Closes#108. The same signing inbuxa-server has (K-S7, server #492/#493), for this repository's one image.
.github/workflows/sign.yml:
signs the multi-arch index keyless with cosign, in the registry and on GHCR, and checks both with cosign verify;
SPDX SBOMs (syft): one per architecture of the image as shipped, attested against that architecture's digest, and one of the app from package-lock.json at the tagged commit, attested against the index. The image's node_modules are the server's; the browser app's packages are bundled into web/dist, where an image scan can't see them.
build provenance, only from the release's own run;
attaches the SBOMs to the Gitea release.
ci.yml calls it on a release tag once publish has run (and after the GHCR copy, signed too when it's there). It's in the report, so a signing failure fails the tag's check; the announcement has gone out by then, and the fix is running sign.yml by hand with the tag.
Same pinned cosign v3.1.4 / syft 1.55.0 (sha256-checked) and actions/attest / attest-build-provenance pinned by commit.
Test after merge: run sign.yml by hand on GitHub for inbuxa-v27.1-rc.10 and check with cosign verify and gh attestation verify, as was done for server rc.33.
Closes #108. The same signing inbuxa-server has (K-S7, server #492/#493), for this repository's one image.
`.github/workflows/sign.yml`:
- signs the multi-arch index keyless with cosign, in the registry and on GHCR, and checks both with `cosign verify`;
- SPDX SBOMs (syft): one per architecture of the image as shipped, attested against that architecture's digest, and one of the app from `package-lock.json` at the tagged commit, attested against the index. The image's node_modules are the server's; the browser app's packages are bundled into `web/dist`, where an image scan can't see them.
- build provenance, only from the release's own run;
- attaches the SBOMs to the Gitea release.
`ci.yml` calls it on a release tag once `publish` has run (and after the GHCR copy, signed too when it's there). It's in the report, so a signing failure fails the tag's check; the announcement has gone out by then, and the fix is running `sign.yml` by hand with the tag.
Same pinned cosign v3.1.4 / syft 1.55.0 (sha256-checked) and `actions/attest` / `attest-build-provenance` pinned by commit.
Test after merge: run `sign.yml` by hand on GitHub for `inbuxa-v27.1-rc.10` and check with `cosign verify` and `gh attestation verify`, as was done for server rc.33.
sign.yml, as inbuxa-server has (K-S7), for this repository's one image:
signs the index keyless with cosign in the registry and on GHCR and
checks both; attests an SPDX SBOM per architecture, and one of the app
from package-lock.json at the tag, since the browser app's packages are bundled into web/dist, where an image scan can't see them; attests the
build from the release's own run; attaches the SBOMs to the Gitea
release. ci.yml calls it on a release tag once publish has run; it can be
run by hand for a release made before it existed.
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
Closes #108. The same signing inbuxa-server has (K-S7, server #492/#493), for this repository's one image.
.github/workflows/sign.yml:cosign verify;package-lock.jsonat the tagged commit, attested against the index. The image's node_modules are the server's; the browser app's packages are bundled intoweb/dist, where an image scan can't see them.ci.ymlcalls it on a release tag oncepublishhas run (and after the GHCR copy, signed too when it's there). It's in the report, so a signing failure fails the tag's check; the announcement has gone out by then, and the fix is runningsign.ymlby hand with the tag.Same pinned cosign v3.1.4 / syft 1.55.0 (sha256-checked) and
actions/attest/attest-build-provenancepinned by commit.Test after merge: run
sign.ymlby hand on GitHub forinbuxa-v27.1-rc.10and check withcosign verifyandgh attestation verify, as was done for server rc.33.