Files
inbuxa-server/crates/smtp/src/reporting/dmarc.rs
T
jcoffey-dev e1e8a9aeb0
ci / fork-checks (pull_request) Successful in 52s
ci / build (pull_request) Successful in 16m34s
Send "none" instead of "pass" as the DMARC report disposition
Cloudflare's DMARC report intake rejects every aggregate report we
send with "555 5.7.1 invalid_report_schema". Bisected against the live
endpoint: the only element it objects to is <disposition>pass</disposition>,
the value RFC 9990 added for mail that passed DMARC under an enforcing
policy. The RFC 9990 namespace, <np>, <discovery_method>, <testing> and
a missing <pct> are all accepted, and a report that differs only in
using "none" there goes through.

"none" (no action taken) is valid under both RFC 9990 and RFC 7489 and
says the same thing to the reader, so reports now go out with it. The
stored report keeps "pass"; only the serialized copy changes.
2026-09-27 22:31:13 -07:00

768 lines
29 KiB
Rust

/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2020 Stalwart Labs LLC <[email protected]>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-SEL
*
* Modified by Coffey Labs in 2026 for INBUXA.
*/
use super::AggregateTimestamp;
use super::shared::{MAX_WRITE_RETRIES, Revisioned, write_retry_pause};
use crate::{
core::Session,
queue::RecipientDomain,
reporting::{index::InternalReportIndex, send::MtaReportSend},
};
use common::{
Server,
config::smtp::report::AggregateFrequency,
ipc::{DmarcEvent, ToHash},
network::SessionStream,
};
use compact_str::ToCompactString;
use mail_auth::{
ArcOutput, AuthenticatedMessage, AuthenticationResults, DkimOutput, DkimResult, DmarcOutput,
DmarcResult, SpfResult,
common::verify::VerifySignature,
dkim2::Dkim2Output,
dmarc::{self},
report::{
ActionDisposition, AuthFailureType, IdentityAlignment, PolicyPublished, Record, Report,
SPFDomainScope,
},
};
use registry::{
schema::{
enums::FailureReportingOption,
prelude::{ObjectType, Property},
structs::{DmarcInternalReport, DmarcReport, DmarcReportRecord, Rate},
},
types::{EnumImpl, ObjectImpl, datetime::UTCDateTime, map::Map},
};
use std::{borrow::Cow, future::Future};
use store::{
SerializeInfallible, U64_LEN, ValueKey,
registry::ObjectIdVersioned,
write::{BatchBuilder, RegistryClass, ValueClass, assert::AssertValue, key::KeySerializer},
};
use trc::{AddContext, OutgoingReportEvent};
use utils::DomainPart;
impl<T: SessionStream> Session<T> {
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub async fn send_dmarc_report(
&self,
message: &AuthenticatedMessage<'_>,
auth_results: &AuthenticationResults<'_>,
rejected: bool,
dmarc_output: DmarcOutput,
dkim_output: &[DkimOutput<'_>],
dkim2_output: Option<&Dkim2Output<'_>>,
arc_output: &Option<ArcOutput<'_>>,
) {
let dmarc_record = dmarc_output.dmarc_record_cloned().unwrap();
let config = &self.server.core.smtp.report.dmarc;
if self
.server
.is_local_report_domain(dmarc_output.domain(), self.data.session_id)
.await
{
return;
}
// Send failure report. RFC 9991 Section 2: report generators MUST NOT
// honor "ruf" for policy records published with "psd=y".
if !matches!(dmarc_record.psd, dmarc::Psd::Yes)
&& let (Some(failure_rate), Some(report_options)) = (
self.server
.eval_if::<Rate, _>(&config.send, self, self.data.session_id)
.await,
dmarc_output.failure_report(),
)
{
// Verify that any external reporting addresses are authorized
let rcpts = match self
.server
.core
.smtp
.resolvers
.dns
.verify_dmarc_report_address(
dmarc_output.domain(),
dmarc_record.ruf(),
Some(&self.server.inner.cache.dns_txt),
)
.await
{
Some(rcpts) => {
if !rcpts.is_empty() {
let mut new_rcpts = Vec::with_capacity(rcpts.len());
for rcpt in rcpts {
if self.throttle_rcpt(rcpt.uri(), &failure_rate, "dmarc").await {
new_rcpts.push(rcpt.uri());
}
}
new_rcpts
} else {
if !dmarc_record.ruf().is_empty() {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::UnauthorizedReportingAddress),
SpanId = self.data.session_id,
Url = dmarc_record
.ruf()
.iter()
.map(|u| trc::Value::String(u.uri().to_compact_string()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
);
}
vec![]
}
}
None => {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::ReportingAddressValidationError),
SpanId = self.data.session_id,
Url = dmarc_record
.ruf()
.iter()
.map(|u| trc::Value::String(u.uri().to_compact_string()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
);
vec![]
}
};
// Throttle recipient
if !rcpts.is_empty() {
let mut report = Vec::with_capacity(128);
let from_addr = self
.server
.eval_if(&config.address, self, self.data.session_id)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "MAILER-DAEMON@localhost".to_compact_string());
let mut auth_failure = self
.new_auth_failure(AuthFailureType::Dmarc, rejected)
.with_authentication_results(auth_results.to_string())
.with_headers(std::str::from_utf8(message.raw_headers()).unwrap_or_default());
let dkim_aligned = matches!(dmarc_output.dkim_result(), DmarcResult::Pass);
let spf_aligned = matches!(dmarc_output.spf_result(), DmarcResult::Pass);
// Report the first failed signature
if let (
dmarc::Report::Dkim
| dmarc::Report::DkimSpf
| dmarc::Report::All
| dmarc::Report::Any,
Some(signature),
) = (
&report_options,
if !dkim_aligned {
dkim_output
.iter()
.find_map(|o| {
let s = o.signature()?;
if !matches!(o.result(), DkimResult::Pass) {
Some(s)
} else {
None
}
})
.or_else(|| dkim_output.iter().find_map(|o| o.signature()))
} else {
None
},
) {
auth_failure = auth_failure
.with_dkim_domain(signature.domain())
.with_dkim_selector(signature.selector())
.with_dkim_identity(signature.identity());
}
// Report SPF failure
if let (
dmarc::Report::Spf
| dmarc::Report::DkimSpf
| dmarc::Report::All
| dmarc::Report::Any,
Some(output),
) = (
&report_options,
if !spf_aligned {
self.data
.spf_ehlo
.as_ref()
.and_then(|s| {
if s.result() != SpfResult::Pass {
s.into()
} else {
None
}
})
.or_else(|| {
self.data.spf_mail_from.as_ref().and_then(|s| {
if s.result() != SpfResult::Pass {
s.into()
} else {
None
}
})
})
.or(self.data.spf_mail_from.as_ref())
} else {
None
},
) {
auth_failure =
auth_failure.with_spf_dns(format!("txt : {} : v=SPF1", output.domain()));
// TODO use DNS record
}
auth_failure
.with_identity_alignment(match (dkim_aligned, spf_aligned) {
(false, false) => IdentityAlignment::DkimSpf,
(false, true) => IdentityAlignment::Dkim,
(true, false) => IdentityAlignment::Spf,
(true, true) => IdentityAlignment::None,
})
.write_rfc5322(
(
self.server
.eval_if(&config.name, self, self.data.session_id)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "Mail Delivery Subsystem".to_compact_string())
.as_str(),
from_addr.as_str(),
),
&rcpts.join(", "),
&self
.server
.eval_if(&config.subject, self, self.data.session_id)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "DMARC Report".to_compact_string()),
&mut report,
)
.ok();
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::DmarcReport),
SpanId = self.data.session_id,
From = from_addr.to_string(),
To = rcpts
.iter()
.map(|a| trc::Value::String(a.to_compact_string()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
);
// Send report
self.server
.send_report(
&from_addr,
rcpts.into_iter(),
report,
&config.sign,
true,
self.data.session_id,
)
.await;
} else {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::DmarcRateLimited),
SpanId = self.data.session_id,
Limit = vec![
trc::Value::from(failure_rate.count),
trc::Value::from(failure_rate.period.into_inner())
],
);
}
}
// Send aggregate reports
let interval = self
.server
.eval_if(
&self.server.core.smtp.report.dmarc_aggregate.send,
self,
self.data.session_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or(AggregateFrequency::Never);
if matches!(interval, AggregateFrequency::Never) || dmarc_record.rua().is_empty() {
return;
}
// Report the same identifier forms that were used for alignment
let message_from = message.from();
let header_from = message_from.domain_part();
let header_from = header_from
.to_ascii_domain()
.unwrap_or(Cow::Borrowed(header_from));
let envelope_from = self
.data
.mail_from
.as_ref()
.map(|mf| mf.domain.as_str())
.unwrap_or_else(|| self.data.helo_domain.as_str());
let envelope_from = envelope_from
.to_ascii_domain()
.unwrap_or(Cow::Borrowed(envelope_from));
// Create DMARC report record
let mut report_record = Record::new()
.with_dmarc_output(&dmarc_output)
.with_dkim_output(dkim_output)
.with_source_ip(self.data.remote_ip)
.with_header_from(header_from.as_ref())
.with_envelope_from(envelope_from.as_ref());
if let Some(dkim2_output) = dkim2_output {
report_record = report_record.with_dkim2_output(dkim2_output);
}
if let Some(spf_mail_from) = &self.data.spf_mail_from {
report_record = report_record.with_spf_output(spf_mail_from, SPFDomainScope::MailFrom);
}
if let Some(arc_output) = arc_output {
report_record = report_record.with_arc_output(arc_output);
}
// Submit DMARC report event
self.server
.schedule_report(DmarcEvent {
domain: dmarc_output.into_domain(),
report_record,
dmarc_record,
interval,
span_id: self.data.session_id,
})
.await;
}
}
pub trait DmarcReporting: Sync + Send {
fn send_dmarc_aggregate_report(
&self,
report_id: u64,
) -> impl Future<Output = trc::Result<()>> + Send;
fn schedule_dmarc(&self, event: Box<DmarcEvent>) -> impl Future<Output = ()> + Send;
}
impl DmarcReporting for Server {
async fn send_dmarc_aggregate_report(&self, item_id: u64) -> trc::Result<()> {
let object_id = ObjectType::DmarcInternalReport.to_id();
let key = ValueClass::Registry(RegistryClass::Item { object_id, item_id });
// Delete report. inbuxa: only the version read here, so a record
// another node appends meanwhile is sent with it rather than lost
let mut attempt = 0;
let report = loop {
let Some(Revisioned {
revision,
value: report,
}) = self
.store()
.get_value::<Revisioned<DmarcInternalReport>>(ValueKey::from(key.clone()))
.await
.caused_by(trc::location!())?
else {
return Ok(());
};
let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
batch
.assert_value(key.clone(), AssertValue::Hash(revision))
.clear(key.clone())
.clear(RegistryClass::PrimaryKey {
object_id: object_id.into(),
index_id: Property::Domain.to_id(),
key: KeySerializer::new(report.domain.len() + U64_LEN)
.write(&report.domain)
.write(report.policy_identifier)
.finalize(),
});
match self.store().write(batch.build_all()).await {
Ok(_) => break report,
Err(err) if err.is_assertion_failure() && attempt < MAX_WRITE_RETRIES => {
attempt += 1;
write_retry_pause(attempt).await;
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.caused_by(trc::location!())),
}
};
let span_id = self.inner.data.span_id_gen.generate();
let event_from = report.report.date_range_begin.timestamp() as u64;
let event_to = report.report.date_range_end.timestamp() as u64;
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::DmarcAggregateReport),
SpanId = span_id,
ReportId = event_from,
Domain = report.domain.clone(),
RangeFrom = trc::Value::Timestamp(event_from),
RangeTo = trc::Value::Timestamp(event_to),
);
// Verify external reporting addresses
let rua = match self
.core
.smtp
.resolvers
.dns
.verify_dmarc_report_address(
&report.domain,
report.rua.as_slice(),
Some(&self.inner.cache.dns_txt),
)
.await
{
Some(rcpts) => {
if !rcpts.is_empty() {
rcpts
} else {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::UnauthorizedReportingAddress),
SpanId = span_id,
Url = report
.rua
.into_iter()
.map(|u| trc::Value::String(u.into()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
);
return Ok(());
}
}
None => {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::ReportingAddressValidationError),
SpanId = span_id,
Url = report
.rua
.into_iter()
.map(|u| trc::Value::String(u.into()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
);
return Ok(());
}
};
// Serialize report
let config = &self.core.smtp.report.dmarc_aggregate;
let from_addr = self
.eval_if(
&config.address,
&RecipientDomain::new(report.domain.as_str()),
span_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "MAILER-DAEMON@localhost".to_compact_string());
let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(2048);
let _ = with_compatible_dispositions(Report::from(report.report)).write_rfc5322(
&self
.eval_if(
&self.core.smtp.report.submitter,
&RecipientDomain::new(report.domain.as_str()),
span_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "localhost".to_compact_string()),
(
self.eval_if(
&config.name,
&RecipientDomain::new(report.domain.as_str()),
span_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "Mail Delivery Subsystem".to_compact_string())
.as_str(),
from_addr.as_str(),
),
rua.iter().map(|a| a.as_str()),
&mut message,
);
// Send report
self.send_report(
&from_addr,
rua.iter(),
message,
&config.sign,
false,
span_id,
)
.await;
Ok(())
}
async fn schedule_dmarc(&self, event: Box<DmarcEvent>) {
let object_id = ObjectType::DmarcInternalReport.to_id();
let policy_hash = event.dmarc_record.to_hash();
let pk = ValueClass::Registry(RegistryClass::PrimaryKey {
object_id: object_id.into(),
index_id: Property::Domain.to_id(),
key: KeySerializer::new(event.domain.len() + U64_LEN)
.write(&event.domain)
.write(policy_hash)
.finalize(),
});
let mut rety_count = 0;
loop {
// Find the report by domain name
let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
let report = match self
.store()
.get_value::<ObjectIdVersioned>(ValueKey::from(pk.clone()))
.await
{
Ok(Some(object_id_v)) => {
match self
.store()
.get_value::<DmarcInternalReport>(ValueKey::from(ValueClass::Registry(
RegistryClass::Item {
object_id,
item_id: object_id_v.object_id.id().id(),
},
)))
.await
{
Ok(Some(report)) => Some((object_id_v, report)),
Ok(None) => {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::NotFound),
Id = object_id_v.object_id.id().id(),
CausedBy = trc::location!(),
Details = "Failed to find DMARC report for domain"
);
return;
}
Err(err) => {
trc::error!(
err.caused_by(trc::location!())
.details("Failed to query registry for DMARC report")
);
return;
}
}
}
Ok(None) => None,
Err(err) => {
trc::error!(
err.caused_by(trc::location!())
.details("Failed to query registry for DMARC report")
);
return;
}
};
// Create report if missing
let config = &self.core.smtp.report.dmarc_aggregate;
let (item_id, mut report) = if let Some((mut object_id_v, report)) = report {
batch.assert_value(pk.clone(), AssertValue::U32(object_id_v.version));
object_id_v.version += 1;
batch.set(pk.clone(), object_id_v.serialize());
(object_id_v.object_id.id().id(), report)
} else {
let item_id = self.inner.data.queue_id_gen.generate();
let date_range_begin = UTCDateTime::now();
let date_range_end = UTCDateTime::from_timestamp(
date_range_begin.timestamp() + event.interval.as_secs() as i64,
);
let policy =
PolicyPublished::from_record(event.domain.clone(), &event.dmarc_record);
let report = DmarcInternalReport {
created_at: date_range_begin,
deliver_at: date_range_end,
domain: event.domain.clone(),
report: DmarcReport {
report_id: format!("{}_{policy_hash}", date_range_begin.timestamp()),
date_range_begin,
date_range_end,
email: self
.eval_if(
&config.address,
&RecipientDomain::new(event.domain.as_str()),
event.span_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| "MAILER-DAEMON@localhost".to_string()),
extra_contact_info: self
.eval_if::<String, _>(
&config.contact_info,
&RecipientDomain::new(event.domain.as_str()),
event.span_id,
)
.await,
org_name: self
.eval_if::<String, _>(
&config.org_name,
&RecipientDomain::new(event.domain.as_str()),
event.span_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or_default(),
policy_adkim: policy.adkim.into(),
policy_aspf: policy.aspf.into(),
policy_disposition: policy.p.into(),
policy_domain: policy.domain,
policy_failure_reporting_options: match event.dmarc_record.fo {
dmarc::Report::All => vec![FailureReportingOption::All],
dmarc::Report::Any => vec![FailureReportingOption::Any],
dmarc::Report::Dkim => vec![FailureReportingOption::DkimFailure],
dmarc::Report::Spf => vec![FailureReportingOption::SpfFailure],
dmarc::Report::DkimSpf => vec![
FailureReportingOption::DkimFailure,
FailureReportingOption::SpfFailure,
],
}
.into(),
policy_subdomain_disposition: policy.sp.into(),
policy_np: policy.np.into(),
policy_discovery_method: policy.discovery_method.into(),
policy_testing_mode: policy.testing,
policy_version: None,
version: 1.0.into(),
..Default::default()
},
policy_identifier: policy_hash,
rua: Map::new(
event
.dmarc_record
.rua()
.iter()
.map(|u| u.uri.clone())
.collect(),
),
};
report.write_ops(&mut batch, item_id, true);
(item_id, report)
};
// Add record
let mut record = DmarcReportRecord::from(event.report_record.clone());
if let Some(idx) = report
.report
.records
.0
.inner
.iter()
.position(|d| d.value.eq_except_count(&record))
{
report.report.records.0.inner[idx].value.count += 1;
} else {
record.count = 1;
report.report.records.push(record);
}
// Write entry
let report_bytes = report.to_pickled_vec();
let max_report_size = self
.eval_if(
&config.max_size,
&RecipientDomain::new(&event.domain),
event.span_id,
)
.await
.unwrap_or(5 * 1024 * 1024);
if max_report_size != 0 && report_bytes.len() > max_report_size {
trc::event!(
OutgoingReport(OutgoingReportEvent::MaxSizeExceeded),
SpanId = event.span_id,
Domain = event.domain.clone(),
Details = report_bytes.len(),
Limit = max_report_size,
);
return;
}
batch.set(
ValueClass::Registry(RegistryClass::Item { object_id, item_id }),
report_bytes,
);
match self.core.storage.data.write(batch.build_all()).await {
Ok(_) => {
break;
}
Err(err) => {
// inbuxa: another node appended first; try again
// after a short pause
if err.is_assertion_failure() && rety_count < MAX_WRITE_RETRIES {
rety_count += 1;
write_retry_pause(rety_count).await;
continue;
}
trc::error!(
err.caused_by(trc::location!())
.details("Failed to write DMARC report")
);
break;
}
}
}
}
}
// inbuxa: RFC 9990 added "pass" to the evaluated disposition for mail that
// passed DMARC under an enforcing policy. Cloudflare's report intake rejects
// the whole report with "555 5.7.1 invalid_report_schema" when it sees that
// value, and older parsers built on the RFC 7489 schema do the same. "none"
// (no action taken) is valid under both and says the same thing, so reports
// go out with that instead.
fn with_compatible_dispositions(mut report: Report) -> Report {
for record in &mut report.record {
let disposition = &mut record.row.policy_evaluated.disposition;
if *disposition == ActionDisposition::Pass {
*disposition = ActionDisposition::None;
}
}
report
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use mail_auth::report::DmarcResult;
fn record(disposition: ActionDisposition) -> Record {
Record::new()
.with_source_ip("192.0.2.1".parse().unwrap())
.with_count(1)
.with_action_disposition(disposition)
.with_dmarc_dkim_result(DmarcResult::Pass)
.with_dmarc_spf_result(DmarcResult::Fail)
.with_header_from("example.org")
}
#[test]
fn pass_disposition_is_reported_as_none() {
let xml = with_compatible_dispositions(
Report::new()
.with_domain("example.org")
.with_record(record(ActionDisposition::Pass))
.with_record(record(ActionDisposition::Quarantine))
.with_record(record(ActionDisposition::Reject)),
)
.to_xml();
assert!(!xml.contains("<disposition>pass</disposition>"), "{xml}");
assert!(xml.contains("<disposition>none</disposition>"), "{xml}");
assert!(
xml.contains("<disposition>quarantine</disposition>"),
"{xml}"
);
assert!(xml.contains("<disposition>reject</disposition>"), "{xml}");
}
}