jcoffey-dev is traveling from Thursday 1 October through Sunday 4 October. Issues and pull requests are welcome, and will get an answer after that. Thanks for your patience.
Personal-data catalog spec, default D5 (settled 2026-09-28; built after
the v0.16.24 import's spam-rules loader landed). msbl.org's EBL is sent
a SHA-1 of every email address it's asked about. A new install's first
boot now leaves a note, and the rules update, once the bundled rules
are in, switches STWT_MSBL_EBL_EMAIL off and forgets the note, so it
happens once; the loader keeps that switch through later updates. An
existing server has no note and keeps every blocklist as it is.
Also fixes the data inventory's DNSBL endpoints: a zone is an
expression (`ip_reverse + '.zen.spamhaus.org'`, conditional branches,
`hash(email, 'sha1') + '.ebl.msbl.org'`), and the zone names are now
the quoted literals that start with a dot, from every branch, rather
than the expression's text.
Tested: unit test for the zone rule; the compliance system test (no
note, no change; the inventory lists ebl.msbl.org, not a hash; with the
note the blocklist goes off; the note works once); the system suite;
fork checks.
Personal-data catalog spec, §6 (Phase 3c).
inbuxa:DataInventory/get evaluates the catalog against the server's
live settings and says what this server holds: for each source and each
object that can hold personal data, its categories and whose data it
is, whether it is collected here at all, what bounds its retention (the
live value of the setting that does, or unbounded), whether it leaves
the host and to which endpoints, and a summary. Every host that
receives something is listed once as a candidate processor with what it
receives. Inside a tenant it answers with the tenant's slice and none
of the server's processors. Read-only, with sysComplianceGet.
inbuxa:InventorySnapshot/get is the history: a dated copy of the
evaluated inventory, recorded when it changes -- after a registry write
to an object the inventory reads, after inbuxa's log, audit or AI
settings change, and on the daily clean-up -- and kept as long as the
audit log's records. ids: null lists every snapshot, newest first; the
full inventory only when asked for.
The catalog is embedded and parsed at start (new dependency: toml,
MIT/Apache); the evaluation is a pure function of it and the live
facts, so each configuration is tested without a server. Loopback
endpoints stay on the host; any other configured endpoint leaves it.
Tested: unit tests for the evaluation (a new install's defaults, an
external blob store, a hosted AI endpoint, telemetry off, a tenant's
slice, hosts from URLs, loopback), snapshots, and the fact gathering's
store and duration rules; the compliance system test, extended (the
officer reads the inventory, a plain user is refused, a tenant's
officer sees its slice and no processors, a webhook to another host
becomes a processor and a snapshot names x:WebHook, a retention change
reads through); the system, audit, legal hold and account lock suites;
fork checks. The system suite failed once of three runs with an email
import's blob not found, in antispam.rs; the same happened once in
purge.rs on the previous branch. Nothing here touches uploads; noted
for a separate look.
Personal-data catalog spec, §7 (settled 2026-09-28).
sysComplianceGet (673) sees the data inventory and compliance
overview: superusers and, for their tenant's slice, tenant
administrators, by default and through the one-time grants on servers
that already have their roles stored.
A Compliance Officer role at server level holds it with reading and
exporting the audit log, placing, widening, releasing and exporting
legal holds, seeing account locks, and reading accounts, lists,
domains, tenants and roles. It changes no server setting, creates or
deletes no account, and can't shorten audit retention.
A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of their own tenant (MT-3), so
the tenant role is one "Compliance Officer" role per tenant, without
holds (LH-13): made once for every tenant a server has, and whenever a
tenant is created. While nobody holds it, it is removed with its tenant
so it doesn't block the delete, and put back if the delete is refused
for another reason. Both roles carry a user's own permissions too,
since roles given to a person replace the default user role, which a
tenant's accounts can't hold anyway.
Every server makes these once, new or existing -- the built-in roles
are only made on a server with none -- and records each under P c, so a
role an administrator deletes stays deleted.
Tested: unit tests (neither role changes a setting beyond a user's
own; holds for the server's officer only; per-place records); a new
compliance system test (one server-level role; an officer reads the
audit log, places and releases a hold, and is refused a setting, an
account and audit retention; a tenant gets its role, whose holder reads
the tenant's audit log and no holds; a tenant with an unused role is
deleted and the role goes with it); the system, audit, legal hold,
account lock and SCIM suites; fork checks. The directory suite needs
its LDAP container and wasn't run here.
jcoffey-dev