Files
cairnobs/api/internal/config/config.go
T
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00

182 lines
7.2 KiB
Go

// Package config loads api's configuration from environment variables,
// same convention as /ingest: no config file format for Phase 0.
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"time"
)
type Config struct {
HTTPListenAddr string
ClickHouse ClickHouseConfig
Postgres PostgresConfig
SearchGRPCAddr string
QueryTimeout time.Duration
CORSAllowedOrigin string
EnterpriseAuthURL string
AI AIConfig
LocalAuth LocalAuthConfig
}
// LocalAuthConfig gates single-tenant mode's local username/password
// login (see api/localauth) -- off unless Enabled, same "off unless
// configured" convention as EnterpriseAuthURL/AI.OllamaBaseURL. Only
// meaningful when EnterpriseAuthURL is empty -- a deployment with real
// SSO configured has no use for a second, local auth mechanism, and
// main.go's authorizer selection treats EnterpriseAuthURL as taking
// priority if both were somehow set.
type LocalAuthConfig struct {
Enabled bool
// SessionTTL is deliberately long (30 days default) compared to
// enterprise/'s session TTL -- there's no SSO round-trip here to
// silently refresh a session against, so a short TTL would just mean
// re-entering a password often on a self-hosted single-operator tool.
SessionTTL time.Duration
// CookieDomain empty means a host-only cookie (fine for local dev,
// where web/api are both localhost:<port>). Set to e.g.
// ".sentry.example.com" in production so the cookie is also sent to
// api.sentry.example.com/alerting.sentry.example.com.
CookieDomain string
// CookieSecure defaults true (never sent over plain HTTP) --
// deliberately opt-out via LOCAL_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=false, only
// useful to test the login flow locally over http://localhost.
CookieSecure bool
}
// AIConfig gates Phase 7's AI-assisted query features (Track A/B) --
// off unless OllamaBaseURL is set, same "off unless configured"
// convention as EnterpriseAuthURL and everything else optional in this
// codebase. OllamaFastModel is the per-operation override for
// Complete's tight latency budget (/docs/phase-7-ai-design.md's
// per-operation provider/model config) -- empty means Complete uses
// OllamaModel too, same as every other operation.
type AIConfig struct {
OllamaBaseURL string
OllamaModel string
OllamaFastModel string
}
type ClickHouseConfig struct {
Addr string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
// PostgresConfig is the control-plane metadata store (dashboards, panels
// -- see /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md), distinct from ClickHouse
// which remains log-data-only.
type PostgresConfig struct {
Addr string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- genuinely fine for
// local dev (that's the whole point of a zero-config default), but a
// real deployment that skips docker-compose.override.yml would
// otherwise go live with a password anyone can read straight off
// GitHub. See DevCredentialWarnings.
const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
// DevCredentialWarnings reports which configured credentials still
// equal docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only default -- cmd/api/main.go
// logs each one loudly at startup. Deliberately a warning, not a
// startup-refusing error: local dev's documented zero-config path is
// exactly "run docker-compose.yml with no override," which legitimately
// leaves every password at this literal value, so hard-failing here
// would break that path rather than only catching real deployments that
// forgot to override it.
func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
var warnings []string
if c.ClickHouse.Password == devOnlyCredential {
warnings = append(warnings, "CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password via docker-compose.override.yml (or your deployment's equivalent) before this is reachable outside local dev")
}
if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
warnings = append(warnings, "POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password via docker-compose.override.yml (or your deployment's equivalent) before this is reachable outside local dev")
}
return warnings
}
func Load() (Config, error) {
cfg := Config{
HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8080"),
ClickHouse: ClickHouseConfig{
Addr: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_ADDR", "localhost:9000"),
Database: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE", "sentry"),
Username: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME", "default"),
Password: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD", ""),
},
Postgres: PostgresConfig{
Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
},
// Search service's gRPC address (see /search) -- default matches
// /search's own default GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR.
SearchGRPCAddr: getenv("SEARCH_GRPC_ADDR", "localhost:50052"),
// Phase 0 has no auth, so this is wide open by default to keep
// the local SvelteKit dev server (a different origin/port)
// working out of the box. Tighten before this is ever reachable
// from outside a trusted dev/homelab network.
CORSAllowedOrigin: getenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN", "*"),
// Empty by default -- a single-tenant deployment without
// enterprise/ configured runs with authz.RequireRole* as a
// no-op, matching Phase 0-3 behavior. Set to enterprise-auth's
// base URL (e.g. "http://enterprise-auth:8081") to turn on
// real session/service-token enforcement.
EnterpriseAuthURL: getenv("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL", ""),
// Empty OllamaBaseURL means AI features are entirely disabled --
// /ai/* routes aren't even registered (see main.go), matching
// "no cloud dependency required for the default deployment" and,
// by the same reasoning, no *local* model dependency forced on a
// deployment that doesn't want one either. Model names default to
// the recommendation confirmed in /docs/phase-7-ai-design.md.
AI: AIConfig{
OllamaBaseURL: getenv("OLLAMA_BASE_URL", ""),
OllamaModel: getenv("OLLAMA_MODEL", "qwen2.5-coder:7b"),
OllamaFastModel: getenv("OLLAMA_FAST_MODEL", "qwen2.5-coder:1.5b"),
},
}
timeoutSec, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "30"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: %w", err)
}
cfg.QueryTimeout = time.Duration(timeoutSec) * time.Second
localAuthEnabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(getenv("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED", "false"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED: %w", err)
}
sessionTTLHours, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("LOCAL_SESSION_TTL_HOURS", "720")) // 30 days
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_SESSION_TTL_HOURS: %w", err)
}
cookieSecure, err := strconv.ParseBool(getenv("LOCAL_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE", "true"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE: %w", err)
}
cfg.LocalAuth = LocalAuthConfig{
Enabled: localAuthEnabled,
SessionTTL: time.Duration(sessionTTLHours) * time.Hour,
CookieDomain: getenv("SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN", ""),
CookieSecure: cookieSecure,
}
return cfg, nil
}
func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return fallback
}