jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
45 lines
2.1 KiB
Docker
45 lines
2.1 KiB
Docker
# Build context can be just web/ (unlike agent/ingest/api, this doesn't
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# need /proto):
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# docker build -f web/Dockerfile -t sentry-web web/
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FROM node:22-alpine AS builder
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WORKDIR /src
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COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
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RUN npm ci
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COPY . .
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# All three VITE_* vars are baked in at build time — this is a
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# prerendered static site, not a server. Override with --build-arg for
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# non-default deployments. Each one needs its own ARG: an undeclared
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# --build-arg from docker-compose.yml's build.args is silently dropped
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# by Docker, not an error -- confirmed the hard way when
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# VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL/VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL were being
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# passed in but only VITE_API_BASE_URL was ever declared here, so the
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# other two never reached `npm run build` even though docker-compose.yml
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# looked correct. VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL has no default (unlike
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# the other two) -- web/src/lib/api.ts treats it as intentionally
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# undefined when unset, meaning "enterprise-auth isn't deployed", not
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# "use some fallback host."
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ARG VITE_API_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080
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ARG VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8081
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ARG VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL
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# Off by default -- local dev's plain WithCORS (wildcard
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# Access-Control-Allow-Origin) can't be combined with a credentialed
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# fetch at all, so api.ts must not send cookies unless the deployment
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# actually turned local auth on server-side too (LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED).
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# See api.ts's requestFrom/alertingRequest doc comment.
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ARG VITE_LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED=false
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ENV VITE_API_BASE_URL=${VITE_API_BASE_URL}
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ENV VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL=${VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL}
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ENV VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL=${VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL}
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ENV VITE_LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED=${VITE_LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED}
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RUN npm run build
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# Not distroless: serving a static SPA needs *some* HTTP server, and
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# nginx:alpine is the boring, well-understood choice for that job — a
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# custom static-file-serving binary would be more engineering than a
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# Phase 0 placeholder page warrants. See /web/README.md.
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FROM nginx:alpine
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COPY --from=builder /src/build /usr/share/nginx/html
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COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
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EXPOSE 3000
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