Closes#427 (K-S4, part of inbuxa for Kubernetes). Webmail sign-out (inbuxa-webmail#104) calls this so a copied session cookie stops working.
What it does
POST /auth/revoke takes an access or refresh token. From then on it is refused on every node until it would have expired.
Both discovery documents list revocation_endpoint and revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (none, client_secret_post, client_secret_basic).
A token issued to a client is revoked only by that client, with its secret if it has one. Naming no client stands for the token's own, as with a refresh. Another client gets 401 invalid_client.
A token that doesn't validate (expired, already revoked, garbage) gets 200, as the RFC asks. No token is 400 invalid_request; a live or RSVP token is 400 unsupported_token_type.
How
Each account keeps one list of revoked tokens in the in-memory store (KV_OAUTH_REVOKED, 202): token id (xxh3-128 of the token) and its expiry. The list's TTL is its longest-lived entry, and expired entries are dropped on every read.
The list is loaded with the account's cached access token, in build_access_token, so every way that cache is filled carries it. Validation already loads that entry for the credential-version check, so an access token costs no extra read.
Revoking rewrites the list under a per-account lock, then drops the account's access-token cache entry on every node through the existing cache-invalidation broadcast.
A refresh token is also checked against the store when it is redeemed. That covers a node that was rebuilding its cache entry while the revocation went in: it can't mint new access tokens from a revoked refresh token.
Cap: 2048 unexpired revocations per account (503 temporarily_unavailable past it). Filling it takes that many valid tokens of the account.
Not covered
Revoking a refresh token doesn't revoke the access tokens it already minted (nothing links them). A client revokes both; access tokens are short-lived.
An open WebSocket or EventSource keeps running until its own token-expiry check; that check is unchanged.
Tests
Unit: list parse/serialize, expiry, damaged lines, sorted ids.
system::system_tests (RocksDB) passes, including new OIDC steps: discovery lists the endpoint; four refused revocations (no secret, wrong secret, another client) leave the token working; a revoked access token can't sign in; revoking twice or a garbage token returns 200; no token returns 400; the refresh token still works after its access token is revoked; a revoked refresh token is refused (basic auth).
Local CI: fmt, cargo test --workspace --locked --no-run, cargo build -p inbuxa --locked, fork checks (notice added to the 2 upstream files touched).
docs/spec/contract.md: the "no revocation endpoint" note now says what 27.1 adds.
Closes #427 (K-S4, part of inbuxa for Kubernetes). Webmail sign-out (inbuxa-webmail#104) calls this so a copied session cookie stops working.
**What it does**
- `POST /auth/revoke` takes an access or refresh token. From then on it is refused on every node until it would have expired.
- Both discovery documents list `revocation_endpoint` and `revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported` (none, client_secret_post, client_secret_basic).
- A token issued to a client is revoked only by that client, with its secret if it has one. Naming no client stands for the token's own, as with a refresh. Another client gets `401 invalid_client`.
- A token that doesn't validate (expired, already revoked, garbage) gets `200`, as the RFC asks. No token is `400 invalid_request`; a live or RSVP token is `400 unsupported_token_type`.
**How**
- Each account keeps one list of revoked tokens in the in-memory store (`KV_OAUTH_REVOKED`, 202): token id (xxh3-128 of the token) and its expiry. The list's TTL is its longest-lived entry, and expired entries are dropped on every read.
- The list is loaded with the account's cached access token, in `build_access_token`, so every way that cache is filled carries it. Validation already loads that entry for the credential-version check, so an access token costs no extra read.
- Revoking rewrites the list under a per-account lock, then drops the account's access-token cache entry on every node through the existing cache-invalidation broadcast.
- A refresh token is also checked against the store when it is redeemed. That covers a node that was rebuilding its cache entry while the revocation went in: it can't mint new access tokens from a revoked refresh token.
- Cap: 2048 unexpired revocations per account (`503 temporarily_unavailable` past it). Filling it takes that many valid tokens of the account.
**Not covered**
- Revoking a refresh token doesn't revoke the access tokens it already minted (nothing links them). A client revokes both; access tokens are short-lived.
- An open WebSocket or EventSource keeps running until its own token-expiry check; that check is unchanged.
**Tests**
- Unit: list parse/serialize, expiry, damaged lines, sorted ids.
- `system::system_tests` (RocksDB) passes, including new OIDC steps: discovery lists the endpoint; four refused revocations (no secret, wrong secret, another client) leave the token working; a revoked access token can't sign in; revoking twice or a garbage token returns 200; no token returns 400; the refresh token still works after its access token is revoked; a revoked refresh token is refused (basic auth).
- Local CI: fmt, `cargo test --workspace --locked --no-run`, `cargo build -p inbuxa --locked`, fork checks (notice added to the 2 upstream files touched).
`docs/spec/contract.md`: the "no revocation endpoint" note now says what 27.1 adds.
jcoffey-dev
added this to the 27.1 milestone 2026-11-18 08:17:21 +00:00
/auth/revoke takes an access or refresh token and refuses it from then
on, on every node, until it would have expired. Each account keeps a
list of revoked tokens in the in-memory store; the list is cached with
the account's access token, and a revocation drops that cache entry
cluster-wide. A refresh token is also checked against the store when
redeemed. A token issued to a client is revoked only by that client,
with its secret if it has one; one that doesn't validate is answered
200 as the RFC asks. Both discovery documents list revocation_endpoint.
Closes#427
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Closes #427 (K-S4, part of inbuxa for Kubernetes). Webmail sign-out (inbuxa-webmail#104) calls this so a copied session cookie stops working.
What it does
POST /auth/revoketakes an access or refresh token. From then on it is refused on every node until it would have expired.revocation_endpointandrevocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported(none, client_secret_post, client_secret_basic).401 invalid_client.200, as the RFC asks. No token is400 invalid_request; a live or RSVP token is400 unsupported_token_type.How
KV_OAUTH_REVOKED, 202): token id (xxh3-128 of the token) and its expiry. The list's TTL is its longest-lived entry, and expired entries are dropped on every read.build_access_token, so every way that cache is filled carries it. Validation already loads that entry for the credential-version check, so an access token costs no extra read.503 temporarily_unavailablepast it). Filling it takes that many valid tokens of the account.Not covered
Tests
system::system_tests(RocksDB) passes, including new OIDC steps: discovery lists the endpoint; four refused revocations (no secret, wrong secret, another client) leave the token working; a revoked access token can't sign in; revoking twice or a garbage token returns 200; no token returns 400; the refresh token still works after its access token is revoked; a revoked refresh token is refused (basic auth).cargo test --workspace --locked --no-run,cargo build -p inbuxa --locked, fork checks (notice added to the 2 upstream files touched).docs/spec/contract.md: the "no revocation endpoint" note now says what 27.1 adds.jcoffey-dev referenced this pull request from inbuxa/inbuxa-charts2026-11-18 08:33:44 +00:00