This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
182 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
182 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
// Package config loads api's configuration from environment variables,
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// same convention as /ingest: no config file format for Phase 0.
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package config
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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)
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type Config struct {
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HTTPListenAddr string
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ClickHouse ClickHouseConfig
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Postgres PostgresConfig
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SearchGRPCAddr string
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QueryTimeout time.Duration
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CORSAllowedOrigin string
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EnterpriseAuthURL string
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AI AIConfig
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LocalAuth LocalAuthConfig
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}
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// LocalAuthConfig gates single-tenant mode's local username/password
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// login (see api/localauth) -- off unless Enabled, same "off unless
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// configured" convention as EnterpriseAuthURL/AI.OllamaBaseURL. Only
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// meaningful when EnterpriseAuthURL is empty -- a deployment with real
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// SSO configured has no use for a second, local auth mechanism, and
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// main.go's authorizer selection treats EnterpriseAuthURL as taking
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// priority if both were somehow set.
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type LocalAuthConfig struct {
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Enabled bool
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// SessionTTL is deliberately long (30 days default) compared to
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// enterprise/'s session TTL -- there's no SSO round-trip here to
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// silently refresh a session against, so a short TTL would just mean
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// re-entering a password often on a self-hosted single-operator tool.
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SessionTTL time.Duration
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// CookieDomain empty means a host-only cookie (fine for local dev,
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// where web/api are both localhost:<port>). Set to e.g.
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// ".sentry.example.com" in production so the cookie is also sent to
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// api.sentry.example.com/alerting.sentry.example.com.
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CookieDomain string
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// CookieSecure defaults true (never sent over plain HTTP) --
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// deliberately opt-out via LOCAL_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=false, only
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// useful to test the login flow locally over http://localhost.
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CookieSecure bool
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}
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// AIConfig gates Phase 7's AI-assisted query features (Track A/B) --
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// off unless OllamaBaseURL is set, same "off unless configured"
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// convention as EnterpriseAuthURL and everything else optional in this
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// codebase. OllamaFastModel is the per-operation override for
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// Complete's tight latency budget (/docs/phase-7-ai-design.md's
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// per-operation provider/model config) -- empty means Complete uses
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// OllamaModel too, same as every other operation.
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type AIConfig struct {
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OllamaBaseURL string
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OllamaModel string
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OllamaFastModel string
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}
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type ClickHouseConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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// PostgresConfig is the control-plane metadata store (dashboards, panels
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// -- see /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md), distinct from ClickHouse
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// which remains log-data-only.
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type PostgresConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
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// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- genuinely fine for
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// local dev (that's the whole point of a zero-config default), but a
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// real deployment that skips docker-compose.override.yml would
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// otherwise go live with a password anyone can read straight off
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// GitHub. See DevCredentialWarnings.
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const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
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// DevCredentialWarnings reports which configured credentials still
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// equal docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only default -- cmd/api/main.go
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// logs each one loudly at startup. Deliberately a warning, not a
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// startup-refusing error: local dev's documented zero-config path is
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// exactly "run docker-compose.yml with no override," which legitimately
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// leaves every password at this literal value, so hard-failing here
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// would break that path rather than only catching real deployments that
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// forgot to override it.
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func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
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var warnings []string
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if c.ClickHouse.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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warnings = append(warnings, "CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password via docker-compose.override.yml (or your deployment's equivalent) before this is reachable outside local dev")
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}
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if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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warnings = append(warnings, "POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password via docker-compose.override.yml (or your deployment's equivalent) before this is reachable outside local dev")
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}
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return warnings
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}
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func Load() (Config, error) {
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cfg := Config{
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HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8080"),
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ClickHouse: ClickHouseConfig{
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Addr: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_ADDR", "localhost:9000"),
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Database: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE", "sentry"),
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Username: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME", "default"),
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Password: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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Postgres: PostgresConfig{
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Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
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Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
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Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
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Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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// Search service's gRPC address (see /search) -- default matches
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// /search's own default GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR.
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SearchGRPCAddr: getenv("SEARCH_GRPC_ADDR", "localhost:50052"),
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// Phase 0 has no auth, so this is wide open by default to keep
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// the local SvelteKit dev server (a different origin/port)
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// working out of the box. Tighten before this is ever reachable
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// from outside a trusted dev/homelab network.
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CORSAllowedOrigin: getenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN", "*"),
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// Empty by default -- a single-tenant deployment without
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// enterprise/ configured runs with authz.RequireRole* as a
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// no-op, matching Phase 0-3 behavior. Set to enterprise-auth's
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// base URL (e.g. "http://enterprise-auth:8081") to turn on
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// real session/service-token enforcement.
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EnterpriseAuthURL: getenv("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL", ""),
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// Empty OllamaBaseURL means AI features are entirely disabled --
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// /ai/* routes aren't even registered (see main.go), matching
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// "no cloud dependency required for the default deployment" and,
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// by the same reasoning, no *local* model dependency forced on a
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// deployment that doesn't want one either. Model names default to
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// the recommendation confirmed in /docs/phase-7-ai-design.md.
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AI: AIConfig{
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OllamaBaseURL: getenv("OLLAMA_BASE_URL", ""),
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OllamaModel: getenv("OLLAMA_MODEL", "qwen2.5-coder:7b"),
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OllamaFastModel: getenv("OLLAMA_FAST_MODEL", "qwen2.5-coder:1.5b"),
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},
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}
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timeoutSec, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "30"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.QueryTimeout = time.Duration(timeoutSec) * time.Second
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localAuthEnabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(getenv("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED", "false"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED: %w", err)
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}
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sessionTTLHours, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("LOCAL_SESSION_TTL_HOURS", "720")) // 30 days
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_SESSION_TTL_HOURS: %w", err)
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}
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cookieSecure, err := strconv.ParseBool(getenv("LOCAL_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE", "true"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.LocalAuth = LocalAuthConfig{
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Enabled: localAuthEnabled,
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SessionTTL: time.Duration(sessionTTLHours) * time.Hour,
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CookieDomain: getenv("SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN", ""),
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CookieSecure: cookieSecure,
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}
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return cfg, nil
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}
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func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
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if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return fallback
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}
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