This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
82 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML
82 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML
name: Security scan
|
|
|
|
# Closes a real gap the security audit found: license-compliance.yml
|
|
# (this repo's only other workflow) checks license text, never
|
|
# vulnerabilities -- and agent/deny.toml and search/deny.toml already
|
|
# ship an [advisories] policy that nothing in CI ever invoked. Same
|
|
# matrix-per-language shape as license-compliance.yml, extended to the
|
|
# equivalent vulnerability-scanning tool per ecosystem: cargo-deny's
|
|
# other command for Rust, govulncheck for Go, npm audit for the one
|
|
# npm package. A new dependency with a known vulnerability now fails
|
|
# the build here, not months later when someone happens to re-run this
|
|
# by hand.
|
|
|
|
on:
|
|
push:
|
|
branches: [master, main]
|
|
pull_request:
|
|
|
|
jobs:
|
|
rust-advisories:
|
|
name: Rust vulnerability check (cargo-deny)
|
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
|
strategy:
|
|
matrix:
|
|
crate_dir: [agent, search]
|
|
steps:
|
|
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
|
- uses: EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action@v2
|
|
with:
|
|
manifest-path: ${{ matrix.crate_dir }}/Cargo.toml
|
|
command: check advisories
|
|
|
|
go-vulncheck:
|
|
name: Go vulnerability check (govulncheck)
|
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
|
strategy:
|
|
matrix:
|
|
# Same module list as license-compliance.yml's go-licenses job --
|
|
# see that job's own comment for why cli/hack-webhook-sink/
|
|
# hack-alert-load-test are excluded (no third-party dependencies
|
|
# at audit time).
|
|
module_dir:
|
|
- api
|
|
- ingest
|
|
- alerting
|
|
- enterprise
|
|
- deploy/operator
|
|
- terraform
|
|
- proto
|
|
- hack/benchmark-fixture
|
|
- hack/windows-fixture
|
|
steps:
|
|
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
|
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
|
|
with:
|
|
go-version-file: ${{ matrix.module_dir }}/go.mod
|
|
- run: go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
|
|
- name: Check for known vulnerabilities
|
|
working-directory: ${{ matrix.module_dir }}
|
|
run: govulncheck ./...
|
|
|
|
npm-audit:
|
|
name: npm vulnerability check (npm audit)
|
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
|
steps:
|
|
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
|
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
|
|
with:
|
|
node-version: 22
|
|
- working-directory: web
|
|
run: npm ci
|
|
- name: Audit production dependencies
|
|
working-directory: web
|
|
# --omit=dev, not the deprecated --production: this deliberately
|
|
# only gates the runtime bundle a real deployment actually
|
|
# ships. The one known finding in web's full dependency tree
|
|
# today (a `cookie` advisory) lives entirely in the SvelteKit
|
|
# build toolchain, not the production bundle -- fixing it needs
|
|
# a deliberate, tested major-version bump, not an automated
|
|
# `audit fix --force`, so it's out of scope for this gate.
|
|
run: npm audit --omit=dev
|