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Author SHA1 Message Date
jcoffey-dev 8afaee7d21 DLP and mail flow rules: inbuxa:MailRule over JMAP, and its permissions
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Phase 2e of the DLP and mail flow rules spec, the API half.

- inbuxa:MailRule/get and /set under urn:inbuxa:jmap. Rules convert
  through serde, so what a client sends is the stored format. A create
  or change is validated whole (Rule::validate) and refused with the
  property at fault; id, createdBy, createdAt and updatedAt are the
  server's. Every change goes through the request layer's audit record.
- Six permissions, ids 674-679 (enum and schema labels): mail flow rules
  (sysMailRuleGet/Update), DLP rules (sysDlpPolicyGet/Update) and held
  mail (sysDlpReviewGet/Update, for phase 3). Either kind's permission
  gets through the gate; the handler shows and changes each rule only
  with its own kind's. All server-level: a tenant is refused (settled
  answer 3).
- Administrators get all six; the server-level Compliance Officer gets
  DLP rules to see and held mail to review (settled answer 4), added
  once to an existing server's officer role by the grant mechanism,
  which gains an officer audience.
- Privacy catalog entry for inbuxa:MailRule.

tests/src/system/mail_rules.rs: create, list in order, validation,
server-set properties refused, update, kind-separated permissions for
an officer, destroy, audit records.
2026-09-28 17:29:35 -07:00
jcoffey-dev 63adb4e2b8 Add the compliance permission and the Compliance Officer roles
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Personal-data catalog spec, §7 (settled 2026-09-28).

sysComplianceGet (673) sees the data inventory and compliance
overview: superusers and, for their tenant's slice, tenant
administrators, by default and through the one-time grants on servers
that already have their roles stored.

A Compliance Officer role at server level holds it with reading and
exporting the audit log, placing, widening, releasing and exporting
legal holds, seeing account locks, and reading accounts, lists,
domains, tenants and roles. It changes no server setting, creates or
deletes no account, and can't shorten audit retention.

A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of their own tenant (MT-3), so
the tenant role is one "Compliance Officer" role per tenant, without
holds (LH-13): made once for every tenant a server has, and whenever a
tenant is created. While nobody holds it, it is removed with its tenant
so it doesn't block the delete, and put back if the delete is refused
for another reason. Both roles carry a user's own permissions too,
since roles given to a person replace the default user role, which a
tenant's accounts can't hold anyway.

Every server makes these once, new or existing -- the built-in roles
are only made on a server with none -- and records each under P c, so a
role an administrator deletes stays deleted.

Tested: unit tests (neither role changes a setting beyond a user's
own; holds for the server's officer only; per-place records); a new
compliance system test (one server-level role; an officer reads the
audit log, places and releases a hold, and is refused a setting, an
account and audit retention; a tenant gets its role, whose holder reads
the tenant's audit log and no holds; a tenant with an unused role is
deleted and the role goes with it); the system, audit, legal hold,
account lock and SCIM suites; fork checks. The directory suite needs
its LDAP container and wasn't run here.
2026-09-28 08:50:17 -07:00