Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
204 lines
7.4 KiB
YAML
204 lines
7.4 KiB
YAML
# Default values for the sentry chart. See deploy/helm/sentry/README.md
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# for the multi-tenant-specific values (enterprise.*, tenants) and what
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# "multi-tenant-aware" does and doesn't mean at this layer.
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#
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# Image repositories default to locally-built tags matching each
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# service's docker-compose.yml container_name, minus the "sentry-"
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# container_name prefix duplication -- push these to a registry this
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# cluster can actually pull from before installing; this chart never
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# builds images itself (same division of labor as docker-compose.yml:
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# `docker compose build` vs. `docker compose up`).
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global:
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imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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redpanda:
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image:
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repository: docker.redpanda.com/redpandadata/redpanda
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tag: v24.2.7
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persistence:
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size: 10Gi
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resources: {}
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# Built from ./transport (docker-compose.yml's redpanda-provision
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# service) -- the one-shot topic-creation Job below.
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provisionImage:
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repository: sentry-redpanda-provision
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tag: latest
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clickhouse:
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image:
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repository: clickhouse/clickhouse-server
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tag: "24.8"
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persistence:
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size: 20Gi
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resources: {}
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# Leave empty to auto-generate and persist across upgrades -- see
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# templates/secrets.yaml's stableSecretValue helper.
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password: ""
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# Built from ./storage (docker-compose.yml's clickhouse-migrate
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# service) -- the one-shot schema-migration Job.
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migrateImage:
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repository: sentry-clickhouse-migrate
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tag: latest
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postgres:
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image:
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repository: postgres
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tag: 16-alpine
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persistence:
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size: 10Gi
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resources: {}
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password: ""
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auditWriterPassword: ""
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# Built from ./metadata (docker-compose.yml's metadata-migrate
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# service) -- the one-shot schema-migration Job.
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migrateImage:
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repository: sentry-metadata-migrate
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tag: latest
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ingest:
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image:
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repository: sentry-ingest
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tag: latest
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replicas: 1
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resources: {}
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# mTLS server cert/key/CA -- see hack/dev-certs/generate.sh for the
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# dev equivalent of what this Secret must contain
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# (server.pem/server-key.pem/ca.pem) in a real deployment. Unlike
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# docker-compose.yml's bind-mounted ./hack/dev-certs/out, a cluster
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# deployment supplies this as a real Secret -- named here, not
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# generated by this chart (cert issuance is out of scope, same
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# "boring, well-understood" preference as everywhere else in this
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# repo -- use cert-manager or an equivalent, don't hand-roll it here).
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tlsSecretName: ""
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# Only meaningful when enterprise.enabled is also true -- see
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# templates/ingest.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL comment for why this is
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# its own deliberate opt-in, not folded into enterprise.enabled
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# directly: turning it on requires every agent to already present a
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# valid ingest credential (`enterprise-auth
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# -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`) or be refused outright.
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requireTenantCredential: false
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search:
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image:
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repository: sentry-search
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tag: latest
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# Pinned to 1: search consumes the same Redpanda topic ingest's
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# consumer does with its own offset tracking (see search/README.md).
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# A second replica would form a second, independent consumer instance
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# against the same partitions with no coordination -- correctness,
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# not just resource waste, is the reason this isn't a `replicas` knob
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# yet. Matches CLAUDE.md's Phase 4 non-goal: "no general multi-cluster
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# orchestration."
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replicas: 1
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resources: {}
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persistence:
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size: 20Gi
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api:
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image:
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repository: sentry-api
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tag: latest
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replicas: 2
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resources: {}
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alerting:
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image:
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repository: sentry-alerting
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tag: latest
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# Pinned to 1 for the same reason as search: rulestore.ClaimDueRules
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# has no leader-election/partitioning story for multiple evaluator
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# replicas yet -- two would both try to claim and evaluate the same
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# due rules. Named explicitly rather than silently defaulted, since
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# it's the kind of knob someone reasonably expects to just work.
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replicas: 1
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resources: {}
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# See templates/alerting.yaml's comment -- only meaningful when
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# enterprise.enabled is true. Empty by default.
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apiServiceToken: ""
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web:
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image:
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repository: sentry-web
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tag: latest
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replicas: 2
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resources: {}
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# NOT wired to any Deployment env var -- web is a static SvelteKit
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# build (adapter-static, see web/package.json), and VITE_API_BASE_URL/
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# VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL/VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL are baked in
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# at *image build time* (docker-compose.yml's web.build.args), not
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# read at container runtime. Deploying this chart into a real cluster
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# means rebuilding the web image with these three build args pointed
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# at wherever api/alerting/enterprise-auth are actually reachable from
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# a browser (an Ingress host, a LoadBalancer IP, etc.) -- this section
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# exists to document that requirement, not because the chart can act
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# on it.
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builtWithApiBaseURL: "http://localhost:8080"
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builtWithAlertingApiBaseURL: "http://localhost:8081"
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builtWithEnterpriseAuthBaseURL: "http://localhost:8082"
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# enterprise-auth (commercial license) + the tenant-operator that
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# reconciles the Tenant CRD -- both off by default, matching
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# docker-compose.yml's own "included, not wired into enforcement by
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# default" stance (see its enterprise-auth service comment) and
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# enterprise/README.md's "Status" section on what's built vs. deferred.
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enterprise:
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enabled: false
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image:
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repository: sentry-enterprise-auth
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tag: latest
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# enterprise-api (templates/enterprise-api.yaml) -- swaps in for
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# api.yaml's plain api Deployment when enterprise.enabled is true, on
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# the same Service/port every consumer already expects. Built from the
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# repo root (needs api/ and proto/, not just enterprise/), unlike
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# enterprise-auth's image above -- see
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# enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api/Dockerfile.
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apiImage:
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repository: sentry-enterprise-api
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tag: latest
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replicas: 1
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resources: {}
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# Leave empty to auto-generate (>= 32 bytes) and persist across
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# upgrades -- see templates/secrets.yaml.
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sessionSigningKey: ""
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oidc:
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issuerURL: ""
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clientID: ""
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clientSecret: ""
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redirectURL: ""
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saml:
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entityID: ""
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acsURL: ""
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idpMetadataURL: ""
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# Installs deploy/operator (the Tenant CRD controller) alongside this
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# chart. Only meaningful when enterprise.enabled is also true -- gated
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# on that, not a separate flag, since a Tenant CR with nothing to
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# reflect (see below) has nothing to do. Also turns on enterprise-api's
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# own Tenant-CRD-syncing permissions (a ServiceAccount/Role, and the
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# TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE env var) -- see templates/enterprise-api.yaml.
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tenantOperator:
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enabled: false
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image:
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repository: sentry-tenant-operator
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tag: latest
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resources: {}
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# One entry per tenant to provision -- rendered as Tenant CRs
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# (templates/tenants.yaml), a declarative request an admin/GitOps
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# process makes. The operator (tenant-operator, above) only ever
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# *reflects* real state onto these objects (Phase/Conditions, derived
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# from what enterprise-api's `-provision-tenant` has reported) -- it's
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# `-provision-tenant` (run via `kubectl exec` into the enterprise-api
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# Pod), not the operator, that actually calls ClickHouse and writes the
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# credential Secret. See deploy/operator/internal/controller/
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# tenant_controller.go's and enterprise/internal/tenantcrd's doc
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# comments for the full split. Empty by default; a real two-tenant
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# deployment (Phase 4's exit criteria) sets e.g.:
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# tenants:
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# - name: acme
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# displayName: "Acme Corp"
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# - name: globex
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# displayName: "Globex Corporation"
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tenants: []
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