K-W1 · size M · part of inbuxa for Kubernetes (tracking issue in inbuxa-charts)
Sessions live in a per-process Map today, so only one replica can run. Seal the session into an encrypted, signed cookie keyed from APP_SECRET, with a key list for rotation. SESSION_FILE stays for single-node installs.
Done when
Two replicas behind a round-robin balancer: sign in on one, keep working on the other
Key rotation tested
Cookie size within the limit found by S3
Single-node behaviour unchanged
Depends on: S3
**K-W1** · size M · part of inbuxa for Kubernetes (tracking issue in inbuxa-charts)
Sessions live in a per-process Map today, so only one replica can run. Seal the session into an encrypted, signed cookie keyed from APP_SECRET, with a key list for rotation. SESSION_FILE stays for single-node installs.
**Done when**
- Two replicas behind a round-robin balancer: sign in on one, keep working on the other
- Key rotation tested
- Cookie size within the limit found by S3
- Single-node behaviour unchanged
**Depends on:** S3
jcoffey-dev
added this to the 27.1 milestone 2026-11-18 05:14:40 +00:00
New SessionBackend implementation that carries the record in the cookie (the interface in server/src/sessions.ts was written for this). Chosen by config, for example SESSION_BACKEND=cookie; the default stays the in-memory/SESSION_FILE store.
OAuth sessions only in cookie mode. Password sign-in is refused there with a clear message, since a sealed password can't be revoked.
listForUser returns only the current session, and the UI hides the sessions list and 'sign out other sessions' when the backend says it can't enumerate.
destroyAllForUser on password or app-password change: the server already invalidates every token for the account (credential version), so the webmail only has to drop its own cookie.
Key rotation through a list of keys derived from APP_SECRET values (newest seals, all open).
Cookie size: well under 1 KB expected; checked against a real token in the lab.
**Scope settled (spike S3, decided 2026-11-17):**
- New `SessionBackend` implementation that carries the record in the cookie (the interface in `server/src/sessions.ts` was written for this). Chosen by config, for example `SESSION_BACKEND=cookie`; the default stays the in-memory/`SESSION_FILE` store.
- OAuth sessions only in cookie mode. Password sign-in is refused there with a clear message, since a sealed password can't be revoked.
- `listForUser` returns only the current session, and the UI hides the sessions list and 'sign out other sessions' when the backend says it can't enumerate.
- `destroyAllForUser` on password or app-password change: the server already invalidates every token for the account (credential version), so the webmail only has to drop its own cookie.
- Key rotation through a list of keys derived from `APP_SECRET` values (newest seals, all open).
- Cookie size: well under 1 KB expected; checked against a real token in the lab.
Follow-up: a sign-in itself still couldn't cross replicas (the pending OAuth state lived in the process). Fixed in #113, merged; it ships in the next 27.1 release candidate.
Follow-up: a sign-in itself still couldn't cross replicas (the pending OAuth state lived in the process). Fixed in #113, merged; it ships in the next 27.1 release candidate.
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K-W1 · size M · part of inbuxa for Kubernetes (tracking issue in inbuxa-charts)
Sessions live in a per-process Map today, so only one replica can run. Seal the session into an encrypted, signed cookie keyed from APP_SECRET, with a key list for rotation. SESSION_FILE stays for single-node installs.
Done when
Depends on: S3
Scope settled (spike S3, decided 2026-11-17):
SessionBackendimplementation that carries the record in the cookie (the interface inserver/src/sessions.tswas written for this). Chosen by config, for exampleSESSION_BACKEND=cookie; the default stays the in-memory/SESSION_FILEstore.listForUserreturns only the current session, and the UI hides the sessions list and 'sign out other sessions' when the backend says it can't enumerate.destroyAllForUseron password or app-password change: the server already invalidates every token for the account (credential version), so the webmail only has to drop its own cookie.APP_SECRETvalues (newest seals, all open).Fixed in #109, merged to main; ships in the next 27.1 release candidate.
Follow-up: a sign-in itself still couldn't cross replicas (the pending OAuth state lived in the process). Fixed in #113, merged; it ships in the next 27.1 release candidate.