jcoffey-dev
1d57e697b1
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.
Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.
Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."
Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
73 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
73 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package authz
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestHTTPAuthorizerForwardsCredentialsAndParsesIdentity(t *testing.T) {
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var gotCookie, gotAuth string
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotCookie = r.Header.Get("Cookie")
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gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeResponse{TenantID: "acme", UserID: "u1", Role: "editor"})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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a := NewHTTPAuthorizer(srv.URL)
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incoming := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/query", nil)
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incoming.Header.Set("Cookie", "sentry_session=abc123")
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incoming.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer service-token-xyz")
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identity, err := a.Authorize(incoming)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Authorize: %v", err)
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}
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if identity.TenantID != "acme" || identity.UserID != "u1" || identity.Role != RoleEditor {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected identity: %+v", identity)
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}
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if gotCookie != "sentry_session=abc123" {
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t.Fatalf("Cookie header not forwarded, got %q", gotCookie)
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}
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if gotAuth != "Bearer service-token-xyz" {
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t.Fatalf("Authorization header not forwarded, got %q", gotAuth)
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}
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}
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func TestHTTPAuthorizerNon2xxIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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a := NewHTTPAuthorizer(srv.URL)
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_, err := a.Authorize(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/query", nil))
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected an error for a 401 response from enterprise-auth")
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}
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}
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func TestHTTPAuthorizerDoesNotForwardUnrelatedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
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var gotXForwarded string
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotXForwarded = r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeResponse{Role: "viewer"})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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a := NewHTTPAuthorizer(srv.URL)
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incoming := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/query", nil)
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incoming.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4")
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if _, err := a.Authorize(incoming); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Authorize: %v", err)
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}
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if gotXForwarded != "" {
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t.Fatalf("expected only Cookie/Authorization to be forwarded, but X-Forwarded-For leaked through as %q", gotXForwarded)
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}
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}
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