The Hardening link merged to main changed the packaged schema, which this
branch also changes. The file is gzipped, so the two can't be merged line
by line: this takes main's schema and adds security.legacy-protocols-changed
to it again, with the hash recomputed.
Turning legacy mail protocols off or back on raises
security.legacy-protocols-changed (id 643, info level, also in the packaged
schema), with the scope (policy = server), the new value, who made the
change (accountId), whether listeners closed or reopened (details), which
ones (listenerId), and -- only when a listener could not be put back --
which and why (reason).
It is raised in Server::set_protocol_policy rather than by the JMAP
method, so whatever turns the switch is reported. A /set that changes
nothing -- the switch already where it was asked to be, nothing to close
or reopen -- is not a change and raises nothing.
The event is never an error, but jmap's exhaustive map from security
events to HTTP errors has to name it; it joins the other two that can't
occur there. rustfmt now also wraps LP-6's two over-long lines in
enums_impl.rs, which it flagged along with this change's.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py now gives the server a stdout tracer and
reads events from the container's log: turning the switch off is exactly
one event naming the scope, value, author and listeners closed; setting it
off again raises none; turning it on is one event naming the listeners
reopened. It also proves LP-6's side: seven refused submission sign-ins
are seven auth.legacy-protocol-refused events, and there is no auth.failed
or auth.too-many-attempts among them. All checks pass.
LP-6 added auth.legacy-protocol-refused to the packaged schema, which this
branch also changes. The file is gzipped, so the two can't be merged line
by line: this takes main's schema and adds the Settings › Security ›
Hardening link to it again, with the hash recomputed.
The second lock. While legacy mail protocols are off, a sign-in over IMAP,
POP3, ManageSieve or SMTP AUTH is refused for every account, so a listener
that exists by mistake -- or submission, which the SMTP lock keeps open --
still lets nobody in.
The check sits at the top of each protocol's sign-in, before the
credentials are looked at. So the answer is the same for a right password,
a wrong one and an account that doesn't exist; it isn't auth.failed, so it
counts nothing against the account and never feeds the auto-ban; and the
session stays open, since the mail app is being told, not thrown off.
Mail apps read the spec's words (LP-12, at server scope):
IMAP NO [ALERT] This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP
apps. This mail app can't sign in.
POP3 -ERR [AUTH] ...the same...
ManageSieve NO "This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
SMTP 535 5.7.0 This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP
apps. This mail app can't send.
SMTP AUTH is refused on every SMTP listener, port 25 included: only mail
apps authenticate, so inbound delivery is untouched. LMTP is left alone.
The policy is read from the store on each sign-in rather than cached, so
every node of a cluster answers the same the moment the switch turns.
Each refusal raises a new event, auth.legacy-protocol-refused (id 642, info
level, also in the packaged schema), with the protocol as source, the
policy's scope and the domain -- never the account. The session adds the
listener and remote IP.
tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py now also proves, on a running server: a
normal IMAP and submission sign-in works with the switch on, before and
after; while off, submission refuses the right password and six wrong ones
with the same words and without hanging up; and an IMAP listener created by
mistake while off refuses the right password, a wrong one and an account
that doesn't exist. All 33 checks pass. SMTP sign-ins in the script wait
out a second first: every connection arrives from Docker's gateway, and the
stock inbound throttle takes five a second from one IP.
Adds a link to CustomComponent/LegacyProtocols in the packaged schema's
Settings › Security, between Settings and Blocked IPs, and updates the
schema hash so admins fetch the new layout rather than a cached one.
INBUXA Admin draws the screen; this is what makes it reachable. An admin
from before that screen would show "Unknown component" here, so this
lands after the admin release that carries it.
Every SCIM operation becomes the x:Account get, query or set JMAP makes,
as the service principal, so permissions, tenant scope and limits,
address uniqueness and account destruction are enforced in one place.
Discovery is anonymous; everything else takes an API key as a bearer
token and nothing else. Domains open to SCIM carry a flag in the domain
cache. Filters take eq and and, answered from the account indexes, with
unindexed attributes checked on at most 200 candidates. Cursors are
stateless, HMAC-sealed under the server key. PATCH applies to the
resource in memory and saves it as a PUT, so it is all or nothing.
Groups get an address from their display name on the principal's
domain; membership is written on each user.
Every write emits one of five new scim.* events (ids 637 to 641), also
added to the packaged schema. The helpers the surviving SCIM suites
import are rebuilt from the spec; scim_tests runs the new acceptance
suite and the surviving tenant isolation suite, and both pass.
Upstream commit: 474dd0229cb20cf513036619781ed97bd8073c3f
Enterprise-only files removed or emptied: 63
Enterprise-only snippets removed: 117 in 50 files
Dangling module declarations removed: 5
Cargo edits turning enterprise off: 14
Verification: clean
Enterprise feature gates left for rebuilt features: 19 in 18 files
Produced by tools/fork/strip.py. The full report is in docs/fork/strip-reports/ on main.
jcoffey-dev