A sign-in challenge and a registration ceremony were read, then deleted, in two steps. Two requests sent together with the same challenge could both read it before either deleted it. Each still needed a valid signed assertion, so this didn't let anyone in without the passkey, but PK-10 says a challenge is good once. Each reader now also takes a claim counter named after the key and what it read. Every in-memory store increments it atomically (Redis, SQL, the key-value stores, sharded or not), and only the first reader gets the challenge. A registration ticket that starts a new ceremony after a failed try gets a new claim. The counter expires with the challenge. Tests, in the passkey suite: 64 readers claiming one challenge at once get exactly one win, and a ticket's next ceremony is a new claim. The read-then-delete window is two back-to-back store calls, too short to hit reliably over HTTP, so the claim is tested directly; the same challenge sent six times at once over HTTP also signs in exactly once. Reported privately in a security review.