# Changelog All notable changes to the inbuxa chart. Chart versions follow the inbuxa suite: release candidates `27.1.0-rc.N`, then `27.1.0`. Each release says which server, webmail and console images it runs, pinned by digest. ## Unreleased ### Added - The repository: the chart's layout, a values schema that refuses unknown keys, and CI (`helm lint` under Helm 4 and 3, kubeconform against Kubernetes 1.35 to 1.37, kube-linter, helm-unittest). - The server, as three Deployments: `front` (client protocols and web), `mta` (as front, plus outbound delivery) and `core` (everything, exactly one replica). The data store is a value, written as `config.json`; its secrets are Secrets mounted under `/etc/inbuxa/secrets`. - Pods that run as a non-root user with every capability dropped, a read-only root filesystem and the RuntimeDefault seccomp profile. They listen on the standard mail ports through the namespaced sysctl `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start`, which Pod Security "restricted" allows. - A `mail` LoadBalancer Service (front and mta, client addresses kept) and an `http` ClusterIP Service (front and core), PodDisruptionBudgets, and spreading across nodes and zones. - `server.seed`: the new store's setup (domain, administrator, blob store, coordinator, roles), applied once on install by a pre-install Job running the server's `--seed`, before any server pod starts. - `server.upgrade`: before an upgrade or rollback rolls out, a Job on the new image asks the server what it does to the store (`--upgrade-plan`). A layout change waits for `upgrade.acknowledgeLayout`. When a layout step can't run with older pods up, the server Deployments are scaled to 0 first, which a rolling update can't do. Then `--upgrade-store` upgrades the store. - `webmail` and `console`, off by default: Deployments, Services, optional autoscalers and PodDisruptionBudgets, read-only root filesystems. The webmail keeps sessions in sealed cookies, so any replica serves any request, and signs in through the server's page. Its app and OAuth client secrets are a Secret the chart makes (kept across upgrades) or `webmail.existingSecret`, mounted as files rather than set in its environment; `webmail.previousAppSecret` reads the old app secret during a rotation. The webmail checks its read-only root at start (`IMMUTABLE`). Every server pod is told both addresses, so it registers them as OAuth clients; the webmail's client secret reaches the server as a mounted file too (`INBUXA_WEBMAIL_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE`), never the environment. - `routes`: the server's, the webmail's and the console's public addresses, each by host name, as Gateway API HTTPRoutes or one Ingress. - The server counts clients by the address the ingress or gateway and the webmail pass on (`INBUXA_HTTP_USE_FORWARDED`), so failed sign-ins and anonymous requests aren't charged to the proxy: without it, enough wrong passwords between all users would ban the ingress for everyone. `server.trustedProxies` lists the proxies when the pod network isn't a private range. Needs server 27.1-rc.32; older servers ignore it. - Certificates for the mail ports (`server.certificates`): TLS Secrets (`secrets`, or `certManager` to have the chart ask cert-manager for one) mounted in every server pod and reread within about two minutes of a renewal, with no restart; and `acmeHosts`, which routes the server's own ACME HTTP-01 challenges for the mail names to it. Needs server 27.1-rc.33. - Mail out from a known address (`server.egress`): with `expectedAddresses` and `checkUrl` set, a Job placed like the mta pods asks which address it leaves from after each install and upgrade, and records the answer on the mta Deployment as an event, a Warning when it isn't one of the expected addresses. It never fails an install. Its token may create events and nothing else. `podLabels` on each server group, for an egress gateway that selects the mta pods. - Mail in through a load balancer that sends PROXY protocol v2 (`server.services.mail.proxyProtocol`, off by default): the mail Service sends each port to a second listener in the pods that takes the client's address from the PROXY header, believed only from `trustedNetworks`, the load balancer's own addresses. It needs `externalTrafficPolicy: Local`, and server 27.1-rc.32. - A pre-flight check before each server pod starts (`server.check`, on by default): an init container runs `inbuxa --check`, which opens the data store, writes, reads and deletes a small object in the blob store, and connects to NATS. A pod that can't use one stays in `Init:Error`, and its status names the part and why. The server container keeps its last log lines as its termination message too. Needs server 27.1-rc.33: an older server doesn't know `--check`. - `tools/docs-pages.py --out ` writes the docs' generated Kubernetes pages: the values reference, the Services and their ports, what each network policy lets in and out, and the alerts, from `helm template` with `ci/docs-values.yaml`. CI builds them, so a change that breaks one fails. - `charts/inbuxa/VALUES.md`, every value with its default and what the schema allows, generated from values.yaml and the schema by `tools/values-reference.py`; CI fails when it's out of date. The schema checks resources (requests and limits as quantities) and annotation and node-selector maps (strings) too, and `tools/bad-values` holds values the chart must refuse before anything is applied, each for a stated reason. - The server's, the webmail's and the console's `publicUrl` must be `https://`; plain `http://` is refused. - Backups and store checks on a schedule. `server.backup` exports the whole store nightly to an S3 bucket (`inbuxa --export s3://...`), streamed while the server runs, into a folder per export with `export.json` written last; `inbuxa --import s3://bucket/prefix` restores the newest finished one. `server.storeCheck` runs a quick check nightly and a full one weekly; a check that finds problems fails its Job. With the metrics rules and kube-state-metrics, InbuxaBackupMissing and InbuxaStoreCheckFailed alert on them. Needs server 27.1-rc.34. - Metrics (`server.metrics`, off by default). `prometheus`: every server pod serves `/metrics/prometheus` behind a username and a password the pods read as a file, and a headless Service lists them all, with a ServiceMonitor that scrapes each pod and labels its group. `rules`: PrometheusRules for a pod down, a cluster lease not renewed, a large or stuck queue, deliveries bouncing, a certificate about to expire, a slow data store, and (from kube-state-metrics) restarts and flapping readiness. `otlp`: push to an OpenTelemetry collector, the token from a Secret read as a file. `grafanaDashboard`: a dashboard for Grafana's sidecar. `networkPolicy.metricsFrom` lets Prometheus through when `httpFrom` is narrowed. Needs server 27.1-rc.34. - `networkPolicy`, on by default: every pod starts from deny all, in and out, and gets only what it needs. The server takes mail on its listeners from anywhere and connects anywhere; `networkPolicy.httpFrom` and `networkPolicy.serverEgress` narrow its HTTP port and its egress. The webmail reaches DNS, the server and the web (`networkPolicy.webmailInternet` for remote images); the console reaches nothing. The seed and upgrade Jobs, which run before the release's own policies exist on a first install, are covered by copies of the two they need, run as hooks first. Every pod passes Pod Security "restricted", tested in enforce mode. - Releases (K-C13): a `v*` tag releases the chart from `release/suite.yaml`, with the server, webmail and console images pinned by digest once their signatures check out; the chart pushed to GHCR and the Gitea registry and signed keyless with cosign; rendered manifests; a minisign-signed `SHA256SUMS`. `tools/verify-release.sh` checks all of it. - GitOps (K-C14): `generateSecrets: false` makes the chart refuse to render without `webmail.existingSecret` and `server.metrics.prometheus.existingSecret`, for Argo CD and `helm template | kubectl apply`, which can't read back the secrets the chart makes and would replace them on every sync. Every hook also carries Argo CD's own annotations, so the order there is safe: the hook network policies, then the upgrade check (nothing to do on a new store), then the seed, which Argo runs on every sync and which does nothing on a seeded store. - `server.shutdownDelaySeconds` (5 by default): a stopping server pod keeps serving that long, with a `preStop` sleep, while Kubernetes takes it out of the Services, so a request routed to it in that moment isn't refused.