Files
cairnobs/api/queryapi/handler.go
T
jcoffey-dev 1d57e697b1 Phase 4: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation via a new enterprise-api binary
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.

Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.

Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."

Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
2026-08-13 22:48:38 -07:00

187 lines
6.8 KiB
Go

// Package queryapi is Sentry's query API: a single POST /query endpoint
// accepting either the pipe syntax or raw SQL, compiled by
// querylang/planner and executed by querylang/executor. Replaces Phase
// 0/1's two separate placeholder endpoints (raw-SQL-only /query,
// free-text-only /search) -- see /docs/query-language-design.md.
//
// Still plain net/http, not the pinned gRPC+REST-gateway pattern, for
// the same reason as Phase 0/1: this is one endpoint, and the
// proto/annotations/codegen machinery doesn't buy much at that size.
// `/api` does speak gRPC internally (to /search) — this simplification
// is about the public-facing surface only.
package queryapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/internal/querylang/planner"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/querylang/executor"
)
// AuditLogger is core's extension point for query audit logging --
// deliberately minimal and tenant-agnostic, since core has no concept of
// tenants (see /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md: that mechanism lives
// entirely in enterprise/). enterprise/internal/audit implements this
// against the real hash-chained, append-only store; a nil AuditLogger
// (the default for a single-tenant deployment without enterprise/
// configured) means no audit logging happens and core behaves exactly
// as it did in Phases 0-3.
//
// Tenant/user identity is deliberately NOT a field on QueryAuditEntry --
// once Phase 4 task 5's auth middleware wraps this handler, it attaches
// that identity to the request's context.Context via
// enterprise/internal/tenant, and LogQuery's ctx parameter is the same
// context the request carried, so an enterprise-side implementation
// reads identity from ctx rather than this interface growing
// tenant-awareness. Per /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit
// section, this is a fail-open path: a LogQuery error is logged but
// never fails the HTTP response for a routine read query.
type AuditLogger interface {
LogQuery(ctx context.Context, entry QueryAuditEntry) error
}
type QueryAuditEntry struct {
Query string
Language string
RowCount int
Duration time.Duration
Success bool
Error string
}
type Handler struct {
logger *slog.Logger
sqlRunner executor.SQLRunner
search executor.SearchClient
queryTimeout time.Duration
audit AuditLogger
authorizer authz.Authorizer
}
// audit and authorizer may both be nil -- see AuditLogger's doc comment
// and authz.RequireRoleOrService's nil-safety. /query allows RoleViewer
// (human sessions) or the alerting service identity (RoleService) --
// it's the one endpoint /alerting's evaluator legitimately calls, per
// /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's alerting service-identity design.
func NewHandler(logger *slog.Logger, sqlRunner executor.SQLRunner, search executor.SearchClient, queryTimeout time.Duration, audit AuditLogger, authorizer authz.Authorizer) *Handler {
return &Handler{logger: logger, sqlRunner: sqlRunner, search: search, queryTimeout: queryTimeout, audit: audit, authorizer: authorizer}
}
// RegisterRoutes adds this handler's routes onto a shared mux. Phase 3
// introduced a second handler package (dashboards), so CORS is
// now applied once, by main.go, around the fully-assembled mux rather
// than by each handler wrapping itself individually -- see
// httpserver.WithCORS.
func (h *Handler) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("POST /query", authz.RequireRoleOrService(h.authorizer, authz.RoleViewer, h.handleQuery))
mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", h.handleHealthz)
}
func (h *Handler) handleHealthz(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
type queryRequest struct {
Query string `json:"query"`
// Language overrides auto-detection ("" / omitted). "sql" or "spl" --
// see planner.Language and /docs/query-language-design.md's
// "Detection" section for why this exists: the rare case a pipe
// query legitimately starts with the literal word "select".
Language string `json:"language"`
}
type queryResponse struct {
Columns []string `json:"columns"`
Rows [][]any `json:"rows"`
}
type errorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
// maxBodyBytes caps the request body: a query string has no legitimate
// reason to be larger than this.
const maxBodyBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
func (h *Handler) handleQuery(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBodyBytes)
var req queryRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body: "+err.Error())
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.Query) == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "query must not be empty")
return
}
lang := planner.Language(req.Language)
if lang != planner.Auto && lang != planner.SQL && lang != planner.SPL {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, `language must be "sql", "spl", or omitted`)
return
}
plan, err := planner.Compile(req.Query, lang, time.Now())
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), h.queryTimeout)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
result, err := executor.Execute(ctx, plan, h.sqlRunner, h.search)
duration := time.Since(start)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Error("query execution failed", "query", req.Query, "error", err)
h.logAudit(r.Context(), req, 0, duration, err)
writeError(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "query failed: "+err.Error())
return
}
h.logAudit(r.Context(), req, len(result.Rows), duration, nil)
writeJSON(w, queryResponse{Columns: result.Columns, Rows: result.Rows})
}
// logAudit is fail-open by design (see AuditLogger's doc comment): a
// write failure here is logged and otherwise ignored, never surfaced to
// the HTTP caller. Uses r.Context() (the original request context, not
// the query-execution one with its own deadline) so a slow/cancelled
// query's context.WithTimeout expiring doesn't also cancel the audit
// write for it.
func (h *Handler) logAudit(ctx context.Context, req queryRequest, rowCount int, duration time.Duration, execErr error) {
if h.audit == nil {
return
}
entry := QueryAuditEntry{
Query: req.Query, Language: req.Language, RowCount: rowCount,
Duration: duration, Success: execErr == nil,
}
if execErr != nil {
entry.Error = execErr.Error()
}
if err := h.audit.LogQuery(ctx, entry); err != nil {
h.logger.Error("audit log write failed", "error", err)
}
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errorResponse{Error: msg})
}