crates/common/src/auth/permissions.rs

@@ -290,6 +290,12 @@ impl Default for DefaultPermissions {
                     default.superuser.push(permission);
                     default.tenant.push(permission);
                 }
+                // inbuxa: personal-data catalog: the data inventory, the
+                // server's or, inside a tenant, the tenant's slice
+                Permission::SysComplianceGet => {
+                    default.superuser.push(permission);
+                    default.tenant.push(permission);
+                }
                 // inbuxa: AL-12: tenant administrators lock and delegate
                 // within their tenant
                 Permission::SysAccountLockGet

crates/common/src/manager/compliance_roles.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The compliance roles (personal-data catalog spec, §7; settled
+//! 2026-09-28): a server-level Compliance Officer, and one Compliance
+//! Officer role in each tenant. A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of
+//! their own tenant (MT-3), so the tenant role is made per tenant: once for
+//! each tenant a server already has, and whenever a tenant is created.
+//!
+//! Each creation is recorded under `P` `c` in the fork's subspace, so a
+//! role an administrator deletes stays deleted. A tenant's role, while
+//! nobody holds it, is removed with the tenant so it doesn't block the
+//! delete.
+//!
+//! Both read what compliance work needs and change no server setting. The
+//! server-level officer also places, widens, releases and exports legal
+//! holds: that is the job, and each is audited with its reason. A tenant's
+//! role has no holds, which are server-level only (LH-13), and the tenant
+//! ceiling keeps it within the tenant. Each role carries a user's own
+//! permissions too (signing in, mail), since roles given to a person replace
+//! the default user role, and a tenant's accounts can't hold the
+//! server-level User role.
+
+use registry::schema::{
+    enums::Permission,
+    prelude::ObjectType,
+    structs::{Role, Tenant},
+};
+use registry::types::map::Map;
+use store::{
+    RegistryStore, SUBSPACE_INBUXA, Store, ValueKey,
+    registry::write::{RegistryWrite, RegistryWriteResult},
+    write::{AnyClass, BatchBuilder, ValueClass},
+};
+use trc::AddContext;
+use types::id::Id;
+
+/// The role's name, in the server's roles and in each tenant's.
+pub const NAME: &str = "Compliance Officer";
+
+/// Reading who and what records refer to, for both roles.
+const READS: &[Permission] = &[
+    Permission::SysAccountGet,
+    Permission::SysAccountQuery,
+    Permission::SysMailingListGet,
+    Permission::SysMailingListQuery,
+    Permission::SysDomainGet,
+    Permission::SysDomainQuery,
+    Permission::SysTenantGet,
+    Permission::SysTenantQuery,
+    Permission::SysRoleGet,
+    Permission::SysRoleQuery,
+];
+
+/// What the server-level officer holds besides [`READS`].
+const OFFICER: &[Permission] = &[
+    Permission::SysComplianceGet,
+    Permission::SysAuditGet,
+    Permission::SysAuditExport,
+    Permission::SysLegalHoldGet,
+    Permission::SysLegalHoldCreate,
+    Permission::SysLegalHoldUpdate,
+    Permission::SysLegalHoldExport,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockGet,
+];
+
+/// What a tenant's officer holds besides [`READS`].
+const TENANT_OFFICER: &[Permission] = &[
+    Permission::SysComplianceGet,
+    Permission::SysAuditGet,
+    Permission::SysAuditExport,
+    Permission::SysAccountLockGet,
+];
+
+fn role(own: &[Permission], tenant: Option<Id>) -> Role {
+    let mut permissions = crate::auth::permissions::DefaultPermissions::default().user;
+    for permission in own.iter().chain(READS) {
+        if !permissions.contains(permission) {
+            permissions.push(*permission);
+        }
+    }
+    Role {
+        description: NAME.into(),
+        enabled_permissions: Map::new(permissions),
+        member_tenant_id: tenant,
+        ..Default::default()
+    }
+}
+
+/// The server-level Compliance Officer role.
+pub fn officer_role() -> Role {
+    role(OFFICER, None)
+}
+
+/// A tenant's Compliance Officer role.
+pub fn tenant_role(tenant: Id) -> Role {
+    role(TENANT_OFFICER, Some(tenant))
+}
+
+/// Where a creation is recorded: the server's role, or a tenant's. The value
+/// is the role's id.
+fn created_key(tenant: Option<Id>) -> ValueClass {
+    let mut key = b"Pc".to_vec();
+    if let Some(tenant) = tenant {
+        key.extend_from_slice(&tenant.id().to_be_bytes());
+    }
+    ValueClass::Any(AnyClass {
+        subspace: SUBSPACE_INBUXA,
+        key,
+    })
+}
+
+async fn recorded(data: &Store, tenant: Option<Id>) -> trc::Result<Option<Id>> {
+    Ok(data
+        .get_value::<u64>(ValueKey::from(created_key(tenant)))
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+        .map(Id::from))
+}
+
+async fn record(data: &Store, tenant: Option<Id>, role: Option<Id>) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    match role {
+        Some(role) => batch.set(created_key(tenant), role.id().to_be_bytes().to_vec()),
+        None => batch.clear(created_key(tenant)),
+    };
+    data.write(batch.build_all())
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())
+        .map(|_| ())
+}
+
+/// Creates a role, unless one was created for this place before, and records
+/// it. Returns the new role's id.
+async fn create_once(
+    registry: &RegistryStore,
+    data: &Store,
+    tenant: Option<Id>,
+    role: Role,
+) -> trc::Result<Option<Id>> {
+    if recorded(data, tenant).await?.is_some() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    match registry.write(RegistryWrite::insert(&role.into())).await? {
+        RegistryWriteResult::Success(id) => {
+            record(data, tenant, Some(id)).await?;
+            Ok(Some(id))
+        }
+        err => {
+            trc::error!(
+                trc::EventType::Registry(trc::RegistryEvent::ValidationError)
+                    .into_err()
+                    .details(format!("Failed to create the {NAME} role: {err}"))
+            );
+            Ok(None)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Once per server: the officer role, and one in each tenant it already has.
+pub async fn ensure_compliance_roles(registry: &RegistryStore, data: &Store) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    create_once(registry, data, None, officer_role()).await?;
+    for tenant in registry.list::<Tenant>().await? {
+        let tenant = Id::from(tenant.id.id());
+        create_once(registry, data, Some(tenant), tenant_role(tenant)).await?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// A new tenant gets its Compliance Officer role.
+pub async fn tenant_created(registry: &RegistryStore, data: &Store, tenant: Id) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    create_once(registry, data, Some(tenant), tenant_role(tenant)).await.map(|_| ())
+}
+
+/// Before a tenant is deleted: removes its Compliance Officer role if nobody
+/// holds it, so the role doesn't block the delete. Returns whether it did,
+/// so a delete refused for another reason can put it back.
+pub async fn tenant_deleting(registry: &RegistryStore, data: &Store, tenant: Id) -> trc::Result<bool> {
+    let Some(role) = recorded(data, Some(tenant)).await? else {
+        return Ok(false);
+    };
+    match registry
+        .write(RegistryWrite::delete(ObjectType::Role.id(role)))
+        .await?
+    {
+        RegistryWriteResult::Success(_) | RegistryWriteResult::NotFound { .. } => {
+            record(data, Some(tenant), None).await?;
+            Ok(true)
+        }
+        // Held by someone: the tenant's delete is refused for that anyway
+        _ => Ok(false),
+    }
+}
+
+/// A tenant's delete was refused after its role went: the role comes back.
+pub async fn tenant_kept(registry: &RegistryStore, data: &Store, tenant: Id) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    tenant_created(registry, data, tenant).await
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use registry::types::EnumImpl;
+
+    fn permissions(role: &Role) -> Vec<Permission> {
+        role.enabled_permissions.iter().copied().collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn neither_role_changes_a_setting() {
+        let user = crate::auth::permissions::DefaultPermissions::default().user;
+        for role in [officer_role(), tenant_role(Id::from(7u64))] {
+            let all = permissions(&role);
+            for permission in user.iter() {
+                assert!(all.contains(permission), "a user's own {permission:?}");
+            }
+            // Beyond what any user holds for their own account
+            for permission in all.into_iter().filter(|p| !user.contains(p)) {
+                let name = permission.as_str();
+                let holds = name.starts_with("sysLegalHold");
+                assert!(
+                    !(name.ends_with("Update") && !holds)
+                        && !(name.ends_with("Create") && !holds)
+                        && !name.ends_with("Destroy")
+                        && permission != Permission::Impersonate
+                        && permission != Permission::FetchAnyBlob,
+                    "{} holds {name}",
+                    role.description
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_officer_places_and_releases_holds_a_tenants_does_not() {
+        let officer = permissions(&officer_role());
+        let tenant = tenant_role(Id::from(7u64));
+        assert_eq!(tenant.member_tenant_id, Some(Id::from(7u64)));
+        let tenant = permissions(&tenant);
+        for hold in [
+            Permission::SysLegalHoldGet,
+            Permission::SysLegalHoldCreate,
+            Permission::SysLegalHoldUpdate,
+            Permission::SysLegalHoldExport,
+        ] {
+            assert!(officer.contains(&hold));
+            assert!(!tenant.contains(&hold));
+        }
+        for both in [Permission::SysComplianceGet, Permission::SysAuditGet, Permission::SysAccountGet] {
+            assert!(officer.contains(&both) && tenant.contains(&both));
+        }
+        assert!(!officer.contains(&Permission::SysAuditSettingsUpdate));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn records_are_per_place() {
+        let ValueClass::Any(server) = created_key(None) else { panic!() };
+        let ValueClass::Any(a) = created_key(Some(Id::from(1u64))) else { panic!() };
+        let ValueClass::Any(b) = created_key(Some(Id::from(2u64))) else { panic!() };
+        assert_eq!(server.key, b"Pc");
+        assert_ne!(a.key, b.key);
+        assert!(a.key.starts_with(b"Pc"));
+    }
+}

crates/common/src/manager/defaults.rs

@@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ async fn insert_safe_defaults(bp: &mut Bootstrap) -> trc::Result<()> {
 
     // inbuxa: administrator roles stored before a permission existed get it once
     super::granted_permissions::grant_new_admin_permissions(bp).await?;
+    // inbuxa: personal-data catalog: the compliance roles, once per server
+    super::compliance_roles::ensure_compliance_roles(&bp.registry, &bp.data_store).await?;
 
     if bp
         .registry

crates/common/src/manager/granted_permissions.rs

@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ use types::id::Id;
 
 /// Granted to the default administrator roles: "Explain this"
 /// (ai-explain spec, EX-4: superuser by default), the audit log, account
-/// locks and legal holds (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-9, AL-12, LH-13).
+/// locks and legal holds (audit-hold-lock spec, AU-9, AL-12, LH-13), and
+/// the data inventory (personal-data catalog spec).
 const ADMIN_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
     Permission::SysAiExplain,
     Permission::SysAuditGet,
@@ -44,11 +45,12 @@ const ADMIN_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
     Permission::SysLegalHoldCreate,
     Permission::SysLegalHoldUpdate,
     Permission::SysLegalHoldExport,
+    Permission::SysComplianceGet,
 ];
 
 /// Granted to the default tenant administrator roles: reading and exporting
-/// the tenant's audit log (AU-9), and locking and delegating its accounts
+/// the tenant's audit log (AU-9), locking and delegating its accounts
-/// (AL-12).
+/// (AL-12), and the tenant's slice of the data inventory.
 const TENANT_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
     Permission::SysAuditGet,
     Permission::SysAuditExport,
@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ const TENANT_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[
     Permission::SysAccountLockCreate,
     Permission::SysAccountLockUpdate,
     Permission::SysAccountLockDestroy,
+    Permission::SysComplianceGet,
 ];
 
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]

crates/common/src/manager/mod.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use utils::HttpLimitResponse;
 pub mod application;
 pub mod backup;
 pub mod boot;
+pub mod compliance_roles; // inbuxa: personal-data catalog, the compliance roles
 pub mod console;
 pub mod defaults;
 pub mod first_party;

crates/jmap/src/registry/set.rs

@@ -747,6 +747,16 @@ impl RegistrySet for Server {
                             if let ObjectInner::MaskedEmail(mask) = &new_object.inner {
                                 crate::inbuxa::masked_email::created(self, id, mask).await?;
                             }
+                            // inbuxa: personal-data catalog: a new tenant gets its
+                            // Compliance Officer role
+                            if matches!(new_object.inner, ObjectInner::Tenant(_)) {
+                                common::manager::compliance_roles::tenant_created(
+                                    self.registry(),
+                                    &self.core.storage.data,
+                                    id,
+                                )
+                                .await?;
+                            }
                             response.object.insert(Property::Id, RegistryValue::Id(id));
                             set.response
                                 .created
@@ -800,6 +810,15 @@ impl RegistrySet for Server {
                                     && object.inner.account_id() != Some(Id::from(set.account_id))))
                         })
                     {
+                        // inbuxa: personal-data catalog: a tenant's compliance
+                        // role, while nobody holds it, goes first
+                        let role_released = matches!(object.inner, ObjectInner::Tenant(_))
+                            && common::manager::compliance_roles::tenant_deleting(
+                                self.registry(),
+                                &self.core.storage.data,
+                                id,
+                            )
+                            .await?;
                         match self
                             .registry()
                             .write(RegistryWrite::Delete {
@@ -863,6 +882,15 @@ impl RegistrySet for Server {
                                 set.response.destroyed.push(id);
                             }
                             err => {
+                                // inbuxa: refused for another reason: the role comes back
+                                if role_released {
+                                    common::manager::compliance_roles::tenant_kept(
+                                        self.registry(),
+                                        &self.core.storage.data,
+                                        id,
+                                    )
+                                    .await?;
+                                }
                                 set.response.not_destroyed.append(id, map_write_error(err));
                             }
                         }

crates/registry/src/schema/enums.rs

@@ -1744,6 +1744,8 @@ pub enum Permission {
     SysLegalHoldCreate = 670,
     SysLegalHoldUpdate = 671,
     SysLegalHoldExport = 672,
+    // inbuxa: personal-data catalog, the data inventory and compliance overview
+    SysComplianceGet = 673,
     SysAccountGet = 219,
     SysAccountCreate = 220,
     SysAccountUpdate = 221,

crates/registry/src/schema/enums_impl.rs

@@ -7084,6 +7084,7 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
             b"sysLegalHoldCreate" => Permission::SysLegalHoldCreate,
             b"sysLegalHoldUpdate" => Permission::SysLegalHoldUpdate,
             b"sysLegalHoldExport" => Permission::SysLegalHoldExport,
+            b"sysComplianceGet" => Permission::SysComplianceGet,
             b"sysAccountGet" => Permission::SysAccountGet,
             b"sysAccountCreate" => Permission::SysAccountCreate,
             b"sysAccountUpdate" => Permission::SysAccountUpdate,
@@ -7773,6 +7774,7 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
             Permission::SysLegalHoldCreate => "sysLegalHoldCreate",
             Permission::SysLegalHoldUpdate => "sysLegalHoldUpdate",
             Permission::SysLegalHoldExport => "sysLegalHoldExport",
+            Permission::SysComplianceGet => "sysComplianceGet",
             Permission::SysAccountGet => "sysAccountGet",
             Permission::SysAccountCreate => "sysAccountCreate",
             Permission::SysAccountUpdate => "sysAccountUpdate",
@@ -8455,6 +8457,7 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
             670 => Some(Permission::SysLegalHoldCreate),
             671 => Some(Permission::SysLegalHoldUpdate),
             672 => Some(Permission::SysLegalHoldExport),
+            673 => Some(Permission::SysComplianceGet),
             219 => Some(Permission::SysAccountGet),
             220 => Some(Permission::SysAccountCreate),
             221 => Some(Permission::SysAccountUpdate),
@@ -8899,7 +8902,7 @@ impl EnumImpl for Permission {
         }
     }
 
-    const COUNT: usize = 673;
+    const COUNT: usize = 674;
 }
 
 impl serde::Serialize for Permission {

docs/spec/features/personal-data-catalog.md

@@ -526,6 +526,17 @@ it (Settled 3). It has no hold permissions, since legal holds are
 server-only by the tenant ceiling (LH-13), and it sees the tenant's slice of
 the inventory only (§6).
 
+**As built (2026-09-28).** A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of
+their own tenant (MT-3), so the tenant role can't be one server-level role:
+each tenant gets its own "Compliance Officer" role, made once for every
+tenant a server has and whenever a tenant is created; while nobody holds
+it, it is removed with its tenant so it doesn't block the delete. For the
+same reason (a tenant's accounts can't hold the server-level User role),
+both roles carry a user's own permissions as well, and are given in place
+of the default user role. Creations are recorded under `P` `c`, so a role
+an administrator deletes stays deleted
+(`crates/common/src/manager/compliance_roles.rs`).
+
 ### Reaching existing servers
 
 New permissions get ids 673 onward and `COUNT` grows (`enums.rs`,

resources/schema/schema.json.sha256

@@ -1 +1 @@
-MiWRzsz0AHdRshG_8JimktRqBO_pHGAUBHFcfV5jwI4
+nh0Vx79fhlQAOjCC9it831hBytCjhGPloPm9qidUhGc

tests/src/system/compliance.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! The compliance roles (personal-data catalog spec, §7): each made once,
+//! the officer reads the audit log and places holds but changes no setting,
+//! and the tenant officer reaches no holds.
+
+use crate::utils::{
+    account::Account,
+    server::{TestServer, TestServerBuilder},
+};
+use registry::schema::{
+    prelude::{ObjectType, Property},
+    structs::{
+        CertificateManagement, CustomRoles, DkimManagement, DnsManagement, Domain, Role, Tenant,
+        UserRoles,
+    },
+};
+use registry::types::map::Map;
+use serde_json::{Value, json};
+use types::id::Id;
+
+const USING: &[&str] = &[
+    "urn:ietf:params:jmap:core",
+    "urn:inbuxa:jmap",
+    "urn:inbuxa:jmap:registry",
+];
+
+async fn call(account: &Account, method: &str, mut arguments: Value) -> (String, Value) {
+    if arguments.get("accountId").is_none() {
+        arguments["accountId"] = account.id_string().into();
+    }
+    let response = account.jmap_request(USING, json!([[method, arguments, "0"]])).await;
+    let call = response
+        .0
+        .pointer("/methodResponses/0")
+        .cloned()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{method}: {}", response.0));
+    (call[0].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string(), call[1].clone())
+}
+
+/// The ids of the roles with this name and tenant, as an administrator sees them.
+async fn roles_named(admin: &Account, description: &str, tenant: Option<Id>) -> Vec<Id> {
+    let mut found = Vec::new();
+    for id in admin
+        .registry_query_ids(ObjectType::Role, Vec::<(&str, &str)>::new(), Vec::<&str>::new())
+        .await
+    {
+        let role = admin.registry_get::<Role>(id).await;
+        if role.description == description && role.member_tenant_id == tenant {
+            found.push(id);
+        }
+    }
+    found
+}
+
+pub async fn test(test: &mut TestServer) {
+    println!("Running compliance role tests...");
+    let admin = test.account("[email protected]");
+
+    // The server's officer role exists, once
+    let officer_role = roles_named(&admin, "Compliance Officer", None).await;
+    let user_role = roles_named(&admin, "User", None).await;
+    assert_eq!(officer_role.len(), 1, "one server-level Compliance Officer role");
+    assert_eq!(user_role.len(), 1);
+
+    // A compliance officer: the role carries a user's own permissions too
+    let officer = admin
+        .create_user_account("[email protected]", "officer-secret-4410", "Officer", &[], vec![])
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_update_object(
+            ObjectType::Account,
+            officer.id(),
+            json!({Property::Roles: UserRoles::Custom(CustomRoles {
+                role_ids: Map::new(vec![officer_role[0]]),
+            })}),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+    // Reads and exports the audit log
+    let (name, response) = call(&officer, "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query", json!({})).await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query", "the officer reads the audit log: {response}");
+
+    // Places and releases a hold: that is the role
+    let (name, response) = call(
+        &officer,
+        "inbuxa:LegalHold/set",
+        json!({"reason": "Regulator's request", "create": {"h": {"name": "Matter 9001",
+            "scope": {"accounts": [officer.id_string()]}}}}),
+    )
+    .await;
+    let hold = response["created"]["h"]["id"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("the officer places a hold: {name} {response}"))
+        .to_string();
+    let (_, response) = call(
+        &officer,
+        "inbuxa:LegalHold/set",
+        json!({"reason": "Closed", "update": {hold.as_str(): {"released": true}}}),
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert!(
+        response["updated"].get(hold.as_str()).is_some(),
+        "the officer releases a hold: {response}"
+    );
+
+    // Changes no server setting and creates no account
+    let (name, response) = call(
+        &officer,
+        "x:DataRetention/set",
+        json!({"update": {"singleton": {"holdTracesFor": 86400000}}}),
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert!(
+        name == "error" || response["notUpdated"].get("singleton").is_some(),
+        "the officer changed a setting: {name} {response}"
+    );
+    let (name, response) = call(
+        &officer,
+        "x:Account/set",
+        json!({"create": {"a": {"@type": "User", "name": "nobody"}}}),
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert!(
+        name == "error" || response["notCreated"].get("a").is_some(),
+        "the officer created an account: {name} {response}"
+    );
+    let (name, response) = call(
+        &officer,
+        "inbuxa:AuditSettings/set",
+        json!({"update": {"singleton": {"keepForDays": 90}}}),
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert!(
+        name == "error" || response["notUpdated"].get("singleton").is_some(),
+        "the officer shortened audit retention: {name} {response}"
+    );
+
+    // A tenant compliance officer reads its tenant's audit log, and no holds
+    let tenant = admin
+        .registry_create_object(Tenant {
+            name: "compliance-tenant".to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_create_object(Domain {
+            name: "tenant-compliance.example.org".to_string(),
+            is_enabled: true,
+            member_tenant_id: Some(tenant),
+            certificate_management: CertificateManagement::Manual,
+            dns_management: DnsManagement::Manual,
+            dkim_management: DkimManagement::Manual,
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    // A new tenant gets its own Compliance Officer role (MT-3: a tenant's
+    // accounts hold only its own roles)
+    let tenant_role = roles_named(&admin, "Compliance Officer", Some(tenant)).await;
+    assert_eq!(tenant_role.len(), 1, "the tenant's Compliance Officer role");
+    let t_officer = admin
+        .create_user_account(
+            "[email protected]",
+            "tenant-officer-secret-7715",
+            "Tenant officer",
+            &[],
+            vec![],
+        )
+        .await;
+    admin
+        .registry_update_object(
+            ObjectType::Account,
+            t_officer.id(),
+            json!({Property::Roles: UserRoles::Custom(CustomRoles {
+                role_ids: Map::new(vec![tenant_role[0]]),
+            })}),
+        )
+        .await;
+    let (name, response) = call(&t_officer, "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query", json!({})).await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "inbuxa:AuditEvent/query", "the tenant officer reads the audit log: {response}");
+    let (name, response) = call(&t_officer, "inbuxa:LegalHold/get", json!({"ids": null})).await;
+    assert_eq!(name, "error", "LH-13: the tenant officer read holds: {response}");
+
+    // A tenant can still be deleted: its unused role goes with it
+    let spare = admin
+        .registry_create_object(Tenant {
+            name: "spare-tenant".to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(roles_named(&admin, "Compliance Officer", Some(spare)).await.len(), 1);
+    let (name, response) = call(&admin, "x:Tenant/set", json!({"destroy": [spare.to_string()]})).await;
+    assert!(
+        response["destroyed"].as_array().is_some_and(|d| d.iter().any(|i| i == &json!(spare.to_string()))),
+        "the tenant was deleted: {name} {response}"
+    );
+    assert!(roles_named(&admin, "Compliance Officer", Some(spare)).await.is_empty());
+}
+
+#[ignore]
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+pub async fn compliance_tests() {
+    let mut test = TestServerBuilder::new("compliance_tests")
+        .await
+        .with_default_listeners()
+        .await
+        .build()
+        .await;
+    let admin = test.create_admin_account("[email protected]").await;
+    test.insert_account(admin);
+    self::test(&mut test).await;
+    if test.is_reset() {
+        test.temp_dir.delete();
+    }
+}

tests/src/system/mod.rs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ pub mod ai_calibration;
 pub mod ai_explain;
 pub mod account_lock; // inbuxa: account lock with delegation
 pub mod legal_hold; // inbuxa: legal hold
+pub mod compliance; // inbuxa: the compliance roles
 pub mod audit; // inbuxa: the audit log
 pub mod authorization;
 pub mod auto_reload; // inbuxa: registry writes apply at once