The installer knew one distribution: Debian, with docker, on a new enough
release. Everything else it would have offered and then failed at.
Three facts now decide what the matrix offers, and each is read from the
machine rather than assumed:
- The container runtime. Docker where the machine has one, podman on the Red
Hat family, which ships no docker at all. Both go through the same compose
plugin: compose speaks the Docker API and podman serves it, so there is one
compose file and one deployment path, not two. Telling a Fedora operator to
add Docker's own repository to a machine that already has a container
runtime would have been the wrong trade.
- glibc. The server binary is downloaded, not built here, and it is linked
against 2.39. Rocky 9 (2.34), Debian 12 and Ubuntu 22.04 cannot run it, so
the host shape is refused there with the version found and the container
shape named as the answer -- rather than installing a file that cannot
start.
- The operating system itself. This compiles for macOS and Windows because Go
compiles anything, and on either it would read no os-release, find no
systemd, and describe a machine that does not exist. It now says what it is
and exits.
Two bugs the other distributions found, both of which Debian could not have:
- The survey reported the first thing in the way and stopped, so on Fedora it
asked to start podman.socket, and then -- having done it -- asked for the
compose plugin. Needs are named now, not described, and reported together.
- apply used the survey taken before dependencies were installed, so on a
machine that had no runtime at all it installed podman and then reached for
docker. It re-surveys after resolving, and stops if containers still are
not usable.
The lab takes DISTRO now: debian13, debian12, ubuntu2404, fedora, rocky9,
arch, each with its own disk and ssh port so several can be up at once. The
cases no longer say "docker" either. install-local passes on Debian 13,
Fedora 43 and Rocky 9 -- 20 checks each, ending with a sign-in to the webmail
the installer put there.
The public shape now works end to end: real ports, Caddy in front, and both
programs that need certificates getting them from the same CA -- Caddy for
the front ends over TLS-ALPN-01, the mail server for its own names over
HTTP-01, which Caddy forwards on port 80.
Proved in the lab against Pebble, with a DNS stub answering every name with
the machine's own address, so no public name or public CA is involved:
twenty checks, ending with IMAPS and submissions presenting a certificate
for the mail host that verifies against the CA, and the webmail sending
sign-in to the server as the first-party client the server registered.
Two things the test found, both of which would have shipped:
- The proxy fronted four of the server's five names. The server puts
ua-auto-config in its own certificate too, so its challenge was never
forwarded, one name failed, and the whole order failed with it -- leaving
the mail ports on a self-signed certificate while everything else looked
healthy. The list now matches what the server asks for.
- Nothing waited for the certificate. An order that fails is not retried on
its own and a restart does not start a new one, so the install declared
itself finished over a self-signed certificate. It now waits, asks again
every 45 seconds, and reports the issuer -- or says plainly that the
server will keep trying once the domain resolves here, which is the
ordinary case on a first install.
--acme-directory and --acme-ca-root are what let a private CA be used: the
root is added to the server image's own bundle and given to Caddy, because
neither sees the other's trust store.
The plan now happens. "inbuxa install --local --domain example.test
--install-deps --yes" on a machine with nothing on it ends with a mail
server, a console and a webmail running, an administrator and a first
mailbox created, and the records the domain needs written out.
The sequence is the one ihasmail-oneshot worked out against a running
server, which is why its JMAP client and its Docker handling came across
nearly whole: bring the server up in bootstrap mode with a credential that
lives in an override file for that step only, complete bootstrap, bring the
rest up without it -- so no recovery credential outlives the setup -- exempt
the front ends from the auto-ban, restart for the settings that need it,
create the first account, and write down the password nothing else holds.
New here: three services rather than two. The console is static files that
learn their server's address at start, and the webmail is given the
first-party OAuth client secret that the server is given too.
Twenty checks in the lab, from a bare Debian 13. The two worth having are
the ones that catch an install that looks fine and is not: nothing in the
running server carries a recovery admin any more, and the account the
installer created can sign in to the webmail it installed.
Two bugs the lab caught, both of which would have shipped:
- the private addresses were worked out on a copy of the stack, so the
server was told the webmail speaks from "", and refused it.
- the console image rewrites index.html when it starts, so a read-only root
filesystem left it restarting forever. The webmail keeps read_only; the
console cannot have it until that rewrite moves.
Refusing because Docker is absent is not help. It is a chore handed back to
the operator, who will then install it however the first search result says
to -- which is how machines end up with a third-party apt repository and a
signing key nobody chose.
So the installer offers. It says what it would do, in the same words the
plan uses, and does it only when told: --install-deps during a run, or
"inbuxa deps --install" on its own for someone preparing a machine before
they have a domain to give it.
What it installs, and from where, is the part worth arguing about:
- the Docker daemon: the distribution's own package. One package from an
archive the machine already trusts beats a new source.
- the Compose plugin: Debian's docker.io ships no compose v2 at all, so this
is Docker's official static build, pinned by version with its checksum in
the source beside it.
- Node: the official tarball into /opt/inbuxa/node, deliberately off PATH so
it runs the webmail's unit and nothing else.
Every download is checked before it is put in place; a checksum that does
not match stops the step rather than warning and carrying on.
Tested from a bare Debian 13 in the lab: 25 checks, ending with docker and
compose answering, node 22 where the unit will look for it, and the
installer agreeing that nothing is missing any more. The last of those
failed the first time -- the survey looked for node on PATH only, and so
could not see the one it had just installed.
The first two pieces of the installer, and deliberately the two that change
nothing: what this machine is, and what would happen to it.
The survey is the floor under every later choice -- a component can only
offer a container shape if Docker answers for this user, or a host shape on
a systemd machine with what that shape needs. It reports what it could not
establish as unknown rather than guessing: an unprivileged probe of port 25
means "I may not bind this", not "something is listening", and reporting
the first as the second is a lie an operator would act on.
The plan is one list, and it will have three readers: --dry-run prints it,
the interface will show it before anything happens, and apply will walk it.
What you are shown is what runs.
Tested on a fresh Debian 13 in qemu, which has neither Docker nor Node and
so exercises every unavailable shape: 23 checks, including that nothing was
created by any of it. The lab that machine runs in is in e2e/vm.
jcoffey-dev