cc532b914c9f67b17403696de7ff8e8b33f9ba18
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jcoffey-dev
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3f40b36032 |
The switch knows who still uses legacy mail apps (LP-15, server)
The impact panel's data. Every successful sign-in over IMAP, POP3,
ManageSieve or SMTP AUTH records, per account and per protocol, one
timestamp -- nothing else: no address, no IP, no client. It is written at
most once an hour per account and protocol, so a mail app polling every
minute costs a read per sign-in and a write an hour. A record that can't be
written is logged and the sign-in goes ahead.
Both switches serve it as a read-only property, recentLegacyUse, as
wouldClose serves the confirmation: a list of {accountId, name, protocol,
lastUsedAt} for sign-ins in the last 30 days, most recent first.
inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy lists every account; inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy
lists only its tenant's own (MT-1). Accounts since deleted are left out. It
is computed only when the property is asked for.
The recording sits where the tenant check already runs once the account is
known, which becomes admit_legacy_session: refuse if the account's tenant
has legacy protocols off, otherwise record. A refused sign-in is never
recorded.
The spec leaves the interface to the implementation; a property on each
switch keeps the panel's data behind the same permission as the switch
itself, with no new object.
Unit tests hold the 30-day window to acceptance test 11 (three days ago
listed, forty not), the hourly throttle and the keys. The e2e proves on a
running server that the admin's IMAP and submission sign-ins are listed
with their time, that a second sign-in within the hour isn't written again,
and that a tenant's list holds its own user and nobody outside the tenant.
All 70 checks pass.
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
b65afb66f9 |
A tenant can turn legacy protocols off for itself (LP-9 to LP-14a)
The tenant switch. A tenant's administrator turns legacy mail protocols off for its own tenant, and from then on sign-in over IMAP, POP3, ManageSieve and SMTP AUTH is refused for every address on the tenant's domains, while every other domain on the server carries on. No port closes, since other tenants share them (LP-13): it is one stored fact per tenant, read at sign-in and when client configuration is answered. inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy/get and /set, one per tenant, id the tenant's: - Inside a tenant, a principal reaches only its own tenant's switch (MT-1): /get with no ids answers with it, another tenant's is notFound and can't be changed. At server level /get with no ids lists every tenant's. - Turning it off is always allowed. Turning it back on is refused with forbidden, naming inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy, while the server has legacy protocols off (LP-9). - A change raises security.legacy-protocols-changed with policy = tenant, the tenant's id, the new value and who made it (LP-14). - It takes sysDomainGet and sysDomainUpdate, not the two new permissions the spec names. The switch governs sign-in on the tenant's domains, so whoever manages those domains may turn it -- and the default Tenant Administrator role already holds both, where new permissions would reach no role already stored on a server (MT-12's note), leaving today's tenant administrators without the switch until someone edited their role by hand. The same trade inbuxa:AiLimits and inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy made. /query is not built yet; /get with no ids covers listing. Sign-in (LP-10 to LP-12). Before the credentials are looked at, the name given is resolved to its domain and the domain to its tenant, so a real account and a made-up address on the domain get the same refusal, with a right password or a wrong one, counted as no failed sign-in (LP-11). The words are the spec's: "Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps...", in each protocol's form. A bearer token needn't name an account, so after authentication the account's own tenant is checked too; a token that named nobody can't slip past. The refusal carries policy = tenant and the domain, not the tenant's id: IMAP answers a command's tag from the Id key, so an error holding one was sent under the wrong tag and the mail app hung waiting for its reply. The first live run found that; a unit test now holds the refusal to it. Client configuration (LP-14a). Autoconfig, autodiscover, PACC and the suggested DNS records now ask whether legacy services are off for the domain being answered for -- the server's switch, or the domain's tenant's -- so a tenant's domains stop offering IMAP, POP3 and submission while others still do. tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py builds a tenant with its own domain, a user and a tenant administrator, and a second tenant, and proves on a running server: the admin sees and changes only its own tenant's switch (test 10); turning it off is an event (test 14); the tenant's user is refused over IMAP with the right password and a wrong one, a made-up address on the domain the same (tests 6, 7); POP3 and submission refuse in their own forms and JMAP still works (test 8); an account on another domain signs in normally (test 6); autoconfig drops IMAP for the tenant's domain only; with the server off, the tenant can't turn it back on (test 9); and once back on, the user signs in again. All 62 checks pass. |
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
04252000da |
Legacy sign-in is refused while the switch is off (LP-6)
The second lock. While legacy mail protocols are off, a sign-in over IMAP,
POP3, ManageSieve or SMTP AUTH is refused for every account, so a listener
that exists by mistake -- or submission, which the SMTP lock keeps open --
still lets nobody in.
The check sits at the top of each protocol's sign-in, before the
credentials are looked at. So the answer is the same for a right password,
a wrong one and an account that doesn't exist; it isn't auth.failed, so it
counts nothing against the account and never feeds the auto-ban; and the
session stays open, since the mail app is being told, not thrown off.
Mail apps read the spec's words (LP-12, at server scope):
IMAP NO [ALERT] This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP
apps. This mail app can't sign in.
POP3 -ERR [AUTH] ...the same...
ManageSieve NO "This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
SMTP 535 5.7.0 This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP
apps. This mail app can't send.
SMTP AUTH is refused on every SMTP listener, port 25 included: only mail
apps authenticate, so inbound delivery is untouched. LMTP is left alone.
The policy is read from the store on each sign-in rather than cached, so
every node of a cluster answers the same the moment the switch turns.
Each refusal raises a new event, auth.legacy-protocol-refused (id 642, info
level, also in the packaged schema), with the protocol as source, the
policy's scope and the domain -- never the account. The session adds the
listener and remote IP.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py now also proves, on a running server: a
normal IMAP and submission sign-in works with the switch on, before and
after; while off, submission refuses the right password and six wrong ones
with the same words and without hanging up; and an IMAP listener created by
mistake while off refuses the right password, a wrong one and an account
that doesn't exist. All 33 checks pass. SMTP sign-ins in the script wait
out a second first: every connection arrives from Docker's gateway, and the
stock inbound throttle takes five a second from one IP.
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jcoffey-dev
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7dae9b29fd |
Import upstream v0.16.22, stripped
Upstream commit: 474dd0229cb20cf513036619781ed97bd8073c3f Enterprise-only files removed or emptied: 63 Enterprise-only snippets removed: 117 in 50 files Dangling module declarations removed: 5 Cargo edits turning enterprise off: 14 Verification: clean Enterprise feature gates left for rebuilt features: 19 in 18 files Produced by tools/fork/strip.py. The full report is in docs/fork/strip-reports/ on main. |