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Personal-data catalog spec, §6 (Phase 3c).
inbuxa:DataInventory/get evaluates the catalog against the server's
live settings and says what this server holds: for each source and each
object that can hold personal data, its categories and whose data it
is, whether it is collected here at all, what bounds its retention (the
live value of the setting that does, or unbounded), whether it leaves
the host and to which endpoints, and a summary. Every host that
receives something is listed once as a candidate processor with what it
receives. Inside a tenant it answers with the tenant's slice and none
of the server's processors. Read-only, with sysComplianceGet.
inbuxa:InventorySnapshot/get is the history: a dated copy of the
evaluated inventory, recorded when it changes -- after a registry write
to an object the inventory reads, after inbuxa's log, audit or AI
settings change, and on the daily clean-up -- and kept as long as the
audit log's records. ids: null lists every snapshot, newest first; the
full inventory only when asked for.
The catalog is embedded and parsed at start (new dependency: toml,
MIT/Apache); the evaluation is a pure function of it and the live
facts, so each configuration is tested without a server. Loopback
endpoints stay on the host; any other configured endpoint leaves it.
Tested: unit tests for the evaluation (a new install's defaults, an
external blob store, a hosted AI endpoint, telemetry off, a tenant's
slice, hosts from URLs, loopback), snapshots, and the fact gathering's
store and duration rules; the compliance system test, extended (the
officer reads the inventory, a plain user is refused, a tenant's
officer sees its slice and no processors, a webhook to another host
becomes a processor and a snapshot names x:WebHook, a retention change
reads through); the system, audit, legal hold and account lock suites;
fork checks. The system suite failed once of three runs with an email
import's blob not found, in antispam.rs; the same happened once in
purge.rs on the previous branch. Nothing here touches uploads; noted
for a separate look.
Personal-data catalog spec, §7 (settled 2026-09-28).
sysComplianceGet (673) sees the data inventory and compliance
overview: superusers and, for their tenant's slice, tenant
administrators, by default and through the one-time grants on servers
that already have their roles stored.
A Compliance Officer role at server level holds it with reading and
exporting the audit log, placing, widening, releasing and exporting
legal holds, seeing account locks, and reading accounts, lists,
domains, tenants and roles. It changes no server setting, creates or
deletes no account, and can't shorten audit retention.
A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of their own tenant (MT-3), so
the tenant role is one "Compliance Officer" role per tenant, without
holds (LH-13): made once for every tenant a server has, and whenever a
tenant is created. While nobody holds it, it is removed with its tenant
so it doesn't block the delete, and put back if the delete is refused
for another reason. Both roles carry a user's own permissions too,
since roles given to a person replace the default user role, which a
tenant's accounts can't hold anyway.
Every server makes these once, new or existing -- the built-in roles
are only made on a server with none -- and records each under P c, so a
role an administrator deletes stays deleted.
Tested: unit tests (neither role changes a setting beyond a user's
own; holds for the server's officer only; per-place records); a new
compliance system test (one server-level role; an officer reads the
audit log, places and releases a hold, and is refused a setting, an
account and audit retention; a tenant gets its role, whose holder reads
the tenant's audit log and no holds; a tenant with an unused role is
deleted and the role goes with it); the system, audit, legal hold,
account lock and SCIM suites; fork checks. The directory suite needs
its LDAP container and wasn't run here.
D1 becomes a fork-owned setting, as audit retention is, because a field
on x:TracerLog would change x:Bootstrap's stored format. D5 waits for
the v0.16.24 import's reworked spam-rules loader.
Personal-data catalog spec, defaults D2, D3, D4, D6 and D7 (settled
2026-09-28, new installs only):
- D2: automatic IP bans expire after 30 days instead of never; D3:
spam training samples, whole messages, are kept 90 days instead of
180; D4: Pyzor, which sends a digest of each message's text to a
public server, is off; D6: delivery history is kept 14 days instead
of 30. Written on the first boot of a new install only -- one with no
roles yet, the same test the built-in roles use -- by reading each
singleton, setting these fields and writing it back whole. A server
with roles keeps its settings, saved or default.
- D7: a webhook created from now on starts with the include policy and
no events, so it sends nothing until events are chosen (Rust default
and schema default, marked). The registry stores every field, so
existing webhooks keep their policy.
- Expired bans are also removed by the daily data clean-up. They
already stopped blocking and were deleted when settings next loaded;
a server that seldom reloads kept them.
D1 (log retention) and D5 (the hashed-address blocklist off) are held,
and the spec says why: x:TracerLog is stored inside x:Bootstrap with a
field after it, so adding one changes that object's stored format; and
the spam-rules loader D5 touches is being reworked by the v0.16.24
import. The spec also corrects finding 3: expired bans were deleted on
settings load; bans were permanent only because no period is set.
Tested: unit tests for the new-install values and that everything else
in each singleton stays; the system suite, whose security test now
purges an expired ban and checks its record is gone; the telemetry
test; common's unit tests; fork checks.
The sidecar catalog; the Compliance Officer places and releases holds;
the Tenant Compliance Officer is built now; shortening audit retention
is recorded and surfaced, not gated on a second person; all seven
new-install defaults, in Phase 3; the webhook finding fixed now as a
bug; snapshots kept as long as the audit log.
Phase 1 of the GDPR auditor foundation: the investigation and the
design, committed before anything is built (SPEC.md §3 rule 3).
It maps every place the server stores or sends personal data found
in the code at de275ba, each with its categories, whose data it is,
the settings that control it, what bounds its retention, where it
lives, whether it leaves the host, its scope and the code that writes
it, and the default in a new install. It proposes a sidecar catalog
(resources/privacy/catalog.toml), since the schema and registry code
are upstream's generated output with no generator here; a CI check
modeled on name-check.py; a strip-report section; a read-only
inventory method with dated snapshots; a Compliance Officer role; and
the Compliance navigation with Overview and Data inventory.
Findings worth reading on their own: webhooks ignore levels and, at
their defaults, receive every event including raw SMTP input; log
files are never deleted; automatic bans never expire; some of the
fork's records outlive the account; spam training keeps whole
messages for 180 days; traces are on in a new install; the spam
filter sends IPs, domains, hashed addresses and body digests to
third-party services by default.
Proposed default changes (new installs only) and seven open questions
are for John to decide. No default is changed.
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