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Schema layout entries for the console pages of the DLP and mail flow rules spec (§3): Held Mail and Data Loss Prevention under Management > Compliance after Legal Holds, and Mail Flow Rules beside the server Sieve scripts (the console's nine-group Settings bar places it under Mail flow). An older console shows these as unknown pages, so this ships with the console that has them.
The hold action now holds (dlp-and-mail-flow-rules spec, §2.6), where
until now it blocked.
- At DATA a hold decision queues the message with its release a century
off (the queue's future-release mechanism, so the stored format is
unchanged and an older node just never sends it), transport rules
still applied, and replies 250 Held for review. A review record under
R/h + queue id keeps the sender, recipients, subject, size, rules and
detector counts. The sender is told when the rule asks.
- smtp/queue/held.rs: release (each recipient due now, its next notice
as far off as it was, its lifetime counted from the release), reject
(removed from the queue, the sender told, with the reviewer's note),
and expiry: the daily clean-up rejects what nobody reviewed in 7 days,
recorded as the server's doing.
- inbuxa:HeldMessage get/set: the review queue, sysDlpReviewGet to list
and read (preview, 64 KB of text, only when asked for and recorded as
blobAccess), sysDlpReviewUpdate to release or reject, a reason
required and audited by the request layer; no create or destroy;
server-level only.
- Guards: Emails > Queue refuses to change or delete held mail; the
sender can't unsend it.
- Privacy catalog entry for inbuxa:HeldMessage; spec §2.6 as built.
Tests: mail_rules_tests gains the whole flow (held and listed with
counts, sender notified and nothing delivered, queue and unsend
refused, preview recorded, reject needs a reason and tells the sender
the note, release delivers, expiry returns it, decisions audited with
reasons). smtp inbound, system_tests (after one BlobNotFound in
antispam, the known flake, then clean), features and common unit tests.
Phase 2g of the DLP and mail flow rules spec: transport rules now act,
on outgoing and incoming mail.
- features/mailflow/rewrite.rs: add or remove a header, prefix or set the
subject (an RFC 2047 word when not ASCII), add a disclaimer. A
disclaimer edits the message's main text and HTML bodies only, each
decoded, changed and written back as UTF-8 quoted-printable with its
other headers kept, top or bottom (after <body> or before </body> in
HTML); attachments and attached messages are left alone, and a
disclaimer already present isn't added again.
- smtp/inbound/mailflow.rs: the check runs for incoming mail too
(transport rules only; DLP stays outgoing). After DLP passes, each
matched transport rule's actions run in order: message edits,
add-recipient and redirect (envelope changes DATA applies), route (a
per-message queue ahead of the queue strategy), refuse (550 5.7.1
with the rule's text). The override tag is stripped with the same
subject writer, so a non-ASCII subject stays valid.
- Audit: refusals and changes to where mail goes are recorded (sender,
or system:mail-flow for incoming mail); wording and header changes
aren't, or a banner rule would record every message (spec §2.7).
Tests: rewrite unit tests (headers, encoded subjects, disclaimers on a
single part and on multipart/alternative with an attachment, once
only); mail_rules_tests gains the actions end to end: disclaimer,
header and subject prefix on a delivered message, a redirect, a
refusal, a banner on incoming LMTP mail that outgoing rules leave
alone, and which of those are audited.
Phase 2f of the DLP and mail flow rules spec: the rules now run on mail
an authenticated sender submits, after the DATA system script and
before headers and DKIM signing (§2.1).
- smtp/inbound/mailflow.rs: builds what the rules look at from the
message (subject, the text version of each body, one level of attached
messages, attachment text via the extractor, 10 MB of text at most)
and the envelope (sender's groups and tenant; each recipient local or
not, and its groups). Skipped entirely when no enabled rule applies to
outgoing mail. Rules that can't be loaded refuse with a 451: nothing
unchecked leaves.
- Block: 550 5.7.1 with the rule's notice. Warn: 550 5.7.1 with the
notice and how to override: "[override: reason]" at the start of the
subject, taken out before the message goes on (settled answer 1).
Until phase 3, a hold rule blocks rather than let mail through.
- JMAP: EmailSubmission takes inbuxa:dlpOverride {reason}; a refusal
comes back as inbuxa:dlpWarning or inbuxa:dlpBlocked with each rule's
name and notice (description too, for older clients).
- Audit: one record per DLP match, the sender as actor, action create,
target a message: the recipient domains, each rule with its detectors'
counts, the outcome, an override's reason. Never the matched text. No
new audit action: an older node that meets one fails its daily
clean-up, which would make rolling back unsafe (spec §2.7 updated).
Tests: mail_rules_tests gains the DLP flow over JMAP (no rules, warning
with rule and notice, local recipient not warned, override with a
reason, block that no reason passes, the subject tag stripped from the
delivered message, audit records with no card or key text). smtp
inbound tests pass; system_tests passed twice after one timeout in the
email delivery tests that didn't recur.
Phase 2e of the DLP and mail flow rules spec, the API half.
- inbuxa:MailRule/get and /set under urn:inbuxa:jmap. Rules convert
through serde, so what a client sends is the stored format. A create
or change is validated whole (Rule::validate) and refused with the
property at fault; id, createdBy, createdAt and updatedAt are the
server's. Every change goes through the request layer's audit record.
- Six permissions, ids 674-679 (enum and schema labels): mail flow rules
(sysMailRuleGet/Update), DLP rules (sysDlpPolicyGet/Update) and held
mail (sysDlpReviewGet/Update, for phase 3). Either kind's permission
gets through the gate; the handler shows and changes each rule only
with its own kind's. All server-level: a tenant is refused (settled
answer 3).
- Administrators get all six; the server-level Compliance Officer gets
DLP rules to see and held mail to review (settled answer 4), added
once to an existing server's officer role by the grant mechanism,
which gains an officer audience.
- Privacy catalog entry for inbuxa:MailRule.
tests/src/system/mail_rules.rs: create, list in order, validation,
server-set properties refused, update, kind-separated permissions for
an officer, destroy, audit records.
Phase 2e of the DLP and mail flow rules spec, in the features crate.
- rules.rs: a rule (§2.2) with its conditions (§2.3) and actions (§2.4),
as JSON under R/r in the fork's subspace. validate() enforces the
spec's shape: DLP rules check outgoing mail and have exactly one of
block, warn or hold; transport rules have neither those nor
detectors; lists, header names, header values (one line), addresses,
texts, word lists, patterns and detector ids are checked.
- engine.rs: rules compiled once (word lists to automata, patterns to
size-limited regexes) and run in priority order with exceptions and
stop processing. Each detector runs at most once per message and
only when a rule asks for it. The outcome lists what matched with
each detector's count, and decides DLP strictest first: block, hold,
warn; an override answers warnings only (§2.5).
- cache.rs: each node's compiled copy, refreshed after 30 seconds or at
once when this node changes a rule.
Nothing calls this yet: the JMAP object and the check at DATA follow.
55 unit tests in mailflow.
Phase 2b of the DLP and mail flow rules spec: every identifier in the
§2.3 catalog, each implemented from its issuer's published rules and
tested against published examples.
US (SSN, ITIN, EIN, ABA routing, driver's licenses, MBI, NPI, DEA), UK
(NI number, NHS number, UTR), Canada (SIN), Australia (TFN, Medicare),
the EU (Germany's tax ID and ID card, France's NIR, Spain's DNI/NIE,
Italy's codice fiscale, the Dutch BSN, Belgium's national number,
Poland's PESEL, Sweden's personnummer, Denmark's CPR, Finland's HETU,
Ireland's PPS, Portugal's NIF, Austria's SVNR), Norway, Switzerland,
India (Aadhaar, PAN), China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Brazil (CPF,
CNPJ), Mexico (CURP) and South Africa. 49 detectors in all, plus seven
templates named for what they find.
An identifier that is only digits and whose check about one random
number in ten passes counts alone only in its written form
(536-22-1234, 943 476 5919) and as bare digits only beside a word; ABA
routing numbers and NPIs always need one. Spec §2.3 records this.
A test runs every detector over an ordinary business email (order,
invoice and tracking numbers, dates, amounts, an address) and requires
nothing to fire but the contact detectors. 47 unit tests.
Phase 2a of the DLP and mail flow rules spec: pure functions in
crates/features/src/mailflow, nothing wired into the mail path yet.
- Detectors report distinct values found, each either checked by its
published check digit or counted only beside a corroborating word
within 50 characters. This PR adds the region-free ones: payment
cards (issuer prefixes, Luhn), IBAN (registry lengths, mod 97),
SWIFT/BIC, email addresses and phone numbers in bulk, dates of birth,
passport numbers, private keys and published service-token formats.
Regional identifiers follow, a region per PR.
- Word lists (Aho-Corasick, whole words, any case) and patterns (regex
with a compiled-size limit) count occurrences.
- Attachment text: text files with or without a UTF-16 mark, HTML,
DOCX/XLSX/PPTX, ODT/ODS/ODP and ZIP archives one level deep, read
with the zip and quick-xml crates the workspace already has.
Encrypted files, PDF, legacy binary Office files, nested archives
and anything past the limits come back as not inspectable, with why.
21 unit tests, against the networks' test card numbers and the IBAN
registry's own examples among others.
All six settled as recommended. Answer 6 ("and any other recognized and protected PII") becomes a catalog of identifiers with published formats and checks, grouped by region, each either checked by its check digit or counted only beside a corroborating word, plus templates named for what they find. Data with no number to find is covered by word lists and not claimed as detection. Office documents are read; PDF counts as can't be inspected.
Phase 1: one native rule engine at DATA, after the system Sieve script,
for both DLP policies and transport rules. DLP checks outgoing mail
with counted detectors (payment cards, IBAN, US SSN, word lists,
patterns) and blocks, warns with an audited override, or holds for
review. Held mail stays in the queue unscheduled, with its own review
record, so the queue's stored format is unchanged. Matches go to the
audit log without the matched text. Six questions for John at the end.
The automation suite's DNS test compared the published zone with one
copied from upstream v0.16.22. Its _ua-auto-config record carries a
SHA-256 of the account-configuration (PACC) document, and that document
names the provider as the brand, which the rebrand changed. The digest
the server publishes is right; the expected zone still held upstream's.
With the new digest the whole automation suite passes: ACME (including
the not-due reschedule check), DKIM, DNS and RFC 2136. It had been
failing at this point on main since the rebrand.
POST /api/directory/test takes a saved directory's id, an address and
optionally a password, and answers whether the directory opened, what a
recipient lookup of the address finds (account or group, with its
aliases, groups and name), and whether the password signs in. A wrong
password is told apart from a directory that can't be reached or is set
up wrong.
It calls the directory itself, below the sign-in path: a test never
creates or updates an account, never counts toward the sign-in ban and
doesn't depend on which domains use the directory. A password hash a
directory returns is never sent back. OIDC directories report their
discovered issuer; they take no passwords.
For server-level administrators with directory update permission. The
console's guided directory setup uses it to test a real person before
any domain is switched over.
The registry knows, for every expression field, the constants it may
evaluate to and the variables its conditions may read, and enforces both.
The schema served to INBUXA Admin described every one as a bare
x:Expression, so the console could offer nothing better than free text.
tools/fork/expr-schema.py reads those contexts from the generated registry
code and writes them onto each field's type as
expression: {constants, variables}. All 124 expression fields are covered.
CI runs it with --check so the schema can't drift from the registry.
The personal-data catalog and what it feeds: the data inventory and its
snapshots (#83, #89), the Compliance Officer roles (#88), the Compliance
Overview and Data Inventory menu entries (#92). Log file retention
(#87), privacy defaults for new installs (#85, #90), webhooks that send
only the events they name (#82), and upstream v0.16.24 (#84), whose
spam rules updates keep what an admin edited.
Explain: 12 settings asked about (upstream's new createdAt fields, the
certificate dates and the webhook events policy), with the release's
recommended model built locally; 705 answers carry over.
When a valid certificate already covered a domain's names (one stored
by hand before the domain was switched to automatic, for instance), the
renewal task ended with NotDue, which the task manager treats as a
permanent failure. Nothing rescheduled it, so the certificate expired
unrenewed. The renewal now returns a new AcmeRenewal task due when the
certificate falls due, the same way a successful renewal does, and logs
it as a backoff.
The ACME integration suite checks that renewing again right after
issuance hands back one AcmeRenewal for that domain, due at the
certificate's renewal point.
Seen in the console's first Overview. x:DmarcTroubleshoot and
x:SpamClassify are one-off actions whose results come back in the
response, not kept: object-life, not unbounded. Tasks go when done
(only a failed one's status may stay, still unconfirmed): object-life.
x:Log reads the log files, so it follows inbuxa:LogSettings.keepForDays.
x:TracerLog, x:WebHook and the OpenTelemetry tracers are configuration:
their credential fields stay classified, but they are no longer listed
in the inventory, where they counted as always sent off the server
even with none configured; the log-file, webhooks and otel-tracer
sources carry what they send.
Personal-data catalog spec, §8: the Compliance section in the console
reads Overview, Data Inventory, Legal Holds, Audit Log, Locked
Accounts. The two new entries are hand-built console pages
(CustomComponent/ComplianceOverview, CustomComponent/DataInventory),
shown to people with sysComplianceGet.
A console from before these pages shows the links and answers
"Unknown component", so the console that has them should be deployed
with the server release that carries this. Schema edited as the fork's
earlier Compliance entries were, hash updated.
Personal-data catalog spec, default D5 (settled 2026-09-28; built after
the v0.16.24 import's spam-rules loader landed). msbl.org's EBL is sent
a SHA-1 of every email address it's asked about. A new install's first
boot now leaves a note, and the rules update, once the bundled rules
are in, switches STWT_MSBL_EBL_EMAIL off and forgets the note, so it
happens once; the loader keeps that switch through later updates. An
existing server has no note and keeps every blocklist as it is.
Also fixes the data inventory's DNSBL endpoints: a zone is an
expression (`ip_reverse + '.zen.spamhaus.org'`, conditional branches,
`hash(email, 'sha1') + '.ebl.msbl.org'`), and the zone names are now
the quoted literals that start with a dot, from every branch, rather
than the expression's text.
Tested: unit test for the zone rule; the compliance system test (no
note, no change; the inventory lists ebl.msbl.org, not a hash; with the
note the blocklist goes off; the note works once); the system suite;
fork checks.
Personal-data catalog spec, §6 (Phase 3c).
inbuxa:DataInventory/get evaluates the catalog against the server's
live settings and says what this server holds: for each source and each
object that can hold personal data, its categories and whose data it
is, whether it is collected here at all, what bounds its retention (the
live value of the setting that does, or unbounded), whether it leaves
the host and to which endpoints, and a summary. Every host that
receives something is listed once as a candidate processor with what it
receives. Inside a tenant it answers with the tenant's slice and none
of the server's processors. Read-only, with sysComplianceGet.
inbuxa:InventorySnapshot/get is the history: a dated copy of the
evaluated inventory, recorded when it changes -- after a registry write
to an object the inventory reads, after inbuxa's log, audit or AI
settings change, and on the daily clean-up -- and kept as long as the
audit log's records. ids: null lists every snapshot, newest first; the
full inventory only when asked for.
The catalog is embedded and parsed at start (new dependency: toml,
MIT/Apache); the evaluation is a pure function of it and the live
facts, so each configuration is tested without a server. Loopback
endpoints stay on the host; any other configured endpoint leaves it.
Tested: unit tests for the evaluation (a new install's defaults, an
external blob store, a hosted AI endpoint, telemetry off, a tenant's
slice, hosts from URLs, loopback), snapshots, and the fact gathering's
store and duration rules; the compliance system test, extended (the
officer reads the inventory, a plain user is refused, a tenant's
officer sees its slice and no processors, a webhook to another host
becomes a processor and a snapshot names x:WebHook, a retention change
reads through); the system, audit, legal hold and account lock suites;
fork checks. The system suite failed once of three runs with an email
import's blob not found, in antispam.rs; the same happened once in
purge.rs on the previous branch. Nothing here touches uploads; noted
for a separate look.
The schema conflicted as a binary file: taken from main and the one
edit here re-applied (sysComplianceGet after sysLegalHoldExport). The
import kept the permission count at 673, so the new id stays 673.
Retested on the merged tree in its own target directory: the
compliance and system suites pass. One earlier system run failed in
purge.rs (an imported blob not found) and didn't recur.
Personal-data catalog spec, §7 (settled 2026-09-28).
sysComplianceGet (673) sees the data inventory and compliance
overview: superusers and, for their tenant's slice, tenant
administrators, by default and through the one-time grants on servers
that already have their roles stored.
A Compliance Officer role at server level holds it with reading and
exporting the audit log, placing, widening, releasing and exporting
legal holds, seeing account locks, and reading accounts, lists,
domains, tenants and roles. It changes no server setting, creates or
deletes no account, and can't shorten audit retention.
A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of their own tenant (MT-3), so
the tenant role is one "Compliance Officer" role per tenant, without
holds (LH-13): made once for every tenant a server has, and whenever a
tenant is created. While nobody holds it, it is removed with its tenant
so it doesn't block the delete, and put back if the delete is refused
for another reason. Both roles carry a user's own permissions too,
since roles given to a person replace the default user role, which a
tenant's accounts can't hold anyway.
Every server makes these once, new or existing -- the built-in roles
are only made on a server with none -- and records each under P c, so a
role an administrator deletes stays deleted.
Tested: unit tests (neither role changes a setting beyond a user's
own; holds for the server's officer only; per-place records); a new
compliance system test (one server-level role; an officer reads the
audit log, places and releases a hold, and is refused a setting, an
account and audit retention; a tenant gets its role, whose holder reads
the tenant's audit log and no holds; a tenant with an unused role is
deleted and the role goes with it); the system, audit, legal hold,
account lock and SCIM suites; fork checks. The directory suite needs
its LDAP container and wasn't run here.
Personal-data catalog spec, default D1 (settled 2026-09-28): log files
were never deleted. inbuxa:LogSettings.keepForDays says how many days
rotated log files are kept; unset (null) keeps every file, as before,
and a new install sets 30 days.
It is a fork-owned setting, stored under T + l as audit retention is,
not a field on x:TracerLog: that object is also stored inside
x:Bootstrap with a field after it, so a new field would change
x:Bootstrap's stored format. Server-level, with the tracers'
permissions (sysTracerGet, sysTracerUpdate); changes are in the audit
log, before and after.
Log files are local, so every node deletes its own: hourly, and at once
when the setting changes on that node. Only regular files named
<prefix>.<something> in each enabled log tracer's directory, last
changed more than the limit ago, are removed; the file being written is
never that old, and nothing else in the directory is touched. Minimum
one day. The catalog classifies inbuxa:LogSettings and points the log
file's retention at it.
Tested: unit tests for the file rule (only this log's old files; the
current file, other files and directories stay) and a purge on disk;
the system suite, which reads, sets, refuses zero, restores null and
checks the audit records; fork checks.
The schema, which both sides changed, merged as JSON with no conflicts.
The personal-data catalog (#83) gains upstream's new x:DnsServerPowerDns:
nothing personal but its API key, like the other DNS providers.
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