81deaa69c4044954db87d5c68857f38f2e435ed6
93
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jcoffey-dev
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20abf69d31 |
x:Metric: say which node wrote each sample
Each node stores histograms as running totals since it started. A sample didn't say which node wrote it (the node was only in the id's low bits), so a reader couldn't diff totals per node, and the console diffed across nodes: on the three-node production cluster the delivery attempt time read 14.7 s over the last hour against 0.7 s from the nodes' own figures. x:Metric/get now returns nodeId alongside timestamp, both from the id. The telemetry suite checks every sample carries it. |
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jcoffey-dev
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faf3d1e056 |
Take a token, never a password, outside DAV
Anyone could host a copy of a front end on a server of their own, collect a person's password there, and replay it as HTTP Basic against JMAP or the API. Cross-origin rules don't stop that, since a server isn't a browser, and neither does client registration, since Basic never goes through OAuth (contract C-23). JMAP (session, API, upload, download, event source, WebSocket), /api, /auth/introspect, /auth/userinfo and authenticated /auth/register now refuse an Authorization: Basic header before looking at the password, with a 401 whose only challenge is Bearer. A wrong password gets the same answer as the right one. CalDAV and CardDAV keep Basic, and their 401s still offer it. The sign-in page's /api/auth takes the password in its body and is unaffected, as is the token endpoint's client authentication. Bootstrap and recovery mode accept Basic everywhere, as they keep permissive CORS. INBUXA_HTTP_BASIC_AUTH=all puts it back everywhere; dav is the default, and any other value logs a warning and keeps it. Test builds accept Basic everywhere, since the integration suites sign in with passwords, and legacy_protocols.py sets the variable. Tested: unit tests for the paths, and tests/e2e/http_basic_auth.py against the debug build, 26 checks, including both front ends' sign-in path and a refused unregistered redirect. |
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jcoffey-dev
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eea96e8674 | Security to-do list: accepted items, kept on the server | ||
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jcoffey-dev
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441ad0b18e |
Journaling: capture at the queue, the built-in journal, retention
Phase 2 of the journaling spec. - A copy of each message is taken in MessageWrapper::queue, after DLP and transport rules, for every enabled journal that takes it (direction and scope: everyone, or accounts, groups, domains, tenants). If the copy can't be taken the message isn't queued (temporary failure). - The journal report: the envelope one field a line (sender, To, Cc, Bcc from the envelope, list members from their ORCPT, direction, held for review), then the queued message byte for byte as message/rfc822. - The built-in journal under J in the inbuxa subspace: one chain per node whose links name each entry by SHA-256, so entries can expire out of chain order; purge leaves a marker, and verify catches an entry changed or removed early and a report that doesn't match. - Retention per journal (30 to 3650 days); an entry keeps what it was written with. The daily maintenance purges what's due, keeping entries whose people a legal hold covers (deleted accounts a hold keeps too), and records the counts in the audit log. - inbuxa:Journal get/set, audited by the request layer. Permissions 680-683: administrators see and change journals; the Compliance Officer sees, searches and exports. Whoever changes journals may grant search and export without holding them, so officers can still be appointed. - Catalog entries (inbuxa:Journal, source "journal"); spec as-built notes. tests/src/system/journal.rs: validation, internal mail with a Bcc, outgoing into two journals, incoming over LMTP, the report and its original, tamper and early removal caught, hold-aware purge, retention changes leave entries alone, disabled and removed journals take nothing. |
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jcoffey-dev
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e35fc3e6d6 | Ports: each node checks the others' ports from outside | ||
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jcoffey-dev
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15064d6fd5 | Merge pull request 'Webhooks: send one sample event to a saved webhook' (#100) from feature/webhook-test into main | ||
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jcoffey-dev
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8afaee7d21 |
DLP and mail flow rules: inbuxa:MailRule over JMAP, and its permissions
Phase 2e of the DLP and mail flow rules spec, the API half. - inbuxa:MailRule/get and /set under urn:inbuxa:jmap. Rules convert through serde, so what a client sends is the stored format. A create or change is validated whole (Rule::validate) and refused with the property at fault; id, createdBy, createdAt and updatedAt are the server's. Every change goes through the request layer's audit record. - Six permissions, ids 674-679 (enum and schema labels): mail flow rules (sysMailRuleGet/Update), DLP rules (sysDlpPolicyGet/Update) and held mail (sysDlpReviewGet/Update, for phase 3). Either kind's permission gets through the gate; the handler shows and changes each rule only with its own kind's. All server-level: a tenant is refused (settled answer 3). - Administrators get all six; the server-level Compliance Officer gets DLP rules to see and held mail to review (settled answer 4), added once to an existing server's officer role by the grant mechanism, which gains an officer audience. - Privacy catalog entry for inbuxa:MailRule. tests/src/system/mail_rules.rs: create, list in order, validation, server-set properties refused, update, kind-separated permissions for an officer, destroy, audit records. |
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jcoffey-dev
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9e0aab6b6a | Webhooks: send one sample event to a saved webhook | ||
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jcoffey-dev
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beb6c33e63 |
ACME: a renewal that isn't due yet is rescheduled, not failed for good
When a valid certificate already covered a domain's names (one stored by hand before the domain was switched to automatic, for instance), the renewal task ended with NotDue, which the task manager treats as a permanent failure. Nothing rescheduled it, so the certificate expired unrenewed. The renewal now returns a new AcmeRenewal task due when the certificate falls due, the same way a successful renewal does, and logs it as a backoff. The ACME integration suite checks that renewing again right after issuance hands back one AcmeRenewal for that domain, due at the certificate's renewal point. |
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jcoffey-dev
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b20b09f81a |
New installs start with the hashed-address blocklist off, and DNSBL zones read right
Personal-data catalog spec, default D5 (settled 2026-09-28; built after the v0.16.24 import's spam-rules loader landed). msbl.org's EBL is sent a SHA-1 of every email address it's asked about. A new install's first boot now leaves a note, and the rules update, once the bundled rules are in, switches STWT_MSBL_EBL_EMAIL off and forgets the note, so it happens once; the loader keeps that switch through later updates. An existing server has no note and keeps every blocklist as it is. Also fixes the data inventory's DNSBL endpoints: a zone is an expression (`ip_reverse + '.zen.spamhaus.org'`, conditional branches, `hash(email, 'sha1') + '.ebl.msbl.org'`), and the zone names are now the quoted literals that start with a dot, from every branch, rather than the expression's text. Tested: unit test for the zone rule; the compliance system test (no note, no change; the inventory lists ebl.msbl.org, not a hash; with the note the blocklist goes off; the note works once); the system suite; fork checks. |
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jcoffey-dev
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a8fb10458b |
Evaluate the personal-data catalog: the data inventory and its history
Personal-data catalog spec, §6 (Phase 3c). inbuxa:DataInventory/get evaluates the catalog against the server's live settings and says what this server holds: for each source and each object that can hold personal data, its categories and whose data it is, whether it is collected here at all, what bounds its retention (the live value of the setting that does, or unbounded), whether it leaves the host and to which endpoints, and a summary. Every host that receives something is listed once as a candidate processor with what it receives. Inside a tenant it answers with the tenant's slice and none of the server's processors. Read-only, with sysComplianceGet. inbuxa:InventorySnapshot/get is the history: a dated copy of the evaluated inventory, recorded when it changes -- after a registry write to an object the inventory reads, after inbuxa's log, audit or AI settings change, and on the daily clean-up -- and kept as long as the audit log's records. ids: null lists every snapshot, newest first; the full inventory only when asked for. The catalog is embedded and parsed at start (new dependency: toml, MIT/Apache); the evaluation is a pure function of it and the live facts, so each configuration is tested without a server. Loopback endpoints stay on the host; any other configured endpoint leaves it. Tested: unit tests for the evaluation (a new install's defaults, an external blob store, a hosted AI endpoint, telemetry off, a tenant's slice, hosts from URLs, loopback), snapshots, and the fact gathering's store and duration rules; the compliance system test, extended (the officer reads the inventory, a plain user is refused, a tenant's officer sees its slice and no processors, a webhook to another host becomes a processor and a snapshot names x:WebHook, a retention change reads through); the system, audit, legal hold and account lock suites; fork checks. The system suite failed once of three runs with an email import's blob not found, in antispam.rs; the same happened once in purge.rs on the previous branch. Nothing here touches uploads; noted for a separate look. |
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jcoffey-dev
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7285b3e38a |
Merge main (upstream v0.16.24) into feature/compliance-roles
The schema conflicted as a binary file: taken from main and the one edit here re-applied (sysComplianceGet after sysLegalHoldExport). The import kept the permission count at 673, so the new id stays 673. Retested on the merged tree in its own target directory: the compliance and system suites pass. One earlier system run failed in purge.rs (an imported blob not found) and didn't recur. |
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jcoffey-dev
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9893452ca2 | Merge pull request 'Merge upstream v0.16.24' (#84) from merge/upstream-v0.16.24 into main | ||
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jcoffey-dev
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63adb4e2b8 |
Add the compliance permission and the Compliance Officer roles
Personal-data catalog spec, §7 (settled 2026-09-28). sysComplianceGet (673) sees the data inventory and compliance overview: superusers and, for their tenant's slice, tenant administrators, by default and through the one-time grants on servers that already have their roles stored. A Compliance Officer role at server level holds it with reading and exporting the audit log, placing, widening, releasing and exporting legal holds, seeing account locks, and reading accounts, lists, domains, tenants and roles. It changes no server setting, creates or deletes no account, and can't shorten audit retention. A tenant's accounts can hold only roles of their own tenant (MT-3), so the tenant role is one "Compliance Officer" role per tenant, without holds (LH-13): made once for every tenant a server has, and whenever a tenant is created. While nobody holds it, it is removed with its tenant so it doesn't block the delete, and put back if the delete is refused for another reason. Both roles carry a user's own permissions too, since roles given to a person replace the default user role, which a tenant's accounts can't hold anyway. Every server makes these once, new or existing -- the built-in roles are only made on a server with none -- and records each under P c, so a role an administrator deletes stays deleted. Tested: unit tests (neither role changes a setting beyond a user's own; holds for the server's officer only; per-place records); a new compliance system test (one server-level role; an officer reads the audit log, places and releases a hold, and is refused a setting, an account and audit retention; a tenant gets its role, whose holder reads the tenant's audit log and no holds; a tenant with an unused role is deleted and the role goes with it); the system, audit, legal hold, account lock and SCIM suites; fork checks. The directory suite needs its LDAP container and wasn't run here. |
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jcoffey-dev
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1d5a49409f |
Keep rotated log files for a set number of days
Personal-data catalog spec, default D1 (settled 2026-09-28): log files were never deleted. inbuxa:LogSettings.keepForDays says how many days rotated log files are kept; unset (null) keeps every file, as before, and a new install sets 30 days. It is a fork-owned setting, stored under T + l as audit retention is, not a field on x:TracerLog: that object is also stored inside x:Bootstrap with a field after it, so a new field would change x:Bootstrap's stored format. Server-level, with the tracers' permissions (sysTracerGet, sysTracerUpdate); changes are in the audit log, before and after. Log files are local, so every node deletes its own: hourly, and at once when the setting changes on that node. Only regular files named <prefix>.<something> in each enabled log tracer's directory, last changed more than the limit ago, are removed; the file being written is never that old, and nothing else in the directory is touched. Minimum one day. The catalog classifies inbuxa:LogSettings and points the log file's retention at it. Tested: unit tests for the file rule (only this log's old files; the current file, other files and directories stay) and a purge on disk; the system suite, which reads, sets, refuses zero, restores null and checks the audit records; fork checks. |
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jcoffey-dev
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80d6c09c59 |
Merge main into merge/upstream-v0.16.24
The schema, which both sides changed, merged as JSON with no conflicts. The personal-data catalog (#83) gains upstream's new x:DnsServerPowerDns: nothing personal but its API key, like the other DNS providers. |
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jcoffey-dev
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a0ffdb8071 |
New-install privacy defaults, and expired bans purged daily
Personal-data catalog spec, defaults D2, D3, D4, D6 and D7 (settled 2026-09-28, new installs only): - D2: automatic IP bans expire after 30 days instead of never; D3: spam training samples, whole messages, are kept 90 days instead of 180; D4: Pyzor, which sends a digest of each message's text to a public server, is off; D6: delivery history is kept 14 days instead of 30. Written on the first boot of a new install only -- one with no roles yet, the same test the built-in roles use -- by reading each singleton, setting these fields and writing it back whole. A server with roles keeps its settings, saved or default. - D7: a webhook created from now on starts with the include policy and no events, so it sends nothing until events are chosen (Rust default and schema default, marked). The registry stores every field, so existing webhooks keep their policy. - Expired bans are also removed by the daily data clean-up. They already stopped blocking and were deleted when settings next loaded; a server that seldom reloads kept them. D1 (log retention) and D5 (the hashed-address blocklist off) are held, and the spec says why: x:TracerLog is stored inside x:Bootstrap with a field after it, so adding one changes that object's stored format; and the spam-rules loader D5 touches is being reworked by the v0.16.24 import. The spec also corrects finding 3: expired bans were deleted on settings load; bans were permanent only because no period is set. Tested: unit tests for the new-install values and that everything else in each singleton stays; the system suite, whose security test now purges an expired ban and checks its record is gone; the telemetry test; common's unit tests; fork checks. |
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jcoffey-dev
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6945714aa9 |
Stop webhooks sending every event, message content included
A webhook has a level (info by default) that nothing read: its events were chosen by its list and policy alone. With the default policy, exclude, and nothing listed, that meant every event type, including smtp.raw-input (the raw SMTP bytes, DATA included) and the model's reply to the spam classifier. The docs suggest a webhook to pass the audit log to a SIEM; set up that way it would have received whole messages. Found by the personal-data catalog investigation (finding 1). Now an include list is sent as named, whatever each event's level: naming an event is the choice. Otherwise a webhook gets only events at or above its level, as a tracer does, and never a protocol's raw input or output (IMAP, SMTP, POP3, ManageSieve, delivery, milter), which carries whole messages and credentials; those go out only when named. Tested: unit tests for the rule (level, raw I/O only when named, a named event below the level, custom event levels, a webhook's own errors); the telemetry system test, whose webhook names debug-level connection events and still receives them. |
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jcoffey-dev
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b2453d066b |
Merge upstream v0.16.24
Eight conflicted files resolved, plus the lock file and the schema:
- crates/services/src/task_manager/spam_classifier.rs: upstream's rules
update now replaces existing rules, DNSBL servers, lookups and file
extensions, keeping only whether each is on. Taken, with one difference:
an object an admin edited is kept as it is. Every object an update writes
is fingerprinted (content without `enable`, SHA-256, stored under
SUBSPACE_INBUXA "Sf"), and only one that still matches is replaced.
Scores are never replaced, as upstream has it. The AU-1.10 summary record
now names what was added, replaced and kept, and the bundled rules are
marked applied only when the update fully succeeded, so a failure runs
again on the next start. The marker becomes "3.0.2+2", which runs the
update once on upgrade to fingerprint every rule still as bundled.
- crates/common/src/network/autoconfig/autodiscover.rs: upstream's rewrite
(implicit TLS first, labeled SSL), with the per-protocol switches (LP-7,
LP-14a) passed in as a filter.
- crates/store/src/backend/mysql/{search,write}.rs: upstream's chunked
deletes (no unbounded first DELETE, stop on a short chunk, halve the
chunk on the new chunk-too-large errors) inside the fork's query timeout.
- crates/smtp/src/lib.rs: the fork's queue spawn kept. It already fixed the
stall upstream fixes here (a node without outboundMta stops accepting
mail at about 1024 queued messages), and follows role changes live.
- crates/jmap/src/registry/mapping/bootstrap.rs: the log path stays
/var/log/inbuxa/; upstream's PowerDNS mapping taken.
- crates/main/Cargo.toml: the AGPL-only license kept, version 0.16.24.
- tests/src/jmap/principal/get.rs: the fork's capabilities kept.
- resources/schema/schema.json.gz: merged as JSON; upstream relabeled the
vendor Sieve extensions "(Stalwart)", kept as "(vnd.inbuxa)".
- Cargo.lock: upstream's, with the fork's crates added by Cargo.
Also:
- tests/src/smtp/inbound/spam_rules_kept.rs: an edited rule survives an
update, an unedited one is updated, rules from before fingerprints are
handled, and the audit summary says so. Upstream's own spam_rules test
passes unchanged.
- tests/src/smtp/reporting/reschedule.rs moves to port 19058; upstream's
new spam_rules test took 19057.
- tools/fork/renames.py renames the "(Stalwart)" labels and the default
log path, so neither conflicts again.
- tools/fork/notice-check.py compares against the newest snapshot in the
checked-out history instead of the upstream branch head, so moving the
branch no longer fails other open pull requests.
- tests/src/directory/issuer.rs (since v0.16.23) stays out, and is on the
build check's known list: it tests issuer-based directory routing, which
the fork doesn't have (DIR-2).
- Strip report: docs/fork/strip-reports/v0.16.24.{md,json}.
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jcoffey-dev
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f59b084ce5 |
Import upstream v0.16.24, stripped
Upstream commit: af37a234981722493b74623a983581691d2b70b6 Enterprise-only files removed or emptied: 63 Enterprise-only snippets removed: 118 in 50 files Dangling module declarations removed: 5 Edits turning enterprise off: 25 Third-party code: 14 files, 0 not in THIRD-PARTY.md Renamed identifiers: 62 in 18 files Verification: clean The same Enterprise footprint as v0.16.23. The build check fails only on tests/src/directory/issuer.rs, unchanged since v0.16.23: it calls a helper from upstream's Enterprise-only OIDC test, and tests issuer-based directory routing, an Enterprise feature. main has never carried it. |
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jcoffey-dev
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8e9cedbe97 |
Give IMAP, POP3 and ManageSieve a switch each
The legacy-protocols switch was all or nothing. An operator can now stop
POP3 and keep IMAP: each of IMAP, POP3 and ManageSieve has its own
switch, server-wide on inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy and per tenant on
inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy (properties imap, pop3, manageSieve).
legacyProtocols stays as the kill-all: setting it sets all three, and it
reads "disabled" exactly when all three are off. A policy stored before
this has only legacyProtocols and reads as all three at that value, so
existing servers and tenants carry over unchanged. In one /set, a
protocol named beside legacyProtocols overrides it.
SMTP submission keeps no switch of its own: sign-in over it is refused
only when all three are off, as the single switch did (LP-6), so
turning one protocol off never stops a mail app sending. For a tenant,
the server's switches and the tenant's count together.
Server-wide, a change closes the listeners of whatever is now off and
puts back the saved listeners of whatever is on again, both in one
change if asked; listeners of a protocol still off stay saved. Sign-in,
autoconfig, autodiscover, PACC (now prepared once per combination) and
the suggested DNS records all follow each protocol separately. A tenant
may turn a protocol on only while the server has it on (LP-9), and the
refusal names which. The JMAP session adds legacyAllowed, the protocols
still allowed for the account; legacyProtocols there keeps its meaning
for older webmail builds. Events name the switches ("pop3 disabled"),
and audit before/after reads every switch even from an older policy.
Tested: unit tests for the switches, the old-policy reading, the
server/tenant combination, the tenant refusal and listener refusal; and
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py against a running server, all 100 checks,
including new ones: POP3 alone off closes only its port and refuses
only its sign-in while IMAP and sending go on; only POP3 stops being
advertised; one change closes IMAP and reopens POP3; a tenant turns
POP3 off for itself, and can't turn IMAP on while the server has it off.
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jcoffey-dev
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538ae107d7 |
Legal holds, step 6: what each hold keeps
inbuxa:LegalHold/get answers accountsCovered, itemsHeld and sizeHeld when asked: the accounts a hold reaches now (deleted ones it keeps included) and the archived items it keeps, with their size. Worked out in one pass over accounts and archive, only for requests that name them. Held items stay out of the user's quota, as all archived copies do (LH-9). |
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jcoffey-dev
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39707cd2e8 |
Legal holds, step 5: held accounts can't be destroyed
Destroying a held account removes the login, as offboarding needs, but keeps its data as a deleted account with no expiry, whether or not undelete keeps accounts; its addresses stay reserved and its holds name it from then on. Destroy-now refuses it, and its DestroyAccount task defers itself while it's held or its time hasn't come. Holds placed or released later freeze or free kept accounts in the same settle pass, with 30 days' grace after the last release (LH-8, LH-10). |
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jcoffey-dev
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8d3e99bc00 |
Legal holds, step 4: freezing, release, and the audit log
Placing or widening a hold freezes what's already archived in its scope and range, its old deadline noted; releasing one gives each item no other hold covers that deadline back, or release plus 30 days if later. One pass over the archive does both and changes nothing twice (LH-6, LH-10, LH-11). A held archived item can't be destroyed; restoring still can, and the hold is named only to callers who may see holds (LH-7). Audit records about a held account survive the purge (AU-7). Fixes the daily clean-up of expired archived items (UD-13), which never found any: the registry's unfiltered query reads an all-ids index that archived items aren't in. Items are now walked account by account, kept deleted accounts included. Expired items were still removed whenever their account's archive was read. |
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jcoffey-dev
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7b97efbb7f |
Legal holds, step 3: deleted items in a held account are kept
Every way of deleting mail (JMAP, IMAP EXPUNGE, POP3, mailbox removal, Trash emptying) and Sieve scripts, events, contacts and files now asks how the account's deletions are kept: a hold keeps them with no expiry (archivedUntil 9999-12-31), even with undelete off; otherwise undelete's period applies as before (LH-4). A hold's date range decides by the item's own date (LH-3). Mail is noted as held at deletion and settled when it's archived, once its received date is known; outside the range it gets undelete's deadline or isn't kept. Events go by their start, with a day's slack for time zones; recurring events, contacts, files and scripts are held whole. A groupware item's note now stays until its archive succeeds, and a failure retries the task instead of being logged and lost (LH-5). |
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jcoffey-dev
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318783f444 |
Legal holds, step 2: who a hold covers
A hold reaches an account by name, through any of its addresses' domains, its groups or its tenant, as they are now, so an account added to a held domain later is held too. An account that leaves a held domain, group or tenant stays held: the registry write hook adds it to the hold by name on every account change, whoever makes it (LH-2). Server::holds_on answers for the deletion paths, from the store each time so a hold binds every node at once. |
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jcoffey-dev
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5d2e35b2dc |
Legal holds, step 1: the hold itself
inbuxa:LegalHold get/set places a hold on accounts, groups, domains, tenants or the whole server, with an optional date range. A hold's range and scope can only widen, a released hold is read-only, and none is ever deleted. Placing, changing and releasing each need a reason and are audited (LH-1, LH-3, LH-10, AU-12). Permissions 669-672 (see, place, widen or release, export held data) go to server administrators only; the tenant ceiling always strips them, as it does Impersonate (LH-13). Schema: Compliance > Legal Holds. What a hold keeps comes next, through the undelete hooks. Also moves the lock expiry helpers below the lock module's imports. |
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jcoffey-dev
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9f6761c9dd |
Writing delegates may add at the top of a locked account's Files
A shared account refuses top-level folders, so an organize or full delegate couldn't add anything to a locked account with no folders. A delegate who may write now can, as the owner could; the reconcile after the create grants it the new folder. Read delegates still can't (AL-6, AL-7). |
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jcoffey-dev
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d4d127fa7d |
Delegates reach the whole locked account
A delegate's token listed the locked account only for kinds of data it held grants on, so one with no files (or no calendar) was refused to the delegate outright: "You do not have access to account". The token now lists the locked account for mail, calendars, contacts and files alike, so an empty kind reads as empty. What the delegate may see or change is still each container's grant (AL-7). |
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jcoffey-dev
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447229f871 |
Lock accounts: keep receiving mail, no sign-in, hand to delegates
A locked account can't sign in (it fails as a wrong password does), its sessions end on every node, refresh tokens stop working, and its Sieve scripts forward and reply to nothing. Mail keeps arriving. Delegates get real ACL grants on the account's mailboxes, calendars, address books and files at read, organize or full, with the rights they replaced restored on unlock. Folders made later are granted after the create and in a daily sweep. Organize delegates can't destroy; send-as needs organize or full. The JMAP session marks delegated accounts in urn:inbuxa:jmap. New inbuxa:AccountLock object with get/set, permissions 665-668, and a Compliance > Locked Accounts entry in the schema. Lock, unlock and delegate changes need a reason and are audited; delegate access and writes are audited too (audit-hold-lock spec AL-1 to AL-12). |
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jcoffey-dev
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86d7ebd982 |
Audit log: a permanent, tamper-evident record of admin actions
What administrators and the server itself do to the control plane is now recorded, from inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md (AU-1 to AU-12): settings, accounts, domains, roles and every other registry change, with each field's before and after (secrets only as "changed"); the fork's own settings objects; administrator sign-ins (and failed ones to administrator accounts), master-user and recovery-admin sign-ins, once an hour per account, method and address; access to another account's data through impersonation or FetchAnyBlob, once an hour; exports and tamper checks; and registry writes the server makes on its own, named by subsystem (system:AcmeRenewal, system:auto-ban, system:directory-sync, ...), with a spam rules update as one summary record. No change without its record (AU-3): before a set method changes anything, a pending record per requested create, update and destroy is written; if that fails, the method is refused with serverFail. Its outcome follows as a later entry. A change interrupted by a crash stays "unfinished". Records live in the fork's subspace under L, as one SHA-256 hash chain per node. The chain's head is stored, never cached, and every append asserts it, so two writers can't take the same place. Nothing can edit or delete a record; the daily purge removes the oldest past the retention (default 730 days, minimum 90) and records where the chain now starts, so verification still passes. security.audit-recorded (647) copies each record to webhooks, OpenTelemetry and the log; security.audit-write-failed (648) reports a failed write. New JMAP objects under urn:inbuxa:jmap: inbuxa:AuditEvent/get and /query (filters: time, actor, action, target, account, tenant, outcome, address, text), inbuxa:AuditSettings, inbuxa:AuditExport (CSV or JSON Lines built on the server, each line with its chain hash, ending in a manifest; the created object names the blob and its SHA-256) and inbuxa:AuditVerification. New permissions sysAuditGet, sysAuditExport and sysAuditSettingsUpdate: the Administrator role gets all three, the Tenant Administrator role gets read and export, once, on existing installs too. A tenant administrator sees records whose actor or target is in its tenant, including a server administrator's changes there. Sign-in method on the session: access tokens now remember how they signed in (password, app password, API key, OAuth client, directory, master user, recovery admin), including across the HTTP credential cache. New OAuth access tokens carry their client id in the sealed claims; older ones show as client "unknown" until they expire. The schema gains the permissions, the two events and a Management > Compliance > Audit Log link. Stack: the request layer boxes every inner future where it's made. Without that, a debug build overflowed the default 2 MB worker stack on a registry set; measured with the same request, the branch and main now overflow at the same stack size (between 1856 and 1920 KiB, debug), so the layer adds nothing measurable. Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap; system::audit::audit_log_tests (run with --ignored) passes on RocksDB, SQLite, PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL with a read replica, MySQL, MySQL with a replica and FoundationDB. The system, JMAP and SCIM suites pass. authorization.rs skipped fork permissions that guard no registry object; the audit suite checks a plain user is refused instead. |
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jcoffey-dev
|
7e7eca0883 |
Explain: shorter answers, streamed, remembered, and prepared for settings
ai-explain spec, amendment 1 (EX-22 to EX-28): - answers are three or four sentences, max_tokens 160, cut at 700 chars; - POST /api/explain streams the answer as server-sent events; - each node remembers answers in memory (1,000, 24 h), keyed by the facts, prompt version and model, shared by server-level administrators; - resources/explain/settings.json.gz ships answers for settings at their defaults, generated with prepare_setting_explanations (717 for 2026.9.27); - the system prompt no longer carries the per-request marker, so a model server can reuse it; - inbuxa:Explanation gains source, answeredAt and preparedFor. |
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jcoffey-dev
|
b6f943a77c |
Don't listen on a socket whose bind failed
When a listener couldn't bind its address (a port below 1024 without root, a port already in use, or the legacy-protocols switch putting a listener back after privileges were dropped), the bind error was reported but the socket was still passed to listen(). The kernel then bound it itself, to a random port on every interface, and the server logged the listener as started on the port it was configured with. listen() now refuses a socket that isn't bound, so the listener is reported with a listen error and skipped, and nothing opens anywhere unexpected. |
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jcoffey-dev
|
d9a6db025b |
Explain this: the local model reads delivery failures, verdicts, logs and settings
A new method, inbuxa:Explanation/set, asks the node's local model for a short plain-words reading of one thing an administrator is looking at: a failed recipient in the queue, a Classify verdict, a log line or trace event, or one setting with its saved value. The server builds the prompt itself from stored data and the registry schema, never from text the console sends, and grounds SMTP replies in RFC 3463 and RFC 5321. What the model is never shown: secrets (including ones nested inside a setting, like an AI model's HTTP auth), raw protocol events, and the contents of any other event. A tag name that doesn't have a tag's shape is refused before a model is asked. Calls share the AI gate with spam classification, but mail always keeps its slot, and Explain has its own hourly count per account and its own on/off switch in inbuxa:AiLimits. The permission is sysAiExplain, superuser only; tenant administrators can't use it. The session carries an aiExplain flag so a console knows when to offer the button. An install whose roles were stored before the permission existed gets it added once, at start-up, to the roles that are administrators' alone, not the User role their defaults share with every account. An operator who removes it later isn't overruled. Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap, and ai_explain_tests (run with --ignored) covering the acceptance tests and the upgrade. |
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jcoffey-dev
|
71ce11c57d |
Settings writes: wait for a burst to settle before reloading
A cluster rehearsal sent ten x:<Object>/set requests at once and got ten full reloads on every node. #39's coalescing only joined writes that queued behind a running reload, but the requests reached the server about 33 ms apart and a reload takes tens of milliseconds, so none overlapped one. A full reload after a registry write now waits for writes to settle: 75 ms after the last one, and at most 250 ms after the first it covers, so a steady stream still reloads at least four times a second. 75 ms is a little over twice the gap the rehearsal saw between requests. A single write pays it once: in the tests a settings write takes about 140 ms instead of 60. The reload runs in a task of its own, so a request that goes away doesn't cancel it for the others. Each write takes the result of the first reload that started after it was stored (the gate keeps the last 64 results), so applied true or false still describes the reload that covered that write. The 33 ms gap was a queue on the server, not password hashing: Basic credentials are cached per Authorization header, so they are checked once. Every authenticated HTTP request counted itself against the account's rate limit by incrementing one counter per account in the in-memory store, so parallel requests from one account queued on that key: a row lock on PostgreSQL (a few round trips to the database each) and conflict retries with a 50-300 ms backoff on RocksDB. An account with the unlimitedRequests permission (administrators, by default) passes the rate and concurrency limits anyway, so its requests are no longer counted. Ten parallel Core/echo calls as the admin now finish in 1-4 ms; before, they finished one after another over 20 ms on a local PostgreSQL and 300-450 ms on RocksDB. Other accounts still count every request. system::auto_reload::settings_reload_tests: ten concurrent writes now take one reload (the gate counts them; at most two allowed), all are applied: true and in the running settings, and a single write takes exactly one reload. RocksDB and PostgreSQL, 1 reload in 141-196 ms. With the old behavior (no wait, requests counted) the same writes took 5 reloads; without the wait but with the rate fix, 2. cluster::broadcast (3 nodes, PostgreSQL + NATS) and system::reload still pass. |
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
a891667149 |
Tracers whose settings change start over on reload
A cluster rehearsal moved a Log tracer to another directory: the write was reported x:settingsReload applied:true, but the tracer kept writing to the old file until a restart. Telemetry::update only refreshed each running tracer's events, level and lossiness; a tracer's own settings (path, prefix, rotation, format, endpoint, headers, ...) stayed as built. Each tracer now carries a hash of the registry object it was built from, less the fields that change in place. The reload compares it with the running tracer's: unchanged ones are updated in place as before, changed ones are started over, new ones started and removed ones stopped. Only tracers this server started are removed; upstream removed every subscriber not in the settings, which also cut off live-tracing streams on each reload. Starting over is a swap in the collector, so no event is lost or written twice: a subscriber registered under a running one's id replaces it between two collection passes. The old one's batch is sent first (what its full channel can't take moves to the new one), and dropping it closes its channel, so its task writes what is queued and ends. Per tracer kind: - Log: a tracer started over on the same files (rotation or format changed) waits for the old one to finish, so lines don't interleave. - Webhook: the task held a sender of its own channel for retries, so it never ended; retries now use a weak sender, and pending events are posted when the channel closes. - OpenTelemetry: pending logs and spans are exported when the channel closes instead of dropped, and a span that was open across the swap is exported by the new tracer with the events it saw. - Console and journal: nothing kept between batches. - Trace history: built from the tracing store, which takes a restart, so it is never started over. No kind needs a restart, so x:settingsReload doesn't gain one. system::tracer_reload::tracer_reload_tests (new): a Log tracer created over JMAP writes to its directory; its path is changed over JMAP while 2000 numbered events are emitted; after the reload, events land in the new file and not the old one, each numbered event is in exactly one of the two files, and a destroyed tracer writes nothing. On main the new file never appears. |
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
e00978c0b4 |
Cluster role changes apply to delivery and tasks without a restart
In cluster rehearsal 3, turning outboundMta off on node1's role was
reported applied (x:settingsReload applied: true), yet node1 kept
delivering mail, a report message included, until it was restarted.
The queue and report managers were started at boot only when the
node's role included outboundMta (crates/smtp/src/lib.rs), and the task
manager only when the role had some task type (spawn_task_manager).
After that nothing looked at the role again: a queue manager that was
running kept claiming and delivering, and one that wasn't never
started.
They now start on every node (outside recovery mode) and follow the
role live:
- Queue manager: before each scan it reads the role from the running
settings. Without outboundMta it claims nothing new; deliveries
already running finish and report back as usual, which releases
their locks. When the role comes back (a reload wakes the manager
with ReloadSettings, and it looks again every 30 s regardless) it
logs queue.started and scans the whole queue at once.
- Report scheduler: DMARC and TLS report events are handled only while
the role has outboundMta, as at boot; events arriving without it are
dropped, as they were on a node started without the role.
- Task manager: task_enabled already read the current role on every
scan. It now also runs on nodes whose role has no task type (the
scan returns at once until one is added), a job claimed before a
role change is handed back at once rather than run or held until
its lease lapses, and a settings reload wakes the manager so a role
that gained task types starts claiming them straight away.
Starting the queue manager on every node also drains the queue channel
on nodes without outboundMta. Upstream left that channel unread, so
each message queued there parked a refresh in it, and by the code,
queueing would block once 1024 had piled up (not reproduced here).
A role object edit reaches the nodes that name that role in
INBUXA_ROLE. Moving a node to another role still means changing its
environment, and so a restart. Listener changes in a role still need a
restart too (listeners bind at boot); this change is about tasks and
delivery.
cluster::live_roles::live_role_tests (new; PostgreSQL, two nodes over
one store):
1. A node started with outboundMta delivers and runs a TLS report
task; after its role loses outboundMta and the settings reload, a
new message isn't attempted and a new report task stays pending;
with the role back, both are taken up.
2. A node started with no task type at all gains outboundMta: a
waiting message is attempted and a report task runs.
On main the test fails at step 1 ("delivery attempted without
outboundMta"); with step 1 bypassed, step 2 fails (nothing picked the
message up in 20 s).
|
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
08f29926d4 |
SQL queries time out; readiness follows the data store
Cluster rehearsal 3: with PostgreSQL paused (docker pause, so its kernel still answered TCP keepalives), requests on connections already checked out hung until it came back, and /healthz/ready stayed 200 through the outage. #41 bounded getting a connection, not using one. Client-side query limits (store::backend::query_timeout). Every operation on a PostgreSQL or MySQL connection now runs under a time limit. A server-side statement_timeout (or MySQL's MAX_EXECUTION_TIME, which covers SELECTs only) can't do this: the server that would enforce it is the one not answering. When an operation runs out, its connection is closed instead of pooled, since a query may still be in flight on it or a transaction open: deadpool's Object::take on PostgreSQL; Conn::disconnect on MySQL, which marks the connection closed before it sends anything, so the pool discards it even when the server never answers. - query, 2 minutes: reads, writes (the whole transaction with its retries), blobs, SQL lookups, search queries and indexing. These take milliseconds; two minutes leaves room for a large blob over a slow link and still ends a hang. - maintenance, 30 minutes: range deletes (account removal, purges), unindexing, purge_store, and creating tables and indexes at startup, which can legitimately run long in one statement. Their existing chunked fallback for server-side statement timeouts is unchanged. - iterate (exports, reindexing, maintenance scans) can run for hours, so the query limit bounds each wait for the database (preparing, the query starting, the next row) rather than the whole scan. The limits are fixed, like the pool timeouts; the DataStore schema has no field for them. Tests set them with Store::with_query_timeouts (test_mode only). Readiness. /healthz/ready answered 200 whenever a data store was configured. It now reads one key from the data store with a 2 s limit and reuses the answer for 2 s, so probes can't load the database; while one probe runs, others get the last answer. The first failed probe of an outage is logged. /healthz/live stays 200: restarting a node doesn't bring its database back, and an orchestrator restarting on failed liveness would restart every node at once. The container HEALTHCHECK already uses /healthz/live. Tests, store::pool_timeout (a proxy that stops forwarding while keeping connections open plays the paused database): - postgres_query_timeout, mysql_query_timeout (new): with four pooled connections open, a read, a scan and a write each fail with "Query timed out" 2.0 s after the pause (2 s test limit); once the proxy forwards again the store answers. With the limits set to an hour (upstream's behavior), the read was still waiting at the test's 20 s limit. - postgres_readiness (new, STORE=PostgreSql): a node's data store goes through the proxy; /healthz/ready is 200, 503 about 4 s after the pause while /healthz/live stays 200, and 200 again about 2 s after it ends. - postgres_pool_timeout, mysql_pool_timeout: pass as before. store::store_tests (PostgreSql, MySql, including the MariaDB statement timeout step) and store::task_locks (PostgreSql) pass; store::search_tests (PostgreSql) fails at the same ordering assertion (query.rs:684) as on main. |
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
fcef4b1c3f |
Allowed IPs take the full settings reload after a write
write_reload_target sent AllowedIp writes to the blocked-IP reload, but
that reload rebuilds only BlockedIps. Allowed IPs are parsed into the
core's security settings (Security::parse), which only a full reload
rebuilds, so an AllowedIp write reported x:settingsReload applied: true
while the change wasn't live until the next full reload.
AllowedIp now maps to the full reload, like the other settings objects;
BlockedIp keeps its targeted reload.
system::auto_reload::settings_reload_tests now creates an allowed IP
over JMAP and checks that is_ip_allowed sees it with no ReloadSettings,
and that destroying it takes it out again. On main it fails ("allowed
IP not in the running settings").
|
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
6e50ba25a9 |
SQL pools time out; task locks are a renewed five-minute lease
A 3-node rehearsal (PostgreSQL + NATS + Garage) found two ways a crash leaves work stuck: Pool hangs. The PostgreSQL pool (deadpool) was built with no timeouts, so a request waited for a free connection, and for one to be opened or recycled, for as long as it took: forever when the server stopped answering. MySQL's pool (mysql_async) has no wait timeout at all. - PostgreSQL: wait 30 s (or the store's timeout if longer), create the store's timeout or 15 s (it bounds the whole handshake, where tokio-postgres's connect_timeout covers only the TCP connect), recycle 10 s. The pool config is now always set, not only with poolMaxConnections. - MySQL: every connection is taken through MysqlStore::conn(), which gives up after 30 s. - Both: TCP keepalive after 60 s idle, so a server that vanished without closing the connection is noticed in minutes rather than the two-hour system default. The DataStore schema has no pool timeout settings, so these are fixed defaults; the store's own timeout bounds connecting on PostgreSQL. Task locks. A task lock lasted an hour, so after a hard crash the dead node's tasks waited up to an hour and five minutes. The lock is now a five-minute lease: while this node runs a task, the task manager renews its lock every third of the lifetime (InMemoryStore::renew_lock, a compare-and-set on the store backends and SET XX EX on Redis, which leaves a lock that already expired alone). A killed node's tasks run elsewhere within about five minutes plus the claim recheck. A task this node holds isn't handed to a worker again by the scan. store::pool_timeout (new): a local listener that accepts connections and never answers plays a hung server; a PostgreSQL store with a 2 s timeout returns an error in about 4 s, and a MySQL store in 30 s. Without the timeouts both wait for good. store::task_locks gains a task held for 1.5 lock lifetimes: its lease is still held, and released when the task ends. |
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
2c684be5c9 |
Registry writes apply to the running settings without ReloadSettings
A 3-node rehearsal found that saving an MtaDeliverySchedule left it
unknown to the queue ("Queue strategy not found") until someone ran
x:Action ReloadSettings; only Directory and Authentication writes
reloaded (DIR-17). The admin UI has to remember a separate reload after
every save, and a script or API client that doesn't gets a server
running stale settings.
x:<Object>/set now reloads the running settings when it created,
updated or destroyed an object they are built from, and broadcasts the
same RegistryChange::Reload over the coordinator as ReloadSettings, so
every node applies it:
- Settings objects (MTA, spam filter, listeners, tracers, Sieve system
scripts, cluster roles, directories, ...: the object types the core,
telemetry, listener and directory builders read) get a full reload.
- Certificates, lookup stores and blocked/allowed IPs get their own
targeted reloads.
- Accounts, domains, roles and other data read as needed, stores (they
take a restart) and applications (their own reload action) get none.
Full reloads are coalesced: a write waits for a reload that started
after it was stored and joins one if it can, so a burst of writes, or
a request with many objects, costs one or two reloads, not one each.
The write itself is never undone. When the reload is refused (build
errors in objects that were working, the rule from the previous
commit), the set response says so in a new x:settingsReload field,
{"applied": false, "description": "Saved, but the running settings
were not reloaded. <object>: <error>"}; {"applied": true} otherwise.
The field is absent when the write needs no reload. The description
helper is shared with ReloadSettings' refusal.
Each reload sends the queue a ReloadSettings event, so the SMTP test
harness's read_event, try_read_event and assert_no_events now pass over
those; expect_reload_settings still waits for one.
system::auto_reload::settings_reload_tests (new): an MtaVirtualQueue
and an MtaDeliverySchedule created over JMAP are in the running
settings with no ReloadSettings, and gone once destroyed; eight
concurrent creates all land; a write whose reload fails is stored and
reported applied: false with the error; a domain write carries no
x:settingsReload. On main the new schedule is missing. The cluster
broadcast test (three nodes, PostgreSQL + NATS) now checks that every
node has a schedule created on node 0 without a reload.
|
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
999ae12cc7 |
Settings reload: no DNS at build time, don't refuse over old failures
A 3-node rehearsal found every settings reload refused, cluster-wide,
because one node couldn't resolve the Pyzor server:
- PyzorConfig::parse resolved the host while building the settings and
made a failed lookup a build error. It now keeps the host and port and
resolves when a message is checked (an IP address is used as is, a
name is reused for five minutes, the lookup counts against the Pyzor
timeout). A failure there is a Pyzor error for that message.
- A milter's hostname was resolved the same way, with a blocking
to_socket_addrs in async code. An IP address is kept; a name is now
resolved on each connection.
Other build-time I/O is already non-fatal: directories that can't
connect become unavailable with a warning (DIR-21), and the AI model
locality check only warns.
reload_registry swapped the core only when the whole build was free of
errors, while boot runs with whatever built. One failing object thus
refused every later reload, and the running settings went stale. Now a
reload is refused only for errors in objects that built when the
running settings were built (at boot or by the last applied reload):
applying it would lose those. Objects that already failed then are
missing from the running settings anyway, as at boot, so their errors
are logged and returned as known_errors but don't hold the reload back.
Refusing on new errors keeps a bad edit from taking a working object
out of service; the admin gets the error instead.
ReloadSettings now says "Settings were not reloaded." and names the
object and its error ("Tracer with id ...: Only one console tracer is
allowed"), with a count of any further errors. A refused reload after a
directory change logs its errors too.
system::reload::reload_tests (new): with Pyzor enabled on an
unresolvable host, ReloadSettings succeeds (on main it fails with
"Invalid address: failed to lookup address information"); an IP host
needs no lookup; a new build error refuses the reload, names the object
and leaves the running settings unchanged; the same error, once known
from the running settings' build, no longer blocks; once fixed, a new
error there blocks again. smtp::inbound::milter's session test now
names its milter "localhost", so the connect-time lookup is exercised.
|
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
7c80a12d75 |
Task manager: release task locks on stop, recheck claims held elsewhere
A cluster rehearsal (PostgreSQL + NATS) left index tasks pending well past the one-hour task lock after the node that claimed them was stopped or killed. The exact cause there isn't confirmed; this closes every path found in the task manager that stretches a takeover past the lock, or keeps a task claimed without running it: - A graceful stop never released the locks it held, so every task the node had claimed stayed blocked for an hour. The server now tracks the locks it holds (common::ipc::TaskLocks) and, once the shutdown signal arrives, stops claiming and releases them before exiting. - A node that failed to claim a task (another node held it) set its own local hold for a full lock lifetime from that scan. If the holder claimed it just after the scan began, or ran on a clock ahead, that hold ran out a moment before the lock did and was set for another hour: two hours in all. Such claims are now tried again every five minutes (a twelfth of the lock lifetime), and the task manager wakes up for them: before, a node without a coordinator could sleep up to five minutes past the recheck, or until something else woke it. - A worker that panicked took its task type down on that node for good, while the scan kept claiming that type's tasks and failing to hand them over, re-taking each lock as it expired and so starving every other node of them. Each batch now runs on a task of its own; a panic is logged, the batch's locks are released and the worker carries on. A failed hand-over releases the lock too. - A claimed task the worker couldn't read, or found gone, kept its lock for the hour. It is released. - An IndexDocument task for a file (not indexed) returned no result, which shifted every later result in the batch onto the wrong task in update_tasks. It returns Ignored. Nothing queues such a task today. The lock lifetime stays one hour; it now lives per server so the tests can shorten it. store::task_locks::task_lock_tests plays a second node by writing its locks straight into the in-memory store: tasks it claimed and abandoned run here once its locks expire, including locks that outlive this node's view of them, and a graceful stop hands this node's locks back at once and claims nothing more. It passes on RocksDB, SQLite and PostgreSQL. With the old recheck it fails. |
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|
jcoffey-dev
|
212cd77cd3 |
Export/import: keep archived items, spam samples and the spam model
--export skipped three things, so a move from one database to another
(RocksDB to PostgreSQL, say) lost them without a word:
- archived items (subspace j), the records behind undelete;
- spam training samples (subspace w);
- the trained spam classifier and its trainer state, blobs stored under
fixed names that no blob link points at, so the walk over links never
reached them.
j and w now travel with the registry family, where their indexes and id
counters already were, so EXPORT_TYPES=registry keeps them consistent.
The two named blobs travel with the blob family. The file format is
unchanged and import reads any subspace it is given, so an export made
by an older binary still imports.
The full-text index (subspace z) stays out, on purpose. It belongs to one
search backend: PostgreSQL and MySQL index into their own tables and have
no z table at all, and external engines keep the index themselves. So
--import now returns the subspaces it wrote, and boot queues the
reindexAccounts and reindexTelemetry store maintenance tasks, the same
ones an administrator can queue by hand, to rebuild the index for
whichever search store the server runs with once it starts.
The round trip also turned up a loss in import itself: the SQL stores
add a negative amount with an UPDATE, which does nothing to a row that
isn't there yet, so every negative counter or quota vanished on import
into PostgreSQL, MySQL or SQLite. Import now creates the row first.
The in-memory subspaces (m, y) stay out: rate limits, locks, greylisting,
ACME challenge tokens and OAuth codes, all short-lived. Issued
certificates are registry objects and travel.
The store test now writes archived items, spam samples, directory
entries, the fork's own subspace and the named blobs, checks they come
back in place, then imports the same export into a fresh store of the
other local backend (RocksDB to SQLite, or SQLite to RocksDB), compares
it key for key and counter for counter, and checks the queued reindex.
It fails on the old export code ("Subspace j was not exported").
--help now says what an export holds.
|
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
17426f6d60 |
Bundle the spam filter rules with the server
The server fetched upstream's latest published rules from GitHub at run time: a version nobody here tested, code-like expressions from an account we don't control, and the upstream name as a default in the admin form. The published rules of spam-filter v3.0.2 are now embedded (resources/spam-filter/, MIT, in THIRD-PARTY.md) and used whenever no other source is configured. An empty setting and upstream's old default both mean the bundled rules, so existing installs switch without a settings change; the URL stays an operator override (https:// or file://). The schema default is dropped and its description says what empty means, and the strip's rename pass does the same to each import. Rules load on first boot as before, and again whenever the bundled version differs from the last one loaded, which only adds missing rules and tags. That brings the AI classifier's LLM_* scores to installs that predate them: production has none today. upstream-watch now also opens an issue when spam-filter publishes a newer release; resources/spam-filter/README.md says how to take it. The antispam test now runs on the bundled rules, the path production takes; SPAM_RULES_URL tests another set. Unit tests cover the URL handling and that the bundled rules parse and score the AI tags as the AI spec says. |
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
a993f9ab01 |
Write the brand in lowercase where people see it
The name is inbuxa, lowercase, like the wordmark; INBUXA reads as an acronym. The admin and webmail already changed. Here that's everything the server shows people: the brand macro behind the protocol greetings, the HTTP and SCIM realms, the startup banner and the calendar and contact PRODID; the first-party OAuth client descriptions; the legacy-protocol refusals; the default calendar and address book names and the SMTP greeting default, in the code and the schema served to the admin (checksum regenerated); startup and shutdown events; the User-Agent; the sign-in and RSVP pages; the service units; the OpenAPI realm; the crate descriptions and the README, where it's set in bold. Identifiers that are uppercase for their own reasons stay: INBUXA_* settings, SUBSPACE_INBUXA. So do code comments and the AGPL 5(a) notice lines. Tests follow: the IMAP ID name, the default collection names, the PRODID in the iTIP fixtures and the CalDAV free-busy expectations, and the e2e legacy-protocol refusals. The webdav, imap and jmap suites pass, so do the unit tests of every crate touched, and 73 of 75 SMTP tests; of the other two, antispam fails on main too, and queue_retry is a timing flake that passes on its own. |
||
|
jcoffey-dev
|
cc6f1eb298 |
Rename the identifiers that carried the upstream name
Everything clients, users and operators meet now carries the fork's name, with no aliases (SPEC.md §2.4, changed here from "protocol identifiers stay"): - JMAP: upstream's registry capability is urn:inbuxa:jmap:registry, beside the fork's own urn:inbuxa:jmap. - WebDAV lock and sync tokens are urn:inbuxa:dav*; clients resync once. - Sieve: vnd.inbuxa.while and vnd.inbuxa.expressions. sieve-rs spells these into its compiler, so it's vendored (vendor/sieve-rs, 0.7.3) and patched in; a unit test fails if Cargo.lock ever moves past the vendored copy. The trusted runtime now names itself too, rather than answering sieve-rs's default. - The web interface's OAuth client is inbuxa-webui. On every start the old stalwart-webui client is removed and any application naming it is moved over. - The spam filter's blobs are INBUXA_SPAM_*; every start moves any left under the old keys, so a trained model survives. - SQL stores and log files default to inbuxa, in the code and in the schema served to the admin (checksum regenerated). - Settings are INBUXA_* only. A STALWART_* variable that's set where its INBUXA_* one isn't stops the server at startup, naming it. - The version-upgrade messages link docs.inbuxa.org's migration page, and the OpenAPI description, smtp crate metadata and web-push test fixtures lose the name. Kept on purpose, allowlisted with reasons: the OAuth key-derivation contexts (renaming them would end every session and invalidate every sealed client id) and the hashed application prefix. Also fixes a latent start-up failure: ensure_client updated an existing first-party client with a revision of 0, which the registry's assertion never matches, so adding a redirect URI or changing the webmail secret failed start-up. And the principal session test now expects legacyProtocols (C-1, added 2026-09-21), which it had missed. Tested: the server builds without warnings; common's 106 unit tests, including the vendoring check; a new integration test for the two start-up migrations; and the webdav, jmap, imap and SMTP Sieve suites. |
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jcoffey-dev
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c240946248 |
Drop upstream's issuer-routing test and an import it left unused
tests/src/directory/issuer.rs, new in v0.16.23, tests routing a bearer token to a directory by its issuer. That routing is Enterprise-only upstream (the body of get_directory_for_issuer), and the fork doesn't build it: a token naming no address gets the server default (DIR-2). The test also calls a helper from upstream's Enterprise-only OIDC test, so it can't compile here. mta.rs imported types::id::Id for code inside an Enterprise snippet; the stripped tree leaves it unused, upstream's as well as ours. |
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jcoffey-dev
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ee4988e00d |
Mark eight more changed files (AGPL section 5(a))
These upstream files were changed after the fork marked the files it had modified, and never got the notice: six by the listener and schema-cache work on 2026-09-20, two by the name check. Found by diffing against the upstream snapshot branch, as before. |
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jcoffey-dev
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b2ded0a776 |
Merge upstream v0.16.23
Five conflicts, resolved: - crates/common/src/auth/authentication.rs: upstream's get_directory_for_token and JwtClaims replace extract_jwt_domain; the per-domain directory code (DIR-1, DIR-5 to DIR-7) is kept, and the token lookup routes through it. The release's one new Enterprise snippet was the body of get_directory_for_issuer, which stays returning None: a token naming no address gets the server default, as DIR-2 specifies and as v0.16.22 did. - crates/common/src/manager/application.rs: upstream's rewrite of the tests, with the temp directory names renamed again, and the 5(a) notice the name-purge change should have added. - crates/common/src/network/mta.rs: both sides' imports. - crates/main/Cargo.toml: the AGPL-only license kept, version 0.16.23. - Cargo.lock: upstream's, with the fork's crates added by Cargo. |