Part of #334. The passkeys spec, docs/spec/features/passkeys.md, plus its line in SPEC.md §4. Docs only; nothing is built yet.
It covers passkey sign-in on the server's login page for the OAuth code and device flows, inbuxa:Passkey records kept in the fork's own data, the relying-party id and what a rename does to it, challenges in the in-memory store (so any node can finish a ceremony), management and recovery over JMAP, audit and log events, and acceptance tests.
Not to merge until these are decided (the end of the spec has the detail):
Registration runs on a small page the server serves itself, next to the login page, because the webmail and console are on other hostnames than the relying-party id. This would be a second exception to SPEC.md §5.3 (no web interface on the mail host). Recommended: the page now, Related Origin Requests later as an option.
A passkey signs in on its own: no TOTP code after it. Recommended.
Passkeys allowed by default, with off switches per server, tenant and domain. Recommended.
Part of #334. The passkeys spec, `docs/spec/features/passkeys.md`, plus its line in SPEC.md §4. Docs only; nothing is built yet.
It covers passkey sign-in on the server's login page for the OAuth code and device flows, `inbuxa:Passkey` records kept in the fork's own data, the relying-party id and what a rename does to it, challenges in the in-memory store (so any node can finish a ceremony), management and recovery over JMAP, audit and log events, and acceptance tests.
**Not to merge until these are decided** (the end of the spec has the detail):
1. Registration runs on a small page the server serves itself, next to the login page, because the webmail and console are on other hostnames than the relying-party id. This would be a second exception to SPEC.md §5.3 (no web interface on the mail host). Recommended: the page now, Related Origin Requests later as an option.
2. A passkey signs in on its own: no TOTP code after it. Recommended.
3. Passkeys allowed by default, with off switches per server, tenant and domain. Recommended.
Passkey sign-in on the server's login page for the OAuth code and device
flows: inbuxa:Passkey records in the fork's own data, discoverable
credentials with user verification, the relying-party id and what a
rename does to it, challenges in the in-memory store, management and
recovery over JMAP, audit and log events, and acceptance tests. Three
decisions are left open for approval.
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Part of #334. The passkeys spec,
docs/spec/features/passkeys.md, plus its line in SPEC.md §4. Docs only; nothing is built yet.It covers passkey sign-in on the server's login page for the OAuth code and device flows,
inbuxa:Passkeyrecords kept in the fork's own data, the relying-party id and what a rename does to it, challenges in the in-memory store (so any node can finish a ceremony), management and recovery over JMAP, audit and log events, and acceptance tests.Not to merge until these are decided (the end of the spec has the detail):