Files
cairnobs/enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ingest_credentials.go
T
jcoffey-dev 17fdc212c2 Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)
Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across
CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last
major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a
config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates
(smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS
certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and
attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it
deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or
Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed
explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not
silently left half-done.

New pieces:

- metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/
  ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its
  SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed,
  not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext
  exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/
  ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out.
- enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/
  -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same
  offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in
  this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint
  (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its
  tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed
  /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all.
- ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver
  (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client
  implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP
  call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import,
  same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
  api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path.
  PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC
  metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch
  closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no
  tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a
  `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it.

Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed:
rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every
other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new
endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a
session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver
(real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as
authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake
resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured
resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing
token).

Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate,
separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be
refused outright, so it must not default on just because
enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml
leaves it unset, same as ever.

Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md,
docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its
summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not
yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
2026-08-14 15:21:55 -07:00

111 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package rbacstore
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)
// IngestCredential is one ingest_credentials row -- see
// metadata/migrations/0034_create_ingest_credentials.sql's doc comment
// for why only a hash is stored. Consumed by
// ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver (an HTTP call to
// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest, which calls
// ValidateIngestCredential below) so an agent's records can be
// attributed to a tenant at the point they enter the system.
type IngestCredential struct {
ID string
TenantID string
CreatedAt time.Time
}
func hashIngestToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// CreateIngestCredential generates a new bearer token for tenantID and
// returns the plaintext exactly once -- only its hash is ever persisted
// (see this file's package doc comment). There is no way to retrieve a
// lost token again; the only recovery is issuing a new one
// (RevokeIngestCredential + CreateIngestCredential), the same "can't
// recover, can only reissue" UX every real API-key system uses.
func (s *Store) CreateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (token string, err error) {
raw := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: generating ingest credential: %w", err)
}
token = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
_, err = s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
INSERT INTO ingest_credentials (id, tenant_id, token_hash)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
uuid.NewString(), tenantID, hashIngestToken(token))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: creating ingest credential: %w", err)
}
return token, nil
}
// ValidateIngestCredential hashes the presented token and looks up which
// tenant it belongs to via an indexed exact-match on the UNIQUE
// token_hash column -- the only production call site is
// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest handler, per an
// agent's PushBatch request.
func (s *Store) ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error) {
row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT tenant_id FROM ingest_credentials WHERE token_hash = $1`, hashIngestToken(token))
if err := row.Scan(&tenantID); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return "", ErrNotFound
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: validating ingest credential: %w", err)
}
return tenantID, nil
}
// RevokeIngestCredential deletes a credential by ID (not by token --
// the plaintext is never stored, so revocation has to name the row some
// other way; ListIngestCredentialsForTenant is what an operator uses to
// find the ID).
func (s *Store) RevokeIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
tag, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM ingest_credentials WHERE id = $1`, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: revoking ingest credential: %w", err)
}
if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
return ErrNotFound
}
return nil
}
// ListIngestCredentialsForTenant never returns the plaintext token (it
// isn't stored) -- just enough (ID, creation time) for an operator to
// decide which one to revoke.
func (s *Store) ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]IngestCredential, error) {
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
SELECT id, tenant_id, created_at FROM ingest_credentials
WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at`, tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: listing ingest credentials: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []IngestCredential
for rows.Next() {
var c IngestCredential
if err := rows.Scan(&c.ID, &c.TenantID, &c.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: scanning ingest credential: %w", err)
}
out = append(out, c)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}