domain get the same refusal, with a
right password or a wrong one, counted as no failed sign-in (LP-11). The
words are the spec's: "Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and
JMAP apps...", in each protocol's form. A bearer token needn't name an
account, so after authentication the account's own tenant is checked too;
a token that named nobody can't slip past.
The refusal carries policy = tenant and the domain, not the tenant's id:
IMAP answers a command's tag from the Id key, so an error holding one was
sent under the wrong tag and the mail app hung waiting for its reply. The
first live run found that; a unit test now holds the refusal to it.
Client configuration (LP-14a). Autoconfig, autodiscover, PACC and the
suggested DNS records now ask whether legacy services are off for the
domain being answered for -- the server's switch, or the domain's
tenant's -- so a tenant's domains stop offering IMAP, POP3 and
submission while others still do.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py builds a tenant with its own domain, a user
and a tenant administrator, and a second tenant, and proves on a running
server: the admin sees and changes only its own tenant's switch (test 10);
turning it off is an event (test 14); the tenant's user is refused over
IMAP with the right password and a wrong one, a made-up address on the
domain the same (tests 6, 7); POP3 and submission refuse in their own
forms and JMAP still works (test 8); an account on another domain signs in
normally (test 6); autoconfig drops IMAP for the tenant's domain only; with
the server off, the tenant can't turn it back on (test 9); and once back
on, the user signs in again. All 62 checks pass.
Turning legacy mail protocols off or back on raises
security.legacy-protocols-changed (id 643, info level, also in the packaged
schema), with the scope (policy = server), the new value, who made the
change (accountId), whether listeners closed or reopened (details), which
ones (listenerId), and -- only when a listener could not be put back --
which and why (reason).
It is raised in Server::set_protocol_policy rather than by the JMAP
method, so whatever turns the switch is reported. A /set that changes
nothing -- the switch already where it was asked to be, nothing to close
or reopen -- is not a change and raises nothing.
The event is never an error, but jmap's exhaustive map from security
events to HTTP errors has to name it; it joins the other two that can't
occur there. rustfmt now also wraps LP-6's two over-long lines in
enums_impl.rs, which it flagged along with this change's.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py now gives the server a stdout tracer and
reads events from the container's log: turning the switch off is exactly
one event naming the scope, value, author and listeners closed; setting it
off again raises none; turning it on is one event naming the listeners
reopened. It also proves LP-6's side: seven refused submission sign-ins
are seven auth.legacy-protocol-refused events, and there is no auth.failed
or auth.too-many-attempts among them. All checks pass.
While the switch is off, the answers that tell a mail app where to connect
stop offering what the switch closed, so a new phone or desktop app is not
sent to a port that is shut or a sign-in that will be refused:
- Thunderbird-style autoconfig (/mail/config-v1.1.xml and its other
paths) and Outlook autodiscover leave out IMAP, POP3 and SMTP
submission.
- PACC (/.well-known/user-agent-configuration.json) offers JMAP, CalDAV,
CardDAV and WebDAV, and no IMAP, POP3, SMTP or ManageSieve. The document
is rendered once per configuration load, so the JMAP-only version is
rendered beside it and chosen per request; the _ua-auto-config digest in
the suggested zone follows, since it hashes the same document.
- The suggested zone publishes _imap, _imaps, _pop3, _pop3s, _submission
and _submissions with target "." -- "not offered", RFC 6186 section 3.4 --
the spec's decision, rather than dropping them: a client that looks is
told, and an automatically managed zone replaces the old records instead
of leaving them behind.
- It also drops the TLSA records for ports 993 and 995. A TLS pin for a
port the switch has closed advertises a service that is not there.
Submission's 465 keeps its record: the SMTP lock keeps that port open.
The switch is read per answer, as sign-in reads it, so every node agrees
the moment it turns. Inbound mail, MX records and the JMAP, CalDAV and
CardDAV answers are untouched.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py checks all four on a running server: with the
switch on they offer IMAP, POP3 and SMTP (the control); while it is off
they offer none of them and every legacy SRV name has target "."; and once
it is back on, autoconfig and the zone read as they did before. All checks
pass.
LP-6 added auth.legacy-protocol-refused to the packaged schema, which this
branch also changes. The file is gzipped, so the two can't be merged line
by line: this takes main's schema and adds the Settings › Security ›
Hardening link to it again, with the hash recomputed.
While legacy mail protocols are off, x:NetworkListener/set refuses to
create a listener the switch would close, and refuses an update that would
turn an existing one into such a listener -- otherwise changing a
listener's protocol would walk straight past the check. The refusal is
invalidProperties on protocol (or on bind, for a submission listener once
SMTP is unlocked, since its port is what makes it one), and its description
names inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy and says to turn legacy protocols back on first.
The rule is the switch's own, listeners::closes, so what can't be added is
exactly what the switch would close: locked protocols (SMTP, LMTP, HTTP)
and the inbound port are never refused. Putting saved listeners back
(LP-5) writes through the registry, not /set, so it is unaffected.
The e2e changes with it. LP-6's check that an IMAP listener "created by
mistake" refuses sign-in can't be set up any more -- LP-4 is what stops
that listener existing -- so that step now proves test 4 instead: creating
an IMAP listener is refused, naming the policy; an SMTP listener can still
be created; and updating it to IMAP is refused. LP-6 stays proven live over
submission, and its IMAP wording by unit tests. All checks pass.
The second lock. While legacy mail protocols are off, a sign-in over IMAP,
POP3, ManageSieve or SMTP AUTH is refused for every account, so a listener
that exists by mistake -- or submission, which the SMTP lock keeps open --
still lets nobody in.
The check sits at the top of each protocol's sign-in, before the
credentials are looked at. So the answer is the same for a right password,
a wrong one and an account that doesn't exist; it isn't auth.failed, so it
counts nothing against the account and never feeds the auto-ban; and the
session stays open, since the mail app is being told, not thrown off.
Mail apps read the spec's words (LP-12, at server scope):
IMAP NO [ALERT] This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP
apps. This mail app can't sign in.
POP3 -ERR [AUTH] ...the same...
ManageSieve NO "This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
SMTP 535 5.7.0 This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP
apps. This mail app can't send.
SMTP AUTH is refused on every SMTP listener, port 25 included: only mail
apps authenticate, so inbound delivery is untouched. LMTP is left alone.
The policy is read from the store on each sign-in rather than cached, so
every node of a cluster answers the same the moment the switch turns.
Each refusal raises a new event, auth.legacy-protocol-refused (id 642, info
level, also in the packaged schema), with the protocol as source, the
policy's scope and the domain -- never the account. The session adds the
listener and remote IP.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py now also proves, on a running server: a
normal IMAP and submission sign-in works with the switch on, before and
after; while off, submission refuses the right password and six wrong ones
with the same words and without hanging up; and an IMAP listener created by
mistake while off refuses the right password, a wrong one and an account
that doesn't exist. All 33 checks pass. SMTP sign-ins in the script wait
out a second first: every connection arrives from Docker's gateway, and the
stock inbound throttle takes five a second from one IP.
Adds a link to CustomComponent/LegacyProtocols in the packaged schema's
Settings › Security, between Settings and Blocked IPs, and updates the
schema hash so admins fetch the new layout rather than a cached one.
INBUXA Admin draws the screen; this is what makes it reachable. An admin
from before that screen would show "Unknown component" here, so this
lands after the admin release that carries it.
Ports .github/workflows/ci.yml after the GitHub account was suspended and
Actions stopped being reachable. Same checks, same order, with the image
pinned by digest in place of the workflow's SHA-pinned actions.
cleanup.yml is not ported: it pruned GHCR through an action, and GitLab
keeps that as a container registry cleanup policy on the project rather
than as a pipeline. publish.yml and release.yml are larger and follow
separately.
The Actions workflows stay in the tree as the reference.
.gitignore blanket-ignores dotfiles, so .gitlab-ci.yml is negated there the
same way .github already is.
main is protected as of today -- no force-push, no deletion, and a pull
request with a green build to merge -- and GITHUB_TOKEN is not a bypass
actor. `git push origin HEAD:main` in the cut job would have been refused
from Monday, on a scheduled run nobody watches.
GitHub would not take the obvious fix. Adding the Actions integration as a
bypass actor is rejected ("must be part of the ruleset source or owner
organization") because the organization has no app installations. The
other two routes -- an organization-level ruleset, a deploy key with write
access -- both amount to handing the release a credential that outranks
the rule, which is a worse thing to own than a slower Monday.
So the bump lands the way every other change does. It commits to
release/v<version>, opens a pull request, waits for the build the ruleset
requires, merges, and tags what came out. The waiting is not merely the
rule being satisfied: a release cut from a tree that does not compile is
the failure this whole arrangement exists to prevent, and until now
nothing checked.
Three details that would each have produced a wrong tag. The sha comes
from GitHub's merge commit, not the tip that was pushed, because a rebase
merge rewrites it. The pull request is tracked by number, not by branch,
because the branch is deleted on merge and a deleted branch no longer
resolves to its pull request. And a failed or slow build leaves the pull
request open and cuts nothing, rather than tagging whatever main happened
to hold.
Quiet weeks are unaffected: the tag still names the bump commit, so
`previous..HEAD` is still zero when nothing else has landed.
The cost is a Monday run that now takes as long as a full build -- about
25 minutes at the moment, most of it saving the cache.
jcoffey-dev