jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
65 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
65 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
package notifystore
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/url"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ValidateWebhookURL rejects a notification target URL that resolves to
|
|
// an internal, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address --
|
|
// closes an SSRF path a security audit found: without this, any user
|
|
// who could create a notification target could point
|
|
// delivery.Worker.attempt's outbound POST at
|
|
// http://169.254.169.254/... or an internal service address, and read
|
|
// back what happened via delivery_log's recorded status code -- a
|
|
// semi-blind SSRF oracle. Applies to all three Kind values (webhook,
|
|
// slack, pagerduty), since all three deliver through the same
|
|
// WebhookURL-addressed POST -- see webhook.go's package doc comment.
|
|
//
|
|
// Callers should invoke this both at target-creation time
|
|
// (httpapi.handleCreateTarget) and again immediately before every
|
|
// delivery attempt (delivery.Worker.attempt): a hostname that resolved
|
|
// to a public IP at creation time can be repointed at an internal one
|
|
// later (DNS rebinding), so checking only once would leave that gap
|
|
// open.
|
|
func ValidateWebhookURL(raw string) error {
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("URL scheme must be http or https, got %q", u.Scheme)
|
|
}
|
|
host := u.Hostname()
|
|
if host == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("URL must have a host")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("resolving host %q: %w", host, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(ips) == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("host %q did not resolve to any address", host)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, ip := range ips {
|
|
if isDisallowedWebhookTarget(ip) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("host %q resolves to %s, a disallowed address -- internal, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata addresses are not allowed as notification target URLs", host, ip)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isDisallowedWebhookTarget covers RFC1918/RFC4193 private ranges,
|
|
// loopback, link-local (which also covers 169.254.169.254, the AWS/GCP/
|
|
// Azure instance-metadata address), unspecified, and multicast.
|
|
func isDisallowedWebhookTarget(ip net.IP) bool {
|
|
return ip.IsLoopback() ||
|
|
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
|
|
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
|
|
ip.IsPrivate() ||
|
|
ip.IsUnspecified() ||
|
|
ip.IsMulticast()
|
|
}
|