Take a token, never a password, outside DAV

Anyone could host a copy of a front end on a server of their own,
collect a person's password there, and replay it as HTTP Basic against
JMAP or the API. Cross-origin rules don't stop that, since a server
isn't a browser, and neither does client registration, since Basic
never goes through OAuth (contract C-23).

JMAP (session, API, upload, download, event source, WebSocket), /api,
/auth/introspect, /auth/userinfo and authenticated /auth/register now
refuse an Authorization: Basic header before looking at the password,
with a 401 whose only challenge is Bearer. A wrong password gets the
same answer as the right one. CalDAV and CardDAV keep Basic, and their
401s still offer it. The sign-in page's /api/auth takes the password in
its body and is unaffected, as is the token endpoint's client
authentication.

Bootstrap and recovery mode accept Basic everywhere, as they keep
permissive CORS. INBUXA_HTTP_BASIC_AUTH=all puts it back everywhere;
dav is the default, and any other value logs a warning and keeps it.
Test builds accept Basic everywhere, since the integration suites sign
in with passwords, and legacy_protocols.py sets the variable.

Tested: unit tests for the paths, and tests/e2e/http_basic_auth.py
against the debug build, 26 checks, including both front ends' sign-in
path and a refused unregistered redirect for an ordinary account.

docs/spec/contract.md

@@ -240,6 +240,52 @@ Each has an ID, and tests name the IDs they check.
   subscriptions to its own URL, with VAPID for browser notifications. The only
   difference is that it authenticates with its token rather than the password.
 
+### Passwords over HTTP
+
+- **C-23.** **Outside DAV, HTTP sign-in is a token, never a password.** JMAP
+  (`/jmap`, with session, upload, download, event source and WebSocket), the
+  management API (`/api`), and the OAuth endpoints that authenticate a user
+  (`/auth/introspect`, `/auth/userinfo`, authenticated `/auth/register`)
+  refuse an `Authorization: Basic` header with a 401 whose only challenge is
+  `Bearer`, and don't check the password. CalDAV and CardDAV (`/dav`) keep
+  Basic, since that's how calendar and contacts apps sign in, and their 401s
+  still offer it. The sign-in page's own endpoint (`/api/auth`) takes the
+  password in its body, not a header, and isn't affected. Neither is the token
+  endpoint's client authentication. SCIM already takes an API key only.
+  Bootstrap and recovery mode accept Basic everywhere, as they keep
+  permissive CORS (C-16).
+  **Decision**: without this, anyone can put up a copy of a front end on a
+  server of their own that collects a person's password and replays it as
+  Basic. Cross-origin rules (C-14) don't stop that, because a server isn't a
+  browser, and neither does client registration (C-5), because Basic never
+  goes through OAuth. With C-23, the password only goes to the server's own
+  sign-in page (C-8), or to a DAV client or mail app the person set up
+  themselves.
+  An operator who needs Basic on every endpoint sets
+  `INBUXA_HTTP_BASIC_AUTH=all`; `dav`, the default, is this rule. Any other
+  value logs a warning and keeps the default. The setting moves to the
+  registry with `x:FrontEnds` (C-4).
+  ihasmail-inbuxa confirms a typed password, which it does before creating
+  an app password, on `/api/auth` as its own client, to its registered
+  redirect URI, with a PKCE challenge whose verifier it discards. A
+  "two-factor code needed" answer counts as confirmed, since the server gives
+  it only after the password matched.
+  **Built, 2026-09-29.** `crates/http/src/auth/token_only.rs` names the
+  paths; `request.rs` refuses before routing and picks the 401's challenge by
+  path; `Http.basic_auth_everywhere` holds the setting. Test builds
+  (`test_mode`) accept Basic everywhere, since the integration suites sign in
+  with passwords. Checked by `tests/e2e/http_basic_auth.py` against the debug
+  build, 26 checks: everything above, both front ends' sign-in path, a wrong
+  password answered exactly as the right one, and a redirect URI the webmail
+  didn't register refused for an ordinary account. Accounts holding
+  `OAuthClientOverride` (administrators) skip client and redirect checks on
+  the sign-in endpoint, as upstream does; that's C-9's gap, not this one's.
+  Observed before the change, in INBUXA's production logs from 2026-09-20 to 2026-09-29:
+  every HTTPS password sign-in was the operator's own, apart from
+  ihasmail-inbuxa's password sign-in on 2026-09-22, before it moved to OAuth.
+  The logs don't say whether a sign-in used a Basic header or the sign-in
+  page.
+
 ## First boot
 
 1. The installer, or INBUXA Admin's setup wizard, completes bootstrap