Explain this: the local model reads delivery failures, verdicts, logs and settings

A new method, inbuxa:Explanation/set, asks the node's local model for a short plain-words reading of one thing an administrator is looking at: a failed recipient in the queue, a Classify verdict, a log line or trace event, or one setting with its saved value. The server builds the prompt itself from stored data and the registry schema, never from text the console sends, and grounds SMTP replies in RFC 3463 and RFC 5321. What the model is never shown: secrets (including ones nested inside a setting, like an AI model's HTTP auth), raw protocol events, and the contents of any other event. A tag name that doesn't have a tag's shape is refused before a model is asked. Calls share the AI gate with spam classification, but mail always keeps its slot, and Explain has its own hourly count per account and its own on/off switch in inbuxa:AiLimits. The permission is sysAiExplain, superuser only; tenant administrators can't use it. The session carries an aiExplain flag so a console knows when to offer the button. An install whose roles were stored before the permission existed gets it added once, at start-up, to the roles that are administrators' alone, not the User role their defaults share with every account. An operator who removes it later isn't overruled. Tests: unit tests in inbuxa-features and jmap, and ai_explain_tests (run with --ignored) covering the acceptance tests and the upgrade.
2026-09-26 00:52:51 -07:00
parent 96b54ede4e
commit d9a6db025b
40 changed files with 2562 additions and 32 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Coffey Labs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+//! Permissions the fork adds after an install's roles were stored. A new
+//! install's roles take them from `DefaultPermissions`; an older install's
+//! administrator roles were written once, before the permission existed, so
+//! each is added to them here, once. An operator who takes one away later
+//! keeps it away: the grant is recorded and never repeated.
+
+use registry::schema::{
+    enums::Permission,
+    prelude::ObjectType,
+    structs::{Authentication, Role},
+};
+use registry::types::EnumImpl;
+use registry::types::id::ObjectId;
+use store::{
+    SUBSPACE_INBUXA, ValueKey,
+    registry::{
+        bootstrap::Bootstrap,
+        write::{RegistryWrite, RegistryWriteResult},
+    },
+    write::{AnyClass, BatchBuilder, ValueClass},
+};
+use trc::AddContext;
+use types::id::Id;
+
+/// Granted to the default administrator roles: "Explain this"
+/// (ai-explain spec, EX-4: superuser by default).
+const ADMIN_GRANTS: &[Permission] = &[Permission::SysAiExplain];
+
+fn granted_key(permission: Permission) -> ValueClass {
+    let mut key = b"Pg".to_vec();
+    key.extend_from_slice(permission.as_str().as_bytes());
+    ValueClass::Any(AnyClass {
+        subspace: SUBSPACE_INBUXA,
+        key,
+    })
+}
+
+pub(crate) async fn grant_new_admin_permissions(bp: &mut Bootstrap) -> trc::Result<()> {
+    let mut pending = Vec::new();
+    for permission in ADMIN_GRANTS {
+        if bp
+            .data_store
+            .get_value::<String>(ValueKey::from(granted_key(*permission)))
+            .await
+            .caused_by(trc::location!())?
+            .is_none()
+        {
+            pending.push(*permission);
+        }
+    }
+    if pending.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    // An administrator's default roles include the plain User role, which
+    // every user also holds; only roles that are administrators' alone get it
+    let admin_roles: Vec<Id> = bp
+        .registry
+        .object::<Authentication>(Id::singleton())
+        .await?
+        .map(|auth| {
+            let shared = [
+                auth.default_user_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                auth.default_group_role_ids.as_slice(),
+                auth.default_tenant_role_ids.as_slice(),
+            ]
+            .concat();
+            auth.default_admin_role_ids
+                .as_slice()
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|id| !shared.contains(id))
+                .copied()
+                .collect()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    // Fetched by id: the registry's listing doesn't reach stored roles
+    for role_id in admin_roles {
+        let Some(stored) = bp
+            .registry
+            .get(ObjectId::new(ObjectType::Role, role_id))
+            .await?
+        else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        let role = Role::from(stored.clone());
+        let mut updated = role.clone();
+        for permission in &pending {
+            // A role that disables it outright keeps it disabled
+            if !updated.enabled_permissions.as_slice().contains(permission)
+                && !updated.disabled_permissions.as_slice().contains(permission)
+            {
+                updated.enabled_permissions.push(*permission);
+            }
+        }
+        if updated == role {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let result = bp
+            .registry
+            .write(RegistryWrite::update(role_id, &updated.into(), &stored))
+            .await?;
+        if !matches!(result, RegistryWriteResult::Success(_)) {
+            return Err(trc::StoreEvent::UnexpectedError
+                .into_err()
+                .details("Failed to add a new permission to an administrator role.")
+                .reason(result.to_string())
+                .caused_by(trc::location!()));
+        }
+    }
+    let mut batch = BatchBuilder::new();
+    for permission in pending {
+        batch.set(granted_key(permission), b"granted".to_vec());
+    }
+    bp.data_store
+        .write(batch.build_all())
+        .await
+        .caused_by(trc::location!())
+        .map(|_| ())
+}