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A tenant can turn legacy protocols off for itself (LP-9 to LP-14a)

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The tenant switch. A tenant's administrator turns legacy mail protocols
off for its own tenant, and from then on sign-in over IMAP, POP3,
ManageSieve and SMTP AUTH is refused for every address on the tenant's
domains, while every other domain on the server carries on. No port
closes, since other tenants share them (LP-13): it is one stored fact per
tenant, read at sign-in and when client configuration is answered.

inbuxa:TenantProtocolPolicy/get and /set, one per tenant, id the tenant's:

- Inside a tenant, a principal reaches only its own tenant's switch
  (MT-1): /get with no ids answers with it, another tenant's is notFound
  and can't be changed. At server level /get with no ids lists every
  tenant's.
- Turning it off is always allowed. Turning it back on is refused with
  forbidden, naming inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy, while the server has legacy
  protocols off (LP-9).
- A change raises security.legacy-protocols-changed with policy = tenant,
  the tenant's id, the new value and who made it (LP-14).
- It takes sysDomainGet and sysDomainUpdate, not the two new permissions
  the spec names. The switch governs sign-in on the tenant's domains, so
  whoever manages those domains may turn it -- and the default Tenant
  Administrator role already holds both, where new permissions would reach
  no role already stored on a server (MT-12's note), leaving today's
  tenant administrators without the switch until someone edited their
  role by hand. The same trade inbuxa:AiLimits and inbuxa:ProtocolPolicy
  made. /query is not built yet; /get with no ids covers listing.

Sign-in (LP-10 to LP-12). Before the credentials are looked at, the name
given is resolved to its domain and the domain to its tenant, so a real
account and a made-up address on the domain get the same refusal, with a
right password or a wrong one, counted as no failed sign-in (LP-11). The
words are the spec's: "Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and
JMAP apps...", in each protocol's form. A bearer token needn't name an
account, so after authentication the account's own tenant is checked too;
a token that named nobody can't slip past.

The refusal carries policy = tenant and the domain, not the tenant's id:
IMAP answers a command's tag from the Id key, so an error holding one was
sent under the wrong tag and the mail app hung waiting for its reply. The
first live run found that; a unit test now holds the refusal to it.

Client configuration (LP-14a). Autoconfig, autodiscover, PACC and the
suggested DNS records now ask whether legacy services are off for the
domain being answered for -- the server's switch, or the domain's
tenant's -- so a tenant's domains stop offering IMAP, POP3 and
submission while others still do.

tests/e2e/legacy_protocols.py builds a tenant with its own domain, a user
and a tenant administrator, and a second tenant, and proves on a running
server: the admin sees and changes only its own tenant's switch (test 10);
turning it off is an event (test 14); the tenant's user is refused over
IMAP with the right password and a wrong one, a made-up address on the
domain the same (tests 6, 7); POP3 and submission refuse in their own
forms and JMAP still works (test 8); an account on another domain signs in
normally (test 6); autoconfig drops IMAP for the tenant's domain only; with
the server off, the tenant can't turn it back on (test 9); and once back
on, the user signs in again. All 62 checks pass.
This commit is contained in:
jcoffey-dev
2026-09-21 11:18:42 -07:00
parent 64cddc9246
commit b65afb66f9
24 changed files with 1001 additions and 53 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
crates/common/src/network/legacy.rs
+144 -34
View File
@@ -23,17 +23,19 @@
//!
//! And nothing advertises what is closed (LP-7): client configuration and
//! the suggested DNS records leave the legacy services out, or mark them as
//! not offered, while the switch is off.
//! not offered, while the switch is off -- the server's, or for a tenant's
//! domains, the tenant's (LP-14a).
//!
//! Nothing here touches the host's firewall, NAT port-forwards or any proxy
//! (LP-20). The server stops answering; what still routes the port is the
//! operator's to reconcile.
use crate::{Server, config::server::Listeners, network::TcpAcceptor};
use crate::{Server, auth::AccessToken, config::server::Listeners, network::TcpAcceptor};
use directory::Credentials;
use inbuxa_features::security::{
listeners,
protocol_policy::{self, ProtocolPolicy, SavedListener},
tenant_protocol_policy,
};
use registry::schema::enums::ServiceProtocol;
use registry::types::{error::Error, id::ObjectId};
@@ -278,39 +280,71 @@ impl LegacyProtocol {
}
}
/// What the mail app is told, at server scope (LP-12, LP-6). Each
/// protocol's own framing — IMAP's `[ALERT]`, ManageSieve's quoting —
/// is added by its session; POP3 carries `[AUTH]` in the text, since its
/// errors have no separate code, and SMTP is the whole reply line.
pub fn refusal(&self) -> &'static str {
match self {
LegacyProtocol::Imap => {
/// What the mail app is told (LP-12). Each protocol's own framing --
/// IMAP's `[ALERT]`, ManageSieve's quoting -- is added by its session;
/// POP3 carries `[AUTH]` in the text, since its errors have no separate
/// code, and SMTP is the whole reply line. At server scope "Your
/// organization" reads "This server" (LP-6).
pub fn refusal(&self, scope: RefusalScope) -> &'static str {
match (scope, self) {
(RefusalScope::Server, LegacyProtocol::Imap) => {
"This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
}
LegacyProtocol::Pop3 => {
(RefusalScope::Server, LegacyProtocol::Pop3) => {
"[AUTH] This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
}
LegacyProtocol::ManageSieve => "This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps.",
LegacyProtocol::Submission => {
(RefusalScope::Server, LegacyProtocol::ManageSieve) => {
"This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
}
(RefusalScope::Server, LegacyProtocol::Submission) => {
"535 5.7.0 This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't send.\r\n"
}
(RefusalScope::Tenant(_), LegacyProtocol::Imap) => {
"Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
}
(RefusalScope::Tenant(_), LegacyProtocol::Pop3) => {
"[AUTH] Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
}
(RefusalScope::Tenant(_), LegacyProtocol::ManageSieve) => {
"Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
}
(RefusalScope::Tenant(_), LegacyProtocol::Submission) => {
"535 5.7.0 Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't send.\r\n"
}
}
}
/// The refusal as an error: `auth.legacy-protocol-refused`, not
/// `auth.failed`, so it never counts against the account or feeds the
/// auto-ban (LP-11). It names the protocol and the domain, never the
/// account; the session it is raised in adds the remote IP.
pub fn refused(&self, credentials: &Credentials) -> trc::Error {
/// auto-ban (LP-11). It names the protocol, the scope and the domain,
/// never the account; the session adds the remote IP.
///
/// Not the tenant's id: `Id` is what IMAP answers a command's tag from,
/// so an error carrying one is sent under the wrong tag and the mail app
/// waits for a reply that never comes. The domain names the tenant.
pub fn refused(&self, scope: RefusalScope, domain: Option<String>) -> trc::Error {
trc::AuthEvent::LegacyProtocolRefused
.into_err()
.details(self.refusal())
.details(self.refusal(scope))
.ctx(trc::Key::Source, self.as_str())
.ctx(trc::Key::Policy, "server")
.ctx_opt(trc::Key::Domain, domain_of(credentials))
.ctx(
trc::Key::Policy,
match scope {
RefusalScope::Server => "server",
RefusalScope::Tenant(_) => "tenant",
},
)
.ctx_opt(trc::Key::Domain, domain)
}
}
/// Whose switch refused a sign-in: the server's (LP-6) or a tenant's (LP-10).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RefusalScope {
Server,
Tenant(u32),
}
/// The domain a sign-in is for, from the name it gives, if it gives one.
fn domain_of(credentials: &Credentials) -> Option<String> {
let username = match credentials {
@@ -325,22 +359,58 @@ fn domain_of(credentials: &Credentials) -> Option<String> {
impl Server {
/// Refuses a sign-in over a legacy protocol while the server-wide switch
/// is off (LP-6). Called before the credentials are checked, so the
/// answer is the same for a right password, a wrong one and an account
/// that doesn't exist (LP-11).
/// is off (LP-6), or while the switch of the tenant that owns the named
/// domain is (LP-10). Called before the credentials are checked, so the
/// answer is the same for a right password, a wrong one and an address
/// that doesn't exist (LP-11): a tenant's domain answers for every address
/// on it.
///
/// Read from the store on each sign-in rather than cached, so every node
/// of a cluster answers the same the moment the switch turns.
/// of a cluster answers the same the moment a switch turns.
pub async fn refuse_legacy_sign_in(
&self,
protocol: LegacyProtocol,
credentials: &Credentials,
) -> trc::Result<()> {
let domain = domain_of(credentials);
if self.protocol_policy().await?.legacy_protocols.is_disabled() {
Err(protocol.refused(credentials))
} else {
Ok(())
return Err(protocol.refused(RefusalScope::Server, domain));
}
if let Some(name) = &domain
&& let Some(domain) = self.domain(name).await?
&& let Some(tenant_id) = domain.id_tenant
&& self.tenant_legacy_protocols_off(tenant_id).await?
{
return Err(protocol.refused(RefusalScope::Tenant(tenant_id), Some(name.clone())));
}
Ok(())
}
/// The same, once the account is known (LP-10). A bearer token needn't
/// name an account, so a sign-in with one can't be judged by its domain
/// beforehand; this judges it by the tenant the token turned out to
/// belong to. For a password sign-in it has already been decided.
pub async fn refuse_legacy_session(
&self,
protocol: LegacyProtocol,
access_token: &AccessToken,
) -> trc::Result<()> {
if let Some(tenant_id) = access_token.tenant_id()
&& self.tenant_legacy_protocols_off(tenant_id).await?
{
return Err(protocol.refused(RefusalScope::Tenant(tenant_id), None));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Whether a tenant has turned legacy protocols off for itself (LP-10).
pub async fn tenant_legacy_protocols_off(&self, tenant_id: u32) -> trc::Result<bool> {
Ok(
tenant_protocol_policy::get(&self.core.storage.data, tenant_id)
.await?
.legacy_protocols
.is_disabled(),
)
}
}
@@ -358,10 +428,21 @@ pub fn is_legacy_service(protocol: &ServiceProtocol) -> bool {
}
impl Server {
/// Whether the server-wide switch is off, for the answers that must stop
/// offering legacy services (LP-7). Read per answer, as sign-in reads it.
pub async fn legacy_protocols_off(&self) -> trc::Result<bool> {
Ok(self.protocol_policy().await?.legacy_protocols.is_disabled())
/// Whether legacy services are off for this domain, for the answers that
/// must stop offering them: off for the whole server (LP-7), or for the
/// tenant the domain belongs to (LP-14a). Read per answer, as sign-in
/// reads it. A name that is no domain here answers for the server alone.
pub async fn legacy_protocols_off_for(&self, domain_name: &str) -> trc::Result<bool> {
if self.protocol_policy().await?.legacy_protocols.is_disabled() {
return Ok(true);
}
match self.domain(domain_name).await? {
Some(domain) => match domain.id_tenant {
Some(tenant_id) => self.tenant_legacy_protocols_off(tenant_id).await,
None => Ok(false),
},
None => Ok(false),
}
}
}
@@ -380,28 +461,57 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn refusals_read_as_the_spec_writes_them() {
// LP-12, with "Your organization" read as "This server" (LP-6).
let server = RefusalScope::Server;
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::Imap.refusal(),
LegacyProtocol::Imap.refusal(server),
"This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
);
assert!(
LegacyProtocol::Pop3
.refusal()
.refusal(server)
.starts_with("[AUTH] This server allows")
);
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::ManageSieve.refusal(),
LegacyProtocol::ManageSieve.refusal(server),
"This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
);
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::Submission.refusal(),
LegacyProtocol::Submission.refusal(server),
"535 5.7.0 This server allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't send.\r\n"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_tenant_refusal_speaks_for_the_organization() {
// LP-12, exactly as the spec writes them.
let tenant = RefusalScope::Tenant(7);
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::Imap.refusal(tenant),
"Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
);
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::Pop3.refusal(tenant),
"[AUTH] Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't sign in."
);
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::ManageSieve.refusal(tenant),
"Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps."
);
assert_eq!(
LegacyProtocol::Submission.refusal(tenant),
"535 5.7.0 Your organization allows only INBUXA webmail and JMAP apps. This mail app can't send.\r\n"
);
let err = LegacyProtocol::Imap.refused(tenant, Some("example.org".into()));
assert_eq!(err.value_as_str(trc::Key::Policy), Some("tenant"));
// IMAP answers the command's tag from Id; the refusal must leave it be.
assert!(err.value(trc::Key::Id).is_none());
assert!(err.matches(trc::EventType::Auth(trc::AuthEvent::LegacyProtocolRefused)));
}
#[test]
fn a_refusal_is_not_a_failed_sign_in() {
let err = LegacyProtocol::Imap.refused(&basic("[email protected]"));
let err = LegacyProtocol::Imap
.refused(RefusalScope::Server, domain_of(&basic("[email protected]")));
assert!(err.matches(trc::EventType::Auth(trc::AuthEvent::LegacyProtocolRefused)));
assert!(!err.matches(trc::EventType::Auth(trc::AuthEvent::Failed)));
// The session stays open: the mail app is told, not thrown off.