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inbuxa-server/crates/common/src/manager/granted_permissions.rs
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Audit log: a permanent, tamper-evident record of admin actions
What administrators and the server itself do to the control plane is now
recorded, from inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md (AU-1 to AU-12):
settings, accounts, domains, roles and every other registry change, with
each field's before and after (secrets only as "changed"); the fork's own
settings objects; administrator sign-ins (and failed ones to administrator
accounts), master-user and recovery-admin sign-ins, once an hour per
account, method and address; access to another account's data through
impersonation or FetchAnyBlob, once an hour; exports and tamper checks;
and registry writes the server makes on its own, named by subsystem
(system:AcmeRenewal, system:auto-ban, system:directory-sync, ...), with a
spam rules update as one summary record.

No change without its record (AU-3): before a set method changes anything,
a pending record per requested create, update and destroy is written; if
that fails, the method is refused with serverFail. Its outcome follows as
a later entry. A change interrupted by a crash stays "unfinished".

Records live in the fork's subspace under L, as one SHA-256 hash chain per
node. The chain's head is stored, never cached, and every append asserts
it, so two writers can't take the same place. Nothing can edit or delete
a record; the daily purge removes the oldest past the retention (default
730 days, minimum 90) and records where the chain now starts, so
verification still passes. security.audit-recorded (647) copies each
record to webhooks, OpenTelemetry and the log; security.audit-write-failed
(648) reports a failed write.

New JMAP objects under urn:inbuxa:jmap: inbuxa:AuditEvent/get and /query
(filters: time, actor, action, target, account, tenant, outcome, address,
text), inbuxa:AuditSettings, inbuxa:AuditExport (CSV or JSON Lines built
on the server, each line with its chain hash, ending in a manifest; the
created object names the blob and its SHA-256) and
inbuxa:AuditVerification. New permissions sysAuditGet, sysAuditExport and
sysAuditSettingsUpdate: the Administrator role gets all three, the Tenant
Administrator role gets read and export, once, on existing installs too.
A tenant administrator sees records whose actor or target is in its
tenant, including a server administrator's changes there.

Sign-in method on the session: access tokens now remember how they signed
in (password, app password, API key, OAuth client, directory, master user,
recovery admin), including across the HTTP credential cache. New OAuth
access tokens carry their client id in the sealed claims; older ones show
as client "unknown" until they expire.

The schema gains the permissions, the two events and a Management >
Compliance > Audit Log link.

Stack: the request layer boxes every inner future where it's made. Without
that, a debug build overflowed the default 2 MB worker stack on a registry
set; measured with the same request, the branch and main now overflow at
the same stack size (between 1856 and 1920 KiB, debug), so the layer adds
nothing measurable.

Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap; system::audit::audit_log_tests
(run with --ignored) passes on RocksDB, SQLite, PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL with a
read replica, MySQL, MySQL with a replica and FoundationDB. The system, JMAP
and SCIM suites pass. authorization.rs skipped fork permissions that guard
no registry object; the audit suite checks a plain user is refused instead.
2026-09-27 13:40:12 -07:00

162 lines
5.3 KiB
Rust

/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
*/
//! Permissions the fork adds after an install's roles were stored. A new
//! install's roles take them from `DefaultPermissions`; an older install's
//! administrator roles were written once, before the permission existed, so
//! each is added to them here, once. An operator who takes one away later
//! keeps it away: the grant is recorded and never repeated.
use registry::schema::{
enums::Permission,
prelude::ObjectType,
structs::{Authentication, Role},
};
use registry::types::EnumImpl;
use registry::types::id::ObjectId;
use store::{
SUBSPACE_INBUXA, ValueKey,
registry::{
bootstrap::Bootstrap,
write::{RegistryWrite, RegistryWriteResult},
},
write::{AnyClass, BatchBuilder, ValueClass},
};
use trc::AddContext;
use types::id::Id;
/// Granted to the default administrator roles: "Explain this"
/// (ai-explain spec, EX-4: superuser by default), and the audit log
/// (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-9).
const ADMIN_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
Permission::SysAiExplain,
Permission::SysAuditGet,
Permission::SysAuditExport,
Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate,
];
/// Granted to the default tenant administrator roles: reading and exporting
/// the tenant's audit log (AU-9).
const TENANT_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[Permission::SysAuditGet, Permission::SysAuditExport];
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Audience {
Admin,
Tenant,
}
fn granted_key(permission: Permission, audience: Audience) -> ValueClass {
let mut key = b"Pg".to_vec();
// Admin grants keep the key they were first recorded under
if audience == Audience::Tenant {
key.extend_from_slice(b"tenant:");
}
key.extend_from_slice(permission.as_str().as_bytes());
ValueClass::Any(AnyClass {
subspace: SUBSPACE_INBUXA,
key,
})
}
pub(crate) async fn grant_new_admin_permissions(bp: &mut Bootstrap) -> trc::Result<()> {
grant(bp, Audience::Admin, ADMIN_GRANTS).await?;
grant(bp, Audience::Tenant, TENANT_GRANTS).await
}
async fn grant(bp: &mut Bootstrap, audience: Audience, grants: &[Permission]) -> trc::Result<()> {
let mut pending = Vec::new();
for permission in grants {
if bp
.data_store
.get_value::<String>(ValueKey::from(granted_key(*permission, audience)))
.await
.caused_by(trc::location!())?
.is_none()
{
pending.push(*permission);
}
}
if pending.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
// An administrator's default roles include the plain User role, which
// every user also holds; only roles that are the audience's alone get it
let admin_roles: Vec<Id> = bp
.registry
.object::<Authentication>(Id::singleton())
.await?
.map(|auth| {
let (own, shared) = match audience {
Audience::Admin => (
auth.default_admin_role_ids.as_slice(),
[
auth.default_user_role_ids.as_slice(),
auth.default_group_role_ids.as_slice(),
auth.default_tenant_role_ids.as_slice(),
]
.concat(),
),
Audience::Tenant => (
auth.default_tenant_role_ids.as_slice(),
[
auth.default_user_role_ids.as_slice(),
auth.default_group_role_ids.as_slice(),
auth.default_admin_role_ids.as_slice(),
]
.concat(),
),
};
own.iter()
.filter(|id| !shared.contains(id))
.copied()
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
// Fetched by id: the registry's listing doesn't reach stored roles
for role_id in admin_roles {
let Some(stored) = bp
.registry
.get(ObjectId::new(ObjectType::Role, role_id))
.await?
else {
continue;
};
let role = Role::from(stored.clone());
let mut updated = role.clone();
for permission in &pending {
// A role that disables it outright keeps it disabled
if !updated.enabled_permissions.as_slice().contains(permission)
&& !updated.disabled_permissions.as_slice().contains(permission)
{
updated.enabled_permissions.push(*permission);
}
}
if updated == role {
continue;
}
let result = bp
.registry
.write(RegistryWrite::update(role_id, &updated.into(), &stored))
.await?;
if !matches!(result, RegistryWriteResult::Success(_)) {
return Err(trc::StoreEvent::UnexpectedError
.into_err()
.details("Failed to add a new permission to an administrator role.")
.reason(result.to_string())
.caused_by(trc::location!()));
}
}
let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
for permission in pending {
batch.set(granted_key(permission, audience), b"granted".to_vec());
}
bp.data_store
.write(batch.build_all())
.await
.caused_by(trc::location!())
.map(|_| ())
}