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Phase 2g of the DLP and mail flow rules spec: transport rules now act,
on outgoing and incoming mail.
- features/mailflow/rewrite.rs: add or remove a header, prefix or set the
subject (an RFC 2047 word when not ASCII), add a disclaimer. A
disclaimer edits the message's main text and HTML bodies only, each
decoded, changed and written back as UTF-8 quoted-printable with its
other headers kept, top or bottom (after <body> or before </body> in
HTML); attachments and attached messages are left alone, and a
disclaimer already present isn't added again.
- smtp/inbound/mailflow.rs: the check runs for incoming mail too
(transport rules only; DLP stays outgoing). After DLP passes, each
matched transport rule's actions run in order: message edits,
add-recipient and redirect (envelope changes DATA applies), route (a
per-message queue ahead of the queue strategy), refuse (550 5.7.1
with the rule's text). The override tag is stripped with the same
subject writer, so a non-ASCII subject stays valid.
- Audit: refusals and changes to where mail goes are recorded (sender,
or system:mail-flow for incoming mail); wording and header changes
aren't, or a banner rule would record every message (spec §2.7).
Tests: rewrite unit tests (headers, encoded subjects, disclaimers on a
single part and on multipart/alternative with an attachment, once
only); mail_rules_tests gains the actions end to end: disclaimer,
header and subject prefix on a delivered message, a redirect, a
refusal, a banner on incoming LMTP mail that outgoing rules leave
alone, and which of those are audited.
Phase 2a of the DLP and mail flow rules spec: pure functions in
crates/features/src/mailflow, nothing wired into the mail path yet.
- Detectors report distinct values found, each either checked by its
published check digit or counted only beside a corroborating word
within 50 characters. This PR adds the region-free ones: payment
cards (issuer prefixes, Luhn), IBAN (registry lengths, mod 97),
SWIFT/BIC, email addresses and phone numbers in bulk, dates of birth,
passport numbers, private keys and published service-token formats.
Regional identifiers follow, a region per PR.
- Word lists (Aho-Corasick, whole words, any case) and patterns (regex
with a compiled-size limit) count occurrences.
- Attachment text: text files with or without a UTF-16 mark, HTML,
DOCX/XLSX/PPTX, ODT/ODS/ODP and ZIP archives one level deep, read
with the zip and quick-xml crates the workspace already has.
Encrypted files, PDF, legacy binary Office files, nested archives
and anything past the limits come back as not inspectable, with why.
21 unit tests, against the networks' test card numbers and the IBAN
registry's own examples among others.
Personal-data catalog spec, §6 (Phase 3c).
inbuxa:DataInventory/get evaluates the catalog against the server's
live settings and says what this server holds: for each source and each
object that can hold personal data, its categories and whose data it
is, whether it is collected here at all, what bounds its retention (the
live value of the setting that does, or unbounded), whether it leaves
the host and to which endpoints, and a summary. Every host that
receives something is listed once as a candidate processor with what it
receives. Inside a tenant it answers with the tenant's slice and none
of the server's processors. Read-only, with sysComplianceGet.
inbuxa:InventorySnapshot/get is the history: a dated copy of the
evaluated inventory, recorded when it changes -- after a registry write
to an object the inventory reads, after inbuxa's log, audit or AI
settings change, and on the daily clean-up -- and kept as long as the
audit log's records. ids: null lists every snapshot, newest first; the
full inventory only when asked for.
The catalog is embedded and parsed at start (new dependency: toml,
MIT/Apache); the evaluation is a pure function of it and the live
facts, so each configuration is tested without a server. Loopback
endpoints stay on the host; any other configured endpoint leaves it.
Tested: unit tests for the evaluation (a new install's defaults, an
external blob store, a hosted AI endpoint, telemetry off, a tenant's
slice, hosts from URLs, loopback), snapshots, and the fact gathering's
store and duration rules; the compliance system test, extended (the
officer reads the inventory, a plain user is refused, a tenant's
officer sees its slice and no processors, a webhook to another host
becomes a processor and a snapshot names x:WebHook, a retention change
reads through); the system, audit, legal hold and account lock suites;
fork checks. The system suite failed once of three runs with an email
import's blob not found, in antispam.rs; the same happened once in
purge.rs on the previous branch. Nothing here touches uploads; noted
for a separate look.
What administrators and the server itself do to the control plane is now
recorded, from inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md (AU-1 to AU-12):
settings, accounts, domains, roles and every other registry change, with
each field's before and after (secrets only as "changed"); the fork's own
settings objects; administrator sign-ins (and failed ones to administrator
accounts), master-user and recovery-admin sign-ins, once an hour per
account, method and address; access to another account's data through
impersonation or FetchAnyBlob, once an hour; exports and tamper checks;
and registry writes the server makes on its own, named by subsystem
(system:AcmeRenewal, system:auto-ban, system:directory-sync, ...), with a
spam rules update as one summary record.
No change without its record (AU-3): before a set method changes anything,
a pending record per requested create, update and destroy is written; if
that fails, the method is refused with serverFail. Its outcome follows as
a later entry. A change interrupted by a crash stays "unfinished".
Records live in the fork's subspace under L, as one SHA-256 hash chain per
node. The chain's head is stored, never cached, and every append asserts
it, so two writers can't take the same place. Nothing can edit or delete
a record; the daily purge removes the oldest past the retention (default
730 days, minimum 90) and records where the chain now starts, so
verification still passes. security.audit-recorded (647) copies each
record to webhooks, OpenTelemetry and the log; security.audit-write-failed
(648) reports a failed write.
New JMAP objects under urn:inbuxa:jmap: inbuxa:AuditEvent/get and /query
(filters: time, actor, action, target, account, tenant, outcome, address,
text), inbuxa:AuditSettings, inbuxa:AuditExport (CSV or JSON Lines built
on the server, each line with its chain hash, ending in a manifest; the
created object names the blob and its SHA-256) and
inbuxa:AuditVerification. New permissions sysAuditGet, sysAuditExport and
sysAuditSettingsUpdate: the Administrator role gets all three, the Tenant
Administrator role gets read and export, once, on existing installs too.
A tenant administrator sees records whose actor or target is in its
tenant, including a server administrator's changes there.
Sign-in method on the session: access tokens now remember how they signed
in (password, app password, API key, OAuth client, directory, master user,
recovery admin), including across the HTTP credential cache. New OAuth
access tokens carry their client id in the sealed claims; older ones show
as client "unknown" until they expire.
The schema gains the permissions, the two events and a Management >
Compliance > Audit Log link.
Stack: the request layer boxes every inner future where it's made. Without
that, a debug build overflowed the default 2 MB worker stack on a registry
set; measured with the same request, the branch and main now overflow at
the same stack size (between 1856 and 1920 KiB, debug), so the layer adds
nothing measurable.
Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap; system::audit::audit_log_tests
(run with --ignored) passes on RocksDB, SQLite, PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL with a
read replica, MySQL, MySQL with a replica and FoundationDB. The system, JMAP
and SCIM suites pass. authorization.rs skipped fork permissions that guard
no registry object; the audit suite checks a plain user is refused instead.
ai-explain spec, amendment 1 (EX-22 to EX-28):
- answers are three or four sentences, max_tokens 160, cut at 700 chars;
- POST /api/explain streams the answer as server-sent events;
- each node remembers answers in memory (1,000, 24 h), keyed by the facts,
prompt version and model, shared by server-level administrators;
- resources/explain/settings.json.gz ships answers for settings at their
defaults, generated with prepare_setting_explanations (717 for 2026.9.27);
- the system prompt no longer carries the per-request marker, so a model
server can reuse it;
- inbuxa:Explanation gains source, answeredAt and preparedFor.
The name is inbuxa, lowercase, like the wordmark; INBUXA reads as an
acronym. The admin and webmail already changed. Here that's everything
the server shows people: the brand macro behind the protocol greetings,
the HTTP and SCIM realms, the startup banner and the calendar and contact
PRODID; the first-party OAuth client descriptions; the legacy-protocol
refusals; the default calendar and address book names and the SMTP
greeting default, in the code and the schema served to the admin
(checksum regenerated); startup and shutdown events; the User-Agent;
the sign-in and RSVP pages; the service units; the OpenAPI realm; the
crate descriptions and the README, where it's set in bold.
Identifiers that are uppercase for their own reasons stay: INBUXA_*
settings, SUBSPACE_INBUXA. So do code comments and the AGPL 5(a) notice
lines.
Tests follow: the IMAP ID name, the default collection names, the PRODID
in the iTIP fixtures and the CalDAV free-busy expectations, and the e2e
legacy-protocol refusals. The webdav, imap and jmap suites pass, so do
the unit tests of every crate touched, and 73 of 75 SMTP tests; of the
other two, antispam fails on main too, and queue_retry is a timing flake
that passes on its own.
Logos resolve domain, then tenant, then server-wide, then the built-in, with
subdomains finding their domain. GET /logo serves a data-URL image, redirects
to a URL logo without fetching it, sandboxes SVG, and answers 404 when no
custom logo applies. Emails embed the first PNG, JPEG or GIF logo. Logo and
template writes are checked; stored templates are read at send time, always
escaped, and fall back to the built-in with a build warning when they don't
parse. The RSVP page is served byte for byte with a CSP and no-referrer. The
sign-in and RSVP pages load the logo through an image element. MT-22's
session logo follows the chain to the server-wide logo.
Acceptance tests 1 to 17; test 18 written as the ignored branding_compat.
Every way of deleting mail for good (JMAP, IMAP expunge, POP3, Trash
emptying, mailbox removal) notes the message's mailboxes and keywords while
archiving is on, fixing its deadline then; when its data is finally removed
it becomes an x:ArchivedItem record, written as upstream writes them, with
its copy held until the deadline. Retention is read at deletion time, so a
change applies at once. Restore puts a message back in the mailboxes it was
in (Trash only if that was all), with its keywords, and removes the record;
over quota it stays archived. x:ArchivedItem/get returns status and
accountId; query filters on type, archivedAt and text; set requests a
restore once or destroys; /changes is a fork addition. Expired items go in
the data purge. The shared account-access rule moves to jmap::inbuxa::access.
system_tests now calls undelete::test, and the archiving gate is gone.
New crate crates/features (inbuxa-features), AGPL-3.0-only, holding the
tenancy rules. Hooks in common: a tenant's roles and permission lists cap
its people's permissions; a change to a tenant, or to a role a tenant holds,
drops its members' cached permissions; delivery and every other write check
the tenant's maxDiskQuota; usedDiskQuota reads the tenant usage counter.
The default Tenant Administrator role gains sysTenantGet and sysTenantQuery.