Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
111 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
111 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package rbacstore
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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)
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// IngestCredential is one ingest_credentials row -- see
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// metadata/migrations/0034_create_ingest_credentials.sql's doc comment
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// for why only a hash is stored. Consumed by
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// ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver (an HTTP call to
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// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest, which calls
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// ValidateIngestCredential below) so an agent's records can be
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// attributed to a tenant at the point they enter the system.
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type IngestCredential struct {
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ID string
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TenantID string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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func hashIngestToken(token string) string {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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}
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// CreateIngestCredential generates a new bearer token for tenantID and
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// returns the plaintext exactly once -- only its hash is ever persisted
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// (see this file's package doc comment). There is no way to retrieve a
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// lost token again; the only recovery is issuing a new one
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// (RevokeIngestCredential + CreateIngestCredential), the same "can't
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// recover, can only reissue" UX every real API-key system uses.
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func (s *Store) CreateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (token string, err error) {
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raw := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: generating ingest credential: %w", err)
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}
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token = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
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_, err = s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO ingest_credentials (id, tenant_id, token_hash)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
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uuid.NewString(), tenantID, hashIngestToken(token))
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: creating ingest credential: %w", err)
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}
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return token, nil
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}
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// ValidateIngestCredential hashes the presented token and looks up which
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// tenant it belongs to via an indexed exact-match on the UNIQUE
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// token_hash column -- the only production call site is
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// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest handler, per an
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// agent's PushBatch request.
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func (s *Store) ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error) {
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row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT tenant_id FROM ingest_credentials WHERE token_hash = $1`, hashIngestToken(token))
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if err := row.Scan(&tenantID); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return "", ErrNotFound
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}
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return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: validating ingest credential: %w", err)
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}
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return tenantID, nil
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}
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// RevokeIngestCredential deletes a credential by ID (not by token --
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// the plaintext is never stored, so revocation has to name the row some
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// other way; ListIngestCredentialsForTenant is what an operator uses to
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// find the ID).
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func (s *Store) RevokeIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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tag, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM ingest_credentials WHERE id = $1`, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: revoking ingest credential: %w", err)
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}
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if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
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return ErrNotFound
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ListIngestCredentialsForTenant never returns the plaintext token (it
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// isn't stored) -- just enough (ID, creation time) for an operator to
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// decide which one to revoke.
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func (s *Store) ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]IngestCredential, error) {
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rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
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SELECT id, tenant_id, created_at FROM ingest_credentials
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WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at`, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: listing ingest credentials: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []IngestCredential
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for rows.Next() {
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var c IngestCredential
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if err := rows.Scan(&c.ID, &c.TenantID, &c.CreatedAt); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: scanning ingest credential: %w", err)
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}
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out = append(out, c)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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