docs/spec/contract.md

@@ -98,6 +98,20 @@ Each has an ID, and tests name the IDs they check.
   deliberate differences from upstream (see "Security note"). An operator who
   wants open dynamic registration for third-party apps can turn it back on;
   C-9's consent page still names every non-first-party client.
+
+  **`oAuthClientOverride` only in bootstrap and recovery mode** (2026-09-29).
+  Upstream lets an account holding it skip the client and redirect URI checks
+  on the sign-in page, at the code exchange and in the device flow.
+  Administrators hold it, so a link naming a made-up client and an attacker's
+  redirect URI handed an administrator's code, and then a token, to the
+  attacker: registration protected everyone except the accounts most worth
+  phishing. Now the permission counts only in bootstrap and recovery mode,
+  where the recovery administrator signs in before any client is registered.
+  An administrator otherwise signs in like anyone else, through a registered
+  client and one of its redirect URIs. INBUXA's production server was checked
+  first: its front ends' clients are registered with the redirect URIs they
+  use (C-6). Released in 2026.9.29.1. Checked by `tests/e2e/client_override.py` against the debug
+  build, with the same script failing against the build before the change.
 - **C-6.** Two first-party clients are registered as `x:OAuthClient` whenever
   `x:FrontEnds` is set or changed:
   - **`inbuxa-admin`**: a public client (no secret), authorization code with

tests/e2e/client_override.py

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Local end-to-end check that an administrator gets no OAuth client bypass
+outside bootstrap and recovery mode (contract C-5).
+
+Run it with `python3 tests/e2e/client_override.py` after
+`cargo build -p inbuxa`. Needs Docker. Working state goes under target/e2e.
+
+Administrators hold OAuthClientOverride. Upstream lets it skip the client and
+redirect URI checks everywhere, so a link naming a made-up client and an
+attacker's redirect URI would hand an administrator's code to the attacker.
+This boots the debug binary and checks that:
+- in bootstrap mode, the recovery administrator still signs in through an
+  unregistered client, as the setup wizard needs;
+- after setup, an administrator gets no code for an unregistered client, nor
+  for a registered one with a redirect URI it didn't register, while the
+  registered client and URI still work end to end;
+- a device code an administrator approves for an unregistered client can't be
+  exchanged for a token;
+- in recovery mode, the bypass is back for the recovery administrator.
+
+Passwords are generated into files under target/e2e and never printed.
+Everything is removed afterwards unless KEEP=1.
+"""
+
+import base64, hashlib, json, os, secrets, shutil, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
+
+ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+DIR = f"{ROOT}/target/e2e"
+NAME = "inbuxa-client-override"
+PORT = 18195
+HTTP = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}"
+ADMIN_URL = "http://admin.override.test"
+REDIRECT = f"{ADMIN_URL}/oauth/callback"
+EVIL = "https://evil.example/cb"
+# Another build to check, such as one from before the change.
+BINARY = os.environ.get("INBUXA_BINARY", f"{ROOT}/target/debug/inbuxa")
+
+failures = []
+
+
+def check(cond, what):
+    print(("ok   " if cond else "FAIL ") + what)
+    if not cond:
+        failures.append(what)
+
+
+def secret_file(name, value=None):
+    path = f"{DIR}/secrets/{name}"
+    if value is None:
+        value = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
+    with open(path, "w") as f:
+        f.write(value)
+    os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+    return value
+
+
+def docker(*args, check_rc=True):
+    return subprocess.run(["docker", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=check_rc)
+
+
+def start(env=None):
+    env_file = f"{DIR}/secrets/override-env"
+    with open(env_file, "w") as f:
+        for key, value in (env or {}).items():
+            f.write(f"{key}={value}\n")
+    os.chmod(env_file, 0o600)
+    docker("run", "-d", "--name", NAME, "--user", f"{os.getuid()}:{os.getgid()}",
+           "--entrypoint", "/usr/local/bin/inbuxa",
+           "-v", f"{BINARY}:/usr/local/bin/inbuxa:ro",
+           "-v", f"{DIR}/etc-override:/etc/inbuxa", "-v", f"{DIR}/data-override:/var/lib/inbuxa",
+           "-p", f"127.0.0.1:{PORT}:8080",
+           # A debug build's workers need more than the default stack.
+           "-e", "RUST_MIN_STACK=16777216",
+           # Registers inbuxa-admin, the one client this server knows (C-6).
+           "-e", f"INBUXA_ADMIN_URL={ADMIN_URL}",
+           "--env-file", env_file,
+           "stalwartlabs/stalwart:v0.16.22", "--config", "/etc/inbuxa/config.json")
+    for _ in range(120):
+        try:
+            urllib.request.urlopen(f"{HTTP}/.well-known/jmap", timeout=2)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError:
+            return
+        except Exception:
+            time.sleep(1)
+            continue
+        return
+    sys.exit("server didn't come up: " + docker("logs", "--tail", "40", NAME, check_rc=False).stderr)
+
+
+def stop():
+    docker("rm", "-f", NAME, check_rc=False)
+
+
+def restart(env=None):
+    stop()
+    start(env)
+
+
+def request(path, method="GET", body=None, content_type=None, authorization=None):
+    req = urllib.request.Request(f"{HTTP}{path}", data=body, method=method)
+    if content_type:
+        req.add_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+    if authorization:
+        req.add_header("Authorization", authorization)
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
+            return resp.status, resp.read()
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
+        return err.code, err.read()
+
+
+def jmap(user, password, calls):
+    body = json.dumps({"using": ["urn:ietf:params:jmap:core", "urn:inbuxa:jmap:registry"],
+                       "methodCalls": calls}).encode()
+    auth = "Basic " + base64.b64encode(f"{user}:{password}".encode()).decode()
+    status, raw = request("/jmap/", "POST", body, "application/json", auth)
+    if status != 200:
+        sys.exit(f"JMAP call failed: {status}")
+    return json.loads(raw)["methodResponses"]
+
+
+def pkce():
+    verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
+    challenge = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+    return verifier, challenge
+
+
+def sign_in(user, password, client_id, redirect_uri, challenge):
+    """The sign-in page's request: what an authorization link leads to."""
+    status, raw = request("/api/auth", "POST", json.dumps({
+        "type": "authCode", "accountName": user, "accountSecret": password,
+        "clientId": client_id, "redirectUri": redirect_uri,
+        "codeChallenge": challenge, "codeChallengeMethod": "S256"}).encode(), "application/json")
+    return json.loads(raw) if status == 200 else {"type": status}
+
+
+def exchange(client_id, code, redirect_uri, verifier):
+    status, raw = request("/auth/token", "POST", urllib.parse.urlencode({
+        "grant_type": "authorization_code", "client_id": client_id, "code": code,
+        "redirect_uri": redirect_uri, "code_verifier": verifier}).encode(),
+        "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+    return status, json.loads(raw or b"{}")
+
+
+def phished(user, password, client_id, redirect_uri):
+    """Whether a link naming this client and redirect URI ends in a token."""
+    verifier, challenge = pkce()
+    answer = sign_in(user, password, client_id, redirect_uri, challenge)
+    if answer.get("type") != "authenticated":
+        return False, answer.get("type")
+    status, body = exchange(client_id, answer["client_code"], redirect_uri, verifier)
+    return status == 200 and "access_token" in body, f"code issued, exchange {status}"
+
+
+def main():
+    stop()
+    for sub in ("etc-override", "data-override"):
+        shutil.rmtree(f"{DIR}/{sub}", ignore_errors=True)
+    for sub in ("etc-override", "data-override", "secrets"):
+        os.makedirs(f"{DIR}/{sub}", exist_ok=True)
+    os.chmod(f"{DIR}/secrets", 0o700)
+
+    # Bootstrap mode: the recovery administrator keeps the bypass.
+    recovery = secret_file("override-recovery")
+    start({"INBUXA_RECOVERY_ADMIN": f"admin:{recovery}"})
+    got, how = phished("admin", recovery, "setup-wizard", EVIL)
+    check(got, f"bootstrap mode: the recovery administrator signs in through an unregistered client ({how})")
+
+    got = jmap("admin", recovery, [["x:Bootstrap/get", {"ids": None}, "0"]])
+    singleton = got[0][1]["list"][0]["id"]
+    res = jmap("admin", recovery, [["x:Bootstrap/set", {"update": {singleton: {
+        "serverHostname": "mail.override.test", "defaultDomain": "override.test",
+        "requestTlsCertificate": False}}}, "0"]])
+    updated = res[0][1].get("updated", {}).get(singleton)
+    check(bool(updated), "bootstrap completed")
+    if not updated:
+        sys.exit(json.dumps(res))
+    admin, admin_pw = updated["username"], secret_file("override-admin", updated["secret"])
+
+    # After setup: no bypass for an administrator.
+    restart()
+    got, how = phished(admin, admin_pw, "inbuxa-admin", REDIRECT)
+    check(got, f"the registered client and redirect URI still sign an administrator in ({how})")
+    got, how = phished(admin, admin_pw, "evil-client", EVIL)
+    check(not got, f"an unregistered client gets nothing for an administrator ({how})")
+    got, how = phished(admin, admin_pw, "inbuxa-admin", EVIL)
+    check(not got, f"a registered client with a foreign redirect URI gets nothing ({how})")
+
+    # Device flow: the administrator approves a code a made-up client asked for.
+    status, raw = request("/auth/device", "POST", b"client_id=evil-device", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+    device = json.loads(raw) if status == 200 else {}
+    check("device_code" in device, f"a device code is issued to anyone ({status})")
+    if "device_code" in device:
+        status, raw = request("/api/auth", "POST", json.dumps({
+            "type": "authDevice", "accountName": admin, "accountSecret": admin_pw,
+            "code": device["user_code"]}).encode(), "application/json")
+        print("     approval:", json.loads(raw).get("type") if status == 200 else status)
+        status, raw = request("/auth/token", "POST", urllib.parse.urlencode({
+            "grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code",
+            "client_id": "evil-device", "device_code": device["device_code"]}).encode(),
+            "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+        body = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
+        check("access_token" not in body,
+              f"but an administrator's approval can't be exchanged for a token ({status}, {body.get('error')})")
+
+    # Recovery mode: the bypass is back, for the recovery administrator.
+    restart({"INBUXA_RECOVERY_MODE": "1", "INBUXA_RECOVERY_ADMIN": f"admin:{recovery}"})
+    got, how = phished("admin", recovery, "recovery-tool", EVIL)
+    check(got, f"recovery mode: the recovery administrator signs in through an unregistered client ({how})")
+
+    if os.environ.get("KEEP") != "1":
+        stop()
+        for sub in ("etc-override", "data-override"):
+            shutil.rmtree(f"{DIR}/{sub}", ignore_errors=True)
+        for name in ("override-recovery", "override-admin", "override-env"):
+            try:
+                os.remove(f"{DIR}/secrets/{name}")
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+
+    print()
+    if failures:
+        print(f"{len(failures)} failed")
+        sys.exit(1)
+    print("all passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()