Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)

Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across
CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last
major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a
config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates
(smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS
certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and
attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it
deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or
Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed
explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not
silently left half-done.

New pieces:

- metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/
  ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its
  SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed,
  not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext
  exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/
  ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out.
- enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/
  -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same
  offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in
  this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint
  (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its
  tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed
  /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all.
- ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver
  (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client
  implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP
  call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import,
  same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
  api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path.
  PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC
  metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch
  closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no
  tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a
  `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it.

Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed:
rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every
other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new
endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a
session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver
(real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as
authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake
resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured
resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing
token).

Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate,
separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be
refused outright, so it must not default on just because
enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml
leaves it unset, same as ever.

Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md,
docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its
summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not
yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.

enterprise/README.md

@@ -182,24 +182,60 @@ silently left out:
   a cross-origin `fetch` with credentials from `web`'s origin needs
   it), neither of which is verifiable in this environment without a
   live backend and a browser session to exercise.
-- **Ingest tenant-awareness, for either storage engine** -- `chrunner`/
-  `searchclient` prove read isolation given tenant-scoped data exists,
-  but nothing writes it: every record `ingest` produces still lands in
-  the single shared ClickHouse database and the single shared Tantivy
-  index. A newly-provisioned tenant's storage is real and isolated, and
-  permanently empty. Undesigned, not just unbuilt -- see
-  `/docs/security/threat-model.md`.
-- Any deployment-topology mechanism that actually routes traffic to
-  `enterprise-api` instead of `api` -- both binaries exist,
-  `docker-compose.yml` includes `enterprise-api` available but not
-  wired into `web`'s default base URL, and the Helm chart has no
-  service for it at all yet. **This is now the single largest gap** --
-  both storage engines' isolation mechanisms themselves are built.
+- **Ingest write-routing, for either storage engine** -- identity is now
+  real (see "Ingest tenant identity" below), but nothing consumes it
+  yet: `chrunner`/`searchclient` prove read isolation given tenant-
+  scoped data exists, and every record `ingest` produces is now tagged
+  with a real tenant ID, but neither `ingest/internal/consumer` (the
+  ClickHouse writer) nor `search/src/consumer.rs` (a completely
+  independent Redpanda consumer) reads that tag back to route the write
+  anywhere per-tenant. Every record still lands in the single shared
+  ClickHouse database and the single shared Tantivy index regardless of
+  tenant. A newly-provisioned tenant's storage is real and isolated, and
+  permanently empty. Now scoped, disclosed remaining work, not an
+  undesigned gap -- see `/docs/security/threat-model.md`.
+
+Deployment-topology routing (does traffic actually reach `enterprise-api`
+instead of `api`) is no longer deferred -- both `deploy/helm/sentry` and
+`docker-compose.yml` make it a single-flag choice now (`enterprise.
+enabled` / `COMPOSE_PROFILES`), see CLAUDE.md.
+
+## Ingest tenant identity
+
+`ingest` (AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
+(`ingest/internal/grpcserver`) -- nil by default, the same "off unless
+configured" shape as every other optional integration point in this
+codebase. When `ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL` is set, `PushBatch` requires an
+`authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry on every call,
+resolves it via a new `POST /internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint on
+*this* service (`internal/authhandler`, backed by a new
+`ingest_credentials` table in `internal/rbacstore` -- only a SHA-256
+hash of the token is ever stored), and attaches the resolved tenant ID
+to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing
+it. Fail-closed: once a resolver is configured, a missing or invalid
+credential refuses the whole batch, never falls back to "no tenant."
+
+Mint a credential with `-create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>` (prints
+the plaintext token exactly once -- see `ingest_credentials`' migration
+comment for why it can't be recovered again, only reissued);
+`-list-ingest-credentials-tenant=<id>`/`-revoke-ingest-credential=<id>`
+manage existing ones. `ingest`'s own HTTP client
+(`ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver`) is the piece that
+actually calls `/internal/authorize-ingest` -- never an `enterprise/`
+import (`ingest` is AGPL core), same "network boundary, not import
+boundary" shape `api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer` already uses for the query
+path.
+
+**What this does not do**: change where a record is actually written.
+See "Deliberately deferred" above -- attaching a verified tenant
+identity as early as possible (right where the credential is presented)
+was built as a self-contained first step; per-tenant write-routing for
+both storage engines is separate, scoped follow-up work.
 
 ## Package layout
 
 ```
-cmd/enterprise-auth/   config loading, OIDC discovery at startup, health/authorize/features endpoints, -mint-service-token, -create-tenant, -grant-membership-*, -revoke-membership-*, -list-memberships-tenant
+cmd/enterprise-auth/   config loading, OIDC discovery at startup, health/authorize/features/authorize-ingest endpoints, -mint-service-token, -create-tenant, -grant-membership-*, -revoke-membership-*, -list-memberships-tenant, -create-ingest-credential-tenant, -list-ingest-credentials-tenant, -revoke-ingest-credential
 cmd/enterprise-api/     multi-tenant-aware alternative to api/cmd/api -- see its own doc comment
 internal/tenant/        the ID type -- see its package doc comment before touching it
 internal/oidc/           coreos/go-oidc wiring: discovery, login redirect, code exchange + ID token verification
@@ -218,8 +254,13 @@ internal/apiconfig/       enterprise-api's own env-var config
 internal/config/          enterprise-auth's env-var config
 ```
 
-Future additions: ingest tenant-awareness (undesigned), and real
-deployment-topology wiring for `enterprise-api` -- see "Status" above.
+`ingest/internal/tenantresolver` (AGPL core, not enterprise/, since
+ingest must never import enterprise/) is the client side of `internal/
+authhandler`'s new `POST /internal/authorize-ingest` -- see "Ingest
+tenant identity" above.
+
+Future additions: per-tenant write-routing for ingest (ClickHouse and
+Tantivy both) -- see "Ingest tenant identity" above.
 
 ## Why OIDC and SAML aren't hand-rolled
 

enterprise/cmd/enterprise-auth/main.go

@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ func main() {
 	revokeTenant := flag.String("revoke-membership-tenant", "", "tenant id to revoke a membership from -- both -revoke-membership-* flags are required together")
 	revokeUserEmail := flag.String("revoke-membership-user-email", "", "email of the user whose tenant_memberships row to delete")
 	listMembershipsTenant := flag.String("list-memberships-tenant", "", "print every user with a membership in this tenant (id, email, display name, role) and exit")
+	createIngestCredentialTenant := flag.String("create-ingest-credential-tenant", "", "mint a new ingest bearer token for this tenant, print it once, and exit -- see ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver")
+	listIngestCredentialsTenant := flag.String("list-ingest-credentials-tenant", "", "print every ingest credential's id/created_at for this tenant (never the token itself -- only its hash is stored) and exit")
+	revokeIngestCredential := flag.String("revoke-ingest-credential", "", "delete an ingest credential by id (see -list-ingest-credentials-tenant) and exit")
 	// -healthcheck: same self-check mode as api/-healthcheck (see that
 	// binary's doc comment) -- enterprise-auth's image is distroless too.
 	healthcheck := flag.Bool("healthcheck", false, "self-check mode for Docker's HEALTHCHECK")
@@ -132,6 +135,15 @@ func main() {
 	if *listMembershipsTenant != "" {
 		os.Exit(runListMemberships(ctx, logger, rbac, *listMembershipsTenant))
 	}
+	if *createIngestCredentialTenant != "" {
+		os.Exit(runCreateIngestCredential(ctx, logger, rbac, *createIngestCredentialTenant))
+	}
+	if *listIngestCredentialsTenant != "" {
+		os.Exit(runListIngestCredentials(ctx, logger, rbac, *listIngestCredentialsTenant))
+	}
+	if *revokeIngestCredential != "" {
+		os.Exit(runRevokeIngestCredential(ctx, logger, rbac, *revokeIngestCredential))
+	}
 
 	// oidcProvider stays nil (loginhandler.RegisterRoutes then registers
 	// nothing) unless OIDC is actually configured -- matches every other
@@ -187,7 +199,7 @@ func main() {
 		OIDCEnabled: cfg.OIDC.IssuerURL != "",
 		SAMLEnabled: cfg.SAML.IDPMetadataURL != "",
 	}
-	authhandler.New(logger, sessionManager, features).RegisterRoutes(mux)
+	authhandler.New(logger, sessionManager, features, rbac).RegisterRoutes(mux)
 	loginhandler.New(logger, oidcProvider, samlProvider, sessionManager, rbac, cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL, cfg.SelectTenantRedirectURL).RegisterRoutes(mux)
 
 	srv := &http.Server{Addr: cfg.HTTPListenAddr, Handler: mux}
@@ -355,6 +367,60 @@ func runListMemberships(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstor
 	return 0
 }
 
+// runCreateIngestCredential mints a new ingest bearer token for a
+// tenant and prints it to stdout exactly once -- rbacstore only ever
+// stores its hash (see ingest_credentials's doc comment), so this
+// output is the only chance to capture the plaintext. An agent presents
+// it as an `Authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry on every
+// PushBatch call; ingest resolves it to a tenant via
+// POST /internal/authorize-ingest.
+func runCreateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstore.Store, tenantID string) int {
+	if _, err := rbac.GetTenant(ctx, tenantID); err != nil {
+		logger.Error("looking up tenant", "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	token, err := rbac.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		logger.Error("creating ingest credential", "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	fmt.Println(token)
+	return 0
+}
+
+func runListIngestCredentials(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstore.Store, tenantID string) int {
+	if _, err := rbac.GetTenant(ctx, tenantID); err != nil {
+		logger.Error("looking up tenant", "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	creds, err := rbac.ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		logger.Error("listing ingest credentials", "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	if len(creds) == 0 {
+		fmt.Println("(no ingest credentials)")
+		return 0
+	}
+	for _, c := range creds {
+		fmt.Printf("%s\t%s\n", c.ID, c.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339))
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func runRevokeIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstore.Store, id string) int {
+	if err := rbac.RevokeIngestCredential(ctx, id); err != nil {
+		if err == rbacstore.ErrNotFound {
+			logger.Error("no ingest credential with this id", "id", id)
+		} else {
+			logger.Error("revoking ingest credential", "error", err)
+		}
+		return 1
+	}
+	logger.Info("revoked ingest credential", "id", id)
+	return 0
+}
+
 // runHealthcheck mirrors api/cmd/api/main.go's runHealthcheck exactly --
 // see that function's doc comment for why this execs the binary against
 // itself rather than using an external tool.

enterprise/internal/authhandler/authhandler.go

@@ -7,9 +7,16 @@
 // signed tokens with a different Role claim, so one validation path
 // handles both, and the Role claim (not which header carried it) is what
 // determines whether the result looks like a human or a service identity.
+//
+// POST /internal/authorize-ingest is a sibling endpoint, same network-
+// boundary shape but for a different caller (`ingest`, core/AGPL, not
+// api/authz) and a different credential type (an ingest bearer token
+// checked against rbacstore's ingest_credentials table, not a
+// session.Manager JWT) -- see ingestCredentialValidator's doc comment.
 package authhandler
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
@@ -32,19 +39,32 @@ type Features struct {
 	SAMLEnabled bool
 }
 
-type Handler struct {
-	logger   *slog.Logger
-	manager  *session.Manager
-	features Features
+// ingestCredentialValidator is the narrow interface POST
+// /internal/authorize-ingest needs -- *rbacstore.Store is the production
+// implementation. Unlike session-backed /internal/authorize, this
+// endpoint validates a completely different credential type (an ingest
+// bearer token, checked against enterprise/internal/rbacstore's
+// ingest_credentials table, never a session.Manager-signed JWT), so it
+// needs a dependency session.Manager alone can't supply.
+type ingestCredentialValidator interface {
+	ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
 }
 
-func New(logger *slog.Logger, manager *session.Manager, features Features) *Handler {
-	return &Handler{logger: logger, manager: manager, features: features}
+type Handler struct {
+	logger            *slog.Logger
+	manager           *session.Manager
+	features          Features
+	ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator
+}
+
+func New(logger *slog.Logger, manager *session.Manager, features Features, ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator) *Handler {
+	return &Handler{logger: logger, manager: manager, features: features, ingestCredentials: ingestCredentials}
 }
 
 func (h *Handler) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize", h.handleAuthorize)
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /auth/features", h.handleFeatures)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize-ingest", h.handleAuthorizeIngest)
 }
 
 type featuresResponse struct {
@@ -100,6 +120,32 @@ func (h *Handler) handleAuthorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	})
 }
 
+type authorizeIngestResponse struct {
+	TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
+}
+
+// handleAuthorizeIngest is ingest/internal/grpcserver.HTTPTenantResolver's
+// server side -- ingest calls this once per PushBatch (with the bearer
+// token the agent presented) to resolve which tenant the batch belongs
+// to, the network-boundary equivalent of api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer
+// calling /internal/authorize, for a different credential type.
+func (h *Handler) handleAuthorizeIngest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	if token == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+
+	tenantID, err := h.ingestCredentials.ValidateIngestCredential(r.Context(), token)
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid ingest credential", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{TenantID: tenantID})
+}
+
 func bearerToken(header string) string {
 	const prefix = "Bearer "
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(header, prefix) {

enterprise/internal/authhandler/authhandler_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package authhandler
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
@@ -11,13 +12,37 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/session"
 )
 
+// fakeIngestCredentialValidator is an in-memory stand-in for
+// *rbacstore.Store's ValidateIngestCredential, keyed by token.
+type fakeIngestCredentialValidator struct {
+	tenantByToken map[string]string
+}
+
+func newFakeIngestCredentialValidator() *fakeIngestCredentialValidator {
+	return &fakeIngestCredentialValidator{tenantByToken: map[string]string{}}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeIngestCredentialValidator) ValidateIngestCredential(_ context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
+	tenantID, ok := f.tenantByToken[token]
+	if !ok {
+		return "", errNotFound
+	}
+	return tenantID, nil
+}
+
+var errNotFound = &fakeNotFoundError{}
+
+type fakeNotFoundError struct{}
+
+func (*fakeNotFoundError) Error() string { return "not found" }
+
 func testHandler(t *testing.T) (*Handler, *session.Manager) {
 	t.Helper()
 	m, err := session.NewManager([]byte("this-is-a-32-byte-test-signing-key!"))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
 	}
-	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}), m
+	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}, newFakeIngestCredentialValidator()), m
 }
 
 func doAuthorize(t *testing.T, h *Handler, mutate func(*http.Request)) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
@@ -121,7 +146,7 @@ func TestFeaturesReflectsConfiguredMechanisms(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
 	}
-	h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{OIDCEnabled: true, SAMLEnabled: false})
+	h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{OIDCEnabled: true, SAMLEnabled: false}, newFakeIngestCredentialValidator())
 
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
@@ -173,3 +198,78 @@ func TestAuthorizeTokenFromWrongManagerIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
 	}
 }
+
+func doAuthorizeIngest(t *testing.T, h *Handler, mutate func(*http.Request)) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/internal/authorize-ingest", nil)
+	if mutate != nil {
+		mutate(req)
+	}
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	return rec
+}
+
+func TestAuthorizeIngestResolvesTenant(t *testing.T) {
+	m, err := session.NewManager([]byte("this-is-a-32-byte-test-signing-key!"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
+	}
+	validator := newFakeIngestCredentialValidator()
+	validator.tenantByToken["real-token"] = "acme"
+	h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}, validator)
+
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer real-token")
+	})
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, body = %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	var body authorizeIngestResponse
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
+	}
+	if body.TenantID != "acme" {
+		t.Fatalf("TenantID = %q, want acme", body.TenantID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthorizeIngestNoCredentialsIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := testHandler(t)
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, nil)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthorizeIngestUnknownTokenIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := testHandler(t)
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-real-token")
+	})
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuthorizeIngestRejectsSessionToken is the regression test for the
+// two /internal/authorize* endpoints validating genuinely different
+// credential types: a real session.Manager-signed token (a service
+// token or human session) must not work as an ingest credential, since
+// it was never checked against rbacstore.ValidateIngestCredential --
+// this endpoint doesn't call session.Manager.Validate at all.
+func TestAuthorizeIngestRejectsSessionToken(t *testing.T) {
+	h, m := testHandler(t)
+	sessionToken, err := m.IssueServiceToken("alerting")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("IssueServiceToken: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+sessionToken)
+	})
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401 (a session token must not validate as an ingest credential)", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ingest_credentials.go

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+package rbacstore
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// IngestCredential is one ingest_credentials row -- see
+// metadata/migrations/0034_create_ingest_credentials.sql's doc comment
+// for why only a hash is stored. Consumed by
+// ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver (an HTTP call to
+// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest, which calls
+// ValidateIngestCredential below) so an agent's records can be
+// attributed to a tenant at the point they enter the system.
+type IngestCredential struct {
+	ID        string
+	TenantID  string
+	CreatedAt time.Time
+}
+
+func hashIngestToken(token string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+// CreateIngestCredential generates a new bearer token for tenantID and
+// returns the plaintext exactly once -- only its hash is ever persisted
+// (see this file's package doc comment). There is no way to retrieve a
+// lost token again; the only recovery is issuing a new one
+// (RevokeIngestCredential + CreateIngestCredential), the same "can't
+// recover, can only reissue" UX every real API-key system uses.
+func (s *Store) CreateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (token string, err error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: generating ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	token = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
+
+	_, err = s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO ingest_credentials (id, tenant_id, token_hash)
+		VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
+		uuid.NewString(), tenantID, hashIngestToken(token))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: creating ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	return token, nil
+}
+
+// ValidateIngestCredential hashes the presented token and looks up which
+// tenant it belongs to via an indexed exact-match on the UNIQUE
+// token_hash column -- the only production call site is
+// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest handler, per an
+// agent's PushBatch request.
+func (s *Store) ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error) {
+	row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT tenant_id FROM ingest_credentials WHERE token_hash = $1`, hashIngestToken(token))
+	if err := row.Scan(&tenantID); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+			return "", ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: validating ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	return tenantID, nil
+}
+
+// RevokeIngestCredential deletes a credential by ID (not by token --
+// the plaintext is never stored, so revocation has to name the row some
+// other way; ListIngestCredentialsForTenant is what an operator uses to
+// find the ID).
+func (s *Store) RevokeIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
+	tag, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM ingest_credentials WHERE id = $1`, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: revoking ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ListIngestCredentialsForTenant never returns the plaintext token (it
+// isn't stored) -- just enough (ID, creation time) for an operator to
+// decide which one to revoke.
+func (s *Store) ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]IngestCredential, error) {
+	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
+		SELECT id, tenant_id, created_at FROM ingest_credentials
+		WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at`, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: listing ingest credentials: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+
+	var out []IngestCredential
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var c IngestCredential
+		if err := rows.Scan(&c.ID, &c.TenantID, &c.CreatedAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: scanning ingest credential: %w", err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, c)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}

enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go

@@ -771,3 +771,122 @@ func TestListMembershipsForTenant(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected editor entry: %+v", got)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestCreateAndValidateIngestCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	token, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if token == "" {
+		t.Fatal("expected a non-empty token")
+	}
+
+	got, err := s.ValidateIngestCredential(ctx, token)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != tenantID {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential tenant = %q, want %q", got, tenantID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateIngestCredentialRejectsUnknownToken(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	if _, err := s.ValidateIngestCredential(context.Background(), "not-a-real-token"); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIngestCredentialTokenNeverStoredAsPlaintext is the regression test
+// for this table's whole reason for hashing: the raw token string must
+// not appear anywhere in the persisted row (only its hash), so a
+// database leak doesn't hand out usable credentials.
+func TestIngestCredentialTokenNeverStoredAsPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	token, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var stored string
+	row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT token_hash FROM ingest_credentials WHERE tenant_id = $1`, tenantID)
+	if err := row.Scan(&stored); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading stored token_hash: %v", err)
+	}
+	if stored == token {
+		t.Fatal("the plaintext token must never be stored directly in token_hash")
+	}
+	if stored != hashIngestToken(token) {
+		t.Fatalf("stored hash = %q, want sha256(token) = %q", stored, hashIngestToken(token))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRevokeIngestCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	token, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	creds, err := s.ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil || len(creds) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("ListIngestCredentialsForTenant = (%+v, %v), want exactly one", creds, err)
+	}
+
+	if err := s.RevokeIngestCredential(ctx, creds[0].ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("RevokeIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.ValidateIngestCredential(ctx, token); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential after revoke = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRevokeIngestCredentialNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	if err := s.RevokeIngestCredential(context.Background(), uuid.NewString()); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("RevokeIngestCredential error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListIngestCredentialsForTenantExcludesOtherTenants(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	otherTenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, otherTenantID, "Other Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant other: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, otherTenantID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential other: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	creds, err := s.ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ListIngestCredentialsForTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(creds) != 1 || creds[0].TenantID != tenantID {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected credentials: %+v", creds)
+	}
+}