Files
cairnobs/cli/cmd/sentryctl/httpclient.go
T
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00

169 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
)
var httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
// setAuth attaches SENTRYCTL_TOKEN (see resolveToken) as a Bearer
// credential, a no-op when token is empty -- matches every backend's
// nil-authorizer no-op default (see api/internal/authz.RequireRole*).
func setAuth(req *http.Request, token string) {
if token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
}
// httpGetJSON GETs path and prints the pretty-printed JSON response to
// stdout, or the error body/status to stderr. Shared by dashboards/alerts
// list and get, which otherwise differ only in path and resource name.
func httpGetJSON(baseURL, path, token string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+path, nil)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
setAuth(req, token)
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
return printJSONResponse(resp, stdout, stderr)
}
// httpPostFileJSON reads file (a JSON document, e.g. an exported
// dashboard or a rule definition) and POSTs it to path as-is -- no
// reshaping, since the file's shape already matches what the endpoint
// expects (the same JSON the web UI's export button and POST /rules
// produce/accept respectively). This is what makes "apply" the seed of a
// future Terraform provider: one JSON contract, multiple callers.
func httpPostFileJSON(baseURL, path, token, file string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
body, err := os.ReadFile(file)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading %s: %v\n", file, err)
return 1
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuth(req, token)
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
return printJSONResponse(resp, stdout, stderr)
}
// httpMutateNoBody sends method to path with an optional JSON body
// ("" for none, e.g. DELETE) and expects a 2xx with no meaningful
// response body -- PUT/DELETE /dashboards/{id}/permissions/{userId}
// both respond 204 No Content, so there's nothing for printJSONResponse
// to pretty-print here. Prints successMsg to stdout on success, the
// same {"error": "..."} parsing every other helper in this file uses
// otherwise.
func httpMutateNoBody(method, baseURL, path, token, body, successMsg string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
var reqBody io.Reader
if body != "" {
reqBody = strings.NewReader(body)
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, baseURL+path, reqBody)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
if body != "" {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
setAuth(req, token)
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
var errResp errorResponseBody
if json.Unmarshal(respBody, &errResp) == nil && errResp.Error != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %s\n", errResp.Error)
} else {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: status %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
}
return 1
}
fmt.Fprintln(stdout, successMsg)
return 0
}
// httpPutJSON PUTs body (already-encoded JSON) to path and prints the
// pretty-printed JSON response -- same shape as httpPostFileJSON, but
// for callers that construct the body themselves rather than reading it
// from a file (agents config set, agents restart).
func httpPutJSON(baseURL, path, token, body string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
return httpSendJSON(http.MethodPut, baseURL, path, token, body, stdout, stderr)
}
// httpPostJSON is httpPutJSON's POST sibling -- for callers creating a
// resource from a body they built themselves rather than reading it
// from a file (users create, users reset-password).
func httpPostJSON(baseURL, path, token, body string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
return httpSendJSON(http.MethodPost, baseURL, path, token, body, stdout, stderr)
}
func httpSendJSON(method, baseURL, path, token, body string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, baseURL+path, strings.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuth(req, token)
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
return printJSONResponse(resp, stdout, stderr)
}
func printJSONResponse(resp *http.Response, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading response: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
var errResp errorResponseBody
if json.Unmarshal(body, &errResp) == nil && errResp.Error != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %s\n", errResp.Error)
} else {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: status %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
}
return 1
}
var pretty bytes.Buffer
if json.Indent(&pretty, body, "", " ") == nil {
stdout.Write(pretty.Bytes())
} else {
stdout.Write(body)
}
fmt.Fprintln(stdout)
return 0
}