jcoffey-dev
13cf9a30cb
Full rebrand across cosmetic branding, code identifiers, and infrastructure/data-plane naming, using the supplied Cairn OBS logo package. Cosmetic: favicon/logo swap (also closes a stale license-audit finding -- the old favicon was SvelteKit's unreplaced scaffold logo), new centered welcome landing page, larger/legible sidebar logo, page titles, CLAUDE.md/README/docs prose. Code identifiers: Go module path github.com/sentry/sentry -> github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs across all 13 modules and ~91 files (protoc regenerated); Rust crates sentry-agent/sentry-parser/sentry-search -> cairnobs-*; CLI sentryctl -> cairnobsctl; Terraform provider fully renamed (sentry_dashboard etc. -> cairnobs_dashboard, provider type, env vars); every session/auth cookie name; agent config paths and Windows service identity. Deliberately preserved: the gRPC wire protocol's protobuf packages (sentry.logs.v1, sentry.agent.v1) and their Go import directory (proto/sentry/...) -- renaming the wire-level package would break every currently-deployed agent binary (confirmed two real hosts, including mail.inbuxa.com, are actively streaming through this exact contract) until rebuilt and redeployed in lockstep with an ingest cutover. Only the Go module path wrapping the generated code changes. Infrastructure: every docker-compose container name (root and three component-level compose files); the Helm chart (directory, Chart.yaml, named-template helpers, all templates, values.yaml image repos); Kubernetes Operator (CRD group sentry.io -> cairnobs.io, both CRD YAML files, Go identifiers, RBAC markers); the coupled enterprise/tenantcrd package. Caught and fixed real path-coupling bugs along the way: the Helm chart's search/ingest volume mounts and the dev-only-credential detection constant vs. docker-compose.yml's literal values had to move together or a security warning would have silently stopped firing. Data plane: Postgres database sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata and role sentry -> cairnobs; ClickHouse database sentry -> cairnobs; Kafka topic sentry.logs.raw -> cairnobs.logs.raw and its consumer groups. Source-level defaults, docker-compose.yml, and every migrate.sh/ provision script default updated together; already-applied migration files left untouched per this repo's immutable-migration convention. Verified at every layer: all 13 Go modules build/vet/test clean, both Rust workspaces (agent, search) build/clippy/test clean, npm run check/ build clean, docker compose config validates on all four compose files. Live-verified against a real docker stack multiple times through this work, including a final fresh-volume run confirming the actual renamed Postgres database/role, ClickHouse database, and Kafka topic all work end to end with a real login and query, zero console errors.
54 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
54 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package dashboards
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import (
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"context"
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"time"
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"github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs/api/authz"
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)
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// Permission is one dashboard_permissions row -- see
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// /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md's "additive-only per-resource grants"
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// section. Role is always RoleViewer or RoleEditor: Admin/Owner already
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// have tenant-wide access to every dashboard, so a resource-level grant
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// only ever needs to raise someone as high as Editor on one dashboard
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// (metadata/migrations/0033_restrict_dashboard_permissions_role.sql).
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type Permission struct {
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UserID string
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Role authz.Role
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GrantedBy string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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// PermissionStore resolves and manages per-resource dashboard grants --
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// the RBAC matrix's "(own/granted)" qualifier that a baseline tenant
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// role alone can't answer (see RegisterRoutes' doc comment). nil is a
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// deliberate no-op, the same shape as a nil authz.Authorizer: a
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// single-tenant deployment, or one running plain api/cmd/api with RBAC
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// enforcement on but no enterprise permission service wired, simply
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// doesn't get the "granted" half of "(own/granted)" -- ownership and
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// Admin/Owner access still work (see canEditDashboard), only grants
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// beyond that are unavailable. The real implementation
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// (enterprise/internal/rbacstore.DashboardPermissions) is enterprise
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// code, wired in only by enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api -- core never
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// imports it, per the module boundary.
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type PermissionStore interface {
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// GrantedRole returns the role a specific user has been granted on a
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// specific dashboard, ok=false if no grant exists.
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GrantedRole(ctx context.Context, dashboardID, userID string) (role authz.Role, ok bool, err error)
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// SetPermission creates or updates a grant. grantedBy is the
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// authenticated identity performing the grant -- always recorded,
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// never empty, so every grant is attributable (see the migration
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// above's NOT NULL fix).
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SetPermission(ctx context.Context, dashboardID, userID string, role authz.Role, grantedBy string) error
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RevokePermission(ctx context.Context, dashboardID, userID string) error
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ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, dashboardID string) ([]Permission, error)
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}
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// validGrantRole reports whether role is one a dashboard_permissions row
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// may actually hold -- see Permission's doc comment for why Admin/Owner
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// are excluded.
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func validGrantRole(role authz.Role) bool {
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return role == authz.RoleViewer || role == authz.RoleEditor
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}
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