Part of #334. Step 2 of 4 in docs/spec/features/passkeys.md (PK-6 to PK-8).
/passkey/register?ticket= served by the server, next to the login page (same look, logo and theme).
The page asks for the password (plus the TOTP code when the account has one) before the browser's passkey dialog, so a stolen session token can't finish a registration.
POST /api/passkey/register, anonymous and limited like /api/auth: start checks ticket + password through the normal sign-in path and returns the WebAuthn options (discoverable, UV required, attestation none, existing passkeys excluded); finish verifies and turns the passkey active. The step between waits in the in-memory store (prefix 203), good once, any node.
RP id = host of the public URL; that URL is the only origin. A credential id registered before is refused. Per-account random user handle.
webauthn-rs 0.6.2 + webauthn-rs-proto. Licenses checked by hand: webauthn-rs family and crypto-glue MPL-2.0, the other 37 new crates MIT/Apache-2.0; no OpenSSL in the build.
Spec: algorithm list now ES256, ES384, RS256 (what webauthn-rs tests); status updated. The "or an active passkey" part of PK-8 comes with sign-in (step 3).
Tests: system test system::passkeys::passkey_tests now registers with a software authenticator (wrong password, no start, bad ticket, wrong origin, success with flags and transports, ticket reuse, duplicate credential id) and passes locally; the test server can take a host name for its public URL. Page gzip-sync test, fmt, fork checks and cargo test --workspace --locked --no-run are clean.
Part of #334. Step 2 of 4 in `docs/spec/features/passkeys.md` (PK-6 to PK-8).
- `/passkey/register?ticket=` served by the server, next to the login page (same look, logo and theme).
- The page asks for the password (plus the TOTP code when the account has one) before the browser's passkey dialog, so a stolen session token can't finish a registration.
- `POST /api/passkey/register`, anonymous and limited like `/api/auth`: `start` checks ticket + password through the normal sign-in path and returns the WebAuthn options (discoverable, UV required, attestation none, existing passkeys excluded); `finish` verifies and turns the passkey active. The step between waits in the in-memory store (prefix 203), good once, any node.
- RP id = host of the public URL; that URL is the only origin. A credential id registered before is refused. Per-account random user handle.
- webauthn-rs 0.6.2 + webauthn-rs-proto. Licenses checked by hand: webauthn-rs family and crypto-glue MPL-2.0, the other 37 new crates MIT/Apache-2.0; no OpenSSL in the build.
- Spec: algorithm list now ES256, ES384, RS256 (what webauthn-rs tests); status updated. The "or an active passkey" part of PK-8 comes with sign-in (step 3).
Tests: system test `system::passkeys::passkey_tests` now registers with a software authenticator (wrong password, no start, bad ticket, wrong origin, success with flags and transports, ticket reuse, duplicate credential id) and passes locally; the test server can take a host name for its public URL. Page gzip-sync test, fmt, fork checks and `cargo test --workspace --locked --no-run` are clean.
Second part of passkeys (docs/spec/features/passkeys.md, PK-6 to PK-8).
The server now serves /passkey/register, the page an inbuxa:Passkey
create's registrationUrl opens, next to the login page.
The page asks for the account's password, and its TOTP code when it has
one, before the browser's passkey dialog: a stolen session token can
start a registration but not finish one. It posts to
/api/passkey/register in two steps. "start" checks the ticket and the
password through the usual sign-in path (limits and failure counting
included) and answers with the WebAuthn options: a discoverable
credential, user verification required, attestation none, the account's
existing passkeys excluded. "finish" checks what the browser made and
turns the passkey active. What "start" began waits in the in-memory
store, so any node can finish it, and is good once.
The relying-party id is the host of the server's public URL, and that
URL is the only origin accepted. A credential id already registered to
any account is refused. Each account gets a random user handle the
first time it registers one, for sign-in to find it by.
The WebAuthn checks come from webauthn-rs 0.6.2 (MPL-2.0; its new
dependencies are MIT or Apache-2.0, crypto-glue MPL-2.0; no OpenSSL).
It tests ES256, ES384 and RS256, so the spec's algorithm list now says
those.
The "or an active passkey" of PK-8 arrives with passkey sign-in.
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Part of #334. Step 2 of 4 in
docs/spec/features/passkeys.md(PK-6 to PK-8)./passkey/register?ticket=served by the server, next to the login page (same look, logo and theme).POST /api/passkey/register, anonymous and limited like/api/auth:startchecks ticket + password through the normal sign-in path and returns the WebAuthn options (discoverable, UV required, attestation none, existing passkeys excluded);finishverifies and turns the passkey active. The step between waits in the in-memory store (prefix 203), good once, any node.Tests: system test
system::passkeys::passkey_testsnow registers with a software authenticator (wrong password, no start, bad ticket, wrong origin, success with flags and transports, ticket reuse, duplicate credential id) and passes locally; the test server can take a host name for its public URL. Page gzip-sync test, fmt, fork checks andcargo test --workspace --locked --no-runare clean.