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inbuxa:LegalHold get/set places a hold on accounts, groups, domains,
tenants or the whole server, with an optional date range. A hold's range
and scope can only widen, a released hold is read-only, and none is ever
deleted. Placing, changing and releasing each need a reason and are
audited (LH-1, LH-3, LH-10, AU-12).
Permissions 669-672 (see, place, widen or release, export held data)
go to server administrators only; the tenant ceiling always strips them,
as it does Impersonate (LH-13). Schema: Compliance > Legal Holds.
What a hold keeps comes next, through the undelete hooks.
Also moves the lock expiry helpers below the lock module's imports.
A locked account can't sign in (it fails as a wrong password does), its
sessions end on every node, refresh tokens stop working, and its Sieve
scripts forward and reply to nothing. Mail keeps arriving.
Delegates get real ACL grants on the account's mailboxes, calendars,
address books and files at read, organize or full, with the rights they
replaced restored on unlock. Folders made later are granted after the
create and in a daily sweep. Organize delegates can't destroy; send-as
needs organize or full. The JMAP session marks delegated accounts in
urn:inbuxa:jmap.
New inbuxa:AccountLock object with get/set, permissions 665-668, and a
Compliance > Locked Accounts entry in the schema. Lock, unlock and
delegate changes need a reason and are audited; delegate access and
writes are audited too (audit-hold-lock spec AL-1 to AL-12).
What administrators and the server itself do to the control plane is now
recorded, from inbuxa-drafts/specs/audit-hold-lock.md (AU-1 to AU-12):
settings, accounts, domains, roles and every other registry change, with
each field's before and after (secrets only as "changed"); the fork's own
settings objects; administrator sign-ins (and failed ones to administrator
accounts), master-user and recovery-admin sign-ins, once an hour per
account, method and address; access to another account's data through
impersonation or FetchAnyBlob, once an hour; exports and tamper checks;
and registry writes the server makes on its own, named by subsystem
(system:AcmeRenewal, system:auto-ban, system:directory-sync, ...), with a
spam rules update as one summary record.
No change without its record (AU-3): before a set method changes anything,
a pending record per requested create, update and destroy is written; if
that fails, the method is refused with serverFail. Its outcome follows as
a later entry. A change interrupted by a crash stays "unfinished".
Records live in the fork's subspace under L, as one SHA-256 hash chain per
node. The chain's head is stored, never cached, and every append asserts
it, so two writers can't take the same place. Nothing can edit or delete
a record; the daily purge removes the oldest past the retention (default
730 days, minimum 90) and records where the chain now starts, so
verification still passes. security.audit-recorded (647) copies each
record to webhooks, OpenTelemetry and the log; security.audit-write-failed
(648) reports a failed write.
New JMAP objects under urn:inbuxa:jmap: inbuxa:AuditEvent/get and /query
(filters: time, actor, action, target, account, tenant, outcome, address,
text), inbuxa:AuditSettings, inbuxa:AuditExport (CSV or JSON Lines built
on the server, each line with its chain hash, ending in a manifest; the
created object names the blob and its SHA-256) and
inbuxa:AuditVerification. New permissions sysAuditGet, sysAuditExport and
sysAuditSettingsUpdate: the Administrator role gets all three, the Tenant
Administrator role gets read and export, once, on existing installs too.
A tenant administrator sees records whose actor or target is in its
tenant, including a server administrator's changes there.
Sign-in method on the session: access tokens now remember how they signed
in (password, app password, API key, OAuth client, directory, master user,
recovery admin), including across the HTTP credential cache. New OAuth
access tokens carry their client id in the sealed claims; older ones show
as client "unknown" until they expire.
The schema gains the permissions, the two events and a Management >
Compliance > Audit Log link.
Stack: the request layer boxes every inner future where it's made. Without
that, a debug build overflowed the default 2 MB worker stack on a registry
set; measured with the same request, the branch and main now overflow at
the same stack size (between 1856 and 1920 KiB, debug), so the layer adds
nothing measurable.
Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap; system::audit::audit_log_tests
(run with --ignored) passes on RocksDB, SQLite, PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL with a
read replica, MySQL, MySQL with a replica and FoundationDB. The system, JMAP
and SCIM suites pass. authorization.rs skipped fork permissions that guard
no registry object; the audit suite checks a plain user is refused instead.
A new method, inbuxa:Explanation/set, asks the node's local model for a
short plain-words reading of one thing an administrator is looking at:
a failed recipient in the queue, a Classify verdict, a log line or trace
event, or one setting with its saved value. The server builds the prompt
itself from stored data and the registry schema, never from text the
console sends, and grounds SMTP replies in RFC 3463 and RFC 5321.
What the model is never shown: secrets (including ones nested inside a
setting, like an AI model's HTTP auth), raw protocol events, and the
contents of any other event. A tag name that doesn't have a tag's shape is
refused before a model is asked.
Calls share the AI gate with spam classification, but mail always keeps
its slot, and Explain has its own hourly count per account and its own
on/off switch in inbuxa:AiLimits. The permission is sysAiExplain,
superuser only; tenant administrators can't use it. The session carries
an aiExplain flag so a console knows when to offer the button.
An install whose roles were stored before the permission existed gets it
added once, at start-up, to the roles that are administrators' alone,
not the User role their defaults share with every account. An operator
who removes it later isn't overruled.
Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap, and ai_explain_tests
(run with --ignored) covering the acceptance tests and the upgrade.
A 3-node rehearsal found every settings reload refused, cluster-wide,
because one node couldn't resolve the Pyzor server:
- PyzorConfig::parse resolved the host while building the settings and
made a failed lookup a build error. It now keeps the host and port and
resolves when a message is checked (an IP address is used as is, a
name is reused for five minutes, the lookup counts against the Pyzor
timeout). A failure there is a Pyzor error for that message.
- A milter's hostname was resolved the same way, with a blocking
to_socket_addrs in async code. An IP address is kept; a name is now
resolved on each connection.
Other build-time I/O is already non-fatal: directories that can't
connect become unavailable with a warning (DIR-21), and the AI model
locality check only warns.
reload_registry swapped the core only when the whole build was free of
errors, while boot runs with whatever built. One failing object thus
refused every later reload, and the running settings went stale. Now a
reload is refused only for errors in objects that built when the
running settings were built (at boot or by the last applied reload):
applying it would lose those. Objects that already failed then are
missing from the running settings anyway, as at boot, so their errors
are logged and returned as known_errors but don't hold the reload back.
Refusing on new errors keeps a bad edit from taking a working object
out of service; the admin gets the error instead.
ReloadSettings now says "Settings were not reloaded." and names the
object and its error ("Tracer with id ...: Only one console tracer is
allowed"), with a count of any further errors. A refused reload after a
directory change logs its errors too.
system::reload::reload_tests (new): with Pyzor enabled on an
unresolvable host, ReloadSettings succeeds (on main it fails with
"Invalid address: failed to lookup address information"); an IP host
needs no lookup; a new build error refuses the reload, names the object
and leaves the running settings unchanged; the same error, once known
from the running settings' build, no longer blocks; once fixed, a new
error there blocks again. smtp::inbound::milter's session test now
names its milter "localhost", so the connect-time lookup is exercised.
A cluster rehearsal (PostgreSQL + NATS) left index tasks pending well
past the one-hour task lock after the node that claimed them was stopped
or killed. The exact cause there isn't confirmed; this closes every path
found in the task manager that stretches a takeover past the lock, or
keeps a task claimed without running it:
- A graceful stop never released the locks it held, so every task the
node had claimed stayed blocked for an hour. The server now tracks the
locks it holds (common::ipc::TaskLocks) and, once the shutdown signal
arrives, stops claiming and releases them before exiting.
- A node that failed to claim a task (another node held it) set its own
local hold for a full lock lifetime from that scan. If the holder
claimed it just after the scan began, or ran on a clock ahead, that
hold ran out a moment before the lock did and was set for another
hour: two hours in all. Such claims are now tried again every five
minutes (a twelfth of the lock lifetime), and the task manager wakes
up for them: before, a node without a coordinator could sleep up to
five minutes past the recheck, or until something else woke it.
- A worker that panicked took its task type down on that node for good,
while the scan kept claiming that type's tasks and failing to hand them
over, re-taking each lock as it expired and so starving every other
node of them. Each batch now runs on a task of its own; a panic is
logged, the batch's locks are released and the worker carries on. A
failed hand-over releases the lock too.
- A claimed task the worker couldn't read, or found gone, kept its lock
for the hour. It is released.
- An IndexDocument task for a file (not indexed) returned no result,
which shifted every later result in the batch onto the wrong task in
update_tasks. It returns Ignored. Nothing queues such a task today.
The lock lifetime stays one hour; it now lives per server so the tests
can shorten it.
store::task_locks::task_lock_tests plays a second node by writing its
locks straight into the in-memory store: tasks it claimed and abandoned
run here once its locks expire, including locks that outlive this node's
view of them, and a graceful stop hands this node's locks back at once
and claims nothing more. It passes on RocksDB, SQLite and PostgreSQL.
With the old recheck it fails.
--export skipped three things, so a move from one database to another
(RocksDB to PostgreSQL, say) lost them without a word:
- archived items (subspace j), the records behind undelete;
- spam training samples (subspace w);
- the trained spam classifier and its trainer state, blobs stored under
fixed names that no blob link points at, so the walk over links never
reached them.
j and w now travel with the registry family, where their indexes and id
counters already were, so EXPORT_TYPES=registry keeps them consistent.
The two named blobs travel with the blob family. The file format is
unchanged and import reads any subspace it is given, so an export made
by an older binary still imports.
The full-text index (subspace z) stays out, on purpose. It belongs to one
search backend: PostgreSQL and MySQL index into their own tables and have
no z table at all, and external engines keep the index themselves. So
--import now returns the subspaces it wrote, and boot queues the
reindexAccounts and reindexTelemetry store maintenance tasks, the same
ones an administrator can queue by hand, to rebuild the index for
whichever search store the server runs with once it starts.
The round trip also turned up a loss in import itself: the SQL stores
add a negative amount with an UPDATE, which does nothing to a row that
isn't there yet, so every negative counter or quota vanished on import
into PostgreSQL, MySQL or SQLite. Import now creates the row first.
The in-memory subspaces (m, y) stay out: rate limits, locks, greylisting,
ACME challenge tokens and OAuth codes, all short-lived. Issued
certificates are registry objects and travel.
The store test now writes archived items, spam samples, directory
entries, the fork's own subspace and the named blobs, checks they come
back in place, then imports the same export into a fresh store of the
other local backend (RocksDB to SQLite, or SQLite to RocksDB), compares
it key for key and counter for counter, and checks the queued reindex.
It fails on the old export code ("Subspace j was not exported").
--help now says what an export holds.
The server fetched upstream's latest published rules from GitHub at run
time: a version nobody here tested, code-like expressions from an account
we don't control, and the upstream name as a default in the admin form.
The published rules of spam-filter v3.0.2 are now embedded
(resources/spam-filter/, MIT, in THIRD-PARTY.md) and used whenever no other
source is configured. An empty setting and upstream's old default both mean
the bundled rules, so existing installs switch without a settings change;
the URL stays an operator override (https:// or file://). The schema default
is dropped and its description says what empty means, and the strip's
rename pass does the same to each import.
Rules load on first boot as before, and again whenever the bundled version
differs from the last one loaded, which only adds missing rules and tags.
That brings the AI classifier's LLM_* scores to installs that predate them:
production has none today.
upstream-watch now also opens an issue when spam-filter publishes a newer
release; resources/spam-filter/README.md says how to take it.
The antispam test now runs on the bundled rules, the path production
takes; SPAM_RULES_URL tests another set. Unit tests cover the URL handling
and that the bundled rules parse and score the AI tags as the AI spec says.
The name is inbuxa, lowercase, like the wordmark; INBUXA reads as an
acronym. The admin and webmail already changed. Here that's everything
the server shows people: the brand macro behind the protocol greetings,
the HTTP and SCIM realms, the startup banner and the calendar and contact
PRODID; the first-party OAuth client descriptions; the legacy-protocol
refusals; the default calendar and address book names and the SMTP
greeting default, in the code and the schema served to the admin
(checksum regenerated); startup and shutdown events; the User-Agent;
the sign-in and RSVP pages; the service units; the OpenAPI realm; the
crate descriptions and the README, where it's set in bold.
Identifiers that are uppercase for their own reasons stay: INBUXA_*
settings, SUBSPACE_INBUXA. So do code comments and the AGPL 5(a) notice
lines.
Tests follow: the IMAP ID name, the default collection names, the PRODID
in the iTIP fixtures and the CalDAV free-busy expectations, and the e2e
legacy-protocol refusals. The webdav, imap and jmap suites pass, so do
the unit tests of every crate touched, and 73 of 75 SMTP tests; of the
other two, antispam fails on main too, and queue_retry is a timing flake
that passes on its own.
Everything clients, users and operators meet now carries the fork's name,
with no aliases (SPEC.md §2.4, changed here from "protocol identifiers
stay"):
- JMAP: upstream's registry capability is urn:inbuxa:jmap:registry, beside
the fork's own urn:inbuxa:jmap.
- WebDAV lock and sync tokens are urn:inbuxa:dav*; clients resync once.
- Sieve: vnd.inbuxa.while and vnd.inbuxa.expressions. sieve-rs spells these
into its compiler, so it's vendored (vendor/sieve-rs, 0.7.3) and patched in;
a unit test fails if Cargo.lock ever moves past the vendored copy. The
trusted runtime now names itself too, rather than answering sieve-rs's
default.
- The web interface's OAuth client is inbuxa-webui. On every start the old
stalwart-webui client is removed and any application naming it is moved
over.
- The spam filter's blobs are INBUXA_SPAM_*; every start moves any left
under the old keys, so a trained model survives.
- SQL stores and log files default to inbuxa, in the code and in the
schema served to the admin (checksum regenerated).
- Settings are INBUXA_* only. A STALWART_* variable that's set where its
INBUXA_* one isn't stops the server at startup, naming it.
- The version-upgrade messages link docs.inbuxa.org's migration page, and
the OpenAPI description, smtp crate metadata and web-push test fixtures
lose the name.
Kept on purpose, allowlisted with reasons: the OAuth key-derivation
contexts (renaming them would end every session and invalidate every
sealed client id) and the hashed application prefix.
Also fixes a latent start-up failure: ensure_client updated an existing
first-party client with a revision of 0, which the registry's assertion
never matches, so adding a redirect URI or changing the webmail secret
failed start-up. And the principal session test now expects
legacyProtocols (C-1, added 2026-09-21), which it had missed.
Tested: the server builds without warnings; common's 106 unit tests,
including the vendoring check; a new integration test for the two
start-up migrations; and the webdav, jmap, imap and SMTP Sieve suites.
Five conflicts, resolved:
- crates/common/src/auth/authentication.rs: upstream's get_directory_for_token
and JwtClaims replace extract_jwt_domain; the per-domain directory code
(DIR-1, DIR-5 to DIR-7) is kept, and the token lookup routes through it.
The release's one new Enterprise snippet was the body of
get_directory_for_issuer, which stays returning None: a token naming no
address gets the server default, as DIR-2 specifies and as v0.16.22 did.
- crates/common/src/manager/application.rs: upstream's rewrite of the tests,
with the temp directory names renamed again, and the 5(a) notice the
name-purge change should have added.
- crates/common/src/network/mta.rs: both sides' imports.
- crates/main/Cargo.toml: the AGPL-only license kept, version 0.16.23.
- Cargo.lock: upstream's, with the fork's crates added by Cargo.
The first-party application descriptions and the telemetry service name and
instrumentation scope are shown to operators, and the unpacked-application
temp directory carried the name too.
Left alone deliberately: the OAuth key-derivation contexts (renaming them
would invalidate every sealed token and client id), the migration defaults
that read an upstream installation, links to upstream's upgrade guide, the
wire-protocol identifiers, and upstream's own license and templates.
The AGPL asks a modified version to carry prominent notices saying it was
modified, and giving a date. Publishing the source is the conveyance that
asks for it, so it wants doing before the repository is public rather than
at the release.
Every upstream file the fork changed now says so in its header, beneath the
notice it came with: 164 files, found by diffing against the upstream
snapshot branch rather than by guessing, so the list is what actually
differs. Files the fork wrote itself already carry their own copyright and
need nothing. Upstream's notices are untouched, which its licence requires
and which was already true.
The README says the same thing in prose, since the obligation is on the
work as a whole and not only its Rust files.
Builds unchanged: the server and the test binary both compile.
Every one of the 14 was `#[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))]` on the arm the
fork always compiles: the Enterprise arms went with the import, and nothing
turns the feature on. Removing the attribute leaves the same code, now
unconditional, in 11 files.
Two of them looked like behavior worth checking before touching: the
`validate_tenant_quota` stub that always passes, and the refusal to cancel a
pending DestroyAccount task. The stub is vestigial — the rebuilt
multi-tenancy enforces quotas in `crates/features/src/tenancy/quota.rs` for
those objects and more — and the refusal is undelete's open question, which
this change leaves exactly as it was.
The binary builds with no new warnings, and `system_tests` and `jmap_tests`,
which cover the touched registry, task-manager and auth paths, both pass.
The feature definitions stay in the manifests, inert: taking them out would
widen every sync's diff for nothing.
Every node writes a sample per metric on metricsCollectionInterval:
counters as the increase since its last sample, gauges always, histograms
as totals when changed. Samples are x:Metric in the registry's encoding
under the telemetry key class, ids time-ordered. x:Metric/get and /query
read them with metric and timestamp filters and full paging, hide what's
past holdMetricsFor, and the data purge deletes it. The is_enterprise
split is gone, so every gauge and histogram is collected and exported, and
queue.count is set from the queue itself. The shared metrics suite runs.
Subspace _ holds the fork's own data, with its own SQL table and RocksDB
column family, and is part of backup. The masked_email module keeps each
mask's state, last mail and pending deadline beside upstream's record, an
index from address to mask with tombstones, and a per-account change log;
and generates addresses in the fork's format.
inbuxa --version, the banner, startup events, OpenTelemetry and the JMAP
implementation string read "2026.9.18 (Stalwart 0.16.22)". The base comes
from Cargo, which keeps following upstream so version bumps merge cleanly.
Received headers and IMAP ID carry the INBUXA version.
- crates/main: package and [[bin]] renamed to inbuxa; homepage inbuxa.org;
license AGPL-3.0-only (upstream is dual; the fork takes the AGPL).
- types::branding::env_var reads INBUXA_<name>, falling back to
STALWART_<name> with a warning, for all nine server settings.
STALWART_APP_ and STALWART_SPAM_* storage keys are unchanged.
- New-install default paths /var/lib/inbuxa and /var/log/inbuxa.
- Dockerfiles, systemd unit, launchd plist and AppArmor profile renamed.
- Upstream's .github moved to .github-upstream so none of it runs.
- install.sh stubbed: upstream's would install Stalwart.
- Two missed brand strings: the SMTP Received header and the utils user agent.
One branding module (types::brand!) supplies the name to every protocol
greeting, the HTTP realm, the startup banner, Received headers, the
user agent, the IMAP ID response and calendar PRODIDs. The sign-in and
calendar pages take ihasmail's palette and font and the INBUXA logo, and
calendar emails embed the INBUXA lockup. Default calendar and address book
names follow. Protocol identifiers (urn:stalwart:jmap, vnd.stalwart Sieve
extensions) and upstream copyright notices are unchanged.
Upstream commit: 474dd0229cb20cf513036619781ed97bd8073c3f
Enterprise-only files removed or emptied: 63
Enterprise-only snippets removed: 117 in 50 files
Dangling module declarations removed: 5
Cargo edits turning enterprise off: 14
Verification: clean
Enterprise feature gates left for rebuilt features: 19 in 18 files
Produced by tools/fork/strip.py. The full report is in docs/fork/strip-reports/ on main.
jcoffey-dev