Three of the eight compat tests check INBUXA's data against a recording of how the Enterprise server read it, and that recording can only be made while that server is still up. SPEC §7 gives it 45 days from the notice, so the capture shouldn't wait on the cutover being scheduled. record-compat.py writes all three files: the tenants with their quotas and members and what each tenant administrator sees, every masked address and its state, and every archived item whole, since undelete_compat compares every property it recorded. It only reads, and refuses to send a method that isn't /get or /query, because it is the one tool here that runs against the live server. Queries follow their pages, so a server that caps one doesn't leave a short recording behind. Exercised against the fork's own test server, which answers the same JMAP: 3 tenants with members, 8 masked addresses and 3 archived items, each in the shape its test reads.
7.4 KiB
Running the compat tests against a copy of INBUXA's data
Status: 2026-09-19 (dry run below; still unrun against INBUXA data).
Each feature spec has one (compat) acceptance test: the check that
INBUXA's own data opens in inbuxa-server and reads back as it did on the
Enterprise server (SPEC.md §7). They are written, #[ignore]d, and unrun,
because the repository has no copy of that data.
The fork's other #[ignore]d suites, the ones that need containers rather
than INBUXA's data, are in container-tests.md.
Run them against a copy, never against the live server. Two of them
delete data as part of what they check: monitoring_compat purges the
telemetry history it has just read, and per_domain_directory_compat reads
only, but the monitoring one is enough reason to treat the whole set as
destructive. The brief bars touching INBUXA's production server, and these
tests are not an exception.
What you need
-
A copy of the data store, opened with the same
STOREbackend the copy was taken from.TMPDIRis the copy's parent, not the copy. The harness opens$TMPDIR/<test name>(tests/src/utils/temp_dir.rs), so the copy fortenant_compathas to sit at$TMPDIR/tenant_compat, the one forscim_compatat$TMPDIR/scim_compat, and so on. PointTMPDIRat the copy itself and the harness quietly creates an empty store beside it and the test reports INBUXA's data as missing — a cutover blocker that isn't one. Each test wants its own copy anyway:monitoring_compatpurges what it reads. -
NO_INSERT=1, which stops the harness resetting and seeding the store. Every one of the eight refuses to run without it, before the store is touched (verified, "The dry run" below). -
INBUXA_COMPAT_ADMIN, asname:password, for a server-level administrator in that copy. -
For
tenant_compatonly:INBUXA_COMPAT_EXPECTED, a JSON file recorded from the Enterprise server before the move:{ "tenants": {"<id>": {"name": "...", "quotas": {}, "members": ["<id>"]}}, "tenantAdmins": {"<name>": {"password": "...", "accounts": ["<id>"], "domains": ["<id>"]}} } -
For
masked_email_compatonly:INBUXA_COMPAT_MASKS, recorded the same way:[{"id": "...", "accountId": "...", "email": "...", "enabled": true}]. -
For
undelete_compatonly:INBUXA_COMPAT_ARCHIVED, thex:ArchivedItem/getresults, each with itsidandaccountId:[{"id": "...", "accountId": "..."}].
Recording the three files
tools/fork/record-compat.py writes all three, and has to run while the
Enterprise server is still up — after the cutover there is nothing left to
record from, and SPEC.md §7 gives that 45 days from the notice.
tools/fork/record-compat.py --server https://mail.example.org \
--admin '[email protected]:PASSWORD' --out ./compat \
--tenant-admin '[email protected]:PASSWORD'
It only reads: it issues /get and /query and refuses to send
anything else, so it is safe against the live server that the hand-off
brief otherwise bars touching. It is the one thing that has to run there
rather than on a copy.
Pass --tenant-admin once for each tenant administrator whose view should
be checked: the script signs in as each and records the accounts and
domains that administrator can see, which is what tenant_compat compares
against. Without any, tenantAdmins is empty and the test checks only the
tenants themselves. expected.json holds those passwords and is written
0600. --insecure skips certificate verification.
It was exercised on 2026-09-19 against the fork's own test server, which answers the same JMAP: it recorded 3 tenants with their members, 8 masked addresses and 3 archived items, in the shapes above.
Running one
# the copy is at $TMPDIR/<test name>, e.g. /srv/compat/tenant_compat
NO_INSERT=1 STORE=<backend> TMPDIR=/srv/compat \
INBUXA_COMPAT_ADMIN='[email protected]:<password>' \
RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 \
cargo test -p tests --features <backends> <test name> -- --ignored --exact
<test name> is the full path, such as system::tenant::tenant_compat.
Run them one at a time: each starts a server on fixed ports.
The eight tests
| Test | Feature | What it checks |
|---|---|---|
system::tenant::tenant_compat |
1, multi-tenancy | Tenants, their members and quotas read back unchanged, and each tenant administrator sees what it saw before (needs INBUXA_COMPAT_EXPECTED) |
system::masked_email::masked_email_compat |
2, masked email | Existing masked addresses still deliver, and their state reads back |
system::undelete::undelete_compat |
3, undelete | Archived items are still listed and restorable |
system::branding::branding_compat |
4, branding | Every domain's and tenant's logo, logoUrl and the three templates read back as stored |
system::ai::ai_compat |
5, AI spam | The twelve LLM_* tags and their scores |
system::monitoring::monitoring_compat |
6, monitoring | Retention, stores and indexTelemetry as observed; old history in the stripped encoding is skipped, not an error, and is gone after one purge (deletes history) |
scim::scim_compat |
7, SCIM | No domain open to SCIM, and no account with an externalId, as observed |
directory::per_domain::per_domain_directory_compat |
9, per-domain directories | No directory, no server default, and no domain with its own directory: any domain with one is a cutover blocker |
The dry run
None of the eight has ever run against INBUXA's data, so on 2026-09-19 all eight were run against an empty store with synthetic inputs, to prove the plumbing before the day the copy exists. What that established:
NO_INSERTprotects the copy. A sentinel file was left in each store directory. Every run kept it, and the run withoutNO_INSERTstopped at "NO_INSERT must be set, or the copy of INBUXA's data is wiped" before the harness deleted anything. The guard is ahead of the store in all eight.TMPDIRis the parent. The store appeared at$TMPDIR/<test name>/rocks.dbin every run, which is where the finding in "What you need" comes from.- The documented JSON shapes parse. The three files above, written
exactly as this page gives them, were read without complaint by
tenant_compat,masked_email_compatandundelete_compat. - A bad administrator now says so. Each test authenticates once before it
asserts anything, and fails with
INBUXA_COMPAT_ADMIN did not authenticate as <name>and the 401 body. Before that check the first call simply panicked with "Missing list in response", which reads like INBUXA's data is wrong when the login is what's wrong.
What it can't establish is anything about INBUXA's data: every run ended at the authentication check, since an empty store holds no such administrator.
What a failure means
tenant_compat,masked_email_compat,undelete_compat,branding_compat,ai_compat: the fork reads that data differently from the Enterprise server. Treat as a cutover blocker and fix before moving.monitoring_compat: old telemetry that can't be decoded is expected and is skipped; a failure here means the settings differ from what was observed.scim_compatandper_domain_directory_compat: they assert what was observed on 2026-09-18, that INBUXA uses neither feature. A failure means it has started to, and that feature's cutover notes then apply.