Files
cairnobs/deploy/helm/sentry/values.yaml
T
jcoffey-dev 17fdc212c2 Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)
Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across
CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last
major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a
config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates
(smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS
certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and
attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it
deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or
Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed
explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not
silently left half-done.

New pieces:

- metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/
  ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its
  SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed,
  not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext
  exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/
  ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out.
- enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/
  -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same
  offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in
  this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint
  (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its
  tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed
  /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all.
- ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver
  (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client
  implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP
  call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import,
  same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
  api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path.
  PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC
  metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch
  closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no
  tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a
  `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it.

Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed:
rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every
other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new
endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a
session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver
(real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as
authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake
resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured
resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing
token).

Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate,
separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be
refused outright, so it must not default on just because
enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml
leaves it unset, same as ever.

Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md,
docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its
summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not
yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
2026-08-14 15:21:55 -07:00

204 lines
7.4 KiB
YAML

# Default values for the sentry chart. See deploy/helm/sentry/README.md
# for the multi-tenant-specific values (enterprise.*, tenants) and what
# "multi-tenant-aware" does and doesn't mean at this layer.
#
# Image repositories default to locally-built tags matching each
# service's docker-compose.yml container_name, minus the "sentry-"
# container_name prefix duplication -- push these to a registry this
# cluster can actually pull from before installing; this chart never
# builds images itself (same division of labor as docker-compose.yml:
# `docker compose build` vs. `docker compose up`).
global:
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
redpanda:
image:
repository: docker.redpanda.com/redpandadata/redpanda
tag: v24.2.7
persistence:
size: 10Gi
resources: {}
# Built from ./transport (docker-compose.yml's redpanda-provision
# service) -- the one-shot topic-creation Job below.
provisionImage:
repository: sentry-redpanda-provision
tag: latest
clickhouse:
image:
repository: clickhouse/clickhouse-server
tag: "24.8"
persistence:
size: 20Gi
resources: {}
# Leave empty to auto-generate and persist across upgrades -- see
# templates/secrets.yaml's stableSecretValue helper.
password: ""
# Built from ./storage (docker-compose.yml's clickhouse-migrate
# service) -- the one-shot schema-migration Job.
migrateImage:
repository: sentry-clickhouse-migrate
tag: latest
postgres:
image:
repository: postgres
tag: 16-alpine
persistence:
size: 10Gi
resources: {}
password: ""
auditWriterPassword: ""
# Built from ./metadata (docker-compose.yml's metadata-migrate
# service) -- the one-shot schema-migration Job.
migrateImage:
repository: sentry-metadata-migrate
tag: latest
ingest:
image:
repository: sentry-ingest
tag: latest
replicas: 1
resources: {}
# mTLS server cert/key/CA -- see hack/dev-certs/generate.sh for the
# dev equivalent of what this Secret must contain
# (server.pem/server-key.pem/ca.pem) in a real deployment. Unlike
# docker-compose.yml's bind-mounted ./hack/dev-certs/out, a cluster
# deployment supplies this as a real Secret -- named here, not
# generated by this chart (cert issuance is out of scope, same
# "boring, well-understood" preference as everywhere else in this
# repo -- use cert-manager or an equivalent, don't hand-roll it here).
tlsSecretName: ""
# Only meaningful when enterprise.enabled is also true -- see
# templates/ingest.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL comment for why this is
# its own deliberate opt-in, not folded into enterprise.enabled
# directly: turning it on requires every agent to already present a
# valid ingest credential (`enterprise-auth
# -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`) or be refused outright.
requireTenantCredential: false
search:
image:
repository: sentry-search
tag: latest
# Pinned to 1: search consumes the same Redpanda topic ingest's
# consumer does with its own offset tracking (see search/README.md).
# A second replica would form a second, independent consumer instance
# against the same partitions with no coordination -- correctness,
# not just resource waste, is the reason this isn't a `replicas` knob
# yet. Matches CLAUDE.md's Phase 4 non-goal: "no general multi-cluster
# orchestration."
replicas: 1
resources: {}
persistence:
size: 20Gi
api:
image:
repository: sentry-api
tag: latest
replicas: 2
resources: {}
alerting:
image:
repository: sentry-alerting
tag: latest
# Pinned to 1 for the same reason as search: rulestore.ClaimDueRules
# has no leader-election/partitioning story for multiple evaluator
# replicas yet -- two would both try to claim and evaluate the same
# due rules. Named explicitly rather than silently defaulted, since
# it's the kind of knob someone reasonably expects to just work.
replicas: 1
resources: {}
# See templates/alerting.yaml's comment -- only meaningful when
# enterprise.enabled is true. Empty by default.
apiServiceToken: ""
web:
image:
repository: sentry-web
tag: latest
replicas: 2
resources: {}
# NOT wired to any Deployment env var -- web is a static SvelteKit
# build (adapter-static, see web/package.json), and VITE_API_BASE_URL/
# VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL/VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL are baked in
# at *image build time* (docker-compose.yml's web.build.args), not
# read at container runtime. Deploying this chart into a real cluster
# means rebuilding the web image with these three build args pointed
# at wherever api/alerting/enterprise-auth are actually reachable from
# a browser (an Ingress host, a LoadBalancer IP, etc.) -- this section
# exists to document that requirement, not because the chart can act
# on it.
builtWithApiBaseURL: "http://localhost:8080"
builtWithAlertingApiBaseURL: "http://localhost:8081"
builtWithEnterpriseAuthBaseURL: "http://localhost:8082"
# enterprise-auth (commercial license) + the tenant-operator that
# reconciles the Tenant CRD -- both off by default, matching
# docker-compose.yml's own "included, not wired into enforcement by
# default" stance (see its enterprise-auth service comment) and
# enterprise/README.md's "Status" section on what's built vs. deferred.
enterprise:
enabled: false
image:
repository: sentry-enterprise-auth
tag: latest
# enterprise-api (templates/enterprise-api.yaml) -- swaps in for
# api.yaml's plain api Deployment when enterprise.enabled is true, on
# the same Service/port every consumer already expects. Built from the
# repo root (needs api/ and proto/, not just enterprise/), unlike
# enterprise-auth's image above -- see
# enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api/Dockerfile.
apiImage:
repository: sentry-enterprise-api
tag: latest
replicas: 1
resources: {}
# Leave empty to auto-generate (>= 32 bytes) and persist across
# upgrades -- see templates/secrets.yaml.
sessionSigningKey: ""
oidc:
issuerURL: ""
clientID: ""
clientSecret: ""
redirectURL: ""
saml:
entityID: ""
acsURL: ""
idpMetadataURL: ""
# Installs deploy/operator (the Tenant CRD controller) alongside this
# chart. Only meaningful when enterprise.enabled is also true -- gated
# on that, not a separate flag, since a Tenant CR with nothing to
# reflect (see below) has nothing to do. Also turns on enterprise-api's
# own Tenant-CRD-syncing permissions (a ServiceAccount/Role, and the
# TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE env var) -- see templates/enterprise-api.yaml.
tenantOperator:
enabled: false
image:
repository: sentry-tenant-operator
tag: latest
resources: {}
# One entry per tenant to provision -- rendered as Tenant CRs
# (templates/tenants.yaml), a declarative request an admin/GitOps
# process makes. The operator (tenant-operator, above) only ever
# *reflects* real state onto these objects (Phase/Conditions, derived
# from what enterprise-api's `-provision-tenant` has reported) -- it's
# `-provision-tenant` (run via `kubectl exec` into the enterprise-api
# Pod), not the operator, that actually calls ClickHouse and writes the
# credential Secret. See deploy/operator/internal/controller/
# tenant_controller.go's and enterprise/internal/tenantcrd's doc
# comments for the full split. Empty by default; a real two-tenant
# deployment (Phase 4's exit criteria) sets e.g.:
# tenants:
# - name: acme
# displayName: "Acme Corp"
# - name: globex
# displayName: "Globex Corporation"
tenants: []