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Upstream commit: af37a234981722493b74623a983581691d2b70b6
Enterprise-only files removed or emptied: 63
Enterprise-only snippets removed: 118 in 50 files
Dangling module declarations removed: 5
Edits turning enterprise off: 25
Third-party code: 14 files, 0 not in THIRD-PARTY.md
Renamed identifiers: 62 in 18 files
Verification: clean
The same Enterprise footprint as v0.16.23. The build check fails only on
tests/src/directory/issuer.rs, unchanged since v0.16.23: it calls a helper
from upstream's Enterprise-only OIDC test, and tests issuer-based directory
routing, an Enterprise feature. main has never carried it.
The sidecar catalog; the Compliance Officer places and releases holds;
the Tenant Compliance Officer is built now; shortening audit retention
is recorded and surfaced, not gated on a second person; all seven
new-install defaults, in Phase 3; the webhook finding fixed now as a
bug; snapshots kept as long as the audit log.
Phase 1 of the GDPR auditor foundation: the investigation and the
design, committed before anything is built (SPEC.md §3 rule 3).
It maps every place the server stores or sends personal data found
in the code at de275ba, each with its categories, whose data it is,
the settings that control it, what bounds its retention, where it
lives, whether it leaves the host, its scope and the code that writes
it, and the default in a new install. It proposes a sidecar catalog
(resources/privacy/catalog.toml), since the schema and registry code
are upstream's generated output with no generator here; a CI check
modeled on name-check.py; a strip-report section; a read-only
inventory method with dated snapshots; a Compliance Officer role; and
the Compliance navigation with Overview and Data inventory.
Findings worth reading on their own: webhooks ignore levels and, at
their defaults, receive every event including raw SMTP input; log
files are never deleted; automatic bans never expire; some of the
fork's records outlive the account; spam training keeps whole
messages for 180 days; traces are on in a new install; the spam
filter sends IPs, domains, hashed addresses and body digests to
third-party services by default.
Proposed default changes (new installs only) and seven open questions
are for John to decide. No default is changed.
Per-protocol legacy switches (#79) and the hold export's exceptions
list (#75). The prepared Explain answers are relabeled for this
release; 706 carry over unchanged.
The legacy-protocols switch was all or nothing. An operator can now stop
POP3 and keep IMAP: each of IMAP, POP3 and ManageSieve has its own
switch, server-wide on inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy and per tenant on
inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy (properties imap, pop3, manageSieve).
legacyProtocols stays as the kill-all: setting it sets all three, and it
reads "disabled" exactly when all three are off. A policy stored before
this has only legacyProtocols and reads as all three at that value, so
existing servers and tenants carry over unchanged. In one /set, a
protocol named beside legacyProtocols overrides it.
SMTP submission keeps no switch of its own: sign-in over it is refused
only when all three are off, as the single switch did (LP-6), so
turning one protocol off never stops a mail app sending. For a tenant,
the server's switches and the tenant's count together.
Server-wide, a change closes the listeners of whatever is now off and
puts back the saved listeners of whatever is on again, both in one
change if asked; listeners of a protocol still off stay saved. Sign-in,
autoconfig, autodiscover, PACC (now prepared once per combination) and
the suggested DNS records all follow each protocol separately. A tenant
may turn a protocol on only while the server has it on (LP-9), and the
refusal names which. The JMAP session adds legacyAllowed, the protocols
still allowed for the account; legacyProtocols there keeps its meaning
for older webmail builds. Events name the switches ("pop3 disabled"),
and audit before/after reads every switch even from an older policy.
Tested: unit tests for the switches, the old-policy reading, the
server/tenant combination, the tenant refusal and listener refusal; and
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py against a running server, all 100 checks,
including new ones: POP3 alone off closes only its port and refuses
only its sign-in while IMAP and sending go on; only POP3 stops being
advertised; one change closes IMAP and reopens POP3; a tenant turns
POP3 off for itself, and can't turn IMAP on while the server has it off.
Cloudflare's DMARC report intake rejects every aggregate report we
send with "555 5.7.1 invalid_report_schema". Bisected against the live
endpoint: the only element it objects to is <disposition>pass</disposition>,
the value RFC 9990 added for mail that passed DMARC under an enforcing
policy. The RFC 9990 namespace, <np>, <discovery_method>, <testing> and
a missing <pct> are all accepted, and a report that differs only in
using "none" there goes through.
"none" (no action taken) is valid under both RFC 9990 and RFC 7489 and
says the same thing to the reader, so reports now go out with it. The
stored report keeps "pass"; only the serialized copy changes.
An item the hold covers whose stored record or content can't be read
goes in exceptions.csv with the path it would have had and the reason,
rather than being left out silently. The file is always in the ZIP, so a
header-only one shows nothing was missed, and manifest.sha256 carries
its hash beside the manifest's.
inbuxa:HoldExport/set takes a hold, optionally some of the accounts it
covers, and a reason; the collection runs in the background and get
says when it's ready. The ZIP has, per account, mail as .eml under its
folders, calendars as .ics, contacts as .vcf, files as stored, and the
archived items the hold keeps under archived/; a manifest.csv gives each
entry's account, kind, folder, date, whether it was archived, size and
SHA-256, and manifest.sha256 hashes the manifest. Accounts the hold
doesn't cover are left out, and items outside its date range are too:
live mail by arrival, events by start, and archived items the same way,
so an export doesn't carry deleted items that only another hold keeps.
The finished file is a blob of whoever started the export, so only they
download it, and it lasts as long as any upload (uploadTtl). Exports
are records under the hold (SUBSPACE_INBUXA H/e): never changed or
destroyed, each with its status, counts, size and checksum. Starting
one needs sysLegalHoldExport, an active hold and a reason, and is
recorded in the audit log like the audit log's own export.
The build is in memory and capped at 2 GB; bigger holds fail with a
message saying so, and are split by picking accounts.
Tested: unit tests for safe ZIP names and the manifest and its hash;
the legal_hold system test, on RocksDB, PostgreSQL and MySQL, exports a
hold end to end (live and archived mail, the manifest's hash, an asked-
for account the hold doesn't cover left out) and checks the refusals
(no reason, a user without the permission, a released hold) and the
audit record; and by hand from the console on a local server. Not
covered by a test: the archived-item date range with two holds of
different ranges over one account.
hickory 0.26.3 rejects two kinds of valid answers, and outbound
delivery then retries those hosts until the message expires:
- A zone delegated beneath an unsigned zone (l.google.com under
google.com). Proving the delegation insecure needs an SOA record in
the DS reply, and public resolvers often leave it out. Every Google
MX host behind a signed MX record was unreachable.
- A signed CNAME to a signed name that lacks the queried type. The
NSEC denial is checked against the original name, not the target's.
On a bogus verdict, follow a signed CNAME and repeat the lookup at its
target; otherwise look up the name's zone and its parents, nearest
first. A zone that validates as unsigned means nothing below it can be
signed, so the plain resolver answers and the result is insecure. A
zone that validates as signed first leaves the verdict standing.
Legal holds (#70): a hold on people, groups, domains, tenants or the
whole server keeps everything it covers from being destroyed, by anyone,
until it's released; deleted accounts keep their data. Audit records
name accounts by their full address and holds by their case name. The
daily clean-up of expired archived items works again.
Prepared Explain answers relabeled for this release; no setting changed
since 2026.9.27.2, so all 706 carry over.
An account's or mailing list's name is only its local part, so the log
said "Account ken.gosling" where two domains could each have one; it
now says [email protected]. A change to a legal hold was
recorded under its id; the hold's current state is now read first, so
the record carries its case name and each change reads before/after.
inbuxa:LegalHold/get answers accountsCovered, itemsHeld and sizeHeld
when asked: the accounts a hold reaches now (deleted ones it keeps
included) and the archived items it keeps, with their size. Worked out
in one pass over accounts and archive, only for requests that name them.
Held items stay out of the user's quota, as all archived copies do
(LH-9).
Destroying a held account removes the login, as offboarding needs, but
keeps its data as a deleted account with no expiry, whether or not
undelete keeps accounts; its addresses stay reserved and its holds name
it from then on. Destroy-now refuses it, and its DestroyAccount task
defers itself while it's held or its time hasn't come. Holds placed or
released later freeze or free kept accounts in the same settle pass,
with 30 days' grace after the last release (LH-8, LH-10).
Placing or widening a hold freezes what's already archived in its scope
and range, its old deadline noted; releasing one gives each item no other
hold covers that deadline back, or release plus 30 days if later. One
pass over the archive does both and changes nothing twice (LH-6, LH-10,
LH-11). A held archived item can't be destroyed; restoring still can,
and the hold is named only to callers who may see holds (LH-7). Audit
records about a held account survive the purge (AU-7).
Fixes the daily clean-up of expired archived items (UD-13), which never
found any: the registry's unfiltered query reads an all-ids index that
archived items aren't in. Items are now walked account by account, kept
deleted accounts included. Expired items were still removed whenever
their account's archive was read.
Every way of deleting mail (JMAP, IMAP EXPUNGE, POP3, mailbox removal,
Trash emptying) and Sieve scripts, events, contacts and files now asks
how the account's deletions are kept: a hold keeps them with no expiry
(archivedUntil 9999-12-31), even with undelete off; otherwise undelete's
period applies as before (LH-4).
A hold's date range decides by the item's own date (LH-3). Mail is noted
as held at deletion and settled when it's archived, once its received
date is known; outside the range it gets undelete's deadline or isn't
kept. Events go by their start, with a day's slack for time zones;
recurring events, contacts, files and scripts are held whole.
A groupware item's note now stays until its archive succeeds, and a
failure retries the task instead of being logged and lost (LH-5).
A hold reaches an account by name, through any of its addresses'
domains, its groups or its tenant, as they are now, so an account added
to a held domain later is held too. An account that leaves a held
domain, group or tenant stays held: the registry write hook adds it to
the hold by name on every account change, whoever makes it (LH-2).
Server::holds_on answers for the deletion paths, from the store each
time so a hold binds every node at once.
inbuxa:LegalHold get/set places a hold on accounts, groups, domains,
tenants or the whole server, with an optional date range. A hold's range
and scope can only widen, a released hold is read-only, and none is ever
deleted. Placing, changing and releasing each need a reason and are
audited (LH-1, LH-3, LH-10, AU-12).
Permissions 669-672 (see, place, widen or release, export held data)
go to server administrators only; the tenant ceiling always strips them,
as it does Impersonate (LH-13). Schema: Compliance > Legal Holds.
What a hold keeps comes next, through the undelete hooks.
Also moves the lock expiry helpers below the lock module's imports.
Delegates reach the whole locked account (#68): its calendars, contacts
and files as well as its mail, even a kind it holds none of yet, and
writing delegates may add at the top of its Files.
Prepared Explain answers relabeled for this release; no setting changed
since 2026.9.27.1, so all 706 carry over.
A shared account refuses top-level folders, so an organize or full
delegate couldn't add anything to a locked account with no folders. A
delegate who may write now can, as the owner could; the reconcile after
the create grants it the new folder. Read delegates still can't (AL-6,
AL-7).
A delegate's token listed the locked account only for kinds of data it
held grants on, so one with no files (or no calendar) was refused to the
delegate outright: "You do not have access to account". The token now
lists the locked account for mail, calendars, contacts and files alike,
so an empty kind reads as empty. What the delegate may see or change is
still each container's grant (AL-7).
The audit log (#64): every administrator change, admin sign-in and look
into someone else's data, recorded before it happens, chained per node
and checkable for tampering, exportable with a manifest, kept 2 years.
Locked accounts (#65, #66): an account that keeps receiving mail but
can't sign in and sends nothing on its own, handed to delegates at read,
organize or full, ending at a date when one is set.
Prepared Explain answers relabeled for this release; no setting changed
since 2026.9.27, so all 706 carry over.
A delegation with an end date dropped out of the delegate's token then,
but its folder grants stayed until the daily sweep, so the delegate kept
the account as an ordinary share for up to a day. Each node now sleeps
until the soonest end date, woken early by any lock write and at least
hourly, and re-applies that lock under a cluster-wide claim.
The sweep also had a second-run bug: a delegation past its date gave the
delegate back its earlier share, then dropped the note, so the next sweep
removed that share entirely. The note is now kept while the delegate is
still listed.
A locked account can't sign in (it fails as a wrong password does), its
sessions end on every node, refresh tokens stop working, and its Sieve
scripts forward and reply to nothing. Mail keeps arriving.
Delegates get real ACL grants on the account's mailboxes, calendars,
address books and files at read, organize or full, with the rights they
replaced restored on unlock. Folders made later are granted after the
create and in a daily sweep. Organize delegates can't destroy; send-as
needs organize or full. The JMAP session marks delegated accounts in
urn:inbuxa:jmap.
New inbuxa:AccountLock object with get/set, permissions 665-668, and a
Compliance > Locked Accounts entry in the schema. Lock, unlock and
delegate changes need a reason and are audited; delegate access and
writes are audited too (audit-hold-lock spec AL-1 to AL-12).
What administrators and the server itself do to the control plane is now
recorded, from inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md (AU-1 to AU-12):
settings, accounts, domains, roles and every other registry change, with
each field's before and after (secrets only as "changed"); the fork's own
settings objects; administrator sign-ins (and failed ones to administrator
accounts), master-user and recovery-admin sign-ins, once an hour per
account, method and address; access to another account's data through
impersonation or FetchAnyBlob, once an hour; exports and tamper checks;
and registry writes the server makes on its own, named by subsystem
(system:AcmeRenewal, system:auto-ban, system:directory-sync, ...), with a
spam rules update as one summary record.
No change without its record (AU-3): before a set method changes anything,
a pending record per requested create, update and destroy is written; if
that fails, the method is refused with serverFail. Its outcome follows as
a later entry. A change interrupted by a crash stays "unfinished".
Records live in the fork's subspace under L, as one SHA-256 hash chain per
node. The chain's head is stored, never cached, and every append asserts
it, so two writers can't take the same place. Nothing can edit or delete
a record; the daily purge removes the oldest past the retention (default
730 days, minimum 90) and records where the chain now starts, so
verification still passes. security.audit-recorded (647) copies each
record to webhooks, OpenTelemetry and the log; security.audit-write-failed
(648) reports a failed write.
New JMAP objects under urn:inbuxa:jmap: inbuxa:AuditEvent/get and /query
(filters: time, actor, action, target, account, tenant, outcome, address,
text), inbuxa:AuditSettings, inbuxa:AuditExport (CSV or JSON Lines built
on the server, each line with its chain hash, ending in a manifest; the
created object names the blob and its SHA-256) and
inbuxa:AuditVerification. New permissions sysAuditGet, sysAuditExport and
sysAuditSettingsUpdate: the Administrator role gets all three, the Tenant
Administrator role gets read and export, once, on existing installs too.
A tenant administrator sees records whose actor or target is in its
tenant, including a server administrator's changes there.
Sign-in method on the session: access tokens now remember how they signed
in (password, app password, API key, OAuth client, directory, master user,
recovery admin), including across the HTTP credential cache. New OAuth
access tokens carry their client id in the sealed claims; older ones show
as client "unknown" until they expire.
The schema gains the permissions, the two events and a Management >
Compliance > Audit Log link.
Stack: the request layer boxes every inner future where it's made. Without
that, a debug build overflowed the default 2 MB worker stack on a registry
set; measured with the same request, the branch and main now overflow at
the same stack size (between 1856 and 1920 KiB, debug), so the layer adds
nothing measurable.
Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap; system::audit::audit_log_tests
(run with --ignored) passes on RocksDB, SQLite, PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL with a
read replica, MySQL, MySQL with a replica and FoundationDB. The system, JMAP
and SCIM suites pass. authorization.rs skipped fork permissions that guard
no registry object; the audit suite checks a plain user is refused instead.
inbuxa's own mark (#62): the kitten over a server with a bay for each
piece of the suite, on the built-in sign-in and RSVP pages, the web
logo and the email logo.
Prepared Explain answers relabeled for this release; no setting changed
since 2026.9.26.1, so all 706 carry over.
inbuxa's mark was ihasmail's cat-and-envelope reused unchanged. The new
one keeps the family's face, paws and colors, over a server with a bay
for each piece of the suite: the letter (webmail), a prompt (console),
status lights (server).
- The built-in sign-in and calendar RSVP pages, and the web logo, drew
the old cat as an embedded PNG. They now draw the mark as vector in
the same slot, keeping class="symbol"; each page is about 31 KB
lighter. The .min copies are updated the same way and the .min.gz
regenerated with gzip -9 -n, as minify_html.sh does.
- resources/branding: email-logo.png (the compact lockup at 380x80 on
white, as before) with its .b64 regenerated byte-for-byte in the old
76-column form, and favicon-64.png.
- img/brand: the logo bundle, now pure vector, with its README.
announce.yml runs coffey-labs/actions discourse-release on every published
release, posting it to this project's Announcements category on
community.coffeylabs.org. The release workflow also announces
from its own job, since a release made with the job token fires no
'on: release' workflow in Gitea.
jcoffey-dev