search/src/consumer.rs's write-routing (built last pass) had no active- tenant check at all: IndexRegistry.resolve() would open-or-create an index directory for any syntactically-valid tenant_id, active or not -- unlike ClickHouse's chwriter.Registry (an active-tenants-only snapshot built at enterprise-ingest startup) or the read side (gated by searchclient.TenantChecker, a direct rbacstore query). search is AGPL core with no Postgres access and no enterprise/ import allowed, so it needed a network boundary instead -- the same shape ingest's TenantResolver already uses against enterprise-auth, just Rust calling Go instead of Go calling Go. New GET /internal/active-tenants endpoint on enterprise-auth (rbacstore.ListActiveTenantIDs + authhandler.handleActiveTenants), gated on a RoleService Bearer credential -- server-to-server auth, the same shape alerting presents to api, minted via the already-generic enterprise-auth -mint-service-token search. search/src/tenants.rs's ActiveTenantTracker polls it every 60s, blocking startup on the first fetch succeeding (fail-closed cold start -- a control-plane outage at boot must not silently accept every tenant_id) and keeping the last- known-good set on any later refresh failure (a transient blip shouldn't stop every tenant's indexing, only prevent the allowlist from growing/ shrinking until connectivity resumes). consumer.rs refuses any tagged record whose tenant isn't in the polled set, before ever calling resolve() -- IndexRegistry itself stays policy-free, matching the same mechanism/policy split clickhousewriter.Writer vs. chwriter.Registry already draws on the ClickHouse side. Off unless ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL/ENTERPRISE_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKEN are both set (search/src/config.rs rejects exactly one being set) -- every existing deployment is unaffected. Verified with real HTTP round trips in this environment: tenants.rs's tests exercise real reqwest requests (actual Authorization: Bearer header, actual JSON parsing) against a hand-rolled dependency-free TCP test server, including both fail-closed paths (rejected first fetch, unreachable server). authhandler's new tests cover the credential-kind distinction this endpoint exists to enforce -- a real human session, even for a genuine Owner, must not satisfy a check meant for a service identity. One asymmetry remains, disclosed rather than fixed: chwriter.Registry's snapshot still never refreshes (stale until enterprise-ingest restarts), while ActiveTenantTracker's 60s poll gives Tantivy a materially tighter staleness window. Neither is a live per-write check -- that would mean a database/HTTP round trip per record, a throughput cost neither implementation accepts -- so both have some staleness window by design; the gap between the two windows is what's disclosed, not a claim either is fully live.
212 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
212 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
// Package authhandler implements enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize
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// endpoint -- the HTTP side of the "network boundary, not import boundary"
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// pattern api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer calls into (see that package's
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// doc comment). It resolves a caller's credentials (session cookie or
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// service-token Bearer header) to an identity, using session.Manager for
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// both -- a human session and /alerting's service token are both just
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// signed tokens with a different Role claim, so one validation path
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// handles both, and the Role claim (not which header carried it) is what
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// determines whether the result looks like a human or a service identity.
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//
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// POST /internal/authorize-ingest is a sibling endpoint, same network-
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// boundary shape but for a different caller (`ingest`, core/AGPL, not
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// api/authz) and a different credential type (an ingest bearer token
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// checked against rbacstore's ingest_credentials table, not a
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// session.Manager JWT) -- see ingestCredentialValidator's doc comment.
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//
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// GET /internal/active-tenants is a third sibling, for `search`
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// (core/AGPL, Rust) -- see tenantLister's doc comment.
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package authhandler
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/session"
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)
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// SessionCookieName matches the name api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer's
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// tests and doc comments already assume ("sentry_session").
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const SessionCookieName = "sentry_session"
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// Features reports which SSO mechanisms are configured -- the response
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// shape /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md's "Web UI boundary" section commits
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// to ({"sso_configured", "oidc_enabled", "saml_enabled"}), so web can
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// show/hide enterprise settings sections as a runtime capability check
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// rather than a conditional import.
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type Features struct {
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OIDCEnabled bool
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SAMLEnabled bool
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}
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// ingestCredentialValidator is the narrow interface POST
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// /internal/authorize-ingest needs -- *rbacstore.Store is the production
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// implementation. Unlike session-backed /internal/authorize, this
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// endpoint validates a completely different credential type (an ingest
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// bearer token, checked against enterprise/internal/rbacstore's
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// ingest_credentials table, never a session.Manager-signed JWT), so it
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// needs a dependency session.Manager alone can't supply.
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type ingestCredentialValidator interface {
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ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
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}
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// tenantLister is the narrow interface GET /internal/active-tenants
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// needs -- *rbacstore.Store is the production implementation (the same
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// concrete type ingestCredentials above already wires in, just a
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// second narrow interface it happens to also satisfy). Backs
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// search/src/tenants.rs's ActiveTenantTracker: search is AGPL core with
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// no Postgres access and no enterprise/ import allowed, so its write-
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// routing needed a network boundary to learn which tenants are active,
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// the same shape ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver already uses
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// against this exact service (see that package's doc comment).
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type tenantLister interface {
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ListActiveTenantIDs(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error)
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}
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type Handler struct {
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logger *slog.Logger
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manager *session.Manager
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features Features
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ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator
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tenants tenantLister
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}
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func New(logger *slog.Logger, manager *session.Manager, features Features, ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator, tenants tenantLister) *Handler {
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return &Handler{logger: logger, manager: manager, features: features, ingestCredentials: ingestCredentials, tenants: tenants}
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}
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func (h *Handler) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize", h.handleAuthorize)
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /auth/features", h.handleFeatures)
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize-ingest", h.handleAuthorizeIngest)
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /internal/active-tenants", h.handleActiveTenants)
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}
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type featuresResponse struct {
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SSOConfigured bool `json:"sso_configured"`
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OIDCEnabled bool `json:"oidc_enabled"`
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SAMLEnabled bool `json:"saml_enabled"`
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}
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func (h *Handler) handleFeatures(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(featuresResponse{
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SSOConfigured: h.features.OIDCEnabled || h.features.SAMLEnabled,
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OIDCEnabled: h.features.OIDCEnabled,
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SAMLEnabled: h.features.SAMLEnabled,
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})
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}
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type authorizeResponse struct {
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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UserID string `json:"user_id"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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}
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// handleAuthorize checks the Authorization Bearer header first (the
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// service-token path /alerting uses), falling back to the session
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// cookie (the human path a browser sends). Both resolve through the same
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// session.Manager.Validate -- see the package doc comment for why that's
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// safe: the Role claim inside the token is what determines the result,
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// not which header it arrived on.
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func (h *Handler) handleAuthorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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if token == "" {
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if c, err := r.Cookie(SessionCookieName); err == nil {
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token = c.Value
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}
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}
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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claims, err := h.manager.Validate(token)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "invalid or expired credentials", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeResponse{
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TenantID: claims.TenantID,
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UserID: claims.UserID,
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Role: claims.Role,
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})
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}
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type authorizeIngestResponse struct {
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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}
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// handleAuthorizeIngest is ingest/internal/grpcserver.HTTPTenantResolver's
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// server side -- ingest calls this once per PushBatch (with the bearer
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// token the agent presented) to resolve which tenant the batch belongs
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// to, the network-boundary equivalent of api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer
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// calling /internal/authorize, for a different credential type.
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func (h *Handler) handleAuthorizeIngest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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tenantID, err := h.ingestCredentials.ValidateIngestCredential(r.Context(), token)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "invalid ingest credential", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{TenantID: tenantID})
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}
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type activeTenantsResponse struct {
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TenantIDs []string `json:"tenant_ids"`
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}
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// handleActiveTenants is search/src/tenants.rs's ActiveTenantTracker's
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// server side -- polled periodically, not per-write, to build a local
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// allowlist for its write-routing gate (see that module's doc comment).
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// Requires a RoleService Bearer credential (session.Manager-issued,
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// Role == "service"), not a human session -- server-to-server, the same
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// authentication shape /alerting presents to /api, minted via
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// `enterprise-auth -mint-service-token search` (the flag is already
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// generic over caller name; no change needed there for a new caller).
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// Deliberately does NOT accept the tenant-scoped credential a human
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// session or an ingest credential would carry: this endpoint answers
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// "which tenants exist," a question no single tenant's identity should
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// be able to ask on its own.
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func (h *Handler) handleActiveTenants(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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claims, err := h.manager.Validate(token)
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if err != nil || claims.Role != "service" {
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http.Error(w, "invalid or expired credentials", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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ids, err := h.tenants.ListActiveTenantIDs(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("listing active tenant ids", "error", err)
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(activeTenantsResponse{TenantIDs: ids})
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}
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func bearerToken(header string) string {
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const prefix = "Bearer "
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if !strings.HasPrefix(header, prefix) {
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return ""
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}
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return strings.TrimPrefix(header, prefix)
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}
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