Files
cairnobs/cli/cmd/sentryctl/cmd_query.go
T
jcoffey-dev 3eb0f4c589 Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00

121 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
)
type queryArgs struct {
apiURL string
jsonOut bool
language string
query string
}
// parseQueryArgs is pure (env passed in, no I/O), same testability
// reasoning as parsePingArgs. Non-flag arguments are joined with spaces
// to form the query, so `sentryctl query service=api status=500` (no
// quotes, no shell-special characters) works without requiring users to
// quote every query -- though anything using "|" still needs shell
// quoting regardless, since that's a real shell pipe character otherwise.
func parseQueryArgs(args []string, env func(string) string) queryArgs {
qa := queryArgs{apiURL: resolveAPIURL(env)}
var rest []string
for i := 0; i < len(args); i++ {
switch args[i] {
case "--api":
if i+1 < len(args) {
qa.apiURL = args[i+1]
i++
}
case "--json":
qa.jsonOut = true
case "--language":
if i+1 < len(args) {
qa.language = args[i+1]
i++
}
default:
rest = append(rest, args[i])
}
}
qa.query = strings.Join(rest, " ")
return qa
}
type queryRequestBody struct {
Query string `json:"query"`
Language string `json:"language"`
}
type queryResponseBody struct {
Columns []string `json:"columns"`
Rows [][]any `json:"rows"`
}
func cmdQuery(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
qa := parseQueryArgs(args, os.Getenv)
if strings.TrimSpace(qa.query) == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "sentryctl query: missing query string")
return 1
}
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(queryRequestBody{Query: qa.query, Language: qa.language})
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "encoding request: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, qa.apiURL+"/query", bytes.NewReader(reqBody))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
setAuth(req, resolveToken(os.Getenv))
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "query failed: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
respBody, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading response: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
var errResp errorResponseBody
if json.Unmarshal(respBody, &errResp) == nil && errResp.Error != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "query failed: %s\n", errResp.Error)
} else {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "query failed: api returned status %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
}
return 1
}
if qa.jsonOut {
_, _ = stdout.Write(respBody)
fmt.Fprintln(stdout)
return 0
}
var result queryResponseBody
if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &result); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "decoding response: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
printTable(stdout, result.Columns, result.Rows)
return 0
}