A superuser-class blob id names a blob by its hash alone, and
fetchAnyBlob, in the default tenant administrator role, downloaded any
such blob. The check never looked at the tenant, so a tenant
administrator who learned a hash could download that blob from another
tenant's mail.
Inside a tenant, fetchAnyBlob now reaches a blob only when the tenant
holds it: an account of the tenant links it, or it is a queued message
the tenant sees (MT-5). Server-level administrators reach any blob as
before. The permission stays in the tenant role, since queue downloads
use it, and roles already stored need no change. Store::blob_holders
lists what links a hash.
Test: in the tenant suite a tenant administrator downloads, by hash, a
blob of a user outside the tenant: 200 on main, 404 now. The tenant's
own blobs and its queued messages still download, and another tenant's
administrator can't fetch that queued message. With the queue check
turned off, the queued download fails, so the test covers that path.
Reported privately in a security review.
(cherry picked from commit 06856dc98883605ec7456219dc4e536da18b5ef8)